whatever arguments eftablished, judges of the Itrength of the evidence; it makes allowance for the objections; it balances the arguments, or confiderations of whatever kind, against one another; it fees which preponderates. And fuppofing this to be done properly, it fees the true state of the cafe, and determines accordingly; nor - can it poffibly determine contrary to what it fees to be the true ftate of the café.

When, for example, I confider in my own mind, on one hand, the various evidence from authors and remains of antiquity, that there was formerly such a state as the Roman, which conquered great part of this fide of the globe; and on the other, find no reafon for doubting of the exiftence of fuch a state in former times, I find it as reasonable to believe it, and as impoffible to doubt it, as to doubt the folution of a queftion in numbers or quantity, which I had proved by arithmetic vulgar and decimal, and by algebra. And fo of other inftances. So that, though it would not be proper to fay, I fee, by intuition, the truth of this proposition, "There was once fuch 66 a city as Rome;" yet I may with the utmost propriety fay, I fee fuch a fuperabundance of evidence for the truth of the propofition, and at the fame time fee no reafon to think that any valid objections can be brought against it, that I intuitively fee the evidence for it to be fuch as puts it beyond all poffibility of being doubted by me, and feel that, though I fhould labour ever VOL. II.

C

fo

fo much to bring myfelf to question it, I abfolutely cannot; nor can I conceive it poffible that it should appear queftionable to any perfon, who has fairly confidered it.

Suppofe, in the fame manner, (in a point which has been disputed) a man, of a clear head, to have thoroughly examined all the various evidences for the Chriftian religion, allowing to every one its due weight, and no more; suppose him to have attentively confidered every objection against it, allowing, likewife, to every one impartially its full force; fuppofe the refult of the whole enquiry to be his finding fuch a preponderancy of evidence for the truth of Chriftianity, as fhould beyond all comparison overbalance the whole weight of the objections against it; I fay, that fuch a perfon would then intuitively fee the evidence for Christianity to be unfurmountable; and could no more bring him-. felf to doubt it, than to doubt whether all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; nor to conceive the poffibility of any other perfon's doubting it, who had fairly confidered both fides. of the question.

In the fame manner a perfon, who should carefully examine the arguments in a fyftem of ethics, and should clearly and convincingly perceive the ftrength of each, the connexion of one with another, and the refult of the whole; might in the ftricteft propriety of fpeech be faid to fee in

tuitively

tuitively the truth and juftness of that system of ethics.

If fo, then it is plain, that certainty is, in the nature of things, equally attainable upon all fubjects, though beings of our limited capacity may not, in our prefent imperfect state, be capable of attaining it. In the fame manner as the truth of the most obvious axiom in arithmetic or geometry may lie out of the reach of an infant, or an idiot; which appears felf-evident to the first glance of any mind that is capable of putting two thoughts together. How comes it to pafs, that the truth of fuch an axiom as the following appears immediately inconteftable: That if from equal quantities equal quantities be fubtracted, equal quantities will remain? How comes, I fay, the truth of this axiom to appear at once, while moral doctrines furnish endless difpute? The obvious anfwer is, from the fimplicity of the terms of the propofition, and of what is affirmed of them, which leaves no roo:n for ambiguity or uncertainty; and from the narrowness of the fubject to be confidered, or the fmallness of the number of ideas to be taken in, which prevents all danger of puzzling, or diftracting the understanding, and rendering the refult or conclufion doubtful. Suppole the arguments for Christianity to be exactly one thousand, and the objections against it exactly one hundred: Suppose an angelic, or other fuperior understanding, to perceive intuitively the exact state of

C 2

each;

each; and to see diftinctly the hundred objections to be furmountable, or not valid, and the arguments to be every one folid and conclufive, I fay, that fuch a being would intuitively fee the truth of Christianity in the fame manner as a human mind fees the truth of any complex demonstration in Euclid.

It is therefore certain, that all evidence whatever is to be finally tried by, and reduced to intuition, except that which we have from fenfation: That truth of all kinds is equally capable of being intuitively perceived, and of being afcertained to minds fitted for receiving and examining it: That moral truth is in no respect naturally more vague or precarious than mathematical; but equally fixed, and equally clear, to superior minds; and probably will be fo hereafter to those of the human make, who fhall attain to higher improvements in future ftates: And that in the mean time our duty is to examine carefully, and to act upon the refult of candid enquiry.

That we are, in fome inftances of inconfiderable importance to our final happiness, liable to error, is no more than a natural consequence of the imperfection of our present state, and the number of particulars neceffary to be taken in, in order to find out the true ftate of things upon the whole. But this, fo far from proving the impoffibility of coming at truth, or that we are exposed to irremediable error, fhews, that truth

is certainly to be attained by fuch intelligent bèings as fhall, with proper advantages of capacity and means, fet themselves to the finding it out with fincerity and diligence.

The amount of what has been faid on moral certainty is briefly as follows, viz.

That it is felf-contradictory to talk of doubt. ing the perceptions of our faculties, it being im poffible to perceive a truth clearly, and yet to doubt it.

That our fimple ideas, being the immediate objects of our understandings, and being level to direct intuition, are capable of being with the greatest exactnefs examined and compared, in order to the finding the truth or falfhood of any propofition, whose terms are not too complex, or otherwife out of the reach of our faculties. And that whatever the understanding clearly determines, after mature examination, to be truth, it is impoffible to doubt.

That whatever any mind really perceives must be real, as far as perceived. That therefore, there must be real truth perceivable, elfe there could be no perceptive faculty in the universe; fince falfhoods and impoffibilities are not in the nature of things perceivable, being non-entities.

That all kinds of truths appear equally certain to minds capable of inveftigating them. That moral truth is in its own nature no more vague or precarious, than mathematical; though

C 3

in