cise," are legal (V. proviso to s. 18, Gaming Act, 8 & 9 V. c. 109). But a match for so much a side is a wager and not within this proviso (Diggle v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. 422 Trimble v. Hill, 5 App. Ca. 342: over-ruling Batty

v. Marriott, sup.).

V. SUBSCRIPTION.

GAME, Sport, Pastime or Exercise.-Gambling by tossing with coins, if not a "game," is a "pastime or exercise" within s. 17, Gaming Act, 8 & 9 V. c. 109 (R. v. O'Connor, 15 Cox, 3; and as to what is a "Game" within the section, V. R. v. Hudson, 29 L. J. M. C. 145; Bell, C. C. 263).

GAMING." To game," is to play at any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money's worth; and the act is not less gaming because the game played is not in itself unlawful (R. v. Ashton, 22 L. J. M. C. 1; 1 E. & B. 286 : Patten v. Rhymer, 29 L. J. M. C. 189: Parsons r. Alexander, 24 L. J. Q. B. 277; 5 E. & B. 263: Bew v. Harston, 47 L. J. M. C. 121; 3 Q. B. D. 454; 26 W. R. 915; 42 J. P. 808: Dyson v. Mason, 58 L. J. M. C. 55 ; 22 Q. B. D. 351; 5 Times Rep. 230). In view of the "serious doubts " expressed by Cockburn, C. J., in Bew v. Harston, sup., the clause in the above definition expressed in the words "whether of skill or chance" cannot be regarded as absolutely settled by authority.

66

An innkeeper is guilty of an offence against his license prohibiting "any gaming whatsoever," and he or any licensed person is guilty of suffering any gaming" within s. 17, Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 V. c. 94), if he permits, even his private friends, to play at cards or other games of chance for money or money's worth, however small the stakes (Foot v. Baker, 6 Sc. N. R. 301; 5 M. & G. 335; 11 J. P. 444: Patten v. Rhymer, sup.). And convictions against licensed persons for allowing games of skill,—such as ten pins, skittles, skittle-pool, "puff and dart," to be played for money or money's worth have been supported (Danford v. Taylor, 33 J. P. 277 : Luff v. Leaper, 36 J. P. 54: Dyson v. Mason, sup. : Bew v. Harston, sup.).

V. SUFFER: UNLAWFUL GAMING.

GAMING HOUSE.-V. COMMON GAMING HOUSE.

GAMING OR WAGERING CONTRACTS.-The Act (8 & 9 V. c. 109, s. 18) which renders null and void, "all contracts or agreements by way of gaming or wagering," means contracts or agreements for wagers; and relates only to contracts which are themselves by way of wagering (per Cleasby, B., in Beeston v. Beeston, 45 L. J. Ex. 232; 1 Ex. D. 13). Therefore an agreement between two persons that one shall make bets for the other, is not a contract "by way of gaming or wagering." And, accordingly, money won and received by a betting agent may be

recovered from him by his principal (Beeston v. Beeston, sup.: Bridger v. Savage, 15 Q. B. D. 363; 54 L. J. Q. B. 464; 53 L. T. 129; 33 W. R. 891; 49 J. P. 725); and the agent may recover from his principal all moneys paid in pursuance of a betting agency (Rosewarne v. Billing, 33 L. J. C. P. 55; 15 C. B. N. S. 316: Bubb v. Yelverton, Ker's Claim, 19 W. R. 739; 24 L. T. 822: Bubb v. Yelverton, Sleel & Nicholl's Claim, 39 L. J. Ch. 428; L. R. 9 Eq. 471: Re Lister, 47 L. J. Bank. 100; 8 Ch. D. 754). And, "if a person employs another to bet for him in his (the agent's) own name, an authority to pay the bets if lost is coupled with the employment; and although before the bet is made the employment and authority are both revocable, the moment the employment is fulfilled by the making of the bet, the authority to pay it if lost becomes irrevocable," and the liability of the principal is, consequently, irrevocable (per Hawkins, J., Read v. Anderson, 52 L. J. Q. B. 219; 13 Q. B. D. 779: Vth. Lilley v. Rankin, 56 L. J. Q. B. 248: Cohen v. Kittell, 58 L. J. Q. B. 241; 22 Q. B. D. 680 : Seymour v. Bridge, 54 L. J. Q. B. 347; 14 Q. B. D. 460: Perry v. Barnett, 54 L. J. Q. B. 351, 446; 15 Q. B. D. 388). Vh. 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 41.

GARBLE.-V. Termes de la Ley.

GARDEN.-In R. v. Hodges (Moo. & M. 341), the jury (after being directed by Parke, J.), found that a piece of ground chiefly used to grow grafted seedling pear-trees for sale (though there were also a few currant and raspberry bushes on it, and a crop of potatoes and cabbages had in the preceding summer been grown amongst the pear-trees), was not a "Garden," but was a "Nursery Ground" only, within s. 43, 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29. Vf. Ex p. Hammond, 14 L. J. Bank. 14; D. G. 93; 9 Jur. 358. V. MARKET GARDEN.

GAS.-Under a Fire Insurance excepting damage by explosion "except explosion by Gas," the insurer is not liable for an explosion of Gas created incidentally by the chemicals used in the works of the insured (Stanley v. Western Insrce., 37 L. J. Ex. 73; L. R. 3 Ex. 71; 17 L. T. 513; 16 W. R. 369). In that case Kelly, C.B., said,-"Strictly and philosophically speaking it is Gas; but so are the component parts of the water of the ocean in their strict, philosophical and physical sense. But it appears in this case, and, without any statement to that effect, we know of our own knowledge, that though steam and vapour and substances of that description which find their way into the atmosphere strictly speaking are Gas, they do not pass in ordinary parlance by the name of Gas. Therefore construing the Policy on the principle that these parties expressed themselves in the ordinary language, not only of men of business but even of scientific men when dealing with matters of this description, I think that the Company were not to be liable for any explosion unless occasioned by Illuminating Gas." GATEWAY.-By a grant of "the exclusive use" of a "Gateway (with defined dimensions), not merely a right of way, but the right to use

S.J.D.

Y.

the gateway for all lawful purposes passed (Reilly v. Booth, 34 S. J. 250). V. WAY.

GAVEL-ERTH: GAVEL-RIP.-V. BENERTH.

GENERAL.-V. SPECIFIC.

GENERAL AVERAGE.-"The term 'General Average' is used indiscriminately, sometimes to denote the kind of loss which gives a claim to general average contribution, and sometimes to denote such contribution itself; in order to prevent confusion it is better to use the term General Average Loss when speaking of the former, and General Average Contribution when speaking of the latter" (2 Arnould on Mar. Insrce, 1 Ed. 877 ; Va. 2 Ib., 5 Ed. 812; Lowndes, 210, n. (p.); Maude & P. 425 et seq.). V. GENERAL AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION: G. A. Loss: G. A. SACRIFICE : PARTICULAR AVERAGE: AVERAGE.

GENERAL AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION. "The object of General Average Contribution is to indemnify the person making the general average sacrifice against so much of the loss caused directly thereby as does not fall to his own proportionate share "(per Bowen, L.J., Svensden v. Wallace, 53 L. J. Q. B. 393; 13 Q. B. D. 84: affd. 54 L. J. Q. B. 497 ; 10 App. Ca. 404).

GENERAL AVERAGE LOSS.-"A General Average Loss may be defined to be a loss arising out of extraordinary sacrifices made, or extraordinary expenses incurred, for the joint benefit of ship and cargo (per Brett, M.R., Svensden v. Wallace, 13 Q. B. D. 74; 53 L. J. Q. B. 387, citing Arnould on Mar. Insrce.: Svensden v. Wallace, affd. 10 App. Ca. 404;1 54 L. J. Q. B. 497).

GENERAL AVERAGE PER FOREIGN STATEMENT."Policies on Cargoes destined to foreign ports sometimes contain a provision that the underwriter is to pay General Average as per Foreign Statement if so made up,' or to the like effect, Where this is inserted, the underwriters are bound by a foreign adjustment in accordance with the law in force where it is made, although its effect may be to treat as General Average, what, according to English law, would be Particular Average (1, Maude & P. 492, n. (g), citing Harris v. Scaramanga, L. R. 7 C. P. 481; 41 L. J. C. P. 170: Hendricks v. Australasian Insrce., L. R. 9 C. P. 460; 43 L. J. C. P. 188: Mavro v. Ocean Mar. Insrce., L. R. 9 C. P. 595; 10 Ib. 414; 44 L. J. C. P. 229).

In the lastly cited case, Mavro v. Ocean Mar. Insrce., Cockburn, C.J., said, "In a policy of Marine Insurance General Average as per Foreign Statement' appears to be this: the underwriter is only to be liable for a general average, but what is general average is to be determined by the law of the foreign place to which the ship is bound."

GENERAL AVERAGE SACRIFICE.-"A General Average

Sacrifice is an extraordinary sacrifice, voluntarily made in the hour of peril for the common preservation of ship and cargo" (per Bowen, L.J., Svensden v. Wallace, 53 L. J. Q. B. 393; 13 Q. B. D. 84: affd. 54 L. J. Q. B. 497 ; 10 App. Ca. 404).

GENERAL CONTRACTORS.-" General Contractors," as one of the objects of a Company as stated in its Memorandum, will be controlled by the other objects in association with which the phrase is used (Ashbury Co. v. Riché, 44 L. J. Ex. 185; L. R. 7 H. L. 653).

GENERAL EXPENSES.-S. 229, P. H. Act, 1875; V. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. v. Bolton, 5 Times Rep. 610.

GENERAL INTEREST.--The mere question as to whether a particular person has committed perjury, or whether otherwise there be a question of individual character, is not "of General or Public Interest" so as to justify an order for costs on the higher scale under s. 5, 45 & 46 V. c. 57 (R. v. City of London Court, 56 L. J. Q. B. 79; 18 Q. B. D. 105; 55 L. T. 736; 35 W. R. 123).

V. PUBLIC INTEREST.

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GENERAL LINE OF BUILDINGS." General Line of Buildings,' s. 75, Metrop. Man. Act, 1862; V. Barlow v. St. Mary Abbott, 55 L. J. Ch. 680; 11 App. Ca. 257; 55 L. T. 221; 34 W. R. 521; 50 J. P. 691. The decision of the Superintending Architect as provided in the section cited, is conclusive as to the General Line of Buildings (Spackman v. Plumstead, 54 L. J. M. C. 81; 10 App. Ca. 229). Vf. Gilbert v. Wandsworth, 5 Times Rep. 31.

GENERAL OR QUARTER SESSIONS.-This phrase, 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11; s. 6, 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 30 ; s. 4, 17 G. 2, c. 38; s. 14, 5 G. 4, c. 83; means, even in London and Middlesex, the Quarter Sessions only (R. v. London Jus., 15 East, 632: R. v. Middlesex Jus., 12 L. J. M. C. 134; 4 Q. B. 807).

V. QUARTER SESSIONS.

GENERAL WORDS.-General Words in a Conveyance are not to be construed as merely passing Easements, but must be construed "like any other words with reference to what the words are intended to mean" (per Fry, J., Willis v. Watney, 51 L. J. Ch. 181: V. YARDS).

Sometimes the phrase "General Words" refers to those just mentioned, and sometimes describes a class of things,-e.g. "personal estate" (Elph. 186, n.). As to the effect of express words upon rights conferred by s. 6, Conv. & L. P. Act, 1881; V. Birmingham Bank v. Ross, 57 L. J. Ch. 601; 38 Ch. D. 295; 59 L. T. 609; 36 W. R. 914.

GENERALLY.-"And generally do all such acts and things in relation to his property . . . as may be reasonably required: "-This obligation

on a bankrupt (prescribed by s. 24 (2), Bankry. Act, 1883), does not require him to submit to a medical examination with a view to an insurance on his life, and thereby the better to realize a contingent reversionary interest belonging to him (Board of Trade v. Block, 58 L. J. Q. B. 113; 13 App. Ca. 570; 4 Times Rep. 770: Vf. CONDUCT). Fry, L.J., when that case (nom. Re Betts, 56 L. J. Q. B. 370; 19 Q. B. D. 39) was in the Court of Appeal, said, "The most anxious desire is exhibited by the legislature to prevent its special words limiting the generality of its general words, by its use of the word 'generally,'" and therefore that the bankrupt was bound to submit to the examination; but in the H. L., Halsbury, L. C., dissented from that view, and said that the examination was not an act "in relation to" the bankrupt's property.

GENTLEMAN.-"According to Sir T. Smith, this title is applied generally to those who have nothing to do, and can 'live idly"" (per Pollock, C.B., Allen v. Thompson, 25 L. J. Ex. 250; 1 H. & N. 15: Va. Spaddacini v. Treacy, 21 L. R. Ir. 553).

Therefore, for the purposes of the Bills of Sale Acts, neither of the following is correctly described as "Gentleman; "

A Clerk in the Audit Office (Allen v. Thompson, sup.),

An Attorney or an Attorney's Clerk (Tuton v. Sanoner, 27 L. J. Ex. 293; 3 H. & N. 280: Brodrick v. Scale, 40 L. J. C. P. 130; L. R. 6 C. P. 98),

An Attorney's Clerk out of regular employment, but engaged in making out bills for a firm of solicitors (Beales v. Tennant, 29 L. J. Q. B. 188), A Buyer of Silks (Adams v. Graham, 12 W. R. 282; 33 L. J. Q. B. 71). But each of the following has been held to be correctly described as "Gentleman," qua B. of S. Acts ;

One who has never had an occupation (Gray v. Jones, 13 C. B. N. S. 743), A Medical Student who had, for a short time, acted as a surgeon's assistant but for 6 months had been in no business (Bath v. Sutton, 27 L. J. Ex. 388; nom. Sutton v. Bath, 3 H. & N. 382),

A Coal Agent who, having been dismissed, was, at the time, out of employ (Morewood v. South Yorkshire Ry., 28 L. J. Ex. 114; 3 H. & N. 798: Va. London & Westminster Loan Co. v. Chase, 31 L. J. C. P. 314; 12 C. B. N. S. 730),

A person who had been, but had ceased to be, a Proctor's Clerk and was occasionally collecting debts, but who lived chiefly on an allowance from his mother (Smith v. Cheese, 45 L. J. C. P. 156; 1 C. P. D. 60).

"Gentleman" is an insufficient description of a deponent to the fitness of a new trustee (Re Orde, 52 L. J. Ch. 832; 24 Ch. D. 271).

"Gentleman," in a description of a transferee of Shares; V. Re Humber Iron Co., Williams' Case, 1 Ch. D. 576.

GET.-To "Get" Minerals (or to "Get Materials," s. 4, 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 50), is, it seems, synonymous with to "Win" them (Ramsden v. Yeates,