De Marée's Essay on the Civilization of the Greeks in the Time of Homer, Halbkart's Homeric Psychology, several works on the Morality and Theology of Homer,by Heyne, Harles, Delbrück, Hermann, Voss, Wagner; on the Geography of the Homeric Poems, by Schönemann, Schlichthorst, A. W. Schlegel, Voss and Völcker. Even on the medicine, mineralogy, and the general stock of knowledge contained in Homer, works are not wanting. We may mention also, for the general reader, Flaxman's Illustrations of Homer (designs from Homer's descriptions), and Tischbein's Homer, after Antiques, with Explanations by Heyne.

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HOMEROMASTIX(from"Oμnpos and μacrise, to flagellate), the Scourge of Homer; a surname of Zoilus.

HOME-SICKNESS, in medicine Nostalgia. The natural feeling of grief at a separation from the paternal home and native soil, becomes, in men of great sensibility, who go to a different climate (especially from a mountainous to a champaign country), and are surrounded by different scenery, without active occupation, a real disease. It shows itself by a deep melancholy, under which the whole nervous system in a short time suffers. The mind of the patient is filled with thoughts of his country, and with associations which serve to recall it. The desire of seeing it, and despair of gratifying the desire, engross him. As the disease of the nerves increases, spasms come on. The respiration of the individual becomes difficult, interrupted, and consists almost wholly of sighs. His appetite is lost. A deadly paleness extends over all his countenance, and his sight grows dim and weak. His heart beats immoderately, and throbs with the slightest motion. His secretions become irregular; congestions afterwards originate in the noblest organs; sleep flies from him, or consists principally of dreams, which are filled with the scenes he has left. Sudden death sometimes puts an end to this situation; but more commonly a slow, nervous and hectic fever ensues, which carries off the individual, if it is impossible to overcome the disease. A return to his home is the most effectual remedy. The confidence that this will happen has cured many. But when this is impossible, agreeable occupation is a better remedy

than medicine.

HOMICIDE is either justifiable, excusable or felonious. Of the first sort is the killing of public enemies in battle, in the prosecution of a declared war, in pursuance of the orders given by commanders duly com

missioned. So where a crime is punishable capitally according to the laws, the judge is bound to condemn the criminal to death, and the sheriff or other executive officer to carry the sentence into effect, in the manner prescribed by the sentence of condemnation. But the judge must have jurisdiction of the offence, and be duly commissioned, and the executive officer must be empowered to carry the sentence into effect, and must perform the execution in the manner prescribed by law, otherwise the execution of the criminal will make the judge or the officer, as the case may be, guilty of criminal homicide. Sir Matthew Hale, being doubtful of the validity of his commission under Cromwell, declined sitting as judge in a capital case. So, too, where an officer of justice is resisted in the execution of his office, in his attempt to arrest a person in a criminal, or, as is maintained, even in a civil case, he is not obliged to give back, but may repel force with force, and if the person resisting is unavoidably killed, the homicide is justifiable, for few men would quietly submit to arrest, if, in case of resistance, the officer was obliged to give back. But if the party, instead of resisting, attempts to avoid an arrest by flight, the officer is not, in ordinary cases, justified in killing him to prevent his escape. It is, however, laid down as law, that if a felony be committed, and the felon attempts to fly from justice, it is the duty of every man to use his best endeavors to prevent an escape; and if, in the fresh pursuit, the party be killed, where he cannot be taken alive, it will be deemed a justifiable homicide. And this justification is not limited to those who may witness the act of felony, but extends to all who join in the fresh pursuit. The same rule applies to cases of an attempt, on the part of a felon, to break away and escape, after he has been arrested, and is on the way to gaol. So if a party has been indicted for felony, and will not permit himself to be arrested, the officer, having a warrant for his arrest, may lawfully kill him, if he cannot be taken alive. But this is to be understood only of officers, and not of private persons. Magistrates and officers authorized to suppress and disperse mobs, are justified, by the common law, in taking the requisite measures and using the requisite force for this purpose, though it extend to the killing of some of the rioters. An English statute of 21 Edward I provides for a case of forcible resistance of trespassers, which is not applicable in the U. States, where there is no

similar law. It relates to trespasses in parks, and provides that if a parker, forester or warrener finds a trespasser in his grounds, intending to do damage therein, who will not yield after hue and cry made to stand, but flees or defends himself, if he is killed in the attempt to take him, the homicide shall be no crime. And a striking application of this law is mentioned in Hale's Pleas of the Crown, in the case of sir William Hawkesworth, who, being weary of life, after blaming his parker for his negligence, and ordering him to execute the law rigorously against any one who should enter the park for the purpose of stealing deer, went himself into the park, by night, when he could not be distinguished by the keeper, and, on being questioned and refusing to stand, was shot, and the homicide was considered justifiable. The law arms every member of the community with the power of life and death for the prevention of atrocious felonies accompanied with violence and personal danger to others; as, in case of an attempt to murder or rob, or commit burglary or arson, the person making the attempt may, by the common law, if he cannot be otherwise prevented, be killed on the spot, and the law will not recognise the act as a crime. In cases of this sort, in order to justify the homicide, it must appear that there were good grounds for a suspicion that the person killed had a felonious intent. Thus in Levet's case, reported by Croke, Levet being awaked by one of his servants, and told that there were thieves in the house, got up, and with a drawn sword in his hand searched the different rooms to find the thieves. A servant had concealed Frances Freeman, a visitor of hers, in the buttery, not wishing her to be seen, and Levet's wife discovering Frances, it being too dark, however, to distinguish her clearly, called out to her husband that she had found the thieves, and he thereupon went into the buttery, and, thrusting with his sword in the dark, killed Frances. The homicide was held to be justifiable, though sir Michael Foster expresses a doubt whether sufficient caution had been used. But lord Hale considers it to be one of the cases in which the ignorance of the fact, and the strong grounds of the suspicion, afford a sufficient excuse. The cases already mentioned of justifiable homicide, are those in which the public authority and laws are directly concerned. The laws of society, however, leave every individual a portion of that right of personal defence with which he is invested by

those of nature. If one may interpose to prevent an atrocious crime against society, where he is not himself in any personal danger, the laws will, a fortiori, permit him to defend himself against attacks upon his own person. This right may be more clearly explained in connexion with the subject of felonious homicide, usually classed under the titles of murder and manslaughter; for this latter term, though etymologically coinciding with the term homicide, is usually applied to cases of blamable homicide. Murder is the killing of a person who is under the protection of the laws, with malice prepense, either express or implied. Malice is the distinguishing characteristic of murder. It is not necessary, in order to constitute the crime of murder, that the slayer should have the direct intention of killing. If the act be done with a wicked, depraved, malignant spirit, a heart regardless of social duty and deliberately bent upon mischief, it is characterized by what the law denominates malice, though it may not result from any enmity or grudge against the particular victim. Thus, for instance, if a man resolves to kill the first person he may meet, a homicide committed in pursuance of such a resolution, is accompanied by the malice contemplated by the law as the characteristic of murder, although the parties may never have kn each other. So if a man wantonly discharges a gun among a multitude of people, whereby any one is killed, the act will be done with that depravity of disposition which the law considers malice. Another instance of this intention of murder is, the purposely or wantonly letting fall a heavy body from the top of a house, or other height, into the street, where people are known to be frequently passing, and whereby any one is killed. The very definition of this crime imports that, like all other crimes, indeed, it can be committed only by a free agent. The crime presupposes a will, motive or disposition, on the part of the perpetrator. Nor will any mere threat so far take away his freedom of action as to excuse him for killing a third party, though the coercion used for this purpose might exonerate him from a contract made under its influence. An idiot or insane person cannot commit this crime. But drunkenness is, in general, no excuse for homicide, though the act be done under its immediate influence. But in the case of the U. States against Drew, reported in the sixth volume of Mason's Reports, Mr. Justice Story held that where a person had been so long in the habits of

intemperance, as to cause the kind of insanity known under the name of mania a potu, and was accordingly subject to an established derangement of mind, an act of homicide by such a person was not murder, but that he was to be considered as insane, and not responsible for crimes any more than if his mental disorder had been caused by any other vice, or without any fault on his part. The manner of killing is not material. Whether it be by sword, poison, beating, imprisonment, starvation, or exposure to the inclemency of the atmosphere, it will be equally murder. A son, who cruelly and unnaturally exposed his sick father to the open air during inclement weather, whereby his death was occasioned, was held to be guilty of murder; and so was a woman, who caused the death of her child by leaving it in an orchard scantily covered by leaves, whereby it perished; and so, also, persons having the care of a child, who caused its death by removing it from parish to parish without supplying it sufficient sustenance. A master who compelled his apprentice to sleep on boards, exposed to the atmosphere, and thereby occasioned his death, was held to be guilty of murder. This crime may be committed by mere advice and encouragement. In the case of the Commonwealth against Bowen, reported in the Massachusetts Reports, vol. 13, p. 356, a prisoner being condemned to death, and the day of his execution appointed, was advised by another to commit suicide, and disappoint the sheriff of the execution and the multitude of the spectacle. He did commit suicide, and the court instructed the jury that if the act was done in pursuance and in consequence of such instigation, it was an act of murder by the instigator. As to the person on whom a murder may be committed, the English books say it must be one "in the peace of the king," that is, a person entitled to the protection of the laws, as is one of the public enemy, if he is in the country and not participating in the war. An infant unborn is within the protection of the law, and it is laid down that if, in consequence of poison given or wounds inflicted before the birth of a child, which is afterwards born alive, it dies soon after its birth, the act is murder. The act of suicide is considered by the law to be murder, and the person making away with himself, is accordingly styled a self-murderer; and the laws of Great Britain, as well as those of the U. States, have heretofore attempted to punish this crime by directing that the body of a suicide should

be ignominiously buried. But this was only punishing the surviving relatives and friends of the deceased for his offence; and though it should be admitted to be a discouragement of suicide, it would be a very questionable justification of the law, which will appear from applying the same rule to any other offence; as, for instance, we may suppose that if a man knew that all his relatives, friends and neighbors would be whipped for any theft he might commit, he might thereby possibly be induced, from inotives of humanity, to refrain from thieving; but the chance of this salutary influence upon a vicious mind, would hardly be a sufficient justification of the law. These laws, inflicting punishment upon the living by the ignominious sepulture of suicides, have accordingly been very rarely put into execution, and the laws themselves begin to disappear from the statute book. The lines of distinction between felonious and excusable or justifiable homicide, and between manslaughter and murder, are, in many cases, nice and difficult to define with precision. But, in general, the accused has the advantage of any uncertainty or obscurity that may hang over his case, since the presumptions of law are usually in his favor. The characteristic distinction laid down in the books between murder and manslaughter is the absence of malice in the latter. Most of the instances of homicide which come under the term manslaughter, are those which the law considers excusable. Sudden provocation may be an excuse for striking another with the hand, or with a stick held in the hand, without the intention to give a deadly blow, and though death ensue, the party may not be guilty of murder. It is made a question whether mere words, unaccompanied by acts, such as menacing gestures, are a sufficient provocation to justify a blow or violence which results in homicide. Where a person, whose pocket was picked in a crowd, to avenge himself, threw the pickpocket into a neighboring pond, intending only to duck him, and the man was drowned, it was held to be only manslaughter. For though a bodily harm was intended, yet the injury which appeared likely to result from the act, was not greater than the provocation seemed to excuse, or at least palliate. One circumstance, showing the degree of malice, or, rather, showing its presence or absence, is the kind of weapon used in giving a wound on a sudden provocation; and another circumstance of importance is the fact of the weapon's being already in the hand or not, for going to seek a

weapon gives time for deliberation. The ground of excuse of homicide, in case of provocation merely, is the supposed sudden passion, some influence of which the law concedes to the frailty of human nature. But the excuse of self-defence goes still further; and where a man is attacked, so that his own life is endangered, or in such way that he may reasonably suppose it to be so, he may repel the attack with mortal weapons. One of the most frequent cases of manslaughter is that occasioned by single combat; and on account of the firm hold which the point of honor has taken of the civilized nations of the west, this has long been among the most difficult subjects of legislation. (See Duel.) The crime of murder, in its most aggravated degree, is punished with death throughout the civilized world; and, in England and a greater part of the U.States, this crime is so punished without exception. But in Pennsylvania and some other of the states, only murder in the first degree, that is, with deliberate intent, or committed with circumstances of great atrocity, is a subject of capital punishment; murder in the second degree, or of a less aggravated character, being punished by imprisonment in the public penitentiary for a longer or shorter period. Manslaughter is punished by imprisonment only, or by imprisonment and fine.

HOMILIUS, Godfrey Augustus, musicdirector in the three principal churches at Dresden, one of the greatest organists and composers of church music of his time,born February 2, 1714, at Rosenthal, on the Bohemian frontiers, was made, in 1742, organist at a church in Dresden. He died June 1, 1785. Few of his compositions have been printed.

HOMMEL; the name of several great jurists in Saxony.-1. Ferdinand Augustus Hommel was born at Leipsic, in 1697, was professor of law and a member of the supreme court in the same place. He died, after a life devoted industriously to the science of law and the administration of justice, in 1766. His works show his philosophical mind and great legal erudition.-2. Charles Ferdinand Hommel, son of the preceding, was born in 1722; in 1750, taught law at Leipsic, and, in 1756, was made professor of the decretals. After having received many honors and titles, he died in 1781. He was one of the greatest jurists of his age. Besides his labors in the science of law, he contributed to introduce a better and purer language in the German courts. Besides the law, he was well versed in many other branches of

science, as his Bibliotheca Juris Rabbinica et Saracenorum Arabica, his Jurisprudentia Numismatibus illustrata, and his many academical writings prove. Among his works are his German Flavius, that is, directions for drawing up sentences, both in civil and criminal cases (4th edit., augmented and corrected by doctor Klein, Bayreuth, 1800, 2 vols.); Rhapsodia Quastionum in Foro quotidie obvenientium (7 vols., 4th edit., Leipsic, 1783–87, 4to.), of which the seventh volume, edited by Rossig, contains Hommel's Life; his Oblectamenta Juris Feudalis (Leipsic, 1755, 4to.); his work on Rewards and Punishments,according to the Turkish Laws (2dedit., 1772), &c.

HOMO NOVUS (Latin, a new man); in ancient Rome, a person of plebeian birth, and the first of his family that held a curule office, with the right of putting a wax image of himself in the atrium of his house (jus imaginum), which placed him in the class of nobiles. The dignity thus acquired descended to his children.

HOMEOPATHY; the name of a system of medicine, introduced by Samuel Hahnemann (q. v.), and which, for about 20 years, has attracted much attention in Germany, and, of late, in other countries also. The name expresses the essential character of the new system, which consists in this-that such remedies should be employed against any disease as, in a healthy person, would produce a similar, but not precisely the same disease (from polov nabos). The fundamental principle of this system is, therefore, similia similibus curantur. To find such medicines against any given disease, experiments are made on healthy persons, in order to determine the effect on them. In the conviction that every disease carries with it a great susceptibility for the proper medicine, and that the power of medicine increases by minute division, the homeopathist gives but one drug at a time, and does not administer another dose, or a new medicine, until the former has taken effect. At the same time, a strict diet is prescribed, that the operation of the medicine may not be disturbed. Homœopathy directs the attention chiefly to the symptoms of the disease, which are followed up and observed with much greater accuracy than formerly. Disease is considered by it as only an aggregate of symptoms; and therefore the business of the physician is to extinguish the symptoms. The disciples of this system care little about the customary names and divisions of diseases; they only regard the particular pains and debilities of which the varieties of sickness are com

posed. The proximate causes of diseases, therefore, are little regarded, though the more remote causes are studied, at least in relation to diet. Every disease is considered as requiring a specific remedy. Homœopathy is thus in opposition to the Hippocratic system, which has existed, under various forms, for 22 centuries; and it has been exposed to numerous attacks on this account. We will mention some of the points in dispute. Homœopathy objects to the Hippocratic system, that it acts on the maxim contraria contrariis curantur, and therefore effects merely a palliative cure. This reproach is unjust, because the judicious physician endeavors to restore the diseased organs by the influence of the healthy organs, and the merest empiric alone attempts to cure by absolute contraries. The Hippocratic medicine does not even reject the homœopathic principle, as the treatment of nervous diseases proves. Secondly, the homœopathists accuse their opponents of directing their efforts against what cannot be known, the proximate cause of the disease; while, in turn, the homoeopathist may be reproached with attaching himself merely to the superficial, external appearance of the disease, and with a pedantic minuteness in regard to those symptoms which disease assumes in a given case. Thirdly, the homœopathist accuses the others of administering remedies of which they do not know the effects; to which it may be replied, that the effect of a medicine becomes perfectly known only through a patient, never by a healthy person. Fourthly, the minuteness of the dose prescribed by the homœopathists is objected to by other physicians, who, however, should not forget that they constantly order a solution of one grain of tartar-emetic in eight ounces of water. The unnecessary or injudicious mixture of medicines has become much less common than formerly among the Hippocratic physicians. The Hippocratic school cannot reconcile itself to the idea that all classification of diseases under generic names is, in itself, without meaning, and that the course of acute diseases, the doctrine of the crisis, &c. (the basis of the Hippocratic medicine), is imaginary, since it rests on a faithful observation of nature. The old system, therefore, reproaches homœopathy not only with not knowing, but with disdaining to know, the nature of diseases. Since the knowledge of the nature and the course of diseases is the indisputable basis of the Hippocratic medicine, a great revolution in medicine is not to be expected from ho

mœopathy. If its principles should prove true, it will result in a knowledge of specific means of cure, and thus make a valuable addition to medicine, as other systems have done. The works on homoopathy are already numerous. Hahnemann's Organon der rationellen Heilkunst appeared first at Dresden (1810), and has reached a fourth edition (1829); a French translation in Dresden by Brunow(1824), an English by Ahner, an Italian by professor Bernardo Quaranta, and Russian in Casan by Petersen. The Reine Arzneimittellehre von Hahnemann appeared, in six volumes, Dresden, 1811 to 1821. The Archives of Homœopathic Medicine, under the direction of Stapf, has been published at Leipsic, since 1821. Other works on homoopathy, some of which are against it, have been written by A. J. Hecker, Bischoff, Puchelt, Rau, Heinroth, &c.

He

HOMPESCH, Ferdinand, baron of, last grand-master of the order of the knights of St. John, was born, 1744, at Düsseldorf. In the 12th year of his age, he went to Malta, where he rose, successively, from a page of the grand-master to the rank of grand-cross, for 25 years was minister of the court of Vienna to his order, and, in 1797, was chosen grand-master. was the first German invested with this dignity. When Bonaparte landed at Malta, on his passage to Egypt, in June, 1798, the works were surrendered by the commander, Bosreddon, without the knowledge of Hompesch. The grand-master, on the third day after the surrender, embarked for Trieste. He received 100,000 crowns for his plate, and was promised an annual pension, of the same amount, which, however, he did not receive; for, after his arrival in Trieste, he solemnly protested against the capitulation, as never consented to by him, and, some months afterwards, abdicated his dignity in favor of the emperor Paul I. He afterwards lived in obscurity and great distress. Necessity at length compelled him to go to Montpellier, to demand the arrears of the pension which had been promised him. He obtained, with much difficulty, 15,000 francs of this sum, and died in 1803. (See Egypt, Landing of the French in.)

HONDEKOETER, or HONDEKOTTER. There were three Flemish artists of this name.-Giles, born in 1583, at Utrecht, excelled in landscape painting.

His son, Gysbrecht, born in 1613, was celebrated for his delineation of ducks and other fowls, as well as of birds in general.-Melchior, the grandson, by far the most celebrated of the three, was born