Prolegomena to EthicsClarendon Press, 2003 - 477 pàgines This is a new edition of T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), a classic of modern philosophy, in which Green sets out his perfectionist ethical theory. In addition to the text of the Prolegomena itself, this new edition provides an introductory essay, a bibliographical essay, and an index. Brink's extended editorial introduction examines the context, themes, and significance of Green's work and will be of special interest to readers working on the history of ethics, ethical theory, political philosophy, and nineteenth century philosophy. |
Continguts
Editors Introduction | xiii |
CONTENTS | xix |
Preface to the First Edition 1883 | cxv |
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEALCONTINUED | cxxxix |
Use and necessity of the distinction between nature and spirit | 54 |
CHAPTER II | 63 |
and thus shows the existence of an eternal consciousness in man | 65 |
And it is implicitly admitted that the perceiving consciousness is | 70 |
And though it is true that a man might think of his good | 228 |
In this sense Reason as necessary to the idea of an absolute and | 233 |
If we take its abstract expression in the formula suum cuique | 243 |
This idea of justice and of a duty to man as man is at once a priori | 249 |
determination of the content of the idea of good | 254 |
But can the good which satisfies the self be a sum of pleasures? | 260 |
And the wellbeing of a family which is identified by a | 270 |
The happiness he seeks for them is the same as that he seeks | 277 |
Illustration of this by the process of reading where a general | 71 |
Nor does the epithet free take away all meaning from the word | 77 |
CHAPTER III | 85 |
But does not this imply that man himself is in part a mere product | 89 |
and that the appearance of the distinctively human consciousness | 95 |
Thus the form in which it presents a good to itself is conditioned | 102 |
The existence of action from such motives is far more certain than | 103 |
It is true that the act does necessarily proceed from the motive | 116 |
For example the instinctive impulse to obtain food without | 121 |
по Remorse and selfreformation are intelligible on this view which | 122 |
II2 But the question itself implies that the questioner is not this but | 125 |
And 3 the same action of selfconsciousness is farther implied | 127 |
Or is it a real unity arising from the action of a single principle in | 132 |
And in some cases there is a still more complete involution of desire | 135 |
And this is equally the case whether the adopted desire is good | 141 |
opposed and the effort to overcome this opposition | 146 |
Not only is selfsatisfaction sought in ways known to involve | 159 |
To refuse to call this identification desire would be arbitrary | 162 |
But it is misleading to say that mere thought is not will or that will | 168 |
The assumptions that it is that it is present to a divine | 173 |
The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress | 174 |
Hence we suppose it to be realised in nations or in the progress | 184 |
On the ground according to Mill that men knowing both do prefer | 185 |
It is only through it that certain desires on the reality of which | 191 |
The circle is inevitable for in the account of an agent whose | 195 |
175 As being such reproduction under limitations man is not merely | 199 |
CHAPTER II | 206 |
Progress of Humanity again can mean only progress of personal | 212 |
In the second place moral progress is not only the widening of | 218 |
And although this realisation would seem to imply a difference | 219 |
The practical value of the idea of good as a criterion will be consid | 227 |
It may however be objected 1 that our definition of virtue does | 289 |
The conception thence arising even if we confine our view | 297 |
But it may be said the effect in this case is a new kind of action | 300 |
For the dangers arising from inadequate theories and from | 312 |
For such forms must be theoretically inadequate to spiritual | 318 |
Thus though there cannot really be more than one duty in a given | 324 |
In any case it can hardly be held that the selfdenying man obtains | 327 |
It is an illusion to suppose that the desires of different men | 333 |
Its prevalence may be ascribed apart from theoretical mistakes | 337 |
Ideal virtue then being defined as selfdevoted activity to | 339 |
The Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance | 346 |
but as an illustration will show the difficulty of explaining | 350 |
Indeed but for our imperfect knowledge we should see that in | 352 |
But the Chief Good according to the theory is the greatest possible | 359 |
But the function of conscience is not to estimate the precise value | 366 |
And as we have seen the rational soul in seeking an end must | 370 |
CHAPTER II | 372 |
The content of the obligation they assert is blended with | 388 |
Such enlightenment however to be of practical value presupposes | 396 |
At the same time the question may be raised whether this definition | 402 |
But in reality while either theory may suffice for the ordinary cases | 409 |
Again if it be maintained that a course of action if generally | 415 |
A duty must be explained to mean ultimately an act pleasing | 421 |
35I And this danger might become real if the Hedonistic criterion | 428 |
Hence though the idea of human perfection cannot enable us | 436 |
simply a state of pleasure and pleasure is anticipated in | 447 |
but the end which | 454 |
appealed to | 458 |
| 473 | |
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A. C. Bradley absolute idealism according admit agent animal arise Aristotle attainment become British idealism C. D. Broad capable capacities categorical imperative character claims common conceived conception conscience consciousness constitutes deliberative depends desire for pleasure determined distinction doctrine dualism duty effect empiricism epistemology eternal ethics eudaimonism existence experience expression fact feeling freedom fulfilment Greek Green thinks happiness Hedonistic human idea ideal implies individual intelligence interest J. S. Mill Kant Kant's knowledge Liberalism man's means merely mind motive nature object of desire ourselves pain particular perfection perfectionist person phenomena philosophy possible practical present principle Prolegomena psychological egoism psychological hedonism question rational realisation reality reason recognised reflection relation result satisfaction seeks self-consciousness self-realization self-satisfaction sensation sense Sidgwick social society soul spirit succession sum of pleasures supposed T. H. Green theory thing thought tion true understanding utilitarianism virtue well-being