SERM. XI. The chief Causes of Scepticism, &c. 201 actually gone over into the tenets of error. This is too visibly the temper of our own times; and we find, that even the days of inspiration themselves were not entirely free from it. The truths delivered immediately by the inspired teachers of it, were misapprehended through the weakness of some, and gainsaid by the wickedness of others. False teachers arose, speaking perverse things, and, in opposition even to the apostles, were able to draw away disciples after them. It is concerning some of these disciples that the apostle speaks in the text; persons, who, besides their natural levity and fickleness of temper, are charged by him as being under the influence of corrupt appetites and passions, laden with sins, led away with divers lusts. It is no wonder, that persons thus qualified, and who had moreover chosen seducers for their guides, though ever learning, should never be able to come to the knowledge of the truth.

But, abstracting from their particular case and character, I crave leave in this discourse to suggest what I take to be the chief causes of scepticism, in matters of religion. And though it be far from being probable, that the state and temper of the persons here spoken of was properly that of scepticism, or a philosophical suspense, (for though they withheld their assent from the truth, they gave it to divers errors, were tossed about by every wind of doctrine, and successively delivered over from one delusion to another,) yet in other parts of their character they bear some resemblance to the sceptics, whose case I have now in view: and, by pointing out these marks of resemblance in two or three instances, I shall

open the way to what I am going to offer, and limit the discourse to that sort of scepticism which I would be understood to mean.

And the persons here spoken of by the apostle were such as owned the authority of the Christian religion, and the obligations arising from it; and their defects in the knowledge of the truth concerned not the truth of the gospel in general, but only some particular truths delivered in it. Agreeably hereto, the sceptics I would be understood to intend are not such as distrust the authority or evidence of Christianity at large, but only suspend their assent to some particular doctrines which it teaches. The persons also spoken of in the text were not entirely negligent and idle about religious inquiries, but employed much pains and application in them; though for want of proper qualifications of mind, and proper methods of conducting these pursuits after sacred knowledge, they failed at last in the attainment of it. In consistency with this observation, the sceptical persons, here supposed, are such only as are masters of some application in the study of religious truths; excluding the careless and carnal part of mankind, who doubt of the articles of their faith, only because they never made any serious inquiries about them.

It may be proper to observe further, that though the apostle makes use of a very strong expression, with reference to the persons he speaks of, viz. that they were never able to come, &c. yet he does not hereby design to intimate any natural impossibility in the thing, but only suggests a moral inability or incapacity in the persons, arising wholly from some wrong conduct or defect in themselves.

According then to this limitation of the subject, I am now to inquire how it comes to pass, that persons who admit the truth of the gospel, and are far from neglecting the study of the truths contained in it, do yet, through some mismanagement, suspend their assent to some doctrines, more or fewer, or at least entertain them with some degree of diffidence and distrust?

And as, in consequence of the last observation, we must look for the causes of this scepticism only in the persons themselves, so perhaps it may be proper to refer them in general, either,

First, to some errors in the conduct of the understanding; or,

Secondly, to some defects in the regulation of the

will:

I. In the first place then, with respect to the errors of the understanding.

As the persons here supposed are only partial, and not universal sceptics, it will be no absurdity to mention false principles and maxims amongst the causes of the sceptical temper. Such an one is the following: that articles of faith and points of doctrine are matters only of speculation and mere indifference, or at most but of little moment and concern. It is evident, that a man, who conducts his religious inquiries under the influence of this persuasion, will not be so solicitous as he ought to be about the issue and success of them; since, though he find and hold fast the truth, he supposes himself not much the better; neither, if he miss of it, does he imagine himself the worse. His studies are designed to exercise his faculties, or perhaps only to amuse his time, rather

build himself upon his most holy faith; and his search after truth aims more at the pleasure of the pursuit, than the benefit of the acquisition. Actually to assent to error, he may probably own to be a weakness and imperfection; but as the advantages do not answer, on the other hand, in the possession of truth, he may think it best and safest to keep his judgment in entire suspense. For though there may be no great danger in error, yet as it borders so nearly upon weakness and folly; and if truth be so far from being a real good, that it is little better than an empty name; is it not plainly the wisest course to sit equally loose to both, and forbear giving any assent at all? To believe falsehood will disgrace his faculties, to embrace truth will not improve his mind. Here is evidently something to be lost on one hand, but no gain to counterbalance it on the other; and therefore the most rational conclusion is, to run no hazard of believing what is false, since no benefits arise from the belief of what is true. Thus is scepticism the just and genuine consequence of that persuasion, that the doctrinal part of religion is a matter of small or no importance; the just consequence of it in reason, and the natural effect of it in fact. For let us see how a person, under the influence of this persuasion, must act. Truths, that are too obvious to admit of a doubt, he will believe, because they are clear; but others, that are attended with any difficulties or darkness in circumstance or proof, he will distrust; and the importance of them, which here should be called in to make him determine one way or other, is plainly out of the question, and with him of no consideration at all. c Jude 20.

What then has he to do, but to indulge his doubt, and remain in suspense? To a man indeed, who thinks his religious principles of great consequence to him, this suspense would be perfect uneasiness and torment. But the person here supposed is entirely free from this inconvenience; since, according to his maxim, that doctrines in religion are of no importance, he is as safe, and will therefore be as easy in his scepticism, as the believer can be in his faith. But if the truths of religion be really so unconcerning, and of so little moment, it will be difficult to assign any wise reason, and worthy of God, why they were ever revealed at all. It will not be said by the persons I have here to do with, that we are at liberty either to obey or disobey the moral precepts and practical directions of the gospel just as we please. And why then may not the understanding be put under proper regulations, which we are equally obliged to comply with? Are the commandments consistent with free-will? And why then may not the articles of the Creed be consistent with free-thinking? Is not God both the Author and Lord, as well of the intelligent as moral part of our nature? And as he not only gave us our faculties, but knows the capacities of them, knows the nature of truth and of men, why may not he oblige us to find and believe that to be truth which is so, and which he knows we are capable of so finding and believing, if we be not wanting to ourselves? Divine propositions and divine precepts are not indeed of equal importance; but be their importance what it will, I cannot see that it is a matter entirely indifferent whether we assent to a revealed truth or not,