and from the relation which the Supreme Being bears to his rational creatures, that he would communicate to them such information as he might deem suitable to the government of moral and accountable agents.

It is evident, that mankind are capable of religion; or, in other words, that they are endowed with capacities which are adapted to the service and enjoyment of the Creator; if so, no one can reasonably doubt, that this service, and this enjoyment, constitute the chief end of their creation. For, the supposition that God created a species of beings adapted to a much higher end than that which he has actually assigned them, involves an imputation which reflects dishonour both on his wisdom and on his benevolence.

If, then, God designed to receive the homage and obedience of his intelligent creatures, it follows, that he would furnish them with instructions relative to the proper discharge of those obligations. Without such instructions, they could not know any thing correctly of the Divine character, or of the nature and extent of moral duty.

From these premises the following deductions appear to be just and natural. That a revelation from heaven would contain all necessary information concerning the character of the Supreme

Being; that it would exhibit moral obligation in its full extent; that it would not merely state to mankind the fact of their obligation, but insist, also, on the particular duties which they are required to perform; and that it would accompany its requisitions with such promises and threatenings as should be calculated to enforce the observance of them; in a word, that it would contain all necessary directions to secure and enjoy the favour of God.

Now, the Sacred Scriptures afford us ample communications on all these topics. They impress the conviction, that God is spotless in holiness, inflexible in justice, and illimitable in goodness. With respect to his relations, they represent him as a beneficent Father, supplying the wants of his creatures; as the Universal Sovereign, controlling them according to his pleasure; and as the Eternal Legislator, giving them just and suitable laws. It is in the last of these relations that we are now contemplating him; for, in publishing his law, he revealed his will, in which he requires the supreme affection and unwearied obedience of all intelligent beings, on pain of his displea

sure.

This branch of the Divine will contains all those injunctions and prohibitions which are calculated to regulate the passions and conduct

of moral agents. It is perfectly reasonable; because it insists on the natural and indispensable claims of the Divine Majesty on his subjects; it is unquestionably equitable; because it requires that obedience, only, for which they possess every natural qualification;—and it is expressive of the highest benevolence, because the conformity of men to its requisitions involves their true happiness.

Let it be observed, also, that the preceptive will or moral commands of God must be the same in every age. It is impossible that a law, possessing the properties which have just been mentioned, should ever become obsolete; for God is unchangeable in his relation to his creatures, no less than in his nature and character: that is, he never can cease to be the Sovereign Ruler of rational beings; and, consequently, can never cease to demand their love and obedience. If the contrary were possible, the Divine Majesty would virtually relinquish the character of a just and holy Governor, release his creatures from their obligations, and declare himself to be unworthy of their supreme regard.

Further; it cannot be reasonably expected, that the preceptive will of God, contained in the Decalogue, should ever be superseded, or that any other code should be introduced as a

substitute for it; because, in the first place it, naturally arises from Jehovah's supremacy; and, secondly, because it insists on those duties which are absolutely and unchangeably essential to the existence of true religion. Now, if any other law were substituted, it must of course contain something which this does not; or its demands must be fewer, or less rigorous; otherwise the substitution were absurd. But, to suppose the introduction of a law, requiring more than the original code, were to charge that original code with imperfection; and, should it be exchanged for one less extensive, and less rigorous, it would be liable to the imputation of unreasonableness and severity.

It is evident, I presume, from the preceding remarks, that a law, exhibiting the demands of the Eternal Ruler, is natural and indispensable. Imagine it possible, however, for God to repeal the moral law; still, if the above position be admitted, he must replace it by introducing some other for the government of mankind.. But what law could the Divine Legislator frame, worthy of his glorious perfections, which would not require supreme love and universal obedience? If this, then, should be the character of the supposed new law, it must of necessity: contain every article in the Decalogue; consequently, the repeal of the Decalogue, and

object, as the result of the moral system, and we require nothing more to support our position. For, as an omniscient, and infinitely wise Being could not choose to be ignorant of any future events, we may conclude, that he would not refrain from making such a selection from those events as should effectually promote his design; unless it can be proved, that events, merely fortuitous, may transpire with as much regularity, and tend to promote an object with as much exactness, as they would in pursuance of the wisest arrangement.

Whatever purposes the Eternal Sovereign may have formed, respecting the circumstances of individuals, or of nations, it would be improper for us to expect any very minute developement of them in his word. He has, indeed, predicted some events which are of the highest importance to the human race; but he has ever avoided the notice of such particulars as would only serve to gratify a vain curiosity, or would interfere with the perfect freedom of human actions. No reason can be alleged, why God should make known to his creatures, at large, his purposes. No motive for this disclosure can arise from himself; for, being infinitely wise, he can have no inducement to consult with inferior intelligences; and, as for us, we may rest assured, that no communication beyond