Imatges de pàgina
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Do you understand these logomachies, these equivoques? Do you see the least light in this chaos of obscure expressions?

Oh, Locke! Locke! come and define these terms.

earth-the word or spirit, the water, and the blood; and these three are one.'

Those who pretend that this verse is truly St. John's, are much more embarrassed than those who deny it; for they

In all these Platonic dis-must explain it. putes, I believe there was not a single St. Augustin says, that the spirit signione understood. They distinguished two fies the Father, water the Holy Ghost, words, the 'logos endiathetos,'-the word and by blood is meant the Word. This in thought, and the word produced-explanation is fine, but it still leaves a 'logos prophorikos.' They had the eter- little confusion. nity of a word, and the prolation, the emanation from another word.

The book of Apostolic Constitutions, an ancient monument of fraud, but also an ancient depository of these obscure times, expresses itself thus :

"The Father, who is anterior to all generation, all commencement, having created all by his only Son, has engendered this Son without a medium, by his will and his power."

Afterwards Origen advanced, that the Holy Spirit was created by the Son, by the word.

After that came Eusebius of Cæsarea, who taught, that the spirit paraclete is neither of Father nor Son.

The advocate Lactantius flourished in

that time.

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St. Irenæus goes much farther; he says, that Rahab, the prostitute of Jericho, in concealing three spies of the people of God, concealed the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which is strong, but not

consistent.

On the other hand, the great and learned Origen confounds us in a different way. The following is one of many of his passages:

"The Son is as much below the Father as he and the Holy Ghost are above the most noble creatures."

What can be said after that? How can we help confessing, with grief, that nobody understands it? How can we help confessing, that from the first-from the primitive Christians, the Ebionites, those men so mortified and so pious, who "The Son of God," says he, "is the always revered Jesus though they believed word, as the other angels are the spirits him to be the son of Joseph-until the of God. The word is a spirit uttered by great controversy of Athanasius, the Plaa significant voice, the spirit proceeding tonism of the Trinity was always a subfrom the nose, and the word from theject of quarrels. A supreme judge was mouth. It follows, that there is a differ- absolutely required to decide, and he was ence between the Son of God and the at last found in the council of Nice, which other angels; those being emanated like council afterwards produced new factions tacit and silent spirits; while the Son, and wars. being a spirit proceeding from the mouth, possesses sound and voice to preach to the people."

It must be confessed, that Lactantius pleaded his cause in a strange manner. It was truly reasoning á la Plato, and very powerful reasoning.

It was about this time that, among the very violent disputes on the Trinity, this famous verse was inserted in the First Epistle of St. John :

"There are three that bear witness in VOL. 11.-108

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EXPLANATION OF THE TRINTY, ACCORD-
ING TO ABAUZIT.

"We can
can speak with exactness of the
manner in which the union exists of God
and Jesus Christ, only by relating the
three opinions which exist on this sub-
{ject, and by making reflections on each
of them.

"Opinion of the Orthodox. "The first opinion is that of the ortho

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dox. They establish-1st. A distinction of three persons in the divine essence, before the coming of Jesus Christ into the world; 2dly. That the second of these persons is united to the human nature of Jesus Christ; 3rdly, That the union is so strict, that by it, Jesus Christ is God; that we can attribute to him the creation of the world, and all divine perfections; and that we can adore him with a supreme worship.

"Opinion of the Unitarians.

"The second is that of the Unitarians. Not conceiving the distinction of persons in the Divinity, they establish-1st. That divinity is united to the human nature of Jesus Christ; 2dly. That this union is such that we can say, that Jesus Christ is God; that we can attribute to him the creation of the world, and all divine perfections, and adore him with a supreme worship.

"Opinion of the Socinians.

establish a distinction of which we have no idea. There is no appearance, that to imagine a distinction in God, of which we can have no idea, Scripture would put men in danger of becoming idolaters, by multiplying the Divinity. It is besides surprising that this distinction of persons having always existed, it should only be since the coming of Jesus Christ that it has been revealed, and that it is necessary to know them.

"Reflections on the Second Opinion.

"There is not indeed so great danger of precipitating men into idolatry in the second opinion as in the first; but it must be confessed that it is not entirely exempt from it. Indeed, as by the nature of the union which it establishes between Divinity and the human nature of Jesus Christ, we can call him God and worship him, but there are two objects of adoration -Jesus Christ and God. I confess it may be said, that it is God whom we should worship in Jesus Christ; but who knows not the extreme inclination which men have to change invisible objects of worship into objects which fall under the senses, or at least under the imagination? an inclination which they will here gratify without the least scruple, since they say that Divinity is personally united to the humanity { of Jesus Christ.

"Reflections on the Third Opinion.

"The third opinion is that of the Socinians, who, like the Unitarians, not conceiving any distinction of persons in the Divinity, establish--1st. That divinity is united to the human nature of Jesus Christ; 2dly. That this union is very strict; 3dly. That it is not such that we can call Jesus Christ God, or attribute divine perfections and the creation to him, or adore him with a supreme worship; and they think, that all the pas"The third opinion, besides being very sages of Scripture may be explained simple and conformable to the ideas of without admitting any of these things. reason, is not subject to any similar danger of throwing men into idolatry. Though "Reflections on the First Opinion. by this opinion Jesus Christ can be no "In the distinction which is made of more than a simple man, it need not be three persons in the Divinity, we either feared, that by that he can be confounded retain the common idea of persons, or we with prophets or saints of the first order. do not. If we retain the common idea of In this sentiment there always remains a persons, we establish three gods; that is difference between them and him. As we certain. If we do not establish the ordi- can imagine, almost to the utmost, the denary idea of three persons, it is no longer grees of union of divinity with a man, so any more than a distinction of properties; we can conceive, that in particular the which agrees with the second opinion. union of divinity of Jesus Christ has so Or if we will not allow that it is a distinc-high a degree of knowledge, power, felition of persons, properly speaking, we city, perfection, and dignity, that there is

always an immense distance between him and the greatest prophets. It remains only to see whether this opinion can agree with Scripture, and whether it be true that the title of God, divine perfections, creation, and supreme worship, are not attributed to Jesus Christ in the gospels."

It was for the philosopher Abauzit to see all this. For myself I submit, with my heart and mouth and pen, to all that the Catholic church has decided, and to all all that it may decide on any other such dogma. I will add but one word more on the Trinity, which is a decision of Calvin's that we have on this mystery. is it :

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ing of these words. He should have said.-Tell me what you understand by being king? how are you born to be king, and to bear witness unto the truth? It is said that you can only arrive at the ear of kings with difficulty; I, who am a judge, have always had extreme trouble in discovering it. Inform me, whilst your enemies cry outside against you; and you will render me the greatest ser{vice ever rendered to a judge. I would rather learn to know the truth, than condescend to the tumultuous demand of the Jews, who wish me to hang you.

We doubtless dare not pretend to guess what the author of all truth would have said to Pilate.

"In case any person prove heterodox, Should he have said, "Truth is an aband scruples using the words Trinity and {stract word which most men use indifferPerson, we believe not that this can be aently in their books and judgements, for reason for rejecting him; we should support him without driving him from the church, and without exposing him to any censure as a heretic."

error and falsehood?" This definition would be wonderfully convenient to all makers of systems. Thus the word wisdom is often taken for folly, and wit for nonsense.

It was after such a solemn declaration as this, that John Calvin-the aforesaid Humanly speaking, let us define truth, Calvin, the son of a cooper of Noyon-to better understand that which is decaused Michael Servetus to be burnt atclared-such as it is. Geneva by a slow fire with green faggots.

TRUTH.

Suppose that six months only had been taken to teach Pilate the truths of logic: he would doubtless have made this con"PILATE therefore said unto him, Artcluding syllogism :-A man's life should thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto truth: every one that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth? and when he had said this, he went out," &c. (St. John, chap. xviii.)

It is a pity for mankind that Pilate went out, without hearing the reply: we should then have known what truth is. Pilate was not very curious. The accused, brought before him, told him that he was king, that he was born to be a king, and he informs himself not how this can be. He was supreme judge in the name of Cæsar, he had the power of the sword, his duty was to penetrate into the mean

not have been taken away who has only preached a good doctrine; now he who is brought before me, according even to his enemies, has often preached an excellent doctrine; therefore he should not be punished with death.

He might also have inferred this other argument-My duty is to dissipate the riots of a seditious people, who demand the death of a man without reason or juridical form; now such are the Jews on this occasion; therefore I should send them away, and break up their assembly.

We take for granted that Pilate knew arithmetic; we will not therefore speak of these kind of truths.

As to mathematical truths, I believe that he would have required three years at least before he would have been ac

quainted with transcendent geometry. The truths of physics, combined with those of geometry, would have required more than four years. We generally consume six years in studying theology; I ask twelve for Pilate, considering that he was a Pagan, and that six years would not have been too many to root out all his old errors, and six more to put him in a state worthy to receive the bonnet of a doctor. If Pilate had a well organized head, I would only have demanded two years to teach him metaphysical truths, and as these truths are necessarily united with those of morality, I flatter myself that in less than nine years Pilate would have become a truly learned and perfectly

honest man.

Historical Truths.

I should afterwards have said to Pilate,-Historical truths are but probabilities. If you have fought at the battle of Philippi, it is to you a truth, which you know by intuition, by sentiment; but to us who live near the desart of Syria, it is merely a probable thing, which we know by hearsay. How can we form a persuasion from report equal to that of a man, who having seen the thing, can boast of feeling a kind of certainty.

He who has heard the thing told by twelve thousand ocular witnesses, has only twelve thousand probabilities equal to one strong one, which is not equal to certainty.

If you have the thing from only one of these witnesses, you are sure of nothing you must doubt. If the witness is dead, you must doubt still more, for you can enlighten yourself no further. If from several deceased witnesses, you are in the same state.

of the Degrees of Truth, according to which the Accused are judged. We can be made accountable to justice either for deeds or words.

If for deeds, they must be as certain as will be the punishment to which you will condemn the prisoner; if, for example, you have but twenty probabilities against him, these twenty probabilities cannot equal the certainty of his death. If you would have as many probauilities as are required to be sure that you shed not innocent blood, they must be the fruit of the unanimous evidences of witnesses who have no interest in deposing. From this concourse of probabilities, a strong opinion will be formed, which will serve to excuse your judgement; but as you will never have entire certainty, you cannot flatter yourself with knowing the truth perfectly. Consequently you should always lean towards mercy rather than towards rigour.

If it concerns only facts, from which neither manslaughter nor mutilation have resulted, it is evident that you should neither cause the accused to be put to death nor mutilated.

If the questions is only of words, it is still more evident that you should not cause one of your fellow-creatures to be hanged for the manner in which he has used his tongue; for all the words in the world being but agitated air, at least if they have not caused murder, it is ridiculous to condemn a man to death for having agitated the air. Put all the idle words which have been uttered into one scale, and in the other the blood of a man, the blood will weigh down. Now, if he who has been brought before you is only accused of some words which his enemies have taken in a certain sense, all

If from those to whom the witnesses have only spoken, the doubt is still aug-that you can do is to repeat these words mented.

From generation to generation the doubt augments, and the probability diminishes, and the probability is soon reduced to zero.

to him, which he will explain in the sense he intended; but to deliver an innocent man to the most cruel and ignominious punishment, for words that his enemies do not comprehend, is too barbarous. You make the life a man of no more im

portance than that of a lizard; and too fied "he who was charged with relating miany judges resemble you.

TYRANNY.

affairs to the senate."

The acceptations of words change with time. Idiot at first meant only an hermit, an isolated man in time it became synonymous with fool.

At present the name of tyrant is given to an usurper, or to a king who commits violent and unjust actions.

THE Sovereign is called a tyrant who knows no laws but his caprice; who takes the property of his subjects, and afterwards enlists them to go and take that of his neighbours. We have none of these tyrants in Europe. We distinguish the tyranny of one and that of many. The tyranny of several, is that of a body which would invade the rights of other bodies, and which would exercisedoubt an usurper. A general who cuts despotism by favour of laws which it corrupts. Neither are there any tyrannies of this kind in Europe.

Cromwell was a tyrant of both these kinds. A citizen who usurps the supreme authority, who in spite of all laws suppresses the house of peers, is without

the throat of a king, his prisoner of war, at once violates what is called the laws of nations, and those of humanity.

Charles I. was not a tyrant, though the victorious faction gave him that name; he was, it is said, obstinate, weak, and ill-advised. I will not be certain, for I did not know him; but I am certain that he was very unfortunate.

Henry VIII. was a tyrant in his go

covered with the blood of two innocent wives, and that of the most virtuous citizens; he merits the execrations of posterity. Yet he was not punished, and Charles I. died on a scaffold.

Under what tyranny should you like best to live? Under none; but if I must choose, I should less detest the tyranny of a single one, than that of many. A despot has always some good moments; an assemblage of despots, never. If a tyrant does me an injustice, I can disarm him through his mistress, his confessor,vernment as in his family, and alike or his page; but a company of tyrants is inaccessible to all seductions. When they are not unjust, they are harsh, and they never dispense favours. If I have but one despot, I am at liberty to set myself against a wall when I see him pass, to prostrate myself, or to strike my forehead against the ground, according to the custom of the country; but if there is a company of a hundred tyrants, I am liable to repeat this ceremony a hundred times a day, which is very tiresome to those who have not supple joints, If I have a farm in the neighbourhood of one of our lords, I am crushed; if I complain against a relation of the relations of any one of our lords, I am ruined. How must I act? I fear that in this world we are reduced to being either the anvil or the hammer; happy at least is he who escapes this alternative.

TYRANT.

TYRANNOS' formerly "he who had contrived to draw the principal authority to himself;" as 'king,' 'Basileus,' signi

Elizabeth committed an act of tyranny, and her parliament one of infamous weakness, in causing Queen Mary Stuart to be assassinated by an executioner; but in the rest of her government she was not tyrannical; she was clever and manoeuvring, but prudent and strong.

Richard III. was a barbarous tyrant; but he was punished.

Pope Alexander VI. was a more execrable tyrant than any of these, and he was fortunate in all his undertakings.

Christian II. was as wicked a tyrant as Alexander V1. and was punished, but not sufficiently so.

If we were to reckon Turkish, Greek, and Roman tyrants, we should find as many fortunate as the contrary. When I say fortunate, I speak according to the vulgar prejudice, the ordinary acceptation of the word, according to appearances;

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