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CHAPTER XVII.

The conduct of Sir Sidney Smith considered respecting his concurrence with the convention of El-Arisch-Parliamentary proceedings upon it-Short speech of his late Majesty William IV.

HAVING brought down our narrative of these transactions to this epoch, it becomes a duty to us to look at home, and see in what light these transactions were viewed by those who possessed the right and the ability to decide upon them. The question very naturally resolved itself into two distinct interrogatories. Firstly, had Sir Sidney Smith the power to do that which he did? and, secondly, without reference to his authority, was that which he did done well?

It is notorious that the ministry and Mr. Pitt, with a great proportion of the nation, believed that the terms granted to General Kleber were altogether too lenient; and that he and his army

must, in the nature of events, have been shortly compelled to surrender at discretion. Men's minds were too rashly led to this conclusion, because, by an accident, a packet of letters, directed from Kleber's army to the French government, was, about this juncture, intercepted, which letters, purporting to describe the actual state of the French army in Egypt and Syria, were of such a nature as to induce the persuasion that the enemy could by no means sustain his post, and that the troops were upon the eve of a complete disorganisation and also because that Sir Sidney Smith having performed great deeds, impossibilities were expected at his hands, thus being made a martyr to his own superior merits.

Thus prepared to prejudge the question, it was angrily asked, had Sir Sidney the authority to conclude a convention, apparently so unwise, if not altogether treacherous to the best interests of his country?

This momentous subject led to the following proceedings in the House of Commons:

Mr. T. Jones begged the attention of the house to the subject of the evacuation of Egypt; a subject to which he had already called that attention last session, and which had now become, by the incapacity of his Majesty's ministers, the bone of contention between England and

France, and the stumbling-block of

peace. From

the correspondence on the table, it was evident that those counsels which opposed the evacuation of Egypt by the invading army, presented a very serious obstacle to the conclusion, and even to the negociation of a peace. Of the two points most insisted on by France, and which operated as impediments to peace, one was the demand of sending succours to Egypt; and it remained for the House to inquire, why that difficulty had not been precluded, by accepting the terms of the convention agreed on by General Kleber and the Grand Vizier, and guaranteed by the sanction of a general officer? Mr. Jones, after six motions that he had made on the 23d of July, last session, on the subject of the evacuation of Egypt, were read by the clerk, said, that the object of his motion this day would be, the production of a letter, on the subject of which almost the whole of the voluminous correspondence which he held in his hand turned. Having read a number of extracts from the correspondence, and particularly Lord Grenville's instruction to Mr. Hammond, for holding a conference with Mr. Otto, on the subject of the proposed armistice between Great Britain and France, he asked if Sir Sidney Smith was not joined with his brother Mr. Spencer Smith, as joint plenipotentiary of Great

Britain at the court of Constantinople? Had he not power to treat at Acre? Did not ministers know that, in conjunction with the Bashaw Ghezzar, Sir Sidney offered to convey the French out of Egypt, individually or in the aggregate? Did his Majesty's ministers, previous to January 24, 1800, countermand the orders under which, it was presumed, he acted from the beginning of May in the preceding year, as if not warranted in his conduct? Did they, to prevent a repetition of such conduct, express their anger within the eight following months, or even some time after he had acceded to the convention? Did not Lord Elgin, before and since the present year, instruct Sir Sidney Smith to get the French out of Egypt by all possible means? Was not the intention of the court of London, not to ratify the original treaty, sent immediately to General Kleber in the first instance? Ought it not to have been sent to the French general through Sir Sidney Smith? Ought not our ally, the Ottoman Porte, to have had the earliest notice? And farther, did not La Constance galley deliver the letter of Lord Keith, first to Kleber at Alexandria, and then proceed with the same instructions to Sir Sidney, who was on duty at Cyprus? What was the consequence? Did not eight or nine thousand of our good allies

perish in the field? Was not the very existence of the Ottoman government threatened at its centre? In Mr. Hammond's letter to Lord Grenville, after the conference with Mr. Otto, which letter referred, almost in every line, to Egypt, there was this particular assertion, “Mr. Otto added, that he would not conceal from me, that the reinforcement which France intended to send to Egypt amounted to twelve hundred men, and that the supply of military stores consisted chiefly of ten thousand muskets. The language of Mr. Otto, in this part of our conversation, and of Mr. Talleyrand's letter, appeared to me to be so decisive and peremptory, that I was induced to ask of him, distinctly, whether I was to understand that this stipulation was a point from which the French government would not recede? Mr. Otto replied, that, in his opinion, the French government would not recede from it." Mr. Jones having recapitulated the whole of the correspondence, moved, "That the letter alluded to in General Kleber's letter to the Kaimakan of the Sublime Porte, be now laid on the table of that House."

Mr. Pitt replied, that it would be hardly possible for his Majesty's ministers to comply with the object of the present motion. It would be a very difficult thing for government to undertake

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