Defeasance." But a Condition may be by parol (Ex p. Southam, 43 L. J. Bank. 39; L. R. 17 Eq. 578).

V. CONDITION.

DEFECT." Defects in an estate may be either—

a. Patent, that is, such as may be discovered by ordinary vigilance on the part of a purchaser; e.g. the existence of an open footpath over the property (Bowles v. Round, 5 Ves. 508), or the ruinous state of buildings (Grant v. Mint, 9 Coop. 177: Keates v. Cadogan, 10 C. B. 591; 20 L. J. C. P. 76; 16 L. T. O. S. 367); or, b. Latent, that is, such as the greatest attention (Sug. 333) would not enable him to discover; e.g. the existence of defects in a ship's bottom when sold afloat (V. Mellish v. Motteux, Peake, N. P. 156)." Dart, 101, 102.

Unfitness or inadequacy for the purpose for which it is used is a "Defect in the condition" of Machinery within s. 1, Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 V. c. 42), though the machinery may be, in itself, perfect (Heske v. Samuelson, 53 L. J. Q. B. 45; 12 Q. B. D. 30; 49 L. T. 474). So is an unsound combination of sound Plant (Cripps v. Judge, 51 L. T. 182 ; 33 W. R. 35; 53 L. J. Q. B. 517; 13 Q. B. D. 583: Weblin v. Ballard, 55 L. J. Q. B. 395; 17 Q. B. D. 122; 54 L. T. 532; 34 W. R. 455; 50 J. P. 597). But not a mere temporary obstruction, e.g. a substance negligently placed on a roadway (McGiffen v. Palmer's Ship Building Co., 52 L. J. Q. B. 25; 10 Q. B. D. 5: Thomas v. Quartermaine, 55 L. J. Q. B. 439; 17 Q. B. D. 414; 55 L. T. 360; 34 W. R. 741: Pegram v. Dixon, 55 L. J. Q. B. 447); nor mere dangerousness when not used with ordinary care (Walsh v. Whiteley, 57 L. J. Q. B. 586; 21 Q. B. D. 371; 36 W. R. 876); nor insufficient packing of goods on a trolly (Corcoran v. East SurreyIronworks Co., 58 L. J. Q. B. 145).

The omission of the date of an accident from notice of injury under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, is a "defect or inaccuracy" within s. 7 (Carter v. Drysdale, 53 L. J. Q. B. 557; 12 Q. B. D. 91; 32 W. R. 171), so also is the omission to state the cause of the injury if such omission be not misleading (Stone v. Hyde, 51 L. J. Q. B. 452; 9 Q. B. D. 76).

V. FORMAL FAULTS.

DEFENCE. "Defence' commeth of the word defendo" (Co. Litt. 127 b); and as applied to a pleading it does not mean a "justification," which is the ordinary signification, but a "denial" (3 Bla. Com. 296, cited in Hargrave's note to Co. Litt. 127 b).

"Any Defence," s. 1, 31 & 32 V. c. 86; V. Pellas v. Neptune Mar. Insrce., 48 L. J. C. P. 370; 5 C. P. D. 34.

DEFENDANT.-Notwithstanding that s. 100, Jud. Act, 1873, enacts that "Defendant," includes a person" served with notice of, or entitled to attend, any proceedings," the word does not include a person merely

brought in as a Third-Party (Eden v. Weardale Co., 54 L. J. Ch. 384; 28 Ch. D. 333; 33 W. R. 241: Street v. Gover, 46 L. J. Q. B. 582 ; 2 Q. B. D. 498). But when the Third-Party has been treated as an "Opposite Party" and has been ordered, at plaintiff's instance, to answer Interrogatories, he becomes a Defendant and entitled to an Order to interrogate the Plaintiff under Ord. 31, R. 1 (Eden v. Weardale Co., 35 Ch. D. 287): V. OPPOSITE PARTY.

DEFINED CHANNEL.-Subterranean waters can only be the subject of riparian rights when flowing in Defined and Known Channels. "Defined," means a contracted and bounded channel, although the course of the stream may be undefined by human knowledge. "Known means the Knowledge, by reasonable inference, from existing and observed facts in the natural or pre-existing condition of the surface of the ground. "Known" in this rule of law is not synonymous with "Visible," nor is it restricted to knowledge derived from exposure of the channel by excavation (Black v. Ballymena Commrs., 17 L. R. Ir. 459).

DEFINITIVE.-" Definitive Publication" of an Order of the Charity Commrs., s. 8, 23 & 24 V. c. 136; V. Ex p. Nicholls, 34 L. J. Ch. 169. "Definitive Sentence;" V. Esnouf v. A.-G. Jersey, 52 L. J. P. C. 26; 8 App. Ca. 304.

DEFORCEMENT.-" By wrong him deforces.' Deforciare is a word of art, and cannot be expressed by any other word; for it signifieth, to withhold lands or tenements from the right owner" (Co. Litt. 331 b; Va. Ib. 277 b).

DEFRAUD.-V. INTENT TO DEFRAUD.

DELAY.-" Prosecute without Delay;" V. PROSECUTE.
V. WILFUL DELAY.

DELAY IN TRANSIT.-A delay by a carrier in not starting goods on their destination, is a "delay in transit" (Brown v. Manchester S. & L. Ry., 51 L. J. Q. B. 599; 53 Ib. 124; 9 Q. B. D. 230; 8 App. Ca. 703: Vh. Sheridan v. Mid. G. W. Ry., Ireland, 24 L. R. Ir. 146).

DELFS." The word 'Delfs' probably means open pits or diggings " (A.-G. for Isle of Man v. Mylchreest, 48 L. J. P. C. 44; 4 App. Ca. 308).

DELINEATED.-In Dowling v. Pontypool Ry. (43 L. J. Ch. 761; L. R. 18 Eq. 714) the words "lands delineated upon the deposited plans," in the usual clause for compulsory acquirement of land, were considered at great length; and it was held that they were not limited to lands surrounded by lines on every side, but included lands so sketched, represented or shown that the owners would have notice that their property might be taken.

DELIVER.—V. Delivery: CARRY OUT.

DELIVERED.-Freight, on goods, e.g. cotton, at so much per cubic feet "delivered," is to be calculated on the measurement of the goods as put on board, and not when unloaded (Gibson v. Sturge, 10 Ex. 622; 24 L. J. Ex. 121: Buckle v. Knoop, 36 L. J. Ex. 223 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 333).

DELIVERED IN EXECUTION.-Land is "actually delivered in execution," within s. 1, 27 & 28 V. c. 112, as soon as a sheriff under an elegit delivers it to the execution creditor (Re Hobson, 55 L. J. Ch. 754 ; 33 Ch. D. 493; 55 L. T. 255; 34 W. R. 786: Vf. Champneys v. Burland, 19 W. R. 148; 23 L. T. 584), or as soon as a Receiver is appointed (Hatton v. Haywood, 43 L. J. Ch. 372; 9 Ch. 229; 30 L. T. 279; 22 W. R. 356: Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies, 47 L. J. Ch. 833; 9 Ch. D. 275; 27 W. R. 3; 39 L. T. 244: Ex p. Evans, Re Walkins, 49 L. J. Bank. 7; 13 Ch. D. 252; 41 L. T. 565; 28 W. R. 127 : Re Pope, 55 L. J. Q. B. 522; 17 Q. B. D. 743 ; 55 L. T. 369; 34 W. R. 654, 693). V. SEIZURE.

An equitable leasehold interest cannot be "actually delivered in exon." (Re Newcastle, L. R. 8 Eq. 700).

Vh. Dan. Ch. Pr. 932; Fisher, 486.

DELIVERY.-The "Delivery

Delivery" of an Abstract of Title, does not need, to make it complete, any offer of the deeds for examination. "An Abstract is delivered whenever a number of sheets of paper (call it what you will) is delivered to the purchaser, which contains, with sufficient clearness and sufficient fulness, the effect of every instrument which constitutes part of the title of the vendor" (per Kindersley, V.-C., Oakden v. Pike, 34 L. J. Ch. 622; 13 W. R. 673. V. ABSTRACT).

Delivery of a Bill of Exchange; V. s. 21, Bills of Ex. Act, 1882, and (of a Note) ss. 84, 89, Ib. Speaking generally, "Delivery," of a Bill or Note, means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another" (s. 2, Ib.).

66

Delivery of a Conveyance; V. CONVEYANCE.

Delivery of Goods to a tradesman so as to be exempt from distress; V. Clarke v. Milwall Dock Co., 55 L. J. Q. B. 378; 17 Q. B. D. 494; 54 L. T. 814; 34 W. R. 698 and as to what is " Delivery" of goods on a Contract for Sale, V. Add. C. 948-951; Rosc. N. P. 470, 494–509.

"Delivery of a Will, means the same as publication; and consists in executing it in the presence of two witnesses, and declaring it to be your Will. That is sufficient for the execution (by Will) of a Power requiring an instrument delivered'" (per Romilly, M.R., Smith v. Adkins, 41 L. J. Ch. 628; L. R. 14 Eq. 402: Va. Mason v. Heywood, 7 L. J. Ch. 145). V. SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED.

DEMAND." If a man release to another all maner of demands, this

is the best release to him to whom the release is made, that he can have" (Litt. s. 508).

"Demand,' Demandum, is a word of art, and in the understanding of the common law is of so large an extent, as no other one word in the law is, unlesse it be clameum, whereof Littleton maketh mention, Sect. 445." (Co. Litt. 291 b). But in Parkins v. Hinde (Cro. Eliz. 161), it was held that a lease by a parson at a rent to include "all Exactions and Demands did not preclude the lessor from recovering his tithes; and the Court said, "that the words shall discharge the lessee of all rents and services, but not of suit at court, or such things as are not then in demand." Vf. Stiles v. Miller, Ow. 39; 1 Leon. 300.

V. INCUMBRANCES: ON DEMAND: LAWFULLY DEMANDED.

DEMERIT. A power to punish according to a person's "Demerit," imports only that he shall be punished in the ordinary course of justice, by Indictment (4 Inst. 171; Dwar. 673).

DEMESNE. "Demains,' according to the common speech, are the Lord's chief manor place with the lands thereto belonging; terræ dominicales, which he and his ancestors have from time to time kept in their own manual occupation for the maintenance of themselves and their families; and all the parts of a manor, except what is in the hands of freeholders, are said to be demains. Copyhold lands have been accounted demains, because they that are the tenants thereof are judged in law to have no other estate but at the will of the lord; so that it is still reputed to be, in a manner, in the lord's hands; but this word is oftentimes used for distinction between those lands that the lord of the manor hath in his own hands, or in the hands of his lessees demised at a rack-rent, and such other land appertaining to the manor which belongeth to free or copyholders; Bract. lib. 4, tract. 3, c. 9: Fleta, lib. 5, c. 5 " (Jacob, Law Dict., where it is said to be derived from dominium, and not, as some have supposed, from de manu. Cp. the Eng., 'in hand,' and Lat. in manu as used in the Civil Law).

"Britton, 205 b (Bk. III. ch. 15), says, 'Demeyne proprement est tenement qe chescun tient severalment en fee.'

"The Demesnes pass by a conveyance of the manor of which they form part (Touch. 92). It is therefore of importance on the sale of a manor to except any lands belonging to the vendor within the manor, which are not intended to be sold, as they may be demesne land.

"Kelham, Dict., gives Demeigne, demenie, demeine, meaning 'own,' a sense in which the word demesne (or some other form of the same word) is frequently used in the Year Books and other early documents. Prof. Skeat (Etym. Eng. Dict.) connects it with dominium, and says ' demesne' is a false spelling, probably due to confusion with old Fr. mesnee, or maisnie, a household" (Elph. 570).

"In his demesne as of fee;" as to force of this expression, V. Co. Litt. 17 a.

DEMISE. This word in a Lease implies an absolute covenant by the lessor for title and quiet enjoyment, unless there be an express qualifying covenant (Add. C. 1283: Woodf. 172, 674, 675: Dart, 636: Elph. 422, 424). So also of a parol tenancy (Bandy v. Cartwright, 22 L. J. Ex. 285 ; 8 Ex. 913 Hall v. London Brewery, 31 L. J. Q. B. 257; 2 B. & S. 737). But in the case of a lease or letting of Leaseholds this implied contract is limited to the duration of the lessor's interest (Adams v. Gibney, 6 Bing. 656: Penfold v. Abbott, 32 L. J. Q. B. 67; 11 W. R. 169 Schwartz v. Locket, 34 S. J. 80, 73).

"On the demise of a brewery, with the exclusive privilege of supplying ale, it would seem that no covenant can be implied with respect to such a privilege from the word 'demise"" (Woodf. 176, citing Hinde v. Gray, 1 M. & G. 195; 1 Sc. N. R. 123; 9 L. J. C. P. 253).

An instrument is not a Demise, although it contain the usual words of demise, if its contents show that such was not the intention of the parties (Taylor v. Caldwell, 32 L. J. Q. B. 164; 3 B. & S. 826).

DEMOLISH.-"Demolish or Pull Down or Destroy, or Begin to demolish, pull down or destroy," s. 11, 24 & 25 V. c. 97;-this phrase means a total destruction, "or the commencement of a demolition or destruction, the purpose being to effect a complete demolition and destruction if there is no interruption " (per Lindley, J., Drake v. Foottit, 50 L. J. M. C. 143; 7 Q. B. D. 201,-citing R. v. Thomas, 4 C. & P. 237: R. v. Price, 5 Ib. 510 : R. v. Batt, 6 Ib. 329: R. v. Howell, 9 Ib. 437: R. v. Adams, Car. & M. 299). And a like meaning is to be given to "feloniously demolished, pulled down or destroyed, wholly or in part," in s. 2, 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 31 (Drake v. Foottil, sup.). A substantial destruction is a demolition, even though a small part of the building be left uninjured (R. v. Langford, Car. & M. 602); and that it was effected by fire is immaterial (R. v. Harris, Ib. 661).

V. DESTROY.

DEMURRAGE DAYS.-"Days are sometimes given in favour of the charterer which are called 'Demurrage Days.' Those are days beyond the 'Lay Days,' but during which the amount that he has to pay for the use of the ship is a fixed sum" (per Esher, M.R., Neilsen v. Wait, 16 Q. B. D. 70; 55 L. J. Q. B. 89).

V. DAYS.

DENARIATA TERRÆ.-An acre (Elph. 572, citing Spelm. Fardella); Sv. Elph. 598.

DENE.-"Some say that dene or denne, whereof dena commeth, is properly a valley or dale. Dena silvæ, and the like, as drofden, or drufden, or druden, signifieth a thicket of wood in a valley; for druf, or dru,