by it, though unconscious of it. And this is generally true of first truths. They are so universally and so necessarily assumed in practice, that we lose the direct consciousness of being inflenced by them. Myriads of illustrations of this are arising all around us. We do really love God, that is, exercise good will to Him. Of this we are strongly conscious. We are also conscious of willing His actual blessedness upon condition that He is good. This reason we naturally assign to our selves and to others. But in this we may overlook the fact that there is still another and a deeper, and a more fundamental reason assumed for willing His good, to wit, its intrinsic value. And this reason is so fundamental that we should irresistibly affirm our obligation to will His good upon the bare perception of His susceptibility of Happiness wholly irrespective of His character.

Before I quit this subject, I must advert again to the subject of complacent love as a phenomenon of the sensibility and also as a phenomenon of the intelligence. There are sad mistakes and gross and ruinous delusions entertained by many upon this subject, if I mistake not. The intelligence of necessity, perfectly approves of the character of God where it is apprehended. The intelligence is so correlated to the sensibility that where it perceives in a strong light the Divine excellence, or the excellence of the Divine law, the sensibility is affected by the perception of the intelligence as a thing of course and of necessity. So that emotions of complacency and delight in the law, and in the Divine character may and often do glow and burn in the sensibility while the heart is unaffected. The will remains in a selfish choice, while the intellect and the sensibility are strongly impressed with the perception of the Divine excellence. This state of the intellect and the sensibility are, no doubt, often mistaken for true religion. We have undoubted illustrations of this in the Bible, and great multitudes of cases of it in common life. "Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not the ordinance of their God: they ask of me the ordinances of justice, they take delight in approaching to God." Isaiah 58: 2. "And, lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument: for they hear thy words, but they do them not." Ezekiel 33: 32.

Nothing is of greater importance than forever to understand that religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will; that it always and necessarily produces outward ac

tion and inward feeling; that on account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility, almost any and every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as produced by the perceptions of the intelligence whatever the state of the will may be; that unless we are conscious of good will or of consecration to God and the good of being unless we are conscious of living for this end, it avails us nothing, whatever our views and feelings may be.

And also it behooves us to consider that although these views and feelings may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist when the heart is right; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling when the heart is wrong, yet that there will and must be deep emotion and strenuous action when the heart is right. Let it be remembered, then, that complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is always a striking characteristic of true love or benevolence to God; that is, that the mind is affected and consciously influenced in willing the actual and infinite blessedness of God by a regard to His goodness. The goodness of God is not, as has been repeatedly shown, the fundamental influence or reason of the good will, but it is one reason or a condition both of the possibility of willing, and of the obligation to will his actual blessedness. It assigns to itself and to others, as has been said, this reason for loving God, or willing His good, rather than the truly fundamental one, to wit, the intrinsic value of good, because that is so universally and so necessarily assumed, that it thinks not of mentioning that, taking it always for granted, that that will and must be understood.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN ENTIRE OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of God.

12. Opposition to sin is another attribute or characteristic of true love to God.

This attribute is simply benevolence contemplated in its relations to sin. This attribute certainly is implied in the very essence and nature of benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or willing the highest good of being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more palpably and diametrically opposite to this end than sin. Benevolence can not do otherwise than be forever opposed to sin as that abominable thing which it necessarily hates. It is absurd and a contradiction to affirm that benevolence is not opposed to sin. God is love or benevolence. He must, therefore, be the unalterable opponent of sin-of all sin, in every form and degree.

But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that are often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. Opposition to sin as a virtue, is and must be a phenomenon of the will. But it also often exists as a phenomenon of the intellect, and likewise of the sensibility. The intelligence cannot contemplate sin without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often mistaken for opposition of heart, or of will, to it. When the intellect strongly disapproves of and denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily a corresponding feeling of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion of loathing, of hatred, of abhorrence. This is often mistaken for opposition of the will, or heart. This is manifest from the fact, that often the most notorious sinners manifest strong indignation in view of oppression, injustice, falsehood, and many forms of sin. This phenomenon of the sensibility and of the intellect, as I said, is often mistaken for a virtuous opposition to sin.

But let it be remembered, that the only virtuous opposition to sin, is a phenomenon of the will. It is a characteristic of love to God and man, or of benevolence. This opposition to sin can not possibly co-exist with any degree of sin in the heart. That is, this opposition can not co-exist with a sinful choice. The will can not at the same time be opposed to sin, and commit sin. This is impossible, and the supposition involves a contradiction. Opposition to sin as a phenomenon

of the intellect, or of the sensibility may exist in other words, the intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the sensibility may feel strongly opposed to it, while at the same time the will may cleave to self-indulgence, or to that which constitutes sin. This fact, no doubt, accounts for the common mistake, that we can at the same time have a virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to commit it.

Many are, no doubt, laboring under this fatal delusion. They are conscious not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin, but also at times of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore, conclude that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a principle of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful at the same time. Their opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a holy opposition, when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even more so than it is on earth, for the reason that sin is more naked there than it generally is here.

But now the enquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and the sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in? What reason can the mind have for a sinful choice when urged to it neither by the intellect nor the sensibility? The philosophy of this phenomenon needs explanation. Let us attend to it.

I am a moral agent. My intelligence necessarily disapproves of sin. My sensibility is so correlated to my intellect that it sympathizes with it, or is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate sin. I necessarily disapprove of it and condemn it. This affects my sensibility. I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how is this to be accounted for? The usual method is by ascribing it to a depravity in the will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so that it perversely chooses sin for its own sake. Although disapproved by the intelligence and loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the inherent depravity of the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin notwithstanding, and will continue to do so until the faculty is renewed by the Holy Spirit, and a holy bias or inclination is impressed upon the

will itself.

But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this subject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is.

It is admitted, on all hands, that selfishness is sin. Comparatively few seem to understand that selfishness is the whole

of sin, and that every form of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of virtue may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to show that selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present to take the admission that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness? It is the choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our own gratification to the highest good of universal being. Self-gratification is the supreme end of selfishness. This choice is sinful. That is, the moral element, quality or attribute of this selfish choice is sin. Now in no case is or can sin be chosen for its own sake or as an end. Whenever any thing is chosen to gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is sinful, but notwithstanding it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which the choice fixes as an end or for its own sake, but it is the gratification to be afforded by the thing chosen. For example: theft is sinful. But the will in an act of theft does not aim at and terminate on the sinfulness of theft, but upon the gratification expected from the stolen object. Drunkenness is sinful, but the inebriate does not intend or choose the sinfulness for its own sake or as an end. He does not choose strong drink because the choice is sinful but notwithstanding it is so. We choose the gratification, but not the sin, as an end. To choose the gratification as an end is sinful, but it is not the sin that is the object of choice. Our mother Eve ate the forbidden fruit. This eating was sinful. But the thing that she chose or intended was not the sinfulness of eating, but the gratification expected from the fruit. It is not, it can not in any case be true that sin is chosen as an end or for its own sake. Sin is only a quality of selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of sin as an end or for its own sake, but of self-gratification; and this choice of self-gratification as an end is sinful. That is, the moral element, quality or attribute of the choice is sin. To say that sin is or can be chosen for its own sake is absurd. It is the same as saying that a choice can terminate on an element, quality or attribute of itself; that the thing chosen is really an element of the choice itself. This is absurd.

But it is said that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin for its own sake, or because it is sin; that they possess such a malicious state of mind that they love sin for its own sake; that they "roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue;" that "they eat up the sins of God's people as they eat bread;" that is, that they love their sins and the sins of others as they do their necessary food, and choose it for that reason,