have no power at all; because they have neither leisure nor abilities to attend to or comprehendit. Thus, in Greece and Rome, many of the philosophers had very tolerable notions both of God and virtue, and on both subjects have written with much elegance. But their notions, the result of philosophic instruction, or solitary speculation, were of no service to the bulk of their countrymen, who would neither attend to, nor could they understand them. Even the philosophers themselves, though pleased with the beauty of their own conceptions, were often involved in serious doubts respecting their truth'; and whilst, in their writings and to their scholars, they largely declaimed on the nature of God, and the practice of virtue, by their countenance and their practice, they encouraged the superstition and the vices of their countrymen. But not only was their practice in many respects improper, and their influence with their countrymen, where it happened to be correct, inconsiderable, but their very speculations were often most erroneous, and led to consequences equally remote from truth and virtue. The Peripatetics thought the world was eternal; and the Epicureans, that it was made by chance; whilst many others considered it as pervaded and animated by a vital and intelligent substance, and regarded it as a divinity which contained, framed, and governed all things, as is evident both R from their * poets, † orators, historians, and philosophers. The Stoics, indeed, considered it as the chief god. The sentient nature of the sun, moon, and stars, was ever in a particular manner asserted by the most eminent philosophers, especially by Pythagoras and his followers, and by the Stoics. Even they, who believed that the world had a beginning, and was a mere mass of created matter, had not the most distant notion of its real origin, either as to time or manner; and this ignorance occasioned an inundation of fanciful and imaginary opinions, respecting what they had no certain information. The corruption and irregularity in human nature, equally puzzled and perplexed them, and tempted them to conclude, either that the nature of God is not pure; that there are too opposite principles in the world, the one good and the other evil; or that the soul of man is not of divine origin. The mode of effecting a reconciliation between God and man, they could not and did not know any thing about. They might hope for mercy, but they could not be assured of acceptance. * See Virgil. Georg. lib. 4. v. 221. and Eneid lib. 6. v. 724. + See Cic. Acad. I. lib. 2. c. 37. and de Nat. Deorum. lib. 2. c. 14. and 34. See Plut. de Flacit. Philos. lib. 1. 2. c. 3. Plat. Tim. Diog. Laert. lib. Ep. 94. &c. c. 7. and lib. 7. and Seneca This was the work of revelation alone. The nature of public worship, and public instruction, for the poor and unlearned especially, was in those periods equally dark 'and indeterminate. They saw the reasonableness of the thing, but were completely at a loss to fix on the mode, and to give authority to their institutions. Ignorance of those important matters, with which we are happily acquainted, produced among the most learned men of ancient times serious doubts, and, in the world at large, universal uncertainty, particularly respecting the nature and attributes of God, the origin of man, the purpose of his creation, and the nature of his relation to the Deity. Many of them, indeed, men of the greatest celebrity, acknowledged that all things were uncertain; that truth lay buried in a deep abyss; and that the utmost that human reason could do in her inquiries, amounted to nothing more than probability, and often mere conjecture. Accordingly, we find the wisest among them absolutely asserting the necessity of a divine revelation, in order to afford to mankind a full and certain knowledge of their duty *. Of the immortality of the soul, and of a future account, the grand and only effectual motives to virtue, they knew nothing certain. The Epicure *See Cicer. Nat. Deor. lib. 1. Acad. Quest, lib. 1. and Minac. Fel. p. 112. and Lact. lib. 3. c. 20. ans entirely disbelieved the soul's immortality; and even the Stoics believed it survived the body but for a certain period; and the other sects, though inclined to believe it, entertained great doubts about it, and differed in this, as in other respects, most materially amongst one another. Socrates said, he had good hope of some sort of being after this life: but, in another place, he seems rather to have wished, than to have been certain of it-the expectation gave him pleasure, but he doubted whether it was not an erroneous hope*: Cicero, speaking of the several opinions on this subject, adds, "Which of these is true, God only knows, and which is most probable, a very great question †." On which Seneca justly remarked, "That immortality, however desireable, was rather promised than proved by those great men ‡. Of course, they knew nothing of a resurrection, or a day of judgment; and they accordingly exploded the notion of infernal torments for the wicked, as mere fictions of the poets. The effect of this ignorance, and these uncertainties, on the conduct of the bulk of men, must be evident to all who have studied the history, or considered the *See Plato in Phod. et in Apol. Socratis. Tusc. Qust. lib. 1. Ep. 102. See Plut. de Aud. Poet. lib. 1. et Senec. ad Marc. c. 19. Cic. Tusc. Quest. nature of the human race. Every thing was doubtful; there was little ground for hope, and equally little for fear. There were therefore no effectual motives for virtuous action, no authoritative institutions to enforce obedience. The philosophers had endles and irreconcileable differences on the most momentous points; and each sect overthrew all others, in order to establish itself, though in certainty or propriety it could afford nothing superior. Some were atheists, some deists, and others polytheists; some believed in futurity, others not; some believed virtue and vice to be naturally opposite and unchangeable; while others asserted, with some of our modern reformers, that the laws and customs of particular countries, alone, determined what was to be reckoned good or evil, just or unjust, right or wrong. The Stoics considered virtue as the sole good and its own reward; while the Aristotelians considered the good things of this life as necessary to happiness; and the Epicureans asserted, that pleasure, or freedom from pain, was the final good. Some acknowledged a Providence, others denied it; some considered it as general, some as particular; some acknowledged the omniscience of God, and others did not; some believed in the punishment of crimes, and others asserted, that the Gods were neither pleased nor displeased on any account what ever, |