AN INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME. ACCOMPANIMENT. See COPYRIGHT. ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE. AFFIDAVIT. On Motion for a Suggestion-See COUNTY- And see ARREST, I. AGENT. See BROKER. FACTOR. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. AGREEMENT. Sufficiency of Consideration. A. and B. entered into the following agreement: "In consideration that A., of Macclesfield, In assumpsit by A. against B. for a breach of Held that there was a sufficient considera- AMENDMENT. I. At Nisi Prius, under 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, 716 1. In assumpsit by an endorsee against the The judge having permitted the declaration son, 2. The statute does not authorize the amend- II. After Argument of Demurrer. 3 G after judgment pronounced thereon. Smith v. The London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, 793 ANNUITY. Return or Retainer of Part of the Consideration. 1. To induce the court to set aside a warrant of attorney given to secure an annuity, on the ground of an improper returning or retaining of part of the consideration-money, the fact of such returning or retaining must be distinctly and unequivocally sworn to. Barber v. Thomas, 612 2. At the time of executing an annuity deed, the grantor, an attorney, received the full amount of the consideration-money, 170, and immediately paid thereout 87. 68. 6d., for the costs of preparing the securities and enrolling the memorial, and 207. to the grantee's agent, in satisfaction of a liability to him (the agent) upon a bill of exchange drawn by the grantor upon and accepted by his father, and which was within a week of maturity:-Held, that this was not such a transaction as would warrant the court in setting aside the securities eleven years after the date of the grant. Ib. III. Mistake of Arbitrator, &c. By an order of reference made by consent, it was stipulated, amongst other things, that certain items in an account annexed to the order should be taken as admitted between the parties. The arbitrator having made his award, the court refused to amend the order, and refer the matter back, upon affidavits showing a mistake by the clerk of the plaintiff's attorney in the copying of one of the admitted items. Winn v. Nicholson, 819 IV. Demand of Money, &c., awarded. A personal demand of money payable under an award, with a view to a proceeding on a rule I. On a Capias under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3. Affidavit.]—1. An affidavit of debt alleging 2. several distinct and separate causes of action for separate and distinct sums, some of which are well stated, and others not, is not therefore bad altogether. Cunliffe v. Maltass, 695 A capias issued under a judge's order pur suant to the 1 & Vict. c. 110, s. 3, endorsed for bail for 1050., upon an affidavit stating distinct causes of action for four several amounts, three of them correctly, and one (for 500%.) imperfectly. The defendant, having been arrested, applied to a judge at chambers to discharge him out of custody. The judge declined to discharge the defendant, but made an order reducing the amount to be taken for bail, by the 500l. so defectively alleged:-The court refused to rescind the order. II. Taking out of Court Money deposited in Lieu of Bail. Ib. A defendant arrested on a capias under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, deposited with the sheriff the amount endorsed, with 10%. for costs, pursuant to the 43 G. 3, c. 46, and shortly afterwards embarked with his family for Australia, without putting in bail above, or leaving any attorney or agent to act for him. The court granted the plaintiff a rule nisi for taking the money out of court, subject to any deduction from the 107., upon taxation,-which rule was made absolute, upon service by sticking up the rule nisi in the office. Shackel v. Johnson, 865 ARREST OF JUDGMENT. ASSIGNMENT. Of Copyright-See COPYRIGHT. ASSUMPSIT. Sufficiency of Consideration. 1. B. & C., members of a railway committee, being indebted to A. in a large sum, which A. sought to recover by contributions from the committee, and A. having brought an action against B., and having threatened to sue C., D. promises, that, in consideration that A. An order was made by consent, in an action of ejectment, "that the proceedings be stayed, the defendant to pay his own costs of a former ejectment, and the lessor of the plaintiff to pay 57. towards the defendant's costs, and to grant a lease of the premises for 21 years, at the rent of 18. a year, on the same conditions as other parts of the estates of the lessor of the plaintiff in the parish, were held." The defendant having declined to accept a lease and execute a counterpart,-the court refused Ib. to grant an attachment against him. ATTORNEY. I. Authority of. The attorney on the record has authority to consent to a reference on behalf of his client. Smith v. Troup, 757 II. Bill of Costs. will cease to prosecute the action brought, | 2. and will forbear to sue C., he, D., will pay a certain smaller sum to A. In declaring upon this promise, it is not necessary to allege that D. was a member of the committee, or that A. had a well-founded claim against the committee, or that the actions brought and threatened related to the committee, or that the plaintiff was ready and willing to accept the smaller sum in satisfaction of the debt owing from B. and C. Tempson v. Knowles, 651 2. A declaration, in assumpsit, stated that the plaintiffs had commenced an action against A. to recover a sum due to them from A., and another action against B., as a party liable in respect of the same debt; that, in consideration that the plaintiffs would consent to stay the proceedings in the action against A. until a given day, and would proceed to trial with the action against B. at a certain sitting, or as soon after as the practice of the court would admit of,—the defendant promised that he would indemnify the plaintiffs against all costs and expenses connected with the action against B., whether the same should be decided in favour of the plaintiffs or of B., and that he, the defendant, would pay the same costs and expenses when requested by the plaintiffs. The declaration then averred that the plaintiffs, confiding in the promise of the defendant, did consent to stay, and did stay, the proceedings in the action against A., and that they duly proceeded to trial with the action against B., and obtained a verdict therein; that the verdict was afterwards set aside, and a new trial ordered, upon payment of costs by B.; that the plaintiffs again set down the cause for trial; that, by the direction and at the request of the defendant, the record was withdrawn; and that the plaintiffs had incurred, and paid, certain costs and expenses in 3. The bill was not headed in any court: but connexion with the said action: and assigned for breach, the defendant's refusal to reimburse them:-Held, that the declaration disclosed a good cause of action, the final determination of the action against B. not being a condition precedent to the plaintiffs' right to sue for the costs, and the consideration being satisfied by the plaintiffs' staying proceedings against A., and going to trial against B. Wilson v. Bevan, ASSURANCE. ATTACHMENT. 673 I. For Non-Delivery of Bill-See ATTORNEY, II. For Disobedience of Rule of Court. Form of. Name of the Court and Cause.]—1. An attorney's bill, to be in strict compliance with the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, must contain, in express terms, or by reasonable inference, a statement of the name of every cause and of every court in which any part of the business charged for has been transacted. Sargent v. Gannon, 742 2. A bill of costs headed "Yourself v. Round" the whole related to one transaction, and some of the items were for attendances at the accountant-general's and at the master's offices, and in court upon a petition to the ViceChancellor :-Held, that the bill gave reasonable information to the client as to the course to be pursued in order to tax the bill, and therefore that the statute was complied with. lb. Plea of Non-Delivery of.]—4. Assumpsit against several defendants for work and labour by the plaintiff as an attorney, with counts for money paid, &c. Plea,-by one of the defendants,-to the whole declaration, that the action was commenced, after the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, for the recovery of fees, charges, and disbursements due to the plaintiff as an attorney, as in the first count mentioned, and that no signed bill had been delivered to the defendant, or sent by the post to, or left for him at, his counting-house, office of business, dwelling-house, or last known place of abode : -Held, on special demurrer, that the word "disbursements" applied to the count for money paid; and that the plea sufficiently negatived the delivery of a bill of costs within the terms of the statute. Tate v. Hitchings, 875 Attachment for Non-delivery of.]—5. By a judge's order (made a rule of court), A., the former attorney of B., was directed within ten days to deliver to C. & D., B.'s present attorneys, a bill of costs, &c.:-Held, that an attachment could not issue against A. for disobedience of the rule of court, upon a mere demand by a clerk of C. & D. In re Cattlin, 136 III. Collusive Settlement between the Parties. The court will not interfere, even in the case of a plaintiff suing in forma pauperis, to prevent effect being given to a settlement between the parties, although it be evident that the attorney will lose his costs,-unless the settlement be clearly collusive. Francis v. Webb, AWARD: See ARBITRAMENT. BAGUNKILLS, 471 (a). BAIL. See ARREST, I. BAILMENT. See DETINUE. BANKRUPT. I. Act of Bankruptcy. 731 Notice.]-1. An intimation given by a clerk of a defendant's attorney, to a clerk of the plaintiff's attorney, that the defendant has committed an act of bankruptcy,-the clerk to whom it is given not being shown to be a managing clerk, or to have communicated the matter to his principal,-is not such a notice as will defeat an execution, under the proviso in the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29, s. 1. Pennell v. Stephens, 987 2. Quare, whether a notice to one who is shown to be a managing clerk would suffice? Ib. II. Messenger's Fees. In an action by a messenger of the court of bankruptcy, against J. S., for fees due from him as petitioning-creditor under a fiat,Held, that the plaintiff proved a prima facie case, by putting in the proceedings under the fiat, without showing the identity of the defendant with the J. S.-named therein as the petitioning-creditor. Hamber v. Roberts, 861 III. Execution on Warrant of Attorney. A. gave B. a warrant of attorney, under which judgment was entered up. On the 24th of August, 1840, a fi. fa. issued, under which the sheriff, on the 26th, seized A.'s goods, consisting of machinery, iron, &c. On the third of September, A. committed an act of bankruptcy. On the 8th and 9th of September, the sheriff sold part of the goods by auction, in lots, and received a deposit on each lot, but the lots were not separated from the mass. On the 11th of September, a fiat in bankruptcy was granted against A. On the 19th of September, and following days, the goods were weighed out and delivered to the purchasers. The sheriff subsequently paid over the whole of the proceeds of the sale to B.:-Held, that the assignees of A. were entitled to recover the whole of the proceeds, including the deposits, inasmuch as there had been no perfect sale, but only an inchoate sale, at the time of the fiat, and B. still remained a creditor of A. having security, within the provisions of the 108th section of the 6 G. 4, c. 16. Ward 643 v. Dalton, A bill at three months, drawn by A. and accepted by B., for A.'s accommodation, was endorsed and sent by post by A. to C. for value. C. returned the bill, insisting upon having one at two months instead. A. thereupon altered the bill, by making it payable at two instead of three months, and again sent it to C. There was no evidence that B. knew of the alteration at the time; but there was evidence to show that he subsequently assented to its being treated as a two months' bill:-Held, that the bill was well declared on as a two months' bill, and that it was not avoided by the alteration. Tarleton v. Shingler, 812 III. Notice of Dishonour. 1. Knowledge of the probability, however strong, that a bill of exchange will be dishonoured, cannot operate as a notice of dishonour, or dispense with it. But knowledge that the bill has been dishonoured, where the drawer is himself the party who is to pay the bill (as executor of the acceptor), does amount to notice. Caunt v. Thompson, 400 2. In assumpsit by an endorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange, the declaration, in the usual form, alleged that the bill was duly presented to the acceptor, that it was dishonoured, and that the defendant had notice thereof. The defendant pleaded, that the bill was not presented to the acceptor,and that the defendant had no notice of its dishonour. At the trial, it was proved that the bill was presented, on the day it became due, at the house of the acceptor; and that the defendant, to whom it was there shown, said that the acceptor was dead, and that he was his executor,-adding a request that it might be allowed to stand over for a few days, and he would see it paid:-Held, that there was sufficient evidence of notice of dishonour to the defendant. And see AMENDMENT. BIRTH. Evidence of period of, 487. BOND. Ib. Plea of Set-off, under 8 G. 2, c. 24, 8. 5. To an action of debt on a bond conditioned for the payment of the interest half-yearly, and the principal sum six months after notice (which notice had not been given), the defendant pleaded a set-off exceeding the interest due, which set-off accrued before the commencement of the action, but after the interest became payable:-Held, that the plea was a good answer to the action, under the 8 G. 2, c. 24, s. 5. Lee v. Lester, 1008 2. A. employed B., a broker and member of the Stock-Exchange, to buy shares for him. At the time of the purchase, a call had been made, but was not yet payable. The seller having paid the call, in order to enable her to make a transfer of the shares, B., who by the rules of the Stock-Exchange, was personally responsible for it, paid the money:-Held, that B. was entitled to recover from A. the sum so paid, as money paid to his use. BROKER'S BOOK. See PRACTICE, XI. 1, 2. Ib. CAPIAS. Under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 8. 3. See ARREST. CARRIER. See RAILWAY COMPANY, I. CHARTERED COMPANY. See JOINT-STOCK-COMPANY. CHARTER-PARTY. Where, in describing a party in pleading, a single letter is prefixed to his surname, the court will intend it to be his full christian name, if a vowel; otherwise, if a consonant. Kinnersley v. Knott, 980 CLERK. See BANKRUPT, I. COLLIERY. See ECCLESIASTICAL LEASE. MINES. COLLUSION. See ATTORNEY, II. COMMON CARRIER. See RAILWAY COMPANY, I. COMPENSATION. See RAILWAY COMPANY, II. CONDITION. Of Re-entry, in a Lease. Where land is demised subject to a condition for re-entry on default in payment of the rent, the right of re-entry does not accrue until the rent has been duly demanded. Hill v. Kempshall, 975 CONDITION PRECEDENT. See ASSUMPSIT, 2. CONTRACT. Of sale, Construction of. 1. In assumpsit by the sellers against the buyers for the breach of two contracts for the shipment at a foreign port, of two several quantities of rye-meal, the declaration stated, that, "after the making of the said contracts, and before the performance of them, or of any part thereof, it was agreed between the plaintiffs and the defendants that the said two con |