be no officers of their parish (R. v. Westmoreland, 12 L. J. M. C. 113; 1 D. & L. 178).

A person "aggrieved" by diverting or stopping a Highway, s. 88, 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 50, does not include one who only uses the road as one of the general public; to bring a person within this phrase he must be living in the neighbourhood of the Highway, and in the habit of using it (R. v. Taunton St. Mary, 3 M. & S. 465: R. v. Incledon, 1 Ib. 268: R. v. Williamson, 7 T. R. 32: R. v. Townsend, 5 B. & Ald. 420: Vf. Glen on Highways, 390).

As to who is "a party aggrieved," within s. 253, Public Health Act, 1875, by fabricated voting papers; V. Verdin v. Wray, 46 L. J. M. C. 170; 2 Q. B. D. 608; 41 J. P. 484. The Clerk to a Local Board, who fearing dismissal resigns, is not, within that section, "a party aggrieved" by a disqualified person acting on the Board (Rochfort v. Atherley, 1 Ex. D. 511).

"Whether the near relations of a person whose body has been disinterred for dissection, are 'parties aggrieved' is doubtful" (Dwar. 689, 690, citing R. v. Toole, 1 M. & R. 728).

As regards a Qui Tam action; V. Boyce v. Higgins, 23 L. J. C. P. 5 ; 14 C. B. 1: Hollis v. Marshall, 27 L. J. Ex. 235; 2 H. & N. 755 : R. v. Blanshard, 30 J. P. 280: Robinson v. Curry, 50 L. J. Q. B. 561; 7 Q. B. D. 465.

Vh. article discussing this word, 51 J. P. 705.

AGREED AND DECLARED." The rule is that where you have such words as 'It is hereby agreed and declared between and by the parties to these presents,' that some one will do an act or make a payment, and that some one is a party to the deed, it is a covenant by him with the others, not a covenant by all of them. Anything more absurd than to hold it a covenant by all of them could not be imagined. Suppose you had these words; Provided always it is hereby agreed and declared between and by the parties to these presents that the said A. B. shall pay £5000 to the said C. D. on the 6th of January next,' it would be absurd to say that this amounts to a covenant by C. D., the recipient of the money, that A. B. shall pay him, as well as a covenant by A. B. that he will pay him. If, therefore, we find that no act is to be done except by one of the parties, these words only amount to a covenant by that one party with the others" (per Jessel, M.R., Dawes v. Tredwell, 18 Ch. D. 359 cited and applied by Kay, J., in Re De Ros, 55 L. J. Ch. 73, and in which case it was held, on the construction of the deed, that the wife's after-acquired separate estate was bound, although the direct covenant to settle same was only entered into by the husband. Vf. Elph. 426, 502 : Ramsden v. Smith, 23 L. J. Ch. 757; 2 Drew. 298: Butcher v. Butcher, 14 Bea. 222: Re D'Estampes, 53 L. J. Ch. 1117; 32 W. R. 978. The

lastly named case was also decided by Kay, J., and in his judgment he reviews the previous authorities).

AGREEMENT.-" Agreamentum is a word compounded of two words,-viz., of aggregatio and mentium, so that aggreamentum cst aggregatio mentium in re aliqua facta vel facienda. And so by the contraction of the two words, and by the short pronunciation of them, they are made one word, viz., aggreamentum, which is no other than an union, collection, copulation, and conjunction of two or more minds in anything done or to be done" (Reniger v. Fogossa, Plowd. 17a. Va. Com. Dig. "Agreement," and per Ellenborough, C. J., Wain v. Warlters, 5 East 16; 2 Sm. L. C. 266). In Wain v. Warlters, it was held that "Agreement," in the Statute of Frauds, meant the whole agreement, including the consideration for it: a. obs. of Cockburn, C.J., Williams v. Lake (29 L. J. Q. B. 1). But the Agreement or Contract" justifying a stoppage out of wages under the Truck Act (1 & 2 W. 4, c. 37, s. 23), need not specify the amounts to be deducted (Cutts v. Ward, 36 L. J. Q. B. 161; L. R. 2 Q. B. 357; 15 W. R. 445; 15 L. T. 614).

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As to the distinction between "Agreement" in s. 4, Stat. of Frauds, and "Bargain" in s. 17 Ib.; V. Benj. 193, 194. Va. BARGAIN.

"Agreement" contrasted with "Conveyance;" V. Inl. Rev. v. Angus, 23 Q. B. D. 579.

AGRICULTURAL.-An "Agricultural" Holding (s. 54, Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883), "I take it refers only to land cultivated for profit in some way and not to natural grass land; a "Pastoral" holding refers to grass land (per Judge Stephen, Morley v. Jones, 32 S. J. 630). But a holding may be "wholly agricultural," or "wholly pastoral," within the section, though it include a house, if such house be merely auxiliary to the land with which it is held; secus, where such house is independent of the land and, à fortiori, if the house be the chief part of the holding (Ib.). Cp. SERVANT IN HUSBANDRY.

A steam engine let and used for hauling straw and manure for farming operations, and no other purpose, is within s. 32, Highway Act, 1878, as being "a Locomotive used solely for Agricultural Purposes" (Ellis v. Hulse, 23 Q. B. D. 24).

AID.-V. IN AID.

AID OR ABET.-"To constitute an aider or abettor, some active steps must be taken, by word or action, with intent to instigate the principal or principals. Encouragement does not, of necessity, amount to aiding and abetting. It may be intentional or unintentional. A man may unwittingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by mis-interpreted words or gestures, or by his silence or non-interference ;—or he may

encourage intentionally by expressions, gestures, or actions, intended to signify approval. In the latter case he aids and abets; in the former he does not. It is no criminal offence to stand by a mere passive spectator of a crime, even of a murder. Non-interference to prevent a crime is not itself a crime. But the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the commission of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, though he might reasonably be expected to prevent it, and had the power so to do or at least to express his dissent, might, under some circumstances, afford cogent evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged, and so aided and abetted. would be purely a question for the jury whether he did so or not," (per Hawkins, J., R. v. Coney, 51 L. J. M. C. 78). In accordance with those principles the majority of the Court held, in the case cited, that the mere voluntary presence of persons at a prize-fight does not make them guilty of aiding or abetting an assault (51 L. J. M. C. 66; 8 Q. B. D. 534). h. Ex p. Whiteley, 39 J. P. 70: R. v. Cheshire Jus., 40 J. P. 148. AIT.-V. HATH.

ALE.-V. SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS.

ALEHOUSE.-An "Alehouse" is a place (licensed under the 9 G. 4, c. 61, and the Acts amending the same) where exciseable liquors are sold, by retail, to be consumed on the premises. The word is, probably, synonymous with "Public-house" and "Tavern," which latter words were employed in the covenants under discussion in London and Suburban Land Co. v. Field (50 L. J. Ch. 549; 16 Ch. D. 645; 44 L. T. 444) and Holt v. Collyer (50 L. J. Ch. 311; 16 Ch. D. 718; 44 L. T. 214; 29 W. R. 502). A covenant in a Lease prohibiting the user of the premises "as a Publichouse or Alehouse," will comprise a Beer-house (1 W. 4, c. 64, s. 31). V. PUBLIC-HOUSE : BEER-HOUSE.

ALIEN.-"To Alien;" V. ALIENATION: ASSIGN: CHARGE OR IN

CUMBER.

An Alien is one who " is born out of the ligeance of our soveraigne lord the King" (Litt. s. 198; Vth. Co. Litt. 128 b, 129 a). Vh. Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1 Isaacson v. Durant, 55 L. J. Q. B. 331; 17 Q. B. D. 54; 54 L. T. 684; 34 W. R. 547.

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ALIENATION.-A clause of Forfeiture on Alienation "" will extend only to a disposition by the act of the party, and not to a transfer by operation of law; unless it can be collected from the context that the term was intended by the settlor to have so wide a signification" (Lewin 102, citing Dommett v. Bedford, 6 T. R. 684: Cooper v. Wyatt, 5 Mad. 482: Ex p. Eyston, 47 L. J. Bank. 62; 7 Ch. D. 145). Therefore bankruptcy at the suit of creditors is not such an alienation (Lear v. Leggett, 2 Sim. 479, and other cases cited, Lewin 102); secus, if the bankruptcy, or other cessio

bonorum, be on the petition of the beneficiary (Re Amherst, 41 L. J. Ch. 222; L. R. 13 Eq. 464: Sr. Ex p. Dawes, Re Moon, 17 Q. B. D. 275: Vf. Lewin 103). A mere Declaration of Insolvency is not an alienation or attempt at alienation (Graham v. Lee, 26 L. J. Ch. 395; 23 Bea. 388). As to a Warrant of Attorney or Marriage being an alienation; V. Lewin 102.

Vh. Co. Litt. 118 b. I. ASSIGN: RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION.

ALIKE. A testamentary gift to two or more "alike," or "to be enjoyed alike" is synonymous with its being given EQUALLY, and creates a tenancy in common (per Lord Mansfield, Loveacres v. Blight, Cowp. 352. f. Thorougood v. Collins, Cro. Car. 75: Page v. Page, 2 P. Wms. 489, cited 2 Jarm. 258. In Thorowgood v. Collins, the words to be construed were "part and part-like"). V. SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE.

ALL." Qui omne dicit, nihil excludit; " therefore, omnes viduæ, Stat. of Merton, c. 2, included all kinds of Dower, though there were five (2) Inst. 81).

"All," is equivalent to "each and every" (V. jdgmt. of Lord Fitzgerald, Burnett v. G. N. of Scotland Ry., 54 L. J. Q. B. 539) ; but, by a context, it may mean any" (1 Jarm. 504).

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A testamentary gift of "All," without more, is indefinite and void (Bowman v. Milbanke, 1 Lev. 130; Sid. 191; T. Raym. 97; cited and commented on, 1 Jarm. 357, 358).

"The words "All his Estate' will pass everything a man has" (per Lord Mansfield, Hogan v. Jackson, 1 Cowp. 306). So of the words "All I am worth" (Huxtep v. Brooman, 1 Bro. C. C. 437, cited and commented on, 1 Jarm. 738, 739), or "All I have " (per Bayley, J., Doe v. Morgan, 6 B. & Cr. 518; 9 D. & Ry. 633).

"But if the word 'All' is coupled with the word 'Personal,' or a local description, there, the gift will pass only personalty, or the specific estate particularly described" (per Lord Mansfield, Hogan v. Jackson, sup.). Thus "All my Effects" will not pass realty (Henderson v. Farbridge, 1 Russ. 479 ; cited 1 Jarm. 742). Qy. will such words as "All that I possess" or "all that I am or may die possessed of" pass Realty? Cp. Noel v. Hoy (5 Mad. 38): Thomas v. Phelps (4 Russ. 348): Wilce v. Wilce (5 Moo. & P. 682; 7 Bing. 664; 9 L. J. O. S. C. P. 197): Evans v. Jones (46 L. J. Ex. 280): Day v. Daveron (12 Sim. 200; 10 L. J. Ch. 349): and Davenport v. Coltman (11 L. J. Ch. 262; 12 Sim. 588; 9 M. & W. 481): with Monk v. Mawdsley (1 Sim. 286): and Cook v. Jaggard (35 L. J. Ex. 76; L. R. 1 Ex. 125); and V. these cases stated 1 Jarm. 730, 731, 739–742.

Where a testator made a specific devise of part of his realty and by a subsequent part of the same Will made another devise of "all his real and personal estate ;"-Held, that "all" meant "all the Residue" (Doe d. Snape v. Nevell, 17 L. J. Q. B. 119; 11 Q. B. 466). So the generality of a devise of "all my Lands may be restricted by the context (Re Portal, 54

L. J. Ch. 1012; 30 Ch. D. 50). But in King v. George (4 Ch. D. 435; 5 Ib. 627; 46 L. J. Ch. 670), a bequest of "All that I have power over, namely, plate, linen," &c., was an unlimited residuary gift, and not restricted to the classes of goods enumerated. Va. Sidgreaves v. Brewer, 49 L. J.

Ch. 514; 15 Ch. D. 594.

"All the Rest;" V. REST.

As to the efficacy of "All the Rest" to pass lapsed legacies; V. Re Pringle, 17 Ch. D. 819; 50 L. J. Ch. 689.

When "all" is found in conjunction with specified property,-e.g. "all my property in the Funds," the bequest is specific (Hayes v. Hayes, 5 L. J. Ch. 243; 1 Keen 97: Vincent v. Newcombe, You. 599).

"All my Property, Leasehold and Freehold;" V. Re Roberts, Kiff v. Roberts, 56 L. J. Ch. 628; 54 L. T. 386; 34 W. R. 626; W. N. (86) 165. "All my Property, Brewery, &c. ;" V. Waite v. Morland, W. N. (66) 139. If. PROPERTY.

"All my Just Debts." I. DEBTS.

As to effect of Revocation of " All Wills, &c.;" V. Re Kingdon, 55 L. J. Ch. 598.

As to invalidity on account of vagueness through the unqualified use of "All," especially in an Assignment of future things; V. Belding v. Read, 34 L. J. Ex. 212 ; 3 H. & C. 955; 11 Jur. N. S. 547: but that case is now overruled by Tailby v. Official Receiver, 58 L. J. Q. B. 75; 13 App. Ca. 523. Va. Re Clarke, 56 L. J. Ch. 981: VAGUE: FUTURE.

"All Proceedings" in R. 1, Ord. 65, R. S. C., means all proceedings in respect of which there is an existing jurisdiction as to Costs (Re Mills, 56 L. J. Ch. 60).

"All Rates made for the relief of the Poor," which are to be paid to qualify for the parliamentary franchise, s. 3, sub-s. 3, 30 & 31 V. c. 102, mean only those made since the 5th January of the year preceding the qualifying year (Cull v. Austin, Austin v. Cull, 41 L. J. C. P. 153; L. R. 7 C. P. 227).

A stipulation to accept a cargo on receipt of "all the Shipping Documents," will be satisfied by production of three, of the five, parts of the Bill of Lading, if the sellers are unable to supply more (Cederberg v. Borries, 2 Times Rep. 201).

I. ENGAGEMENTS: INTEREST: MONEY: WAYS.

ALL AND EVERY.-For an illustration of effect of this phrase, I. Re Sibley, 46 L. J. Ch. 387; 5 Ch. D. 494; but see that decision, as based on this phrase, criticised by Kay, J., in Re Webster, 52 L. J. Ch. 768; 23

Ch. D. 737.

A bequest to A. and after her decease to "all and every her child and children, and his, her and their executors, administrators and assigns, for his, her, and their own absolute use and benefit ;" held, to create a joint tenancy in the children (Morgan v. Britten, L.R. 13 Eq. 28; 41 L.J. Ch.70).