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SERMON VII.

Preached October 4, 1676.

I JOHN IV. 20.

For be that loveth not his Brother, whom he bath feen; how can he love God, whom he hath not feen?

T

HE fecond head of difcourfe which we are still upon is this, That men are not released from the obligation to love GOD though he be invisible; and that it is not only an evil, but a most horrid and intolerable one too, not to love him, notwithstanding the excufe that we cannot fee him. And this, as we obferved, you have from the plain words of the text; in as much as all the force of the Apostle's reasoning depends upon it. For he is endeavouring to evince how unreasonable it is we should not love one another, because upon this would ensue that infernal thing our not loving GoD; rather than admit which, it is fuppofed that men would admit any thing. For the profecution of this truth we proposed to evince, in the first place, that this is a very vain excufe: and have already fhewn from many confiderations, that it is not impossible to love GoD in these bodies of flesh, wherein we

I.

VOL. have fuch a dependence on the fenfes; neither is it unreasonable, or unfit that it fhould be injoined as a duty. Against the contrary principle we have defigned to infift on fundry confiderations, and have obferved already in the

[1] PLACE, that we may be as fure of the exiftence of many invifible beings, especially of GOD, as we are of any that are vifible. This we have fhewn, and alfo that it is as easy to form conclufions refpecting the nature of the former, as it is of the latter. Both these we laboured to evince from feveral inftances: and concluded with ob'ferving to this effect, that fince all perfections are originally in GoD, which we may difcern by the intervention of the understanding, therefore it is as reasonable to love him, as any visible object how lovely foever; and more fo indeed, because he is eternally and invariably the fame. For, to add fomething further on this head,

I SEE and converfe often with fuch or fuch a perfon, who because of certain amiable qualities that I difcern in him, hath attracted and drawn my love; but I am never fure thofe qualities will remain in him always. I know not whether they be of that kind, yea or no, that they will remain But I most certainly know, that he will not always remain with me the converfible object of my love. And therefore if fenfe, if the fight of what is lovely in him be the only ground of my love to him, I could never have loved him longer than my eye could fee him. For as foon as he is gone out of

my

VII.

my fight, I know not but he is gone out of being, SER M. out of the world, and fo the object of love my may be quite loft. But I know that the eternal Being doth exift neceffarily, and always. It is impoffible that GOD fhould ever not exist, or ever be other than he was: and therefore if lovelinefs and amiablenefs were found there at any time, it is to be found there at all times; without variableness and fhadow of change, yesterday, and to-day the fame, and for ever.

AND now upon all this, fince it is very plain. and evident, that we may be as certain concerning what we fee not, as concerning what we do fee; as fure of the existence of invisible, as of, visible beings; and more efpecially about the nature and existence, (as far as concerns us) of the bleffed invifible GOD; it is plain that there our love ought to have its exercife, as much as any where elfe, fuppofing fuch excellencies to be found in the invifible things, as may equally recommend the object to our love. Therefore we add,

[2] THAT, invifible things are really of far higher excellency, than thofe which are vifible. As the things that we cannot fee have as certain a reality, as those that we can fee; fo, I say, they are of higher excellency: And this bleffed invifible object infinitely more excellent, as we must acknowledge, while we acknowledge him to be GOD. If we fpeak of fuch things as lie within the compass of our being, how plain is the cafe

and

VOL. and how evident the inference! Sure the invisible I. world muft needs be of incomparably greater

excellency and glory, than the vifible world. And if you reduce all kinds of being in the whole universe to these two ranks and orders, vifible, and invifible, certainly the latter must be unspeakably more excellent.

WE who are for our parts fet in the confines of both worlds, vifible, and invifible; we in whofe very nature both meet, unite, and touch one another, and are as it were comparted together; we who are of a nature partly visible, partly invisible, partly flesh and partly fpirit, or as the language of Plato's school was*, mind and duft united into one compound; furely we fhould not be partial in our judgment of this cafe. Who should be impartial if we are not, who are fet as a middle, fort of creatures between the two worlds, and fo are capable of looking into and furveying the one and the other?

AND if we contemplate both even in our felves, methinks it should be no difficult thing with us to determine which is of greater excellency, this bulk of flesh, or this fpirit which inhabits it, and keeps it from being a dead lump, an useless, rotten, putrid carcafs. Yea if we fhould suppose the body of a man to be animated by fome inferior vital principle to that of a reafonable spirit, yet this would be the more excellent part. It is true, we should then have before our eyes a certain fort of human brute, of which kind there are but too

many

Νας, χες.

many in our age, at least that live and carry it as SER M. fuch. We should in short, to speak plainly, have VII. fomewhat before our eyes that wore the mere shape of a man, and could hear, and fee, and fmell, and taste, and move to and fro this way or that, and must ere long, after a few turns are fetched about, turn to duft, to rottenness, and corruption. But suppose we a spirit feparately, fuch as is wont to animate a human body: here we have to contemplate fomething that can think, reafon, and understand; that can form abstract notions of things, or compare one thing with another; fomething that can reflect upon it felf, which our eye cannot do; that can controul and correct the errors of fenfe; that can run through the vaft compass of known things; is capable of folving problems and difficult questions; of laying down principles and maxims of truth, after having weighed and found them firm, fo as that they may pafs current: for such there are which pass unquestionably every where for undoubted principles. In a word, we have here a kind of being to contemplate, that is capable of taking up what lies within the compass of philofophy, policy, and the whole human orb of learning; of being inftructed in all the great mysteries of mechanical skill of every kind, and in short, that can turn it self every way; and is of a nature unperishable and immortal, not liable to, nor capable of corruption, but muft laft for ever and always indure. Who now would make any difficulty of owning, that this is a far more excellent thing than the

other?

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