swered the purpose of its establishment. Mr. Howard's authority had been quoted to justify its damp narrow cells, and its solitary confinement. But Mr. Howard meant this confinement to be limited only to persons whose lives were forfeited to the laws, whose punishment was commuted. Neither did Mr. Howard recommend that solitary confinement to be extended farther than what tended to reformation, and it was in his plan to have the cells warmed with tubes passing through them. What would he have thought, however, to see persons on suspicion of high treason, probably without information on oath, exposed to a treatment like this, so nearly approaching to torture? It had been remarked that formerly, when numbers of persons had been arrested at Sheffield and elsewhere, the good treatment they experienced had convinced them that the constitution which practised such lenity could not be incurably defective. But what would be the sentiment diffused through the country, when the prisoner wrote to his starving wife and family that he himself was exposed to sufferings still more rigorous than theirs? He had one observation more to make, and it was to submit to the attorney-general a question of great importance. He contended that the warrants under which many persons were arrested were illegal, and that ministers would be obliged to apply for a bill of indemnity. What he wished to ask was, whether the suspension of the habeas-corpus gave a power to ministers to arrest persons whom they would not previously have been entitled to arrest? Without information on oath, were they entitled to send men to prison, or were they merely authorised to postpone the trials of men whom it would be dangerous, or inconvenient, to bring to trial within the ordinary time prescribed by law? If a bill of indemnity should be required, it would be a strong argument against it, should ministers have abused the power so obtained, by exercising upon persons detained a rigour beyond the necessity of the case, and foreign from the genius and spirit of the laws of England. Upon the whole, he thought that his hon. friend had brought forward charges which deserved inquiry, and the defects on the face of the report justified its recommitment.

Towards the close of the debate Mr. Sheridan rose again.

Mr. Sheridan hoped the house would permit him to offer a few words in explanation of the question which he had put to

the learned gentleman (the attorney-general), as the learned gentleman had most undoubtedly misunderstood him; for he ascribed to him a very improper question, in supposing that he meant to ask whether persons who should have been thus imprisoned on suspicion of treason, and thus cruelly treated during their imprisonment, might not afterwards be entitled to bring an action against his Majesty's secretary of state? Such a question, indeed, would have been improper and idle in the extreme; for how could it be supposed that a miserable wretch, who was, both himself and his family, totally ruined, and who had not a shilling remaining in the world, could be able to institute such an action? He never, surely, could have dreamt of putting such a question. What he asked was, " whether, during the suspension of the habeas corpus act, and when that suspension had armed ministers with farther powers for committing persons to prison than they possessed before, they ought not to be responsible and amenable for any superfluous and unnecessary hardships which such powers might enable them to inflict upon persons, who might be detained in prison, in consequence of the suspension of the habeas-corpus ?" This question he had followed up with arguments and illustrations to support its propriety, and remarked how seriously it behoved ministers to look to that; if they had been armed with any extraordinary powers, for the security of the constitution and the country, no one exertion of it should lead them to any act of unnecessary rigour in carrying into execution the measures for which such powers had been intrusted to their hands.

The house divided-for the motion 6; against it 47.

FEBRUARY 10, 1800.

HELDER EXPEDITION.

MR. SHERIDAN rose for the purpose of moving for an inquiry into the causes of the failure of the expedition against Holland; and delivered himself as follows:

Sir, upon the extraordinary meeting of parliament on the 24th of September last, an opportunity occurred of discussing the propriety of reducing the militia force of the country, by the introduction of a bill to carry that measure farther than had been done by the act of the preceding session. The avowed

purpose of that bill was, to enable ministers to prosecute the expedition against Holland. Unfortunately, I then differed from some of those gentlemen with whom I always feel it painful to disagree upon political questions. I did not think that, in the peculiar circumstances in which we then were placed, it, was proper to oppose the measure. I will repeat the reason which then dictated my conduct. I then disapproved, as much as I had ever done, that bill, as a dangerous violation of our great constitutional defence, the militia system. When it was proposed, however, to renew and extend the act, there were inducements to a reluctant acquiescence in its renewal, which did not exist upon its first adoption. The law had passed, and ministers had availed themselves of its provisions, to assemble that army which was engaged in the Dutch expedition. We had received accounts of the battle of the 19th of September at Bergen Our troops were in a critical situation; and, seeing no other means by which reinforcements could be procured, I was unwilling that anything should be done that could lead our gallant army to think, for a moment, that they were abandoned by a British parliament.

On that occasion likewise I assumed, that ministers, in prosecuting the attempt which they had begun, acted on the most authentic information of the favourable dispositions of the Dutch people. I stated, that the executive government, in relying upon their knowledge, and proceeding upon their intelligence, incurred a great responsibility. Having done so then, I should conceive that I shrunk from a sort of pledge that I had given, did I not now endeavour to make ministers answer for the confidence which they had obtained, and for the course which they had pursued. I was, indeed, inclined to entertain no very sanguine hopes of ultimate success in the enterprise, after the experience we had of its commencement. My apprehensions were removed in some measure, when I heard it stated by a right hon. gentleman opposite to me, that we had the most unquestionable information of the attachment of the Dutch to the cause we supported. I was again damped in these agreeable expectations, when I found that the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Pitt) shrunk from any declaration that ministers proceeded on such sure ground, when he said, that we were justified in the prosecution of the plan, by a knowledge, not of the actua

state and disposition of the Dutch people, but by a knowledge of human nature-a knowledge now recorded in characters of blood and woe upon the coasts of Holland. When I heard this alleged as sufficient foundation for our experiment, I again despaired of a favourable result.

As to the inquiry which I shall have the honour to propose, few arguments, I should think, will be necessary to prove that it ought to be adopted. When the news arrived of the total failure of the expedition, a failure so disastrous, so disgraceful, so humiliating to those by whom it was planned, while no blame can attach to the conduct of the gallant officers and men, whose efforts were thus rendered unprofitable, the universal cry was, that an inquiry should be instituted by the house into the causes by which so ignominious an event was occasioned. Whether the public feeling of indignation has cooled in the interval that has elapsed, or not, I will not take upon me to say. The right hon. gentleman, however, did everything in his power to prevent any motion for inquiry while the disgrace was yet recent, and the feeling of the country warm. With the intelligence in his possession, of what amounted to nothing less than the overthrow of all our hopes of ultimate success, parliament was adjourned ; every attempt to investigate was rendered impossible; and the resentment and mortification of the public were left to sink away of themselves, or to be diverted by fresh occurrences.

I profess, sir, that in bringing this subject before the house, I do not consider it as a party question. It is one that can admit of no party feeling. It is a question that, in the highest degree, interests every feeling for the glory of the country, every sentiment of humanity for the loss our troops have sustained, for the honour which they have to support. As members of this house, we are called upon by the sacred duty we owe to our constituents, to investigate a transaction, which, on the face of it, presents so much argument for inquiry; and which, in its consequences, has been attended with such a waste of blood and expense of treasure. In treating of this question, I shall not proceed upon such private information as every gentleman in this house may have had an opportunity to obtain. I shall found my arguments and conclusions upon the recorded accounts of ministers themselves in their own gazettes, upon the information furnished by them in their proclamations and treaties. I shall not

consider the advantages of having obtained possession of the Dutch fleet. That acquisition I view, perhaps, as less important than others do, and I shall take an opportunity of saying a few words respecting it. Excepting the Dutch fleet, then, what have we obtained to compensate for the loss of men, for the profusion of money, for the discredit we have incurred? I should be extremely glad to know what arguments will be employed to dissuade the house from agreeing to an inquiry. I hope we shall tonight hear it urged against examining into the causes of an expedition so wasteful in its attempt, so ignominious in its failure, that it might reveal what is not proper to be known, that it will interrupt the service, or produce those inconveniences which it has been usual to object to such a motion for inquiry. Arguments like these, I have heard combatted by the right hon. gentleman during the American war, and I hope he will not rely upon them now. Indeed, they have not in this case the plausibility they may have had in others. By investigating the causes of the failure of the expedition to Holland, what is there to reveal that can be prejudicial to us in future? What interruption can it give to any part of the public service? I certainly cannot suppose that it will be contended that there has been no failure. I cannot conceive that the corrupt and clandestine surrender of the Dutch fleet will be viewed as the attainment of all our wishes, and the success of all our vices. Yet I see, that in the speech of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, on opening the parliament of that country, something like this is advanced. The Marquis Cornwallis tells the Irish parliament, that the expedition to Holland has been attended with such mighty advantages, that it will prevent the invasion of Ireland, and so forth, and merely speaks of it as having not quite succeeded. He speaks as if the main object of our policy, and of our efforts, was not the deliverance of the Dutch from the yoke of France; not the restoration of the house of Orange to their rights; not the protection of religion, the defence of social order; but the capture of a few Dutch ships of war had been the object of such expensive preparation and extraordinary efforts, as if for such an acquisition we have subsidized the mercenary magnanimity of Russia, and for this called into action our military strength, and strained our financial resources What other advantage than this, I ask, have we obtained from this famed secret expedition? Secret, indeed, it