ble nor odious, good nor bad. To this the reply is easy, to wit, That there is not, nor can be, any attribute in the Divine nature, that could poffibly have been wanting; or the want of which would not have been an imperfection for whatever is in his nature, is neceffary, elfe it could not be in his nature; neceffity being the only ac count to be given for his exiftence and attributes. Now what is in its own nature indifferent, cannot be faid to exift neceffarily; therefore could not exist in God. To queftion whether goodness or benevolence in the Divine nature is neceffary or accidental, is the fame, as queftioning whether the very existence of the Deity is neceffary or accidental. For whatever is in God, is God. And to question whether the Divine attribute of goodnefs is a real perfection, or a thing indifferent, that is, to doubt, whether the Divine nature might not have been as perfect without, as with it; comes to the fame as queftioning, whether existence is a thing indifferent to the Deity, or not. His whole nature is excellent; is the abftract of excellence; and nothing belonging to him is indifferent. Of which more hereafter.

It is therefore evident, that the benevolence of the Divine nature is in itself a real excellence or perfection, independent of our ideas of it, and cannot, without the highest abfurdity, not to fay impiety, be conceived of, as indifferent. It is alfo evident, that it must have been upon the whole better that the univerfe fhould be created, and a

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number of creatures produced (in order to be partakers of various degrees and kinds of happiness) than not; elfe God, who fees all things as they are, could not have feen any reason for creating, and therefore would not have created them.

Let it then be fuppofed, that fome being fhould, through thoughtleffness and voluntary blindness at firft, and afterwards through pride and rebellion, at length work up his malice to that degree, as to wish to destroy the whole creation, or to subject millions of innocent beings to unspeakable mifery; would this likewife be good? Was it better to create than not? and is it likewife better to deftroy than preferve? Was it good to give being and happiness to innumerable creatures? and would it likewise be good to plunge innumerable innocent creatures into irrecoverable ruin and mifery? If thefe feeming oppofites be not entirely the fame, then there is in morals a real difference, an eternal and unchangeable truth, proportion, agreement, and difagreement, in the nature of things (of which the Divine nature is the bafis) independent on pofitive will, and which could not have been otherwife; being no more arbitrary or factitious, than what is found in numbers, or mathematics. So that a wickedlydifpofed being would, fo long as he continued. unreformed, have been as really fo in any other ftate of things, and in any other world, as in this in which we live; and a good being would have been

been equally amiable and valuable ten thousand years ago, and in the planet Jupiter, as upon earth, and in our times; and the difference between the degrees of goodness and malignity are as determinate, and as diftinctly perceived by fuperior beings, as between a hundred, a thousand, and a million; or between a line, a furface, and a cube.

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Nothing is more evident, than that we can enter a very great way into the Divine scheme in the natural world, and fee very clearly the wif dom and contrivance, which shine confpicuous in every part of it. I believe nobody ever took it into his head to doubt, whether the inhabitants any other world would not judge the fun to be proper for giving light, the eye for feeing, the ear for hearing, and fo forth. No one ever doubted whether the angel Gabriel conceived of the wisdom of God in the natural world, in any manner contrary to what we do. Why then fhould people fill their heads with fancies, about our perceptions of moral truth, any more than of natural. There is no doubt, but we have all our clear and immediate ideas, by our being capable of feeing, or apprehending (within a certain limited sphere) things as they are really and effentially in themselves. And we may be affured, that fimple truths do by no means appear to our minds in any ftate effentially different from or contrary to that in which they appear to the mind of the angel Gabriel.

That there is a poffibility of attaining certainty, by sensation, intuition, deduction, testimony, and infpiration, feems eafy enough to prove.. For, first, where fenfation is, all other arguments or proofs are fuperfluous. What I feel I cannot, bring myself to doubt, if I would. I must either really exist or not. But I cannot even be miftaken in imagining I feel my own existence; for that neceffarily fuppofes my exifting. I feel my mind easy and calm. I cannot, if I would, bring myself to doubt, whether my mind is easy and calm. Because I feel a perfect internal tranquillity s and there is nothing within or without me to perfuade me to doubt the reality of what I feel; and what I really feel, fo far as I really feel it, must be real; it being abfurd to talk of feeling or perceiving what has no real existence.

Again, there is no natural abfurdity in suppofing it poffible for a human, or other intelligent mind, to arrive at a clear and distinct perception of truth by intuition. On the contrary, the fuppofition of the poffibility of a faculty of intelligence neceffarily infers the poffibility of the existence of truth, as the object of intelligence, and of truth's being within the reach of the intelligent faculty. If there is but one being in the universe capable of understanding truth, there must be truth for that being to understand; and that truth must be within the reach of his understanding. But as it is felf-evident, that there are an infinite number of ideal, or conceivable truths, it is likewife evident, there must be an infinitely comprehensive

comprehensive understanding, which perceives this infinity of truths. To talk of a truth perceivable by no mind, or that never has been the object of any perceptive faculty, would be a felf-contradiction. Mind is the very fubftratum of truth. An infinite mind of infinite truth. That a finite understanding may attain a finite perception of truth, is neceffary to be admitted, unless we deny the poffibility of the exiftence of any finite understanding. For an understanding capable of attaining no degree of knowledge of truth, or an understanding which neither did nor could understand or perceive any one truth, is a contradiction in words. Proceeding in this train of reafoning, we fay, Either there is no fuch thing as intuition poffible, or it must be poffible by intuition to perceive truth; there is no fuch thing as fenfation poffible, or it must be poffible for the mind to perceive real objects. That what we ac tually and really apprehend by intuition and fenfation, muft be fomewhat real, as far as actually and really apprehended; it being impossible to apprehend that which is not. Now the evidence of the reality of any existence, or the truth of any propofition, let it be conveyed to the mind by deduction, by teftimony, by revelation, or if there were a thousand other methods of information, would ftill be reducible at last to direct intuition; excepting what arifes from fenfation. The mind, in judging of any propofition, thro' whatever channel communicated to it, or on whatever