plain, then, that, in order to man's acting his part, and concurring with the general fcheme, he must be brought to use all the faculties of his mind properly.

I promised above to bring fome proofs for the fact of man's being a creature endowed with will, or freedom to defire, and power to determine himfelf in favour of, or against any particular object, The certainty of this fact is founded in fenfation, and confirmed by reafoning. Let any man obferve what paffes in his own mind, and he will be obliged to own, that he feels he has it in his power to wil, or defire, and determine himself in favour of, or against any particular object. We have no other proof for our existence, nor is it in its nature capable of any other, than that we feel we exift.

But because the reality of human liberty has been cavilled at by fome men of metaphyfical heads, who have run into greater difficulties to avoid lefs, it may be worth while to confider this matter a little. I know not whether I am made like the rest of mankind. But I can feel every thing pafs in my mind, that I can conceive I fhould feel, if I was really a free agent. For example, in an indifferent cafe: When I look on my watch, to know whether it is time for me to give over writing, and I find the hour come, when I ufually give over, I do not find that I am impelled to lay down my pen, in the fame manner as the index of my watch is moved to point

at

at the hour; but that I give over, because I think, upon the whole, it is more proper, I fhould give over, than go on. go on. Does my watch point to the hour, because it thinks upon the whole, it is more proper that it fhould point to that hour than any other? If fo, then the watch and I are beings of the fame fort, endowed with much the fame powers and faculties. Do I not lay afide my pen, because I choose to lay it afide, that is, because I am willing to lay it afide? Should I give over, if I was unwilling to give over? If I find my ufual time past, and yet should be glad to finish the head I am upon, before I lay afide my pen, does that motive act upon me, and force me to go on, as a fpring acts upon a watch, or does it act as a confideration upon a rational creature?

Again, fuppofe I am tempted to do a bad action, do the motives laid in my way force my compliance? Do I not, on the contrary, feel that I yield to them, because I choose to seize a prefent object, which I expect to yield me fome fancied advantage? Do I not feel in my own mind a violent ftruggle between the confiderations of prefent profit or pleasure, and those of wisdom and virtue? Is it poffible I fhould feel any fuch struggle if I was not free? Does any fuch thing pafs in a machine? Do I not find, that I fometimes yield to temptations, which at other times I get the better of? Have not others refifted temptations which have proved too hard for me? Could thefe differences happen, if they and I

were machines? Do not thefe inftances of temptations conquered, fix both liberty and guilt upon me, in having yielded to what it was plain I might have refifted at one time, if I did at another? If it is extremely difficult, or what may be called next to impoffible, to refift ail forts of temptations at all times, does this prove any thing else, than that human nature is weak? Were man a machine, he must act as a machine, uniformly and invariably.

What I have here remarked upon the case of being tempted to a bad action, is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to that of an opportunity of doing a good one. Motives, according as they appear, will influence a rational mind. But the appearance of motives to our minds, as well as their influence over us, depends very much upon ourselves. If I am prevailed on by motives, do motives force me? Do I not yield to them, because I choose to yield to them? If this is not being free, what is freedom? What should I feel pafs in my mind, if I was really free? What may we fuppofe fuperior beings, what may we suppose the Supreme him.felf to feel in his infinite mind? Does he (with profound reverence be it spoken) does he act without regard to motives? Does he act contrary to reasonable motives? Can we fuppofe him uninfluenced by proper motives? Can we fuppofe he feels himself to be wholly uninfluenced by reasonable and important confiderations? Would we be more free than the most perfect of all beings? If he gives us liberty and power

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power to a proper extent, what would we have more? If we feel that we have such liberty, why fhould we, contrary to poffibility, endeavour to bring ourselves to doubt of our having it? If we cannot doubt of our being free creatures, what have we more to think of, than how to make a proper use of our liberty, how to get our wills formed to a perfect concurrence with the grand scheme of the Governor of the univerfe, fo that we may behave properly within our sphere, which if we and all other moral agents did, every part must be properly acted, every sphere properly filled, and univerfal regularity, perfection, and happiness be the refult.

Some have imagined that allowing liberty or will to created beings was a derogation from the Supreme, to whom alone the privilege of freedom ought to be afcribed. It is certain that this is strictly true of abfolute, independent, original freedom. As it is undoubted that independent, neceffary, or natural exiftence is the incommunicable privilege of the Firft caufe. But, as we find a limited, dependent existence may be, and actually is, communicated to created beings, where. is the difficulty or impropriety of supposing a limited, independent freedom, or power of choofingor refufing, communicated to created beings. As created beings depend on the Supreme for their existence, and yet the existence they enjoy is a real and proper exiftence; fo may the liberty they enjoy, of choofing or refuling, be a real and proper liberty, and yet derived from, and depen dent on the infinite Giver of every gift.

very term.

If there is no fuch thing as liberty, in any created being, as fome have imagined, then it is evident, there can be no will but that of the Supreme Being: for liberty, or a power of choofing or refufing, is only another term for will. Will, or willingness, implies freedom in the Therefore, the common term freewill is a tautology, as much as if one fhould fay voluntary will. There neither is, nor can be, any will but free will. Conftraint, or force, is the very oppofite of will, or willingnefs. Let it be confidered then, what the confequence must be of affirming that there is no will, but the Supreme. We find in hiftory, that a monster of an emperor wifhed that the whole Roman people had but one neck, that he might cut them all off at The fame temper, which led him to defire the deftruction of his people, of whom he ought to have been the father and protector, would have inclined him to wifh the deftruction of whatever opposed him, that is, of all good beings in heaven and earth. Will any one pretend, that this temper of mind is agreeable to the Supreme will? Is it not blafphemy to imagine the Divine will to be against goodness? But if liberty or will in a created being is impoffible, then what we call Caligula's will was really the Divine will; the destruction of all goodness was agreeable to the Divine mind! It is too horrible to think of.

once.

I know, it has been faid, that the perpetration of the most wicked action, that ever was committed,