ing the greatest annoyance everywhere to the enemy, obstructing by land, and intercepting by sea entirely, their communications along the shore, so as to retard their operations against Gaeta, which was the chief purpose of undertaking the expedition.

Encouraged by this success of our arms, several sorties took place from out of Gaeta, which we have stated Sir Sidney had so opportunely relieved.

All this had, however, but little effect upon the fate of the place, as it was enabled to hold out only until the 13th of July, and was then compelled to surrender to the French.

CHAPTER XXII.

Further operations for the recovery of Naples-Their inutility Sir Sidney Smith receives the acknowledgments of their Sicilian Majesties-Remarks on naval appoint

ments.

On the return of Sir Sidney Smith to Palermo, after the conclusion of this service, and a most harassing cruise to the enemy, the active turn and the sanguine temper of his mind induced him not only to enter into, but also to originate, projects that were, from time to time, suggested to the court, to second the King of the Sicilies' attempts for the recovery of Calabria from the invaders. Had all others, whose duty it was to carry these projects into execution, been actuated by half the zeal of Sir Sidney, and had they been possessed of enough humility and good sense to have followed in matters in which they were not qualified to lead, the re-conquest of Calabria would not have been long delayed.

The eager yet incompetent advisers of the King, finding the admiral thus favourably inclined towards the furtherance of their schemes, and the latter being most anxious to distinguish himself by some great exploit, their Sicilian Majesties invested him with the most ample authority to be exercised in Calabria, and they even went to the extent of constituting the British admiral their viceroy in that province.

But there were obstacles that even the energy of Sir Sidney Smith could not surmount. Though active and indefatigable in the duties of his new dignity, and successful in distributing arms and ammunition among the Calabrians, and a great deal of money among their leaders and influential men, he soon discovered, that unless an English army made its appearance in the country, there was not the remotest chance of producing an insurrection against the French.

It became, therefore, necessary for the court of Palermo either to abandon the fruit of all its intrigues and machinations, or to prevail on the commander of the English forces in Sicily to invade Calabria with the greatest part of his army. In this latter attempt the court succeeded.

The operations, after this, being strictly and almost exclusively military, they do not fall within our province to record. Of course, the admiral

had to attend to the safe and convenient conveyance of the troops to their destination-to provide for their comfort on board, and their safe debark ation on shore. All this was duly effected, and Sir John Stuart, with an army of four thousand five hundred effective men, shortly after gained that victory, than which one more honourable to the combatants, or more glorious to the arms of any nation, was never recorded-the victory of Maida.

Major-general Sir John Stuart, in his despatch, dated, "Camp on the plain of Maida, July 6, 1806," published in the London Gazette Extraordinary of September 5, of the same year, states as follows:

"The scene of action was too far from the sea to enable us to derive any direct co-operation from the navy: but Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, who had arrived in the bay the evening before the action, had directed such a disposition of ships and gun-boats as would have greatly favoured us, had events obliged us to retire. The solicitude, however, of every part of the navy to be of use to us, the promptitude with which the seamen hastened on shore with our supplies, their anxiety to assist our wounded, and the tenderness with which they treated them, would have been an affecting circumstance to observers, even the

most indifferent to me it was particularly so."

This victory led to the desired insurrection, but it proved transient and unsuccessful. So sensible was Sir John Stuart of his inability to maintain the ground he had won in Calabria, that very shortly afterwards he withdrew all his forces from that country, with the exception of a garrison left at Scylla, and a detachment of the seventy-eighth regiment, under Colonel M'Leod, which had been sent in the Amphion frigate to the coast near Catangaro, in order to countenance and assist the insurgents in that quarter.

General Acland was also despatched to the Bay of Naples; and though he was not absolutely prohibited from landing his troops, yet was he directed not to expose them to that danger, unless he had the prospect of effecting some object of real and permanent utility.

During all these operations, Sir Sidney Smith was most actively, if not judiciously, employed along the coast, assisting the insurgents with arms and ammunition, supplying them with provisions, and conveying them from one place to another, in the vessels under his command. Though we doubt that all this was a judicious acting, yet the manner in which the rear-admiral performed it was most judicious and effective.