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Moreover, in addition to these annual and current expenses, there have been various colonial wars-wars in which the mother-country had only a secondary and subsidiary interest. Under this head I might mention in 1873–4 the Ashantee war, which cost us in round numbers 1,000,000l. ; in 1865 the New Zealand war, 750,0001., of which the colony afterwards paid 500,0001., by a loan raised on bonds which we guaranteed ; the Kaffir war (1849-53), 2,000,000l. ; the two Chinese wars, &c.

A portion of the claim made upon us by America in reference to the Alabama' and other cruisers was partly based on the fact that the authorities at Melbourne had allowed the Shenandoah'to refit there. The arbitrators took this view, but we, not the colony, paid accordingly.

Nor must it be forgotten that, from some at least of our civil expenditure, the colonies derive a great benefit, without being put to any expense. They have the advantage of an Imperial Court of Appeal; the whole cost of international communication, of our embassies in foreign countries, of our consular establishments, the Colonial Office, the maintenance of the dignity of the Crown, are borne, cheerfully indeed, but exclusively, by those of her Majesty's subjects who reside in the mother-country."

We carry on, no doubt, a great and lucrative trade with our colonies. The benefit, however, is mutual, and there are no differential duties or other fiscal arrangements which give us any advantage over them. Wherever there is any difference in the duties, it tells against us. Down to the year 1846, for instance, we admitted sugar from our West Indian colonies at a much lower duty than that from other countries. Several of our colonies are not yet alive to the advantages of Free-trade, but maintain a system of protective duties which injures our interests Without benefiting those of the colonies.

On various occasions we have either advanced or guaranteed loans for our colonies. Since 1830 these sums have been as follows,qizi

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• India, however, contributes towards the expense of the embassy and consular establiskments in China

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The loan known as the Russo-Dutch loan stands on a different footing. It amounted originally to 1,750,0001. with 5 per cent. interest, and was undertaken in 1815 “towards the satisfactory settlement of the Low Countries in union with Holland under the dominion of the House of Orange;' and, in consideration of it, the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice were ceded to Great Britain. None of the expense of this loan, however, fell on these colonies; on the contrary, the whole was thrown on the mothercountry, and we are still paying 65,000l. a year under this head.

In the year 1874, at the instance of the natives, and in consequence of the earnest request of our Australasian fellow-countrymen, we reluctantly consented to accept the cession of the Fiji Islands, As had been foreseen, the revenue fell short of the expenditure, and Parliament had to vote 40,0001. in 1875, and 35,0001. in 1876, to carry on the government of our new colony. Under these circumstances, Lord Carnarvon wrote to inquire whether our four great Australasian colonies would be disposed to contribute 4,0001. a year each, thus still leaving the lion's share of the burden to the mothercountry. I confess I regret that not one of the colonies has expressed any readiness to do so. Of course Lord Carnarvon did not press the matter; for, as he very truly observed, in an excellent circular letter of the 9th of July, 1875, it would have been

obviously undesirable, in a matter where the grace of the action depended upon its being voluntary, and where the amount involved was so small that it would be mainly valuable as proving the readiness of the great colonies to accept their membership in the common duties of the Empire, to put the slightest pressure upon any one of them to make this joint contribution. It was, as I explained in my former despatch, principally to give trial and effect to the principle of joint action among different members of the Empire in such cases, that I invited co-operation in a matter in which the contributions proposed were so inconsiderable as to make it practically immaterial, except in connection with such a principle, whether the arrangement could be at once carried out.5

Sir Julius Vogel, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, gave as one reason for his declining the suggestion, that it is not the business of Governments to be liberal,' which is perhaps true, but there is also an opposite course which seems still less appropriate. Sir Julius does not deny that New Zealand felt a great interest in

• Earl of Carnarvon to the Gov. of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and New Zealand. Downing Street, July 9, 1875.

the annexation of Fiji; but he urges that it was trifling as compared with the interest which the mother-country had in it'-and why?

On account of our determination to put down South Sea slavery. Certainly, we feel strongly on that point, and are ready to submit to sacrifices in the future, as we have in the past; but I cannot believe that our fellow-countrymen in the colonies do not go with us on tlie question. But, although our colonies have not hitherto seen their way to act on Lord Carnarvon's suggestion, the general tone of the correspondence is most courteous, the views of the colonial press seem more liberal than those of the Governments, and though the result has thrown a considerable expense on Great Britain and Ireland, I think we shall hereafter look back with satisfaction on the course we have taken in this matter.

Our colonies, as a whole, have been remarkably prosperous, their profits high, their wages far above the English standard, but we have never grudged the large sums spent upon them, feeling ourselves more than repaid by the proud satisfaction with which we viewed their continued and increasing strength and prosperity.

Much of what has been said with reference to the colonies applies also to India. It is hardly necessary to say that India makes no direct contribution to the general expenses of the Empire, nor to those home charges, from which she, like our colonies, derives no small advantage. No English labourer, no English taxpayer, derives a penny of direct advantage, or pays a penny less towards the revenues of the country, because we hold India.

So far as military expenditure is concerned, the greatest care is taken that India should pay nothing beyond what is necessary for the troops actually on duty there. It is amusing, if so serious a subject can be amusing, to see how energetically the India Office resists any application made by the War Office for any charge beyond what the Indian authorities regard as absolutely necessary.

As regards the navy also, it seems to me that India is treated with the utmost liberality. That she derives a great advantage from our fleet cannot be doubted. It saves her from a heavy expense, which she must otherwise have incurred; she contributes to it, however, only the small sum of 70,0001. a year, in addition to which she spends about half a million on steam-tugs, inland vessels, pilotage allowances, port charges, &c.

Moreover, the possession of India has in various ways thrown very heavy charges on this country. The first war with China, in 1840, arose out of disputes connected with the opium trade. Whatever differences of opinion there may be with reference to the effects of this drug, and our fiscal arrangements connected therewith, it is at least clear that the matter is one which concerns India, and not England. India derived even then from opium a revenue of 1,000,000l. a year, which has since risen to 8,000,0001. England, on the other hand, derives no revenue from opium. Yet, although the war of 1840 arose out of disputes with reference to opium, and was therefore undertaken with reference to Indian interests, so scrupulous were we to throw no burden on India which could by any possibility be regarded as unfair, so determined to treat her not only with justice, but with liberality, that the expense of the expedition was borne entirely by the mother-country, though in the end the greater part was paid by China.

The second China war, in 1857, arose out of a dispute about a small vessel called the Arrow. Now the "Arrow' was manned by Chinese; she was owned by a Chinaman, and the cargo belonged to a Chinaman ; but the authorities of Hong Kong claimed her, by virtue of an Act of their local Legislature. This war, therefore, arose with reference to property not belonging to anyone in Great Britain. It was defended by reference to colonial legislation ; but, of course, Hong Kong could not bear the expense, which, amounting to 6,600,0001., was paid by us, though China subsequently paid us an indemnity of 2,000,0001., reducing the cost to 4,600,0001. Even the Crimean war was undertaken on grounds of Imperial policy, in which India was, to say the least, as much interested as Great Britain ; but I need not say that all the expense fell upon us.

I observe that the Mohammedans of India have memorialised us to help the Turks—so ingrained is the idea that all war expenses, whatever the object may be, ought to fall exclusively on the mothercountry. The general principles which regulate the pecuniary relations between Great Britain and India are clearly laid down in the 2nd clause of the Act 21 & 22 Vict., cap. 106, which directs that Indian revenues shall be expended for the purposes of the government of India alone;' and also in the 52nd clause, which directs the auditor to report on the accounts, specially noting any case in which it shall appear to him that any money arising out of the revenues of India has been appropriated to other purposes than those of the government of India, to which alone they are applicable.

These have been the principles on which we have governed India. We may have made mistakes there, as we have made mistakes at home; but, at any rate, our honest effort and desire has been to govern India for the benefit of the people of India. That they have benefited hitherto by our rule cannot, I think, be denied. No one can doubt that their taxes are lighter, their lives and property more secure, than if they had remained under native rulers ; and it is at least certain that India does not contribute a penny

to our English revenue. That we are loved in India cannot be maintained, and would perhaps be too much to expect.

That our government is hated is, however, equally untrue.

That our rule is not unpopular was, I think, clearly shown during

sea.

the mutiny. If our government had been characterised by avarice or injustice-if, on the whole, we had not been trusted and respected by the population of India—we must then have been swept into the

The bravery of our gallant troops, the skill of their officers, would, under such circumstances, have availed little. The people of India took, however, no part against us, and their behaviour in that crisis is the strongest testimony to the mode in which we have fulfilled our great trust.

This is not the place to discuss the future relations between the two countries. The time will, I hope, come when it will be possible to entrust legislative duties to India, as we have done with several of our principal colonies; which, while still retaining the proud privilege of forming part of the greatest empire of the world, have yet the duty and responsibility of self-government. It is not, I think, unreasonable to expect that, when the time sball come when India is ready for a representative government, she may, like our great colonies in Africa, America, Australia, and New Zealand, also elect to remain a member of the British Empire.

I have already alluded to some wars with native races, undertaken on behalf of our colonies. These have, no doubt, thrown a very considerable expense on the mother-country; but, on the whole, I think it is remarkable that we should have maintained such friendly relations with the aboriginal inhabitants in our colonies. In many cases—such, for instance, as the Maoris, Kaffirs, and Redskins—we had to deal with warlike races, continually at feud with one another; and, had they not felt that we were dealing fairly with them, we should, notwithstanding our strength, have been in constant conflict. Witness, for instance, the Redskins. I will quote the striking testimony of an American bishop, Bishop Whipple, of Minnesota, who thus contrasts the relations between America and Great Britain with the Indians in their respective territories :

On one side of the line she says] is a nation that has spent 500,000,0001. in Indian wars; a people who have not one hundred miles between the Atlantic and the Pacific which has not been the scene of an Indian massacre; a Government which has not passed twenty years without an Indian war; not one Indian tribe to whom it has given Christian civilisation; and which celebrates its Centenary by another bloody Indian war. On the other side of the line are the same greedy, dominant Anglo-Saxon race, and the same heathen. They have not spent one dollar in Indian wars, and have had no Indian massacres. Why? In Canada the Indian treaties call these men 'the Indian subjects of her Majesty.' When civilisation approaches them they are placed on ample reservations, receive aid in civilisation, have personal rights ia property, are amenable to law, and protected by law, have schools, and Christian people send them the best teachers.

The loans for which we are responsible are not limited to those raised in the interests of the colonies. We have also either guaran

Tiro Hunting Grounds of the Great West, p. 43.

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