6

ANNATS." Annats or Annates; the first fruits of an ecclesiastical benefice; V. 25 H. 8, c. 20; 26 H. 8, c. 3; 12 Rep. 45; Spelm." (Elph. 560).

ANNOYANCE.-A covenant against doing anything which may be a "Nuisance or Annoyance" to a neighbourhood, is broken by a Sanatorium for the reception of six boys affected with infectious disease (Watson v. Leamington College, 25 S. J. 30). In that case, Jessel, M. R., said it might perhaps be difficult to appreciate the difference between "Nuisance" and "Annoyance," but as both words were used," annoyance," evidently, meant something less than "nuisance." And in Tod-Heatley v. Benham (58 L. J. Ch. 83; 40 Ch. D. 80), it was held that "Annoyance Annoyance" has, in this connection, a wider meaning than "Nuisance," though it was there doubted whether it was not too much to say that no "Nuisance" would be within such a covenant, unless it amounts to an indictable nuisance. V. NUISANCE.

In Bramwell v. Lacy (48 L. J. Ch. 339; 10 Ch. D. 691), the words were "Annoyance, Damage, Injury, Prejudice or Inconvenience; whilst in Tod-Heatley v. Benham (sup.) they were "Annoyance, Nuisance, Grievance or Damage:" and in the first of those cases an out-patient Branch of a Hospital for throat and chest diseases was held to be an "Annoyance, Inconvenience and Injury;" whilst in the latter, a Hospital for throat, nose, ear, skin and eye diseases, and diseases of the rectum, was held an "Annoyance or Grievance," those two words being, apparently, bracketed as synonymous.

"I think an act which is an interference with the pleasurable enjoyment, in reason, of a house is an Annoyance or Grievance.' It is not necessary, in order to bring the case within the words, that the plaintiff should show that any particular man may object to it; but we must be satisfied by argument and by evidence, that reasonable people, having regard to the ordinary use of a house for pleasurable enjoyment, would be annoyed or aggrieved by what is being done there. It is not necessary, in order to show that there has been reasonable ground for annoyance or grievance, to show that, in fact, there is danger or risk of infection. A reasonable apprehension of nuisance from acts done by the defendant will produce such interference with the pleasurable and reasonable enjoyment of the adjoining houses as to come within the words Annoyance and Grievance" (per Cotton, L. J., Tod-Heatley v. Benham, sup.). "The expression Annoyance' is wider than Nuisance;' and a thing that reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person or of a skilled person who knows the truth, but,―of the ordinary sensible English inhabitant of a house, seems to me to be an Annoyance,' although it may not appear to amount to physical detriment to comfort " (per Bowen, L. J., Ib.).

An "

Annoyance," &c. caused by a business, is none the less within such

a covenant, because the business is such as would not be prohibited by accompanying words levelled against certain businesses (Tod-Heatley v. Benham, sup.).

Vf. hereon Re Duvis v. Cavey, 58 L. J. Ch. 143; 40 Ch. D. 601.

ANNUAL EMOLUMENT.-Compensation for loss of office calculated on two-thirds "Annual Emolument," s. 8 (7), 31 & 32 V. c. 110; V. R. v. Postmaster-Gen., 47 L. J. Q. B. 435; 3 Q. B. D. 428.

ANNUAL INCOME.-V. ACTUAL ANNUAL INCOME.

ANNUAL NET VALUE.-V. ANNUAL VALUE: NET.

ANNUAL PROCEEDS." Rents, Dividends, and Annual Proceeds," held, on the context, equivalent to "Annual Rents, Dividends, and Proceeds" (Re Green, 40 Ch. D. €10).

ANNUAL PROFITS.-V. PROFITS.

ANNUAL RACK-RENT.-V. RACK-RENT.

ANNUAL RENT.-V. Smith v. Birmingham, 52 L. J. M. C. 81; 11 Q. B. D. 195: ANNUAL VALUE.

ANNUAL VALUE.-" Value means net value" (per Ld. Bramwell, Dobbs v. Grand Junc. Waterworks Co., 53 L. J. Q. B. 52). And on the authority of the same noble and learned lord in the same case, and on the authority of Re Elwes (28 L. J. Ex. 46; 3 H. & N. 719), it may be laid down that the general primâ facie meaning of "Annual Value" of property is that provided for "Net Annual Value" by s. 1 of the Parochial Assessment Act, 1836 (6 & 7 W. 4, c. 96) viz.-" The rent at which the same might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, free of all usual tenants' rates and taxes, and tithe commutation rent-charge (if any), and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses (if any) necessary (V. NECESSARY) to maintain them in a state to command such rent ;" and to that definition it may now be added that in estimating such lettable value regard is to be had to the worth of the premises as used for the purposes for which they are, for the time being, occupied (West Middlesex W. W. Co. v. Coleman, 54 L. J. M. C. 70; 14 Q. B. D. 529. As to what "expenses" may be deducted, V. R. v. Gainsborough Union, 41 L. J. M. C. 1; L. R. 7 Q. B. 64: R. v. Smith, 55 L. J. M. C. 49; 54 L. T. 431; 50 J. P. 215: Stevens v. Bishop, 19 Q. B. D. 442; 56 L. J. Q. B. 454; 57 L. T. 482; 35 W. R. 839).

That is the principle which the Metropolitan Waterworks Companies must adopt in making their charges on "Annual Value" (Dobbs v. Grand Junc. Waterworks Co., 53 L. J. Q. B. 50; 9 App. Ca. 49). But such a phrase may be enlarged by a context, e.g. "gross" (Bristol Waterworks Co.

v. Uren, 54 L. J. M. C. 102; 15 Q. B. D. 637); or "rack-rent" (Stevens v. Barnet Water Co., 57 L. J. M. C. 82; 36 W. R. 924).

So, too, where a Waterworks Co. are empowered to charge "on the annual value at which the premises are assessed to the poor-rate," that means the annual rateable value (Warrington Waterworks Co. v. Longshaw, 51 L. J. Q. B. 498; 9 Q. B. D. 145).

In cases of Small Tenements let at weekly rents, the landlord doing the repairs and paying the rates and taxes, the proper way of assessing the "annual value" or "annual rent on which the Water-Rate is to be charged, is to multiply the weekly rent by 52, and deduct from the gross amount so ascertained a fair allowance for the average of empty houses and also the actual amount paid for poor and borough rates (Smith v. Birmingham, 52 L. J. M. C. 81; 11 Q. B. D. 195); and as to mode of assessing annual value of such tenements for the Poor-Rate; V. Smith v. Birmingham, 58 L. J. M. C. 33, 161; 22 Q. B. D. 211.

As to mode of calculating annual value of the buildings of a School Board; V. R. v. West Bromwich School Bd., 53 L. J. M. C. 153; 13 Q. B. D. 929 R. v. London School Bd., 55 L. J. M. C. 169; 17 Q. B. D. 738; 55 L. T. 384; 34 W. R. 583; 50 J. P. 419 : and as to exemption where the owners and occupiers are prohibited from selling or leasing,-e.g. Owen's College, Manchester; V. Owen's College v. Chorlton-upon-Medlock, 56 L. J. M. C. 29; 18 Q. B. D. 403; 56 L. T. 373; 35 W. R. 236; 51 J. P. 356 Sv. Burton-on-Trent Case, 34 S. J. 94.

In a case under ss. 21 & 22 of the Sucn. Dy. Act, 1853, Watson, B., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, said, “The words ' annual value of the land' are not words of art; but mean, in common parlance, a rack-rent, or the value of the gross produce of the land, minus all payments, expenses, interest, labour, and charges on the land or on the tenant" (Re Elwes, 28 L. J. Ex. 47).

So also the "value" "By the Year" of lands, &c., for the purpose of giving County Courts jurisdiction in Ejectment (Co. Co. Act, 1888, s. 59), is the market value of the property, the convenient mode for ascertaining which is prescribed by s. 1, Parochial Assessment Act, 1836 (Elston v. Rose, L. R. 4 Q. B. 4; 38 L. J. Q. B. 6: V. RENT PAYABLE): but the premises to be valued are those actually in dispute,-e.g., if there be a dispute over a party-wall, it is the wall, and not the premises of which it is part, that has to be valued (Stolworthy v. Powell, 55 L. J. Q. B. 228).

Rule 1 of s. 60, Income Tax Act (5 & 6 V. c. 35), provides that for the purposes of that Act the "annual value" of lands, &c., shall be the rackrent; but the subsequent Rules of the Act would seem to bring this definition nearly identical with that in the Parochial Assessment Act : Vf. Re Elwes, sup. Coltness Co. v. Black, 6 App. Ca. 315; 51 L. J. Q. B. 626 ; 29 W. R. 717; 45 L. T. 145.

The meaning of "Annual Value" of a resigned Benefice, as used in s. 8, Incumbents' Resignation Act, 1871 (34 & 35 V. c. 44: Vh. s. 11), is its

Net Annual Value at the time it is resigned; and the pension based on such value is not subject to diminution because the value of the Benefice afterwards declines (Robinson v. Dand, 55 L. J. Q. B. 585).

"Clear Yearly Value," Reform Act, 1832; V. CLEAR.

"Net Annual Value;" V. NET.

ANNUALLY.-" Profits and Gains received annually," 6th case, Sch. D., s. 100, Income Tax Act, 5 & 6 V. c. 35,-i.e. for the current year; V. Ryhope Co. v. Foyer, 7 Q. B. D. 485; 45 L. T. 404.

ANNUITY. "An annuity is a yearly payment of a certaine summe of money granted to another in fee, for life or yeares, charging the person of the grantor onely" (Co. Litt. 144 b.; Vf. Wms. Exs. 816).

The gift of an "Annuity" generally means an annual sum during the life of the annuitant (Re Taber, 51 L. J. Ch. 721), "and nothing more" (per Fry, J., Blight v. Hartnoll, 51 L. J. Ch. 163; 19 Ch. D. 294: Vƒ. Re Foster, 23 L. R. Ir. 269); but where there is a direction to purchase an annuity, or a dedication of a fund out of which it is to be purchased, or where the annuity is dealt with as being in existence and operative beyond the life of the first annuitant and no other period can be fixed for such further duration short of making it perpetual, the annuity will be in perpetuity,-i.e., it is a bequest of such a sum as will produce the income. intended for the legatee, who may (notwithstanding a direction to the contrary) elect to take that sum or have the annuity; and in the event of his death before the annuity is purchased the sum which would have been needed for its purchase will go to his representatives (Wms. Exs. 1200, 1201, and cases there cited: Stokes v. Heron, 2 Dru. & W. 89; 12 Cl. & F. 161: Ross v. Borer, 31 L. J. Ch. 709; 2 Jo. & H. 469: Bent v. Cullen, 40 L. J. Ch. 250; 6 Ch. 235: Stokes v. Cheek, 29 L. J. Ch. 922; 28 Bea. 620: Blight v. Hartnoll, 51 L. J. Ch. 162; 19 Ch. D. 294). 'Annuity," s. 8, Legacy Dy. Act (36 G. 3, c. 52); V. Crow v. Robinson, 31 L. J. Ch. 516.

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V. LEGACY: PECUNIARY LEGACY.

"Annuities or Periodical Sums; V. PERIODICAL.

ANOTHER.-A promise "To answer for Another," s. 4, Stat. of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, means that the promise is to be made to the original Creditor (Eastwood v. Kenyon, 9 L. J. Q. B. 409; 11 A. & E. 438; 3 P. & D. 276: Reader v. Kingham, 32 L. J. C. P. 108; 13 C. B. N. S. 344: Cripps v. Hartnoll, 32 L. J. Q. B. 381; 4 B. & S. 414). Vh. Add. C. 166; Rosc. N. P. 431.

ANSWER.-A certificate of indemnity to which a witness is entitled who shall "answer" questions, means that he shall " truly answer" (R. v. Hulme, 39 L. J. Q. B. 149; L. R. 5 Q. B. 377). In that case Lush, J., said, "Wherever the legislature speaks of answering' questions, it means

that which is intended by the words 'true answer,'-'answer' in the sense in which the word is ordinarily and popularly used."

"Presently answer,' held, in Plowden, only presently become debtor, not presently pay" (Dwar. 690).

ANSWERABLE.-V. INDEMNIFY.

"Answerable in Damages," s. 54, Mer. Shipping Act, 1862; V. Stoomvart Maatschappy Nederland v. P. and O. Nav. Co., 7 App. Ca. 795: over-ruling Chapman v. Royal Netherlands Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 449; 4 P. D. 157.

ANTICIPATION.-A restraint on "Anticipation" is equivalent to a restraint on "Alienation" (Re Currey, 55 L. J. Ch. 906; 32 Ch. D. 361 : Re Grey, 56 L. J. Ch. 207).

ANTIQUITY.-V. LAW LIBRARY.

ANY." Any" is a word which excludes limitation or qualification (per Fry, L. J., Duck v. Bates, 53 L. J. Q. B. 344; 12 Q. B. D. 79) : as wide as possible" (per Chitty, J., Beckett v. Sulton, 51 L. J. Ch. 433). A remarkable instance of this wide generality is furnished in Re Farquhar (4 Notes of Ecc. Cases, 651, 652, cited Wms. Exs. 119, 120), wherein the words "any Soldier," &c., in s. 11, 1 V. c. 26, were construed as including minors, so that soldiers and seamen, within that section, can make Nuncupative Wills though under age.

But its generality may be restricted by the subject matter or the context. Thus under R. 295, Bankry. R. 1870, "any Creditor" might oppose registration of resolutions; but that meant "any creditor who had previously proved his debt" (Er p. Bagster, 53 L. J. Ch. 124; 24 Ch. D. 477). So "any other Person," in R. 32, Ord. 42, R. S. C., means, by the context, any Officer of a judgment-debtor Corporation (Irwell v. Eden, 18 Q. B. D. 588; 56 L. J. Q. B. 446; 56 L. T. 620; 35 W. R. 511); and by a context "any Person" may mean any eligible person (Tobacco Pipe Makers v. Woodroffe, 7 B. & C. 838 Vf. Metrop. Bd. Works v. L. & N. W. Ry. 49 L. J. Ch. 355; 14 Ch. D. 521).

So" under a Devise to three persons as tenants in common in tail, and in default of such issue of any of them,' over, Cross Remainders were implied, and any,' in effect, read 'all' " (Watson, Eq. 1410, citing Powell v. Howell, L. R. 3 Q. B. 654; 37 L. J. Q. B. 294; 9 B. & S. 704 : V. Holmes v. Meynell, T. Raym. 452).

But the words "any Person," in s. 13 (3) Debtors Act, 1869, is not restricted to cases of bankruptcy, and applies to any person whether bankrupt or not (R. v. Rowlands, 51 L. J. M. C. 51; 8 Q. B. D. 530). Va. Ex p. Harper, Re Tait, 52 L. J. Ch. 117, and Ex p. Norris, Re Sadler, 56 L. J. Q. B. 93; 17 Q. B. D. 728; 35 W. R. 19, as to the phrase, "at any Time" in the Bankry. Act.

As to the phrase "any Party," R. S. C. 1883; V. Shaw v. Smith, 56