1 Redf. Railw. 487; Williams v. New Albany etc. R. R. Co., 5 Ind. 111; Lafay ette etc. R. R. Co. v. Shriner, 6 Id. 141; New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. Fix, 12 Id. 485; Jeffersonville etc. R. R. Co. v. Dunlop, 29 Id. 426; Toledo etc. R. Co. ▼. Cory, 39 Id. 218; Jeffersonville etc. R. R. Co. v. Ross, 37 Id. 545; Bulkley v. New York etc. R. Co., 27 Conn. 480; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Umphenour, 69 Ill. 198; Hopkins v. Kansas etc. R. Co., 18 Kans. 462; Whittier v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 24 Minn. 394; Gillam v. Sioux City etc. R. R. Co., 26 Id. 268; Gor. man v. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo. 441; Burton v. North Missouri R. R. Co., 30 Id. 372; Miles v. Hannibal etc. R. R. Co., 31 Id. 407; Powell v. Hannibal etc. R. R. Co., 35 Id. 457; Morris v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 58 Id. 78; Cary v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 60 Id. 213; Collins v. Atlantic etc. R. R. Co., 65 Id. 230; Smith v. Eastern R. R., 35 N. H. 356; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Corwin v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; McCall v. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637; Brown v. Milwaukie etc. R. R. Co., 21 Id. 39; Sika v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., Id. 370; Curry v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 43 Id. 665; Veerhusen v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 53 Id. 689. In Gorman v. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo. 441, it is held that if the track is not fenced as required by law, the highest degree of care to prevent injury will not excuse the company. But if the action is not brought under the statute, but is case for negligence at common law, the mere fact that the track is not fenced according to law is held not to be sufficient negli. gence to warrant a recovery: Terre Haute etc. R. R. Co. v. Augustus, 21 Ill. 186.

The obligation to maintain a sufficient fence is as imperative as the obliga. tion to erect it in the first place: McDowell v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 37 Barb. 195. Hence if the company, or its servants or customers, make gaps in the fence, even for a necessary purpose, and do not repair them in a reasonable time, or carelessly leave gates open or insufficiently fastened, so that an injury happens to another's cattle, it will be liable: Fawcett v. York etc. R. R. Co., 20 L. J. Q. B. 222; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Harris, 54 Ill. 528; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Logan, 19 Ind. 294; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Truitt, 24 Id. 162; Cleveland etc. R. R. Co. v. Swift, 42 Id. 119; Brady v. Rensselaer etc. R. R. Co., 3 Thomp. & C. 537; S. C., 1 Hun, 378; Spinner v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 153. So where gaps are made in the fence, or gates or bars left open by others, or breaches are made by fires, freshets, storms, etc., if the company has had actual or constructive notice of the defect and reasonable time to repair it before the injury happens, but not otherwise; the reasonableness of the time for repair depending, of course, upon the circumstances of the particular case: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Umphenour, 69 Ill. 198; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Saunders, 85 Id. 288; Indianap olis etc. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 88 Id. 368; Toledo etc. R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 21 Ind. 256; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Truitt, supra; Toledo etc. R. Co. v. Cohen, 44 Id. 444; Cleveland etc. R. R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Id. 90; Aylesworth v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 30 Iowa, 457; Perry v. Dubuque etc. R. R. Co., 36 Id. 102; Davis v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 40 Id. 292; Robinson v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 32 Mich. 322; Toledo etc. R. Co. v. Eder, 45 Id. 329; Grand Rapids etc. R. R. Co. v. Monroe, 47 Id. 152; Harrington v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 71 Mo. 384; Clardy v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 73 Id. 576; Munch v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 29 Barb. 647; Morrison v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 32 Id. 568; Wheeler v. Erie R. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. 634; Hodge v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 27 Hun, 394; Lande v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 33 Wis. 640; Goddard v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 54 Id. 548. Suffering a cattle-guard to become filled with snow, so that cattle pass over it upon the track and are killed, without any contributory negligence by the owner, will render the company liable:

Dunnigan v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 18 Wis. 28; Hance v. Cayuga etc. R. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 428.

Undoubtedly it must appear that the failure of a railway company to make or repair fences along its track, as required by law, was contributory to an injury to cattle on its track, or the owner can not recover. In other words, the cattle must have entered at a point where a fence was required and was wanting or defective, and if the fence was or was not defective at that point, its sufficiency or insufficiency at other points is wholly immaterial: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Farrelly, 3 Ill. App. 60; Bellefontaine etc. R. R. Co. v. Suman, 29 Ind. 40; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Candle, 60 Id. 112; Toledo etc. R. Co. v. Stevens, 63 Id. 337; Jeffersonville etc. R. R. Co. v. Lyon, 72 Id. 107; Wabash R. Co. v. Forsher, 77 Id. 158; Missouri etc. R. R. Co. v. Leggett, 27 Kans. 323; Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. Cash, Id. 587; Witthouse v. Atlantic etc. R. R. Co., 64 Mo. 523; Snider v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 73 Id. 465; Razor v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., Id. 471. Where the cattle come upon the track at one point, and wander to another, where they are killed, the necessity and sufficiency of the fence at the place of entry, and not at the place of killing, determine the liability: Jeffersonville etc. R. R. Co. v. Lyon, 72 Ind. 107; Witthouse v. Atlantic etc. R. R. Co., 64 Mo. 523; Snider v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 73 Id. 465. If a fence is required, but is wanting or defective at the place of entry, but there is a sufficient fence or no fence is required at the place of killing, the company is nevertheless liable: Wabash R. Co. v. Forsher, 77 Ind. 158; Razor v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 73 Mo. 471. On the other hand, if the cattle enter at a public crossing, where no fence is required, but are killed at a point where a fence is required but is wanting, the company is not liable under the statute: Missouri etc. R. R. Co. v. Leggett, 27 Kans. 323; so where the track is wholly unfenced: Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. Cash, Id. 587. Proof of the general insecurity and insufficiency of the fence will be sufficient, however, without proving that the cattle entered over a particular panel which was defective: Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Spain, 61 Ind. 460.

An adjacent owner having agreed with a railway company to erect and maintain the fence required of it by law can not recover for injuries to his cattle entering upon the track through defects in the fence: Talmadge v. Rensselaer etc. R. R. Co., 13 Barb. 493; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Petty, 25 Ind. 413; Warren v. Keokuk etc. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 484; Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 424; Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 26 Id. 124; contra, New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. Maiden, 12 Ind. 10. Otherwise where the injury results from willfulness, wantonness, or gross negligence: Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. Waterson; Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, supra. Nor can he recover, though the defect is not due to any want of care on his part: Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, supra. Neither can the tenant of such owner recover where he enters with knowledge of the agreement and himself repairs the fence, especially if his animals are breachy: St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Washburn, 97 Ill. 253. See also Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Petty, 25 Ind. 541. But the existence of such an agreement is no defense in an action by a third person for injuries to his cattle by reason of defects in the fence: Gill v. Atlantic etc. R. Co., 27 Ohio St. 240; Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. Ridge, 54 Ind. 39. Where compensation is awarded and paid to the owner of the land for building the fence when the right of way is taken, it is held also that he can not recover for injuries to his cattle through neglect to fence: Georgia R. R. etc. Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ga. 110; Rockford c. R. R. Co. v. Lynch, 67 Ill. 149; Toledo etc. R. Co. v. Pense, 71 Id. 174;

Terre Haute etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 16 Ind. 102; contra, Baltimore etc. R. Co. . Johnson, 59 Ind. 188. So where the company omits to erect the fence, bars, or cattle-guards required by statute with the assent or agreement of the owner of the cattle: Whittier v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 24 Minn. 394; Hurd v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 116; contra, Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. Hildreth, 77 Ind. 504. But a stranger is in no way bound by such agreement or assent by the owner of the land: Berry v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 172.

It is broadly laid down in a number of Indiana cases that the liability of a railway company not fencing its track, as required by law, for injuries to cattle, is so absolute that even contributory negligence of the owner of the cattle is no defense: Jefferson etc. R. R. Co. v. Ross, 37 Ind. 545; Toledo etc. R. Co. v. Cory, 39 Id. 218; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Cahill, 63 Id. 34; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Whitesell, 68 Id. 297, and cases cited. This is probably correct as applied to the particular kind of negligence which was under consideration in most of those cases, to wit, suffering animals to be at large, but as a general doctrine it can scarcely be supported: 1 Thomp. Neg. 528; St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409; Illinois etc. R. R. Co. v. Middlesworth, 43 Id. 64; Kansas etc. R. Co. v. Landis, 24 Kans. 406; Jones v. Sheboygan etc. R. R. Co., 42 Wis. 306; Lawrence v. Milwaukie etc. R. R. Co., Id. 322; Curry v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 43 Id. 665. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether the legislature could constitutionally authorize a recovery of damages for negligence without regard to the plaintiff's contributory neg. ligence: Kansas etc. R. R. Co. v. McHenry, 24 Kans. 501. Turning animals loose on one's own land where there is an unfenced or defectively fenced railway track adjoining or running through it, which the law requires to be fenced, is not such negligence as will preclude a recovery for an injury thereto: Wilder v. Maine etc. R. R. Co., 65 Me. 332; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 698; McCoy v. California etc. R. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532; S. C., 6 Am. Rep. 623; Rogers v. Newburyport R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 16; Shepard v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 641; Brady v. Rensselaer etc. R. R. Co., 3 Thomp. & C. 537; S. C., 1 Hun, 378; Mead v. Burlington etc. R. R. Co., 52 Vt. 278. It would be a novel doctrine to hold that a railway company by violating the law could restrict one's rightful use of his own land. But if the owner of horses should turn them loose in his field with blind bridles on in the vicinity of an unfenced track, it would be negligence which would prevent a recovery, unless the defendants should be guilty of greater negligence, where the rule of comparative negligence prevails: St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409.

Suffering animals to run at large where a track is not lawfully fenced is not necessarily such negligence as will bar a recovery for injury to them by a railway train: Jeffersonville etc. R. R. Co. v. Dunlap, 29 Ind. 426; Bellefontaine etc. R. Co. v. Reed, 33 Id. 476; Flint etc. R. Co. v. Lull, 28 Mich. 510. So even though they are at large in violation of law: Ewing v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 72 Ill. 25; Cairo etc. R. R. Co. v. Murray, 82 Id. 76; Cairo etc. R. R. Co. v. Woosley, 85 Id. 370; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Cahill, 63 Ind. 34; Spence v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 25 Iowa, 139; Fritz v. Milwaukee etc. R. R. Co., 34 Id. 337; contra, Central Branch K. R. Co. ▼. Lea, 20 Kans. 353; Kansas etc. R. R. Co. v. Landis, 24 Id. 406; Kansas etc. R. R. Co. v. McHenry, Id. 501. Certainly not where the animal escapes in spite of reasonable precautions: Kansas etc. R. Co. v. Wiggins, Id. 588. Whether allowing an animal to run at large near a railway track not lawfully fenced is contributory negligence or not depends upon whether or not the injury was the natural and probable consequence of

it: Ewing v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 72 Ill. 25; Cairo etc. R. R. Co. v. Woos. ley, 85 Id. 370. And even if it be negligence the company will still be liable if reasonable caution to prevent injury is not used: Peoria etc. R. R. Co. v. Champ, 75 Ill. 577; Jackson v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Trow v. Vermont etc. R. R. Co., 24 Id. 150.

Aside from the question of contributory negligence it is held in some jurisdictions that railway fence laws are for the benefit of owners of land adjoining railway tracks, and that there can be no recovery for an injury, from a neglect to maintain a proper fence, to cattle not lawfully on the adjoining land whether it be a highway or the land of a third person: Manchester etc. R. Co. v. Wallis, 14 Com. B. 213; S. C., 23 L. J. C. P. 85; Ricketts v. East etc. R. Co., 12 Eng. L. and Eq. 520; S. C., 21 L. J. C. P. 201; 16 Jur. 1072; Eames v. Salem etc. R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 560; contra, Browne v. Providenceets. R. R. Co., 12 Gray, 55; Ellis v. Pacific R. R. Co., 55 Mo. 278 (semble); Towns ▼. Cheshire R. R. Co., 21 N. H. 363; Cornwall v. Sullivan R. R., 28 Id. 161; Chapin v. Sullivan R. R. Co., 39 Id. 53, 564; Giles v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 55 Id. 552; Jackson v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Morse v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 27 Id. 49. But the prevailing doctrine is the other way: Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. Aston, 13 Id. 545; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Guard, 24 Id. 222; Koes v. Missouri etc. R. R. Co., 6 Mo. App. 397; Corwin v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Munch v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 29 Barb. 647; Sheaf v. Utica etc. R. R. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. 388; Marietta etc. R. R. Co. v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St. 48; Dunkirk etc. R. R. Co. v. Mead, 90 Pa. St. 454; McCall v. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637; Curry v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 43 Id. 665. Where animals are on the adjacent land by permission of the owner: Sawyer v. Vermont etc. R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 196; or lawfully on the adjacent highway: Midland R. Co. v. Daykin, 17 Com. B. 126; Evans etc. R. R. Co. v. Barbee, 74 Ind. 169; the liability is undoubted.

Negligence of an adjacent owner in keeping up bars in a railway fence, which the company allow him to have for his accommodation, whereby his cattle escape on the track, will no doubt defeat his recovery for a deficiency in the fence: Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Shimer, 17 Ind. 295; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Adkins, 23 Id. 340; Eames v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 14 Allen, 151. So where the defective fence is a partition fence, under the statute, which both parties are bound to keep in repair, the same never having been divided, and the owner of cattle turns them into the adjacent inclosure, knowing the defect: Sandusky etc. R. R. Co. v. Sloan, 27 Ohio St. 341; Dayton etc. R. R. Co. v. Miami Co. Infirmary, 32 Id. 566. So where the plaintiff leaves his cattle in the adjacent inclosure, knowing that the railway fence is about to be carried away by a freshet: Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Wright, 13 Ind. 213; or fails to give the company notice of a defect in its fence: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Seires, 60 Ill. 295; or puts breachy animals in his inclosure: Jones v. Sheboygan etc. R. R. Co., 42 Wis. 306. Where a railway track is sufficiently fenced and cattle break in, the company is liable only for want of ordinary care in preventing injury: Galena etc. R. R. Co. v. Crawford, 25 Ill. 529; Northern etc. R. R. Co. v. Martin, 10 Ind. 460; Toledo etc. R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 18 Id. 215; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Irish, 26 Id. 268; or, as the rule is in some states, for gross negligence or wanton injury: Alger v. Mississippi etc. R. R. Co., 10 Iowa, 268; Fisher v. Farmers' etc. Co., 21 Wis. 73.

4. Liability for Injury to Train by Trespassing Animals.-Where the common-law rule as to allowing cattle to run at large prevails, an owner of cattle

is no doubt liable for injuries done by them while trespassing on a railway track, in causing a train to be thrown off, or the like, if the company's servants use due care: Housatonic etc. R. Co. v. Knowles, 30 Conn. 313; Sinram v. Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co., 28 Ind. 244. But where the owner of land on both sides of an unfenced railway track permitted a steer to be at large there, and it went upon the track and caused injury to a train, the owner was held not liable, though there was no duty to fence, because, if anybody should fence, it should be the company: Sherman v. Anderson, 27 Kans. 333; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 414. Certainly, if there is a failure to maintain a statutory fence, the company can not recover for an injury by cattle to its cars, etc.: Child v. Hearn, L. R., 9 Ex. 176.

MORGAN v. GROFF.

[5 DENIO, 864.]

MONEY ADVANCED TO ANOTHER TO BE BET ON AN ELECTION, or to be used to violate the provisions of any public statute, can not be recovered back, though never used by the receiver for the purpose for which it was sent. ACTION by Morgan against Groff to recover fifty dollars which the former had sent the latter to be bet upon the result of the presidential election of 1844, and which the defendant had never bet. The referee to whom the case had been referred reported in favor of plaintiff. The defendant moved to set aside the report. J. K. Porter, for the defendant.

E. F. Bullard, for the plaintiff.

By Court, WHITTLESEY, J. This money was sent to the defendant for the purpose of being bet with one Thompson on the election. The defendant did not use it for the purpose for which it was sent; and common honesty and common morality require that he should return it to the plaintiff. The money was, however, sent to be employed for an illegal purpose. The act (1 R. S. 662, sec. 8) makes all wagers unlawful, and avoids the contract for the money staked. Hence money loaned for the purpose of betting or adventuring upon an illegal wager can not be recovered back: McKinnel v. Robinson, 3 Mee. & W. 434; Peck v. Briggs, 3 Denio, 107. Money advanced to another for the purpose of violating the provisions or the spirit and policy of a public statute, can not be recovered back: Perkins v. Savage, 15 Wend. 412; De Groot v. Van Duzer, 20 Id. 396. There are many cases which show that where a contract is made having for its ultimate purpose and object an intention to aid in violating a positive law, or a principle of public policy, or to commit a breach of good morals, the courts will not aid in enforcing it, whatever the justice of it may be as between the parties them

AM. DEC. VOL. XLIX-18