having already entered into a negotiation, by which the enemy are to evacuate the country. Now, sir, we who talk of the conduct of the French, what do we say to this? Suppose a party of French had landed in Ireland, and that we had some Russian officers in our service in that kingdom, we agree with the French that they shall evacuate it. "No," say the Russians, "they shall stay where they are; they shall not go till they have laid down their arms." Would not the right hon. gentleman reprobate such conduct in his loftiest strain? Sir, I will not press this subject farther; but I do hope and trust that it will again be taken up separately and seriously.

I recur now to the correspondence; and I do it in order to show how hastily some gentlemen give credit to his Majesty's ministers, when they tell us that Count St. Julien had no authority to treat, and that Sir Sidney Smith had none. Let gentlemen advert to this circumstance-let me ask them whether any trust is to be given to that letter in the correspondence which speaks of the letter of General Kleber, and which characterises it as containing an engagement to execute the convention of El Arish as soon as the king's acquiescence in it should be made known to him? Let gentlemen refer to the letter itself.

Sir, I cannot but think I see, through the whole of the correspondence, the preparation for a rupture; I see Captain George appointed, because the attention of the public shall not be drawn to the communications with M. Otto. This stiff-necked policy shows insincerity. I see Mr. Nepean and Mr. Hammond also appointed to confer with M. Otto, because they are of the same rank. Is not this as absurd as if Lord Whitworth were to be sent to Petersburgh, and told that he was not to treat but with some gentleman of six feet high, and as handsome as himself? Sir, I repeat that this is a stiff-necked policy, when the lives of thousands are at stake. Ministers seem to have an excellent knack at putting papers together; they have given us before pictures of pikes and profiles of spears; and, until we sift and compare things, many of us might be led to suppose that they were seriously desirous of peace. Lord Grenville says, "If the situation of the French army in that country were to become matter of discussion between the two governments, his Majesty and his allies have a right, on every principle of good faith, as practised between civilized nations, to require that the French

should evacuate Egypt on the terms stipulated in the convention of Arish, those stipulations having been ratified both by the Turkish government and by the French commanding officer, and his Majesty having also instructed his admiral commanding in those seas to accede to them as soon as they were known here. This demand would be made with the more reason, because, even subsequent to the recommencement of hostilities in Egypt (under circumstances to which his Majesty forbears to advert), an official engagement was entered into by General Kleber in his letter to the kaimakan, dated the 10th April, 1800, by which that gene. ral, then commanding in chief the French army in Egypt, and, consequently, possessing full powers to bind his government in this respect, formally undertook that the convention of El Arish should be executed so soon as the king's acquiescence in it should be notified to him." What does General Kleber say?" The Sublime Porte will still find me disposed to deliver up to him the possession of Egypt upon the conditions stipulated at El Arish, with the exception of some modifications which the existing circumstances have rendered necessary. Thus all motive for a fresh effusion of blood would be obviated, and a regular negotiation (the effect of which would no longer be prevented by unforeseen orders) would restore to the Ottoman Empire those provinces of which it would be in vain to attempt to deprive us `by force of arms. If your excellency shares these sentiments of peace and concord, you will communicate them to his Majesty the Emperor Selim the Second; and, without doubt, you will obtain orders to resume, without delay, those conferences which would conduct us to the object which we are equally desirous of attaining."

It thus appears that General Kleber calls for a new negotiation, and desires to have fresh conferences. There is not a word in the letter which states he will evacuate Egypt as soon as the king's acquiescence is known. A right hon. gentleman attempted, the other day, to attach some importance to the letter of an aidede-camp, who was at Jaffa. Where is the letter? (D in the Appendix to the Correspondence.) I always suspect something from these gentlemen with respect to papers. Does Lord Grenville say anything of this letter? No; he only refers to General Kleber's. Sir, I dwell the more upon this, in order to show that we are not to take it for granted that the cha

racter of the documents referred to in the correspondence is a true one. I have proved that the character given of General Kleber's letter is in no part correct; and I contend I have a right to assume that the description of other papers is as little correct. Sir, I honestly confess that I do not believe anything would have induced the secretary at war to have put his name to such a quibble.

The object of the motion which it is my intention to submit, is, to afford one step more towards negotiation, and remove those impediments which our connection with the Emperor of Germany has thrown in the way of it. With respect to the war itself, I do think it to have been a most unsuccessful, and (to ministers) a most disgraceful one. God forbid that any man should, as some persons hinted the other night, attack the exploits of our navy! they have been most glorious and splendid; but when you talk of a successful war, you must mean one that has accomplished the objects for which it was undertaken. Have you deterred other countries from aggrandizement and rapine? Have you restored the Bourbons? No; but you have taken Trincomalee. Have you re-established the noblesse of France? No; but you have taken Ceylon. Have you restored the orders of France? No; but you have taken the Cape. But will you tell me, that if you place these in one scale, and the two hundred and seventy millions of debt in the other, the latter will not overbalance your successes? But this is not the fair way. You must calculate what you will keep; you must calculate the seventeen millions imposed by the war; you must calculate their effect upon the industry and impatience of the country. Will any man tell me that we should have consented to have made the purchase at such a price, even without the loss of a single life? No, sir, no. This, then, I contend, is an unsuccessful war. But, it is said, "we have annihilated the navy of the enemy." Let us recollect, however, the time when it was said “that nothing could compensate for leaving Holland in the power of France, for suffering her to possess the Netherlands, and for permitting her to have such a long line of coast, from the Texel almost to the Adriatic." You may, it is true, leave the enemy crippled, but you leave them with the power of raising themselves to as great a naval height as they ever were in possession of before.

But it is said "we have preserved our constitution." How have we preserved it? So careful have ministers been of its preservation, that they are afraid to give us the use of it. They have considered it as some choice thing which ought to be put out of sight, and carefully locked up. I hope, sir, the constitution is only suspended, and that we shall yet see it in all its splendour; but, till that time comes, I can give no one any credit for his attentions to it. Sir, peace must be concluded, or it must be proved that the period of fraud, prevarication, and insincerity is over, and that a new system of things is about to commence. If I am asked "whether I expect that ministers will ever make peace with sincerity ?" I answer "No!" In some circumstances I can conceive that they may conclude a peace which might be preferable to this destructive war; and I believe that they will, ere long, be compelled to conclude one of some kind or other. But that they will ever be authors of a peace which will heal the wounds the war has inflicted, which will soothe national animosity, which will justify a reduction of our forces, which will render it possible to lighten the oppressive load of taxes-that they will make a peace of conciliation, I confess that I have no hope. I do not say that there is but one man in the kingdom capable of making a solid peace. God forbid! I believe that there are many. But I do not scruple to say that a solid peace can be concluded only upon the principles of that one man. Who that man is, it is needless for me to mention, and his principles are equally well known. All right to interfere with the internal concerns of other nations must be disclaimed; and, for commanding due respect to the constitution, we must trust to the good sense and loyalty of the people, and disdain the idea that jacobinism can make any impression upon England. That such a peace may produce the blessings and benefits which peace is calculated to confer, the rights of the people must be attended to-the constitution must be restored. Without national liberty, national happiness can neither be great in its degree, extensive in its sphere, or long in its duration. Those bonds which now slavishly bind down the inhabitants of this country, which break the spirit of the people, which render impossible the expression of the public voice, must all be completely removed. Till then, while war continues, our sufferings must be aggravated, and they will be but slightly alleviated even by the arrival of peace.

Mr. Sheridan concluded with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, humbly to assure him that we have taken into our most serious consideration the papers relative to the negotiation for peace with France, and that the result of our reflections on this important subject, founded as well on due examination of the documents now referred to us, as on experience of the past conduct of most of his Majesty's allies, is an humble, but earnest desire, that his Majesty will omit no proper opportunity which may arise, consistently with the good faith ever preserved on the part of his Majesty, of entering into a separate negotiation with the government of France for a speedy and honourable peace; and farther to implore his Majesty not to sanction any new engagements which shall preclude such a mode of negotiation."

For the motion 35; against it 156.

MAY 14, 1802.

DEFINITIVE TREATY.

MR. SHERIDAN said, sir, at this late hour, (about two o'clock), it is with extreme reluctance I rise to address the house, and to trespass upon your time and patience. I shall not be singular to-night in the professions I make you of avoiding details: but, sir, in one respect my conduct will differ from that of any other gentleman who has addressed you. I will keep my word. If I feel repugnance to rise at so late an hour, I feel equally strange with respect to the unpopularity which I fear I must experience. It is natural to every person to have pleasure in voting in a majority, though to that pleasure, I believe, I have long been a stranger. Among the strange things we are continually witnessing, is the strange division of parties at present in this house. Sir, I have heard it said, that there are about twelve or thirteen different parties among us; nay, some carry the number much farther. Now I scarcely expect a single vote with me beyond that little circle of a constitutional party, who have for the last ten years been the objects of so much unqualified abuse; but those men who have so often been held up to public opprobrium, are the very same men whose every prediction has been fulfilled, and every fear realized. The discussion of this necessary, but disgraceful treaty of peace to-night, is a confirmation of the propriety of their political conduct during