was conceived to be effectual. They had established the system of barracks, on which millions of the public money had been expended, and the house was then told, that such a system would keep the soldiers out of the way of seduction, and prevent them from being exposed to the intrigues of the emissaries of faction. The house was also told, that if the people could not be made dumb, the soldiers should be made deaf. There was, he maintained, no proof whatever before the house to show there was any deficiency in the existing laws to provide for the evil complained of; and until that proof was fairly made out, gentlemen could not, with any degree of consistency, pledge themselves to give their support to the bill. Knowing from experience, that the moment the legislature agreed to increase the code of sanguinary penal laws, they would also agree to increase the evil intended to be remedied, he could not give his assent to that part of the address. But as the right hon. gentleman wished so very much for unanimity in parliament, on a subject, he was ready to confess, of the most serious importance, he should not, for his part, interrupt this unanimity, and would, therefore, for the present, decline giving any vote at all.

The address was agreed to nem. con.

DECEMBER 14.

INCREASED ASSESSMENT OF TAXES.

Mr. Pitt moved, "That the bill for raising a sum for the supplies of the year, by an increased assessment of taxes, be read a second time.”

MR. SHERIDAN said--Sir, when any stranger, or person who has been a long time absent, first enters a house of any establishment, it is the ordinary custom for the master of the house to do the ceremonies of the place, and welcome him on his arrival with some expression of pleasure or politeness, as a mark of hospitality. In this house, I know, sir, there can be no master-but if there were any, I am sure it is not the hon. gentleman (Mr. Yorke), who has taken upon himself, with such officious kindness, to act that part, and hail, with compliments so truly worthy of himself, the arrival of my right hon. friend (Mr. Fox) and myself. I cannot help thanking the hon. gentleman for his politeness, though I must acknowledge my gratitude would be of a warmer kind, if the hon. gentleman

had not, under form of predicting, taken upon him to prescribe what ought to be our conduct now that we have come. Whether we were or were not right in absenting ourselves, is a question, which, as was well remarked in a certain daily paper (The Morning Chronicle), cannot very properly come before the house, but is to rest with our consciences and feelings, and to be canvassed only by ourselves and our constituents. However, sir, when we did come down last Tuesday, with full expectation to find a full senate arrayed, anxiously hearing the discussion of this very important and momentous question, with the right hon. gentleman and his faithful friends and colleagues seated in their places, I found, not less to my surprise than disappointment, that only thirty-six members were then present, and that the house and the business was to be adjourned till a future day, for want of a sufficient number to constitute a house. The less, therefore, that is said upon gentlemen's absenting themselves, the better; I will, therefore, drop the sorry subject, and apply myself to superior matter.

My hon. friend (Mr. Nicholls) has been rebuked for introducing the question, whether the war was undertaken from necessity; and the noble lord who has taken upon himself the task of rebuking him, has said, that if any one differed from the opinion respecting the expediency and necessity of the war, which had been so unanimously declared by the house, or chose to give an opinion in contradiction to the unanimous resolutions of the house, he would have done it better by introducing it in the shape of a new question. Now, without disputing the noble lord's authority in this particular rule, I must take the liberty of denying the propriety of his application of it; for, according to my notions of the long-established privileges of the House of Commons of England, it is one of their leading rights, whenever they give and grant, to revise every part of the conduct of the ministers to whom they have entrusted, or are about to entrust, the disposal and expenditure of the public treasure. And, if this privilege exists in us, shall we, sir, be debarred of it by the management of his Majesty's ministers, coming forward on the first day of the session, and, with a trick, entrapping the house into an address unanimously declaratory of their approbation of those very ministers? I fancy not; for, if there be a time when, more than at any other, the good sense and feeling of the people

ought to be appealed to, it is when we put our hands into their pockets.

I will not now, sir, enter into a discussion of the question, whether the war was just, wise, or necessary; or unnecessary, impolitic, and wicked; for I hope to see the day, and that not a very distant one, when it will undergo full consideration—but in the meantime I hope it will not, on the other side, be insisted that peace is unattainable, and that we shall, on our part, be prevented from objecting that the war was unnecessary. An hon. gentleman on the other side has put the question, whether we will rather carry this measure through the house, and submit to its provisions, or leave it to the French to tear the money from our pockets? If, indeed, sir, this were the truth, and this the only alternative, I do hope, and I most sincerely believe, there is not a man in this house, or in this country, let the minister be who he might, that would hesitate to support him in the prosecution of the war with purse, hand, and heart. If there be any who might refuse, in such a cause, to expend the last shilling of his property, and shed the last drop of his blood, he is not to be found among those who, from the beginning, have opposed the war, as equally absurd and unjust. If France looks for friends and abettors here, they must look among the slaves who bow to power, and barter their principles for their private advantage, and not among the real friends of freedom.

But here, sir, let me be indulged in a few observations respecting the sincerity of his Majesty's ministers in their attempts at negotiation. For my part, when I look at the heap of papers that have been laid before the house on that subject, I can discover nothing in them but a trial of diplomatic skill—a contest of dexterity, who should best succeed in avoiding the imputation of duplicity, and most speciously impose on the credulity, and frustrate the expectations of Europe. Indeed, it is my opinion, that both parties were equally indisposed to peace. But admitting that such was the disposition of the French governmentadmitting that the French directory have behaved insultingly towards our ambassador-admitting that the whole of the French nation entertain an inveterate hatred and rancorous hostility against us, and that they are all actuated by the same hostile resolution at aiming at our destruction; must I, therefore, submit to the inference, that because pacific offers have been made

and rejected, and because ministers and their plenipotentiary representative have been disrespectfully treated by the French government, ministers are to stand proudly erect, and imperiously to demand the general concurrence of all those who first had thought proper to condemn and oppose their measures? That I and my friends have frequently urged the propriety and necessity of making pacific propositions to the enemy; that we have also pledged ourselves, should the enemy persevere in an obstinate refusal to listen to reasonable and adequate conditions, that we would support even the present administration, I am ready to confess; but that support it was our intention to afford them only as long as we thought it possible that such ministers might yet obtain a peace. That support we were disposed to lend them while our efforts were as yet seconded by powerful allies, and before the French nation had grasped at and attained their present enormous power; that pledge and promise were given while the Bank of England was yet in credit, and while the public faith remained inviolate. But from these propositions of peace, and from these pledges of support to the present ministers, we desisted last session; circumstances compelled us to adopt a contrary conduct-instead of pledging ourselves any longer to countenance the measures of ministers, an hon. friend of mine, a worthy alderman (Mr. Combe), brought forward a motion for an address to his Majesty, humbly beseeching him to remove his present ministers; and representing to his Majesty that, under their auspices, the attainment of peace was impossible; for that, instead of accelerating the return, they, on the contrary, stood directly in the way of peace; or, as the worthy alderman then very happily expressed it, that the blessings of peace, and the existence of the present ministry, were wholly incompatible; yet, after this direct avowal of our total distrust of their con duct, they now come forward and tell us that we must still give them our support; that parliament is still to countenance and defend the measures of the right hon. gentleman; when, in reality, the only countenance he looks for is, that we defend his existence in administration; he who has broke the bank and ruined the public credit,-though it was his proud boast, that his existence in power, and that of the prosperity of our finances, were involved in one and the same fate.

Nor am I backward, sir, also to declare, that it is not to curb

the ambition of the enemy, or to frustrate the views of French aggrandisement, that the war is now continued. The war, sir, is continued for the sole purpose of keeping nine worthless ministers in their places. When I profess this to be my opinion, I by no means intend anything personally disrespectful to them— their public conduct is all that I impeach; and the calamities that redound from it to the country. Indeed, I feel and know it, that as long as they remain in their present sentiments, there is no possibility of their obtaining peace: and those of them who possess a sound and sincere understanding, must be as sensible of their inability as I am. Why then will they persevere in a mercenary preference of their own interests to those of their country, convinced, as they must be, that the principles they have acted on, and which they still avow, must effectually prevent them from negotiating with success? And how is it possible they should ever treat with success, while they continue solemnly to hold out to the country, that the enjoyment of all that is dear to it, and that the existence of the British constitution, are inconsistent with the existence of the French republic?—that with the principles on which that republic is founded, none of the oldestablished forms and institutions of Europe-in a word, the order of the civilized world-can be reconciled? That, with a power so principled and disposed, they will accede to no terms, unless they be driven to it by the last extremity? From this unwise and inadvertent declaration, what will be the conclusion which the French government must naturally draw? Why, that we attempt a negotiation only because we are reduced to the very last extremity, as we were prepared to make every sacrifice sooner than attempt it. On the effects of such a conclusion, I must beg the house seriously to reflect. But what was the obstacle which impeded the progress, and finally broke off the first negotiation ?—The obstacle publicly held out, was the possession of Belgium by the French. As long as France continued in the possession of that country, it was impossible to think of peace; not, however, that we deemed it necessary for the emperor, but rather for ourselves. We next gave in a project of our own; and we still continued to contend that the war originated in aggression on the part of the French; but here I must beg leave to say, that the drift of our own arguments, and the principles upon which we have proceeded, would prove the aggression to