Care and in the He fome have caft upon it, There are two principal Methods of preProvifion venting the Evils of Ambition, either to take brew Go away the ufual Occafions of ambitious Views and Defigns, or to make the Execution of to prevent them difficult and impracticable. The HeFactions. brew Conftitution has made both thefe Pro vernment vifions in a manner equal, I think I may boldly fay, to any known Conftitution of Government in the World. The very Foundation of the Hebrew Conftitution, was an equal Divifion of the Land, the Continuance of which was secured by à fundamental Law, which made that Divifion perpetual, as no Eftate could be alienated or pass from one Tribe or Family to another. The Laws had further provided, that no Intereft could be made of Money; fo that had a Man never so much Money he could make no Profit of it, either by Purchase or Intereft. All Places of Power, whether in their Courts of Justice, or Commands in their Armies, were not Places of Profit too, too, at least of so very small Profit as to be worth next to nothing at all; and these very Places were moreover, if of any Eminency, fo fixed to Heads of Families and Princes of Tribes, that all Ambition of canvaffing for them must be very much prevented, by striking in great measure at the very Root of fuch Ambitions in taking away the common and ufual Occafions of them; for the Conftitution had made the Places in that Government rather Places of Burthen than of Pro fit, and had left very few, if any Competitors, for most of the principal of them. What room was there for reftlefs and ambitious Spirits, to form Parties or Factions, or to attempt to mislead a Tribe or the Nation into falfe Meafures for their own private Advantage, when there was fo little Power, fo little Profit to be got; and fo few were allow'd to be Competitors, that it could hardly be worth any Man's while to give himself any Trouble, or to run any Hazard in attempting it. So wife Provifion was made for the Peace of Cities, Tribes and the whole Nation, as there was no Encouragement for any ambitious Defigns that might disturb it. It is obfervable, this Provifion is most particular and effectual to prevent any Designs of Ambition or Covetoufnefs in the Priests. For the Conftitution had expressly made a perpetual Mortmain, fo that they could not bave any Increase of Property in Land, by any ; any Title whatsoever, either of Gift or Purchafe, and any occafional Gifts of Money must be very small in a Country where there was fo little, and it could be no Increafe of yearly Revenue, as it could not be laid out to any Intereft. And as to Places of any confiderable Power, they were excluded from them by the Constitution; they could neither be Heads of the Families nor Princes of the Tribes in which they lived, for thefe Offices were in the Families of the Tribes themfelves, exclufive of all Families or Perfons of other Tribes; nor were they to be employed in military Commands, but appointed for the Service of the Tabernacle there was then no room for the Levites and Priests in any Places of the Hebrew Government, except in their Courts of Justice. Their Leifure and Knowledge in the Laws made it proper there fhould be fome Priefts or Levites to affift in them; but thefe Offices were attended with fo little Profit, if with any at all, they were attended with fo little Power and Authority, and fhared among fo many befides the Levites, that most certainly thefe could draw very little of the Power or Riches of the Nation into their Hands. According to the foregoing Account, the Levites were not fole Judges in any Court of Justice, they were a small Number among many others, they were a very fmall Part, if any, of the Congregations or popular Affemblies, whether of the Cities, of the the Tribes, or of all Ifrael. They made a very small Part of the Senates, whether provincial or national, and therefore could have very little Encouragement to canvafs by Party or Faction, what was fo little worth when they had obtained it. As to the particular Interests of the Priests and Levites as a Tribe; they must direct them not only to avoid all Ambitions themfelves, which might disturb the Peace of the Hebrew Nation, or of any of the particular Tribes, but to take all Care, as far as they could, to prevent all fuch Ambitions in others, because they muft fuffer by every Difturbance. They could have no Hope of Gain; from any; and when every Disturbance was like to diminish the Tithe, either in the natural Produce or regular Payment, this must diminish the proper Revenue of the Levites, leffen their Fund, and fo their yearly Divi dend. What Encouragement then could a Prieft have to difturb the Peace of his Coun try, when he could have no Profpect of Gain, and had a fure Profpect of Lofs; when their Eftates and the Provifion for their whole Livelihood were of fuch nature, that they could not be better'd, but were fure to be made worse by every Disturbance of the State? I shall add one general Remark further, on the near Equality of the whole Hebrew Nation, in Eftate. As the Constitution put a bar to great Riches, and made fuch Pro Attempts of Ambiti on and made very vifion for the natural Conveniences of Life, that very few could be in great Want or Poverty; this ferved to diminish greatly the Temptations of Luxury, Pride and Envy, nor were there any fo neceffitous as to feek Relief for their private Wants and Misery, in the publick Confufion and Disorders of their Country How much do these Provifions of the Hebrew Government, to prevent the Occafions of Faction, excel all the Conftitutions of the fam'd Spartan Lawgiver for the fame Purpose, fo much celebrated by the admired Grecian Authors? Nor would these Conftitutions have mifs'd their Praise, if they had been published by a Lycurgus, a Solon, or a Numa; or indeed by any body but Mofes. The Wisdom of this Conftitution went ftill further, to make all ambitious and facFaction tious Attempts fo very difficult, fo unlikely difficult, to fucceed, as to be next to impracticable : almost im- A great Discouragement to the making any practica fuch Attempts. The particular Powers of ble. each Part of this Government, were fo ba lanced by the Powers of other Parts, that without the Concurrence of all it was hardly practicable for any one Part to draw to themfelves any fhare of Property, Wealth, or Power, from the other Parts; and it was as hard and impracticable to obtain their Concurrence, to the Ruin of their own Property and Liberty. Let any Man but just confider the Plan of this Government in general, and let |