NEVER to prophesy unless you know' is a wise rule for all writers on subjects connected with the vicissitudes of war, but especially for those whose vaticinations are liable to be falsified by events during the interval between composition and publication. Still there is one forecast with reference to the war now commenced in grim earnest which I can venture to make confidently; and that is, that the war, whenever and however it closes, will not leave things as they were previous to its inception. Putting aside the passing speculations of the hour, it seems to me as manifest as any unaccomplished fact can well be, that we are on the eve of a fundamental revolution in the affairs of Eastern Europe. We have come to the beginning of the end. In saying this I am not expressing an opinion whether the end is desirable or otherwise. Personally, I believe it would have been better for the world if the settlement of the Eastern Question could have been deferred for another generation. The prospect of Turkish rule over the Balkan peninsula being replaced by a Russian Protectorate affords me no satisfaction. But whether your sympathies are Turkophil or Russophil, whether you deem Turkey to be the victim of the most iniquitous of intrigues, or whether you hold Russia to be engaged in the holiest of crusades, I fail to see how you can shut your eyes to the patent fact that Ottoman rule in Europe is doomed. That this should be so does not indeed prove that it ought to be so. Good things as well as evil things have their day. Bulwarks of civilisation are no more immortal than remnants of barbarism. All I contend for is that, in Eastern Europe at any rate, the 'manifest destiny' is with the Christian as against the Moslem, with the Slav as against the Turk. It may be, though it scarcely seems to me within the region of probability, that Turkey may pull through the present crisis without absolute dismemberment of her Empire. But even on this hypothesis she can only owe her safety to the mutual jealousies of the Western Powers. It does not lie within the scope of this article to discuss the possible or probable arrangements which may be made at the conclusion of the war. As a matter of fact, however, it may be taken for granted that, whenever peace is made, Russia, whether in Europe or in Asia, will have taken a considerable step towards the overthrow of Ottoman rule, while Turkey will be left less able than

she has proved hitherto to present any formidable resistance to the advance of Russia. Even the most sanguine of believers in the regeneration of Turkey under constitutional government would admit that the proximate, if not the immediate, occupation of Constantinople by Russia lies within the domain of possibility. You do not insure your house against fire because you think it likely to be burnt down, but because you think it possible it may be burnt down. It is sufficient, therefore, for us, as a nation, to know that the command of the Bosphorus passing into the hands of Russia is a possibility, to make it incumbent upon us to consider in what mode we should insure ourselves against the dangers arising out of this possible contingency.

The first question, then, which suggests itself is what practical difference it would make to England if the Bosphorus passed, either nominally or virtually, from under the command of Turkey into that of Russia. I may say in passing that the conditions of the problem under consideration would be modified in degree rather than substance, if, as many persons imagine, the interests of Germany and Austria should compel them to preclude Russia from obtaining possession of Constantinople. If once a vigorous independent government, which the force of events might lead to cooperate with Russia, should be established on the Bosphorus, we should lose the protection afforded to our Indian possessions by the fact of the lands lying east and west of the channel dividing Europe and Asia being under the dominion of a friendly, inert, and unprogressive power. Mr. Bright asked triumphantly at Manchester why we should be affected by a war three thousand miles away. The obvious answer is that the most important possessions of the British Crown lie yet more than three thousand miles further to the East. Of course, if it is contended that our Indian Empire is not worth preserving, cadit quæstio. It would be entirely foreign to my purpose to argue this point. I must ask my readers to take for granted, as the basis of my argument, that the preservation of our dominion in the East is a matter of paramount importance to us, only less important, indeed, than the preservation of our national independence. I may be wrong in this assumption; but it is one which, whether right or wrong, is shared by the vast majority of Englishmen. I say, then, unhesitatingly, that the chief, though not the sole, concern we have in the settlement of the Eastern Question lies in the effect that settlement must produce on the security of our Indian possessions. A mere glance at the map serves to show how the Ottoman Empire, together with the adjacent Mussulman kingdoms, lies like a huge breakwater between Russia and India. We are often told that the only solution of the Eastern Question is to drive the Turks back into Asia. It may be so. But the notion which the authors of this theory seem to hold, that the Sultan could transfer the seat of empire to Damascus, or Bagdad, or Smyrna, or Heaven knows where,

is an utter delusion. Constantinople is the keystone of the arch which supports the crumbling edifice of the Ottoman Empire. Take that away, and the whole structure falls to pieces. To build up a new empire east of the Bosphorus is a task beyond the capabilities of the Turks. Whatever power holds Stamboul is, in virtue of all precedent, mistress of Asia Minor. No doubt Islam would be a force to be taken into account even if there were no caliph in existence; and there would still be Mohammedan States notwithstanding the fall of Turkey. But our own experience in India has shown us that isolated and disjointed Mohammedan communities cannot hold their own against a dominant European Power. Thus, if the Cross should ever replace the Crescent on St. Sophia, Russia, instead of being opposed in her advance towards India by the formidable strength of a great and united if decaying empire, would only be confronted by a number of isolated and disjointed States resembling those of Central Asia, which, from their want of cohesion as well as from their internal jealousies and divisions, must inevitably fall an easy prey to any civilised military Power. Of course I may be told, as we are now daily told by our public instructors, that Russia has no idea of attacking Constantinople, and would be guilty of absolute insanity if she were to entertain any such idea. For my purpose, however, it is sufficient to show that a Russian advance on the Bosphorus is within the domain of possibility, and that the almost certain result of the present war will be to remove some at least of the more serious obstacles which have hitherto barred the advance of Russia Stamboul-wards, whether on land or

Supposing the war should at its close leave the frontiers of Roumania extended to the Balkan under a Russian Protectorate, Russian territory increased in Asia Minor by the annexation of Armenia, and the free passage of the Bosphorus thrown open to Russian men-of-war, it would be impossible to dispute the fact that Russia had made a long step towards the dismemberment of Turkey and the seizure of Constantinople. And yet, in the event of Turkey being worsted in the coming campaign, such terms of peace as those I have indicated are the least that Russia is likely to demand. Thus, whether we like it or not, we are bound in common prudence to face the contingency that at no distant period Russia may command the head of the Euphrates valley by land, and the Bosphorus by sea. If once Constantinople passes directly or indirectly into the hands of an active maritime State, the chain of inland seas leading from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Azof must become home waters, so to speak, of the Power holding the Bosphorus. It is only the utter apathy and want of enterprise, especially on sea, characterising Ottoman rule, which has hindered Turkey from becoming the chief maritime Power of the Levant. Given the possession of the Bosphorus, and Russia would soon have an ironclad fleet in the Sea of Marmora, which could sail out at any moment and reach Port Said long before reinforcements could

arrive from Malta. It is said that in the case of Russia obtaining the passage of the Bosphorus, we could neutralise the danger by keeping a fleet stationed at Besika Bay, or by seizing the mouth of the Dardanelles and holding it as we do Gibraltar. But the former safeguard could only be temporary in its nature; the latter, even if feasible-which I doubt―would involve a heavy constant outlay and a state of permanent antagonism not only to Russia, but to all Powers interested in the freedom of access between the Euxine and the Mediterranean.

Thus, if I have made my meaning clear, the state of things with which we have to deal is this. A war has begun which, as I deem, may probably, and, as all must admit, may possibly, end in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. This overthrow would weaken if not imperil our hold on India. How then are we to protect ourselves against the peril involved in the possible success of Russia? That is the question. Now, in the first place, I must state my conviction that no precaution within our power to take can place us in as strong a position as that we now occupy. Nothing could be as good for us as that the Bosphorus and the provinces west and east of it should remain under the rule of an unaggressive Power, friendlily disposed towards us by virtue of the instinct of self-preservation. But even waiving the question whether we should be justified in upholding a vicious system of government in European Turkey in order to promote our own advantage, it is obvious that we are utterly unable to uphold Turkish rule unless we are prepared to fight for Turkey whenever she is assailed, which, wisely or unwisely, we are not. Now the very fact that, according to my view, we should be manifestly weaker, in the sense of being more liable to attack in our Eastern possessions, than we are at present, in the event of Ottoman rule in Europe receiving a death-blow, renders it all the more essential that we should guard against the impending danger by such means as lie within our power. In plainer words, the mere possibility that Russia may obtain the command of the Bosphorus renders it a matter of urgent necessity to us to secure the command of the Isthmus route to India. In order to effect this, we must have the power of keeping the Suez Canal open to our ships at all times and under all circumstances; and, to secure this, we must acquire a recognised footing in the Delta of Egypt of a far more decided character than any we can claim at present.

No doubt, by the original firman issued by the Porte for the construction of the canal, its waters are declared to be neutral, and we often hear suggestions that this declaration of neutralitywhich at present is a simple agreement between the Porte and the company-should be confirmed by an international guarantee of all the European Powers. But recent experience must have led the most simple-hearted believer in the authority of international declarations to doubt their practical efficacy. If the treaty of Paris guarantee

ing the independence of Turkey, entered into within the lifetime of the present generation, and solemnly reaffirmed only six years ago, is now treated as so much waste paper by all the Powers concerned, what possible security can we have that twenty years, ten years, or twelve months hence, the European Powers could be relied upon to make war upon any State which infringed the neutrality of the canal, even if it were guaranteed by the most solemn and formal of international compacts? Moreover, as Sir Stafford Northcote pointed out the other day, the neutralisation of the canal, even if it could be secured, would be fatal to our interests as a belligerent.

Supposing the canal to be really neutralised, it is obvious that if two European Powers were at war they could not be allowed to traverse its waters with ships of war or transports, or even with merchant vessels carrying supplies to the rival armies. In the event of a war between England and Russia in the East, such a prohibition would be no practical disadvantage to the latter Power; for as long as we hold Aden and Perim we can close the mouth of the Red Sea against all comers. But to us any obstacle in the way of our sending troops and ships to and fro between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea at our pleasure would prove the most serious of disadvantages in the case of war, even if our Indian Empire were not the direct object of attack. If the Euphrates Valley route lay open to the Russian armies, while we could only convey troops to and from India by the long sea route round the Cape, the difficulty of defending ourselves against attack, both in Europe and Asia, would be more than doubled. Again, in the contingency to which I allude, it would be a matter of vital necessity to us, not only to have free right of passage for our own ships of war, but to have the power of excluding all others, during war time, from its waters. A hostile ironclad which once made its way as far as Ismailia or into the Bitter Lakes would prevent the passage of our ships by the mere fact of its presence. Then, too, it should be borne in mind that the canal, owing to the peculiarity of its structure, could very easily be rendered useless. Given four-andtwenty hours' time, and a company of sappers and miners in undisturbed possession of any portion of its sandbanks; and an amount of damage might be inflicted which would not only render the canal impassable for the moment, but which could not be repaired for weeks or months. In order, therefore, to secure our freedom of uninterrupted access to India across the Isthmus, it is essential that we should not only have an unrestricted right of employing its waters for war purposes, but that its course from sea to sea, as well as its ports of ingress and egress, should be under our protection. No strategical knowledge is required to appreciate the importance of the control of the canal to England. With the exception of that small school of politicians who hold that the British Empire should be restricted within the four seas, everybody would, I think, admit that