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plining the sexual life is a half-way station toward the recognition of marriage as the natural objective expression of the sexual life, which is the realistic view of the Renaissance.
Luther's doctrine of the state is parallel to his doctrine of the family. We aim to be completely inward and spiritual beings. But we are as yet in the flesh, in the world. Since we are in this incomplete spiritual condition, God has ordained the state as an instrument with which to protect the good and to punish the bad. According to the medieval ideal there were two estates, the clergy or the spiritual estate, and the laity or the temporal estate. According to Luther all Christian laymen are as spiritual as the clergy, since they have received baptism and faith and the Gospel in the same way. One would think from the way in which the clergy treat the laity, that the latter were not themselves Christians. But the temporal power being baptized is also priest and bishop. One faith, one Gospel, one sacrament, enable the Christian to determine what is right. Through baptism "the temporal power has become a member of the Christian body." "It is, indeed, past bearing, that the spiritual law should esteem so highly the liberty, life, and property of the clergy, as if laymen were not as good spiritual Christians, or not equally members of the Church. Why should your body, life, goods, and honor be free and not mine, seeing that we are equal as Christians, and have received alike baptism, faith, spirit, and all things?" The Church is not above the temporal power. The difference between the clergy and the prince is one of office. All have equal power in the
community; we differ in function because there are different kinds of work to be done in the community. The prince must punish the clergy when it is necessary for the good of the community, for that is his office. All Christians are kings and priests and lords of all things.
Thus although as Christians we are aiming to be completely inward and spiritual, yet while we are in the flesh, and in the world, the state is a necessary part of the economy of life. The inner spiritual life is the sole end as in the medieval view, but the state is a necessary instrument in molding the world in harmony with the inner life.
There is nothing here of the naturalistic doctrine of the state which we see in Machiavelli's Prince, in which the newly-developed national consciousness of the Renaissance finds expression. Man is not, as with Aristotle, a political animal. Luther thinks of the Christian man as an inner, spiritual, supernatural being. Nevertheless the national consciousness of which Machiavelli is so well aware is an unconscious drive in Luther's mind. In teaching that the state is a part of the economy of life, Luther is unconsciously a spokesman of the German nobility. Luther the mediævalist rationalizes his position by holding that the German state is free because it is a baptized, spiritual state. Only as a spiritual being is man free. Nevertheless when once the absoluteness and independence of the inner mind are surrendered, or even seriously modified; when it is admitted that the state is a necessary instrument in molding and training the inner life, the way is open toward the naturalism, the realism, of
the Renaissance view of the state. Luther the mediævalist had in mind a baptized, Christian, spiritual state, but Luther the leader of the Reformation broke down the dualism between the inner life and the political life.
Luther's view of work, of marriage, of the state, is an open surrender, so far as practice is concerned, of an independent inner world of mind. Conscience had not yet come to center about the organization of the state and the family, of agriculture and commerce; it was not yet concerned with one's daily vocation or with the scientific study of nature. The idea that the state, the institution of property, the family, the organization of work around the ideal of a vocation, were essential to the psychological and moral structure of the individual himself, would have been unintelligible to the leaders of the Reformation. But Luther's concessions to the family and the state were a transition stage between the mediæval ideal and the modern interpretation of sex, of creative work, of the state, as normal and necessary aspects of human personality.
VOLUNTARISM AS FORMS OF INTROVERSION
We can understand the modern individualistic development only if we see it as the continuation of the mediæval inner ideal. inner ideal. The normal will follows through to the completion of the objective ends of conduct. On the other hand, a blocking of the will before it reaches its objective ends results in various developments. Because the modern world inherited from mediævalism the tradition of an inner mind, this inner mind in its modern individualized form continued to build around itself a wall of defense. Any world which was immediately possible was still incompatible with the demands of the inner ideal. Hence a blocking of the will by its environment. There floated free therefore between the organism and the objective world an inner world-a world of ideas, of feelings, of attitudes. This inner mental world was elaborated by the imagination into various forms of mental absolutes and infinites. When the will is blocked so that it does not attain its objects, any one of three main types of introversion may result. There may be a detachment of the idea or of knowledge from its object. This is the explanation of rationalism or of intuitionalism. This is true transcendentalism. It is
best exhibited in German philosophy. In England this detachment of knowledge from its object took the form of an empirical idealism. Another type of introversion results when the blocking sets free not a system of detached ideas but a complex of feelings, emotions, or sentiments. This form of disassociation is known as romanticism. It is typically illustrated in Rousseau. The third form of introversion is seen in the disassociation of attitudes of will from their normal objectives. Such a type of thought is illustrated in the voluntarism of Fichte and Schopenhauer.
In Kant we see the inner mind of Protestantism defending itself against the objective world of fact projected by modern science. The Copernican system, which had reached such a confirmation in Newton's law of gravitation, regarded man as a result of the causal mechanism discovered by astronomy and physics. Philosophy's business in the case of Kant was to save the inner mind of Protestant thought from the mechanism of modern science. He succeeded by differentiating a transcendental realm of mind from an empirical realm of mind. The mind by an act of pure reason produces universal, a priori, forms of thought which themselves make possible the objects of scientific knowledge. These pure universal forms of thought come from the mind itself. On its ethical side this means that impulses and dispositions and the raw material of sensation can become elements of rational conduct only as they are interpreted and approved by this transcendental moral reason. There is only one thing which can be good-an inner autonomous moral will. It is the only moral end. Kant