pended by him on account of the lord, was tendered as evidence of a fact noticed in one of the items of discharge for which the reeve took credit in the account. This entry was rejected, on the ground that it did not appear on the face of the account that the reeve gave credit for any sum applied to the discharge of that particular item. Held (by COLTMAN, MAULE, CRESSWELL, and V. WILLIAMS, JJ., absente, et, ut videtur, dissentiente, WILDE, C. J.), that the evidence was properly rejected. Doe d. Kinglake v. Beviss,

456

to enable a married woman to execute a conveyance without her husband's concurrence, under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 74, s. 91, upon a mere statement that the husband, a seaman, has gone abroad, and has not been heard of for some years, and that the wife has been informed that he is dead. The affidavit must show some reasonable ground for presuming the statement to be true. Ex parte Elizabeth Taylor, 1

The court refused to direct the proper officer under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 74, to receive and file an acknowledgment, where the affidavit of verification was sworn before the British minister at Florence,-it not appearing that there was any difficulty in getting it sworn before some properly constituted authority at that place. In re Baroness Dunsany, 119 2. Wife's Provision.]—Where property is sold under the compulsory provisions of an act of parliament, that part of the rule of Hilary term, 4 W. 4, which directs inquiry to be made of a married woman at the time of acknowledging a deed to convey her interest under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 74, whether any provision is made for her in consideration of her so giving up her interest, is inapplicable. In 120 re Elizabeth Ellen Foster,

IMMATERIAL ISSUE. See COVENANT, I. 2. PLEADING, VIII. 4.

IMMATERIAL TRAVERSE. See REPLEAder.

INCORPORATED COMPANY.

See JOINT-STOCK COMPANY.

INDEMNITY.

Proof of.

A., tenant to B., received notice from C., a mortgagee of C.'s term, that the interest was in arrear, and requiring payment to her, B., of the rent then due. A., notwithstanding this notice, paid the rent to B. (under an indemnity which turned out to be unauthorized), and was afterwards compelled, by distress, to pay the amount over again to C.:-At the trial, in support of a special count founded upon the indemnity, the plaintiff proved that one H. was B.'s general attorney; and he then proposed to prove that H. as such attorney, had given the indemnity:-Held, that this evidence was not admissible, in the absence of proof of H.'s authority to make such a contract for his client. Higgs v. Scott,

And see COVENANT, I. 4.

63

INDORSEMENT.

INDORSEMENT.

On Writ of Summons-See PRACTICE, I., 2, 3, 4.

INDUCEMENT.

See PROFERT.

INITIAL.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE, I. CHRISTIAN NAME.

INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

Proof of Proceedings-See EVIDENCE, III.

INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS. See PRACTICE, XI.

INSURANCE.

Changing Venue in Action on a Policy-See PRACTICE, VII., 1.

INTERPLEADER. Maintenance of Claim.

1. Affidavits.]-Upon an application for a rule or order under the interpleader act, an affidavit by the claimant himself, in support of his claim, is not indispensable. Webster v. Dela187 field,

And semble, per MAULE, J., that no affidavit at all is necessary. Xb. The sheriff having seized goods under a fi. fa., a claim was made on behalf of A., who was resident in Paris. Upon an interpleader summons, A.'s attorney made an affidavit, that he had been informed, and, from documents, vouchers, and receipts in his possession, believed, that the goods seized were the bona fide property of A. :-Held,-V. WILLIAMS, J., dissentiente,—that this was a sufficient maintaining of the claim, to justify the judge (or the court, on the judge's refusal) in directing an issue.

Ib.

2. Security for Costs.]-And it was made part of the rule, that the claimant should give seIb. curity for costs.

IRREGULARITY.

See PRACTICE, I., 1.

ISSUABLE PLEA.. See PLEADING, VIII., 5.

JOINT-STOCK COMPANY.

How declared against.

2. Where, therefore, in assumpsit by a landlord against his tenant for breach of a promise to use the premises in a tenant-like manner during the continuance of the tenancy, the latter pleaded, that, during the continuance of the tenancy, and before any breach, the former entered upon part of the premises and evicted him therefrom, and that he thereupon relinquished and gave up, and the landlord had and thence hitherto retained the possession of, the residue of the premises :-Held, that the plea was bad, inasmuch as it did not show a dissolution of the tenancy, by mutual Ib.

consent.

II. Surrender.

In assumpsit by a landlord against his tenant for breach of a promise to use the premises in a tenant-like manner during the continuance of the tenancy, the defendant pleaded, that, during the tenancy, and before any breach, the premises, and the defendant's estate and interest therein, were duly surrendered to the plaintiff by act and operation of law, that is to say, by the defendant's quitting the same premises, and every part thereof, with the license and consent of the plaintiff, and relinquishing the possession thereof to the plaintiff, with the intention of putting an end to the tenancy, and by the plaintiff's then accepting such possession, with the intention of putting an end to the same tenancy :Held, that, if the tenancy continued up to the time of the arrangement stated in the plea, such arrangement would not enure as a

LIBEL. Innuendo.

344

344

1. A count in an action for a libel, stated that the defendant, intending to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff and one J. H. had transferred, or caused to be transferred, a certain amount of Bank-stock from the name of one W. T., by means of a power of attorney obtained by them from W. T. by undue influence, at a time when he was mentally incompetent to do any act requiring reason and understanding, published the following, "There is strong reason for believing that a considerable sum of money was transferred from Mr. T.'s (meaning the said W. T.'s) name in the books of the Bank of England, by power of attorney obtained from him by undue influence after he became mentally incompetent to perform any act requiring reason and understanding (thereby meaning that the plaintiff and J. H. had transferred, or caused to be transferred, the said money from the said W. T.'s name in the said books of the said bank, by means of a power of attorney obtained by them from the said W. T. by undue influence exercised by them over the said W. T., and at a time when the said W. T. had become and was mentally incompetent to give a power of attorney and to perform any act requiring reason and understanding.")

The jury having found a general verdict for the plaintiff:-Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that the count was good, and that the innuendo did not improperly extend

the meaning of the libel Turner v. Meryweather, 251

2. In case for a libel, the declaration stated, by way of inducement, that the plaintiff was a barrister and the editor and proprietor of a weekly publication called "The Medical Times," and also secretary to the committee of "Poor-Law Medical Officers," and to the "Convention of Poor-Law Medical Officers;" that there existed an association called "The National Institute of Medicine;" that certain medical poor-law-union officers were endeavouring to bring about an amelioration of the then-existing system of poor-law medical relief; and that "The National Institute of Medicine" was willing to lend its assistance to the medical poor-law-union officers, and to allow that body the use of certain rooms held by them.

166

The declaration then, in the first count, alleged that the defendant, in a weekly publication called "The Lancet," published, "of and concerning the plaintiff," the following: "In our last, we advised the medical officers of the poor-law-unions to adopt an independent course, to trust to the justice of their cause, and to their own legitimate exertions, for an amendment of the grievances of which they so justly complain:" and, after cautioning those persons not to suffer "The National Institute of Medicine," or "The Committee of Poor-Law Medical Officers," to meddle with their affairs, the libel procceded-"We would exhort the medical officers to avoid the traps set for them by desperate adventurers (thereby meaning the plaintiff, among others), who, participating in their efforts, would inevitably cover them with ridicule and disrepute."

The second count stated that the defendant further published "of and concerning the plaintiff," the following,-"We need not here dwell upon the impolicy of the connexion between the present agitation and 'The National Institute,'-a body which has disgusted the government, and with other persons not belonging to the profession (thereby meaning the plaintiff, as such barrister as aforesaid), and whose weekly vocation it is to bring everything belonging to the profession into disrepute and contempt" (thereby meaning that the plaintiff was in the habit as editor of the said weekly publication called "The Medical Times" as aforesaid, of bringing the medical profession into disrepute and contempt).

The third count described the plaintiff as "a quack lawyer and mountebank," and an "impostor;" and the fourth set out matter tending to hold the plaintiff up to ridicule.

After verdict for the plaintiff upon all these counts, with entire damages:

Held, by the court of error,-that the words charged in the first count were libellous.

Wakley v. Healey,

591

MARRIAGE.

Breach of Promise of.

second count were libellous, without the aid of the innuendo: and

Held also, that the count was not objectionable, by reason of the want of an averment that the libel was published of and concerning the plaintiff as editor of the weekly publication referred to,-that being sufficiently shown by the libel itself.

Ib.

1. The 42d section of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, is not repealed by the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 3. Humfrey v. Gery, 567 2. A. was, from the 2d of July, 1805, till the 10th of July, 1841 (when he was found a lunatic), and B., his committee, had ever since been, seised as of fee of two-thirds of a fee-farm rent of 201. 58. per annum, payable on the 29th of September and 25th of March, created by letters-patent of the 29 H. 8. No payment of this rent, or of any part thereof, had been made since March, 1831, nor had there been any acknowledgment in writing relating thereto :-Held, that the case was governed by the 42d section of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, and, consequently, that neither the lunatic nor his committee was entitled to recover any arrears of the rent after the expiration of six years from the 29th of September, 1831.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See DAMAGES.

LONDON SMALL DEBTS COURT. See COUNTY-COURT, I., 1.

LUNATIC.

See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

MANAGING CLERK.

See BANKRUPT, I.

Ib.

the declaration stated, that, in consideration that the plaintiff, being sole and unmarried, at the request of the defendant had promised the defendant to marry the defendant within a reasonable time, the defendant promised the plaintiff to marry her within a reasonable time; that the plaintiff, confiding in the promise of the defendant, had from thenceforward remained sole and unmarried, and had always, until she had notice that the defendant was married, been ready and willing to marry him; that although a reasonable time had elapsed since the making of the defendant's promise, yet the defendant had not married the plaintiff, but, on the contrary thereof, the defendant, at the time of making his promise, and from thenceforward, had been and still was, married, &c.; and that the plaintiff did not know, at the time of the defendant's making his said promise to her, nor for a long time afterwards, that the defendant was married:-Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that the declaration disclosed a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. Wild v. Harris, 999. [Approved by the court of Exchequer, Milward v. Littlewood, M. T., 1850.]

MEMORANDA, 608.

MESNE PROFITS. See EJECTMENT, III.

MESSENGER.

Fees of-See BANKRUPT, II.

MINES.

Rights and Duties of Owners of.

1. Semble, that it is the right of each of the owners of adjoining mines,-where neither mine is subject to any servitude to the other, -to work his own mine in the manner which the deems most convenient and beneficial to himself, although the natural consequence may be that some prejudice will accrue to the owner of the adjoining mine; so long as such prejudice does not arise from the negligent or malicious conduct of his neighbour. Smith v. Kenrick, 515

2. The plaintiff was possessed of a colliery, called A., and the defendant of a colliery adjoining, called B., which was upon a higher level than A. Before the defendant became possessed of colliery B., one Jones, who then held it, but between whom and the defendant it was found, as a fact, that there was not