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VOL. may especially be moft fure of the exiftence of I. GOD, though we cannot fee him; more indeed than we can be generally of the existence of vifible things.

SOMETIMES the objects of our mind and fight meet in one, there is fomewhat vifible and fomewhat invifible. As for inftance, in actions that are capable of moral confideration, there is the action it felf, and there is alfo the rectitude or irrectitude of that action. Now here is at once an object of my fight, and of my mind; and I may be as certain of the one, as of the other, in many inftances. As, fuppose I fee one strike, wound, or kill an innocent perfon; or, suppose I see one affront a magistrate, injuriously or barbarously; here I have the object of my eye and mind at once. That the action was done I am certain, for I faw the ftroke; and I am no less fure of the affront, though that be an object of the mind. As foon as I see such an action done, do not I apprehend it to be ill done. Is not the thing which my mind apprehends, as real as that which my eyes fee? Am I not as fure that it was ill done, as that the action was done at all? though the one falls under my eye, and the other only under the cognizance of the mind.

AGAIN, if we look no further than our selves, our own frame and compofition, we may be as certain of the existence of what we fee not, as of what we do fee. We have a body. We are fure we have a body, for we can see it.

It is

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ways the object of our fenfes, or the external or- SER M. gans that are planted there. But we cannot fee VI.

our minds, yet I hope we are never the lefs fure that we have minds. We are as certain that we have somewhat about us that can think, can understand, as we are that we may be feen and felt. I go not about to determine now what it is that thinks, whether material or not, mortal or not; but every man that will confider, is as fure that he has a mind which he cannot fee, as that he' has a body which he can fee.

لنت

To bring this matter home to our prefent purpose concerning the fupreme invisible Being, the bleffed GOD. It is moft apparent that we' may be as certain of his existence as of any thing; and unfpeakably more certain of his conftant existence, than we can be of any being whatfoever. There is no man that will ufe his understanding, but must allow this. For, fuppofe an object of fight before me, I am certain that it doth exift; for I fee it. Now the following conclufion may be as certain to any one that confiders, to wit, fomething is, therefore fomething hath ever been. I will appeal to any understanding man, whether this be not as certain as the other. For if we should suppose a time when nothing ever was, when nothing existed, any man's understanding must tell him, it was impoffible that any thing fhould ever have been. Suppose a season when nothing was, and then was it poffible any thing of it felf fhould arife out of that nothing, when there was nothing at all conceivable ?

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VOL. that a thing fhould be before it was, and do fomething when it was nothing? Therefore it is hence most neceffarily confequent, that there must needs be fome original eternal Being, fubfifting of it felf, that was always and never began to be; and therefore was neceffarily, and fo can never ceafe to be*.

LET this be but weighed, and let any fober understanding judge, whether this conclufion be not as certain as the former. That is, compare these two conclufions together, I fee fomething, therefore fomething is; and this alfo, fomething is, therefore fomething hath ever been, fome original Being that always was of it self, and could not but be: A man, I fay, feels as great a certainty in his own mind concerning this, as concerning the other. He must renounce his understanding as much in one cafe, as his eyes in the other, if he will not grant this to be certain, that as fome beings now exift, there has been always an original, felfexiftent Being.

AND then fuppofing the existence of the thing already, I may form as certain concluficas concerning the attributes of what I canno fee, as of that which I can fee. To apply this alio to the invifible eternal Being. Look to any vifible thing, and your eyes can

tell

*This argument is urged at large, with great force and ftrength in the Author's admirable Treatife, intitled, The LIVING TEMPLE. Part 1. Chap. 2.

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tell what are its vifible accidents. I look upon SE R M. the wall, and fee it is white. I know it is fo, because I fee it is fo. Cannot I as certainly conclude concerning this original eternal Being, that he is wife, holy, juft, and powerful? I know that there is fuch a thing as wifdom, and juftice, goodness, and power in the world. I know that these things are not nothing, and that they did not come out of nothing; therefore they must needs originally belong to the original Being. Is not this as certain, and as plain, as any visible accident of any thing is to a man's eye? Muft not these attributes neceffarily first be in GOD, as in their original feat and proper subject? yea, a great deal more certainly, than any kind of quality we can fuppofe to be lovely in the creature can agree to it; becaufe as for the original Being, that exifted of it felf; and therefore, is neceffarily, and by confequence eternally, and invariably whatever it is. Therefore fince these perfections are originally in God himfelf, or derivations from him, what should rationally keep a man in fufpenfe, when by the intervention of his mind he fees fuch an invifible object, but that he fhould fall in love with that, as well as with any visible object, that commends itself as lovely to the fight. And I should next add,

[2.] THAT invifible excellency is infinitely greater than any visible excellency can be. As there is a reality in unfeen things, and efpecially in this invifible object, as much as in

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VOL. any thing we fee with our eyes; fo there is generally a higher excellency in invisible objects, than in those that are visible, and infinitely more in this than in other invifible objects. But thi and the other confiderations I cannot reach to now.

SERM.

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