paid, free of Legacy Duty," will apply to all the specific legacies of chattels as well as to the pecuniary legacies; but not to the Succession Duty in respect of a bequest of leaseholds (Re Johnson, 53 L. J. Ch. 645; 26 Ch. D. 538).

As to what words will exempt a legatee from payment of Legacy Duty; V. 1 Jarm. 186, 187.

LEGAL ESTATE.-As to what words vest the legal estate in Trustees; V. Jarm. ch. 34.

LEGAL FRAUD.-In the general acceptation of the phrases, there would seem no real difference between "Legal Fraud" and "Fraud (Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Ca. 337; 58 L. J. Ch. 864; 38 W. R. 33; 61 L. T. 265; 5 Times Rep. 625).

Vh. Joliffe v. Baker, 52 L. J. Q. B. 609; 11 Q. B. D. 255: Glasier v. Rolls, 42 Ch. D. 436: FRAUD.

LEGAL HEIRS.-I. Low v. Smith, 25 L. J. Ch. 503; 2 Jur. N. S. 344: Re Diron, 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 57; 4 P. D. 81. HEIRS: LAWFUL HEIRS.

LEGAL INCAPACITY.-A woman, as such, is subject to a "Legal Incapacity" to vote for a Member of Parliament, within s. 3 (1), Representation of the People Act, 1867 (Chorlton v. Lings, 38 L. J. C. P. 25; L. R. 4 C. P. 374: Va. Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst, 58 L. J. Q. B. 316 ; 23 Q. B. D. 79).

V. INCAPABLE.

LEGAL MORTGAGE.-A "Legal Mortgage" means a first mortgage. This is unquestionably so as regards land, because it is only the first mortgage which can grant the legal estate in the land. But where a person had agreed to give a "Legal Mortgage" of a Ship it was contended that this did not necessarily mean a first mortgage, because (by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 V. c. 104, ss. 66, 70) even a first mortgage would not pass the legal interest in a ship. It was, however, held in that case that even as regards a ship the expression "Legal Mortgage" generally means a first mortgage (Thompson v. Clerk, 7 L. T. 269; 11 W. R. 23).

LEGAL MERCHANDIZE.-Under the words "Other Legal Merchandize" in a Charter-party, the charterer is at liberty to ship any lawful article he pleases (due regard being had to the safety of the vessel), but is bound to pay the same amount of freight as the vessel would have earned if loaded within the terms of the Charter (Cockburn v. Alexander, 18 L. J. C. P. 74 ; 6 C. B. 791).

LEGAL NOTICE.-A "Legal Notice,"-e. g. "Legal Notice to Quit," s. 50, Co. Co. Act, 1856, s. 138, Co. Co. Act, 1888,-means a Notice

provided by law, as distinguished from one prescribed by contract (Friend v. Shaw, 57 L. J. Q. B. 225; 20 Q. B. D. 374; 36 W. R. 236; 58 L. T. 89). V. BY LAW: NOTICE TO QUIT.

LEGAL OR EQUITABLE DEBT.-V. Vyse v. Brown, 13 Q. B. D. 199: DEBT.

LEGAL OR NEXT OF KIN.-V. Harris v. Newton, 46 L. J. Ch. 268.

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.-In Smith v. Manchester (53 L. J. Ch. 96; 24 Ch. D. 611), it was held that a Winding-up Petition was not a legal proceeding within Articles of Association empowering directors to direct "Legal Proceedings" to be prosecuted on behalf of the Company.

LEGAL PROCESS.-V. PROCESS.

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES.-The primary meaning of "Reprcsentatives," "Legal Representatives," "Personal Representatives," or "Legal Personal Representatives," is "Executors or. Administrators" in their official capacity (Stockdale v. Nicholson, 36 L. J. Ch. 793; L. R. 4 Eq. 359 and cases therein cited: 2 Jarm. 120; Wms. Exs. 1132–1134 ; Chitty, Eq. Ind. 7690), but that meaning may be controlled by the context. Thus in a gift to nephews and nieces, living on the happening of an event," or their legal personal representatives share and share alike," the phrase "legal personal representatives" means Next of Kin (King v. Cleaveland, 4 D. G. & J. 477; 26 Bea. 26, 166; 28 L. J. Ch. 835, 74, 76 : Va. Walker v. Camden, 17 L. J. Ch. 488; 16 Sim. 329). The phrase Legal Representatives," and such like phrases will generally mean next of kin, and not exors or admors, when the individuals so indicated are to take beneficially (Briggs v. Upton, 7 Ch. 376; 41 L. J. Ch. 33 : 2 Jarm. 111 et seq.; Wms. Exs. 1136, 1137: Jacob v. Catling, W. N. (81) 105 V. EXECUTORS).

66

Where such a phrase as "Legal Representatives" would be held to mean next of kin, that would, it has been said, generally imply next of kin according to the Statute of Distribution and would include a wife, but not a husband (2 Jarm. 125; Wms. Exs. 1141-1143). But Booth v. Vicars

(13 L. J. Ch. 147; 1 Coll. 6) cited on this point in Wms. Exs. was, in Stockdale v. Nicholson (sup.), thus dealt with by Malins, V.-C., in his judgment:" In the case of Booth v. Vicars, Lord Justice Knight Bruce held that it was the next of kin, according to the statute, who took; but I think the authorities since that decision are so clear that a gift to the next

of kin, as a class, gives a joint tenancy to the nearest of kin." But as the point had only been slightly argued he invited further discussion, upon which Counsel, whose interest it was to argue the other way, said that he considered the question had been so clearly settled by Withy v. Mangles (10 L. J. Ch. 391; 10 Cl. & F. 215; 4 Bea. 358) and other cases that it would be hopeless to argue it.

V. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES: NEXT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES: NEXT OF KIN.

LEGAL RIGHTS.-S. 32, Patent, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 V. c. 57); V. Kurtz v. Spence, 55 L. J. Ch. 919; 33 Ch. D. 579; 55 L. T. 317; 35 W. R. 26: Seth. Challender v. Royle, 36 Ch. D. 425.

LEGALLY DEMANDED.-V. LAWFULLY DEMANDED.

LEGATEE.-Where a testator directed "every legatee" to make a per centage contribution "out of their legacies," it was held that legatees of chattels and annuities, as well as ordinary pecuniary legatees, were included and also (on the context) the residuary legatees (Ward v. Grey, 29 L. J. Ch. 74; 26 Bea. 485).

V. LEGACY: RESIDUARY LEGATEE.

LEGISLATURE.-V. COLONIAL.

LEGITIMATE HEIR.-A limitation to A. "and his Legitimate Heir or Legitimate Heirs" passes a fee simple, as the words of the limitation are not to be construed as "heirs of the body lawfully begotten" (Re Co-operative Wholesale Socy. & Kershaw, W. N. (86) 45). V. LAWFULLY BEGOTTEN LAWFUL HEIR.

LESS.-V. NOT LESS.

A covenant in a Mining Lease to pay certain royalties where "less than" a stated quantity is gotten, is applicable to a case where none is gotten (Jervis v. Tomkinson, 26 L. J. Ex. 41; 1 H. & N. 195).

"Less than," read as "Not exceeding " (Garby v. Harris, 21 L. J. Ex. 160; 7 Ex. 591).

LESSEE.-"Lessee," s. 14 (1). Conv. & L. P. Act, 1881, includes an Assignee of a Lease (Cronin v. Rogers, Cab. & El. 348).

LESSEN.-V. AFFECT.

LESWES.-V. PASTURES.

LET.-As an operative word in a Lease, "let" is synonymous with DEMISE (Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68, 85; 18 L. J. Ex. 185, 136: Mostyn v. West Mostyn Co., 1 C. P. D. 152; 45 L. J. C. P. 405).

V. ASSIGN: UNDERLEASE.

"Let into possession; " V. Wheeler v. Tootel, 36 L. J. Ch. 221; L. R. 3 Eq. 571.

LEVANT AND COUCHANT.-Levancy and Couchancy, for the purpose of estimating the number of Cattle which a commoner has the right to depasture on an unstinted common, means the capability of the commonable tenement to maintain, during the winter, by its summer produce, the cattle claimed to be depastured (Scholes v. Hargreaves, 5 T. R. 46: Mellor V. Spateman, 1 Wms. Saund. 343: Rogers v. Benstead, Camb. Sum. Ass. 1727, cor. Lord Raymond, C. J., MS., Serj. Leeds, quoted by Bayley, J., Cheesman v. Hardham, 1 B. & Ald. 711); but the cattle need not be actually fed on the commonable tenement, or from its produce (Carr v. Lambert, 34 L. J. Ex. 66; 3 H. & C. 499: Robertson v. Hartopp, 6 Times Rep. 126).

LEVEL.-Oral evidence may be given to explain this word as used in a Mining Lease (Clayton v. Gregson, 4 L. J. K. B. 161; 5 A. & E. 302; 6 N. & M. 694).

LEVIED.-V. LEVY.

LEVY.—By s. 1, 29 Eliz. c. 4, a Sheriff became entitled to poundage on the amount of goods which he should "levy" under a fi. fa.; "levy" there, means to seize the goods and turn them into money; and, therefore, where the debt and costs were paid before seizure (Coles or Colls v. Coates, 9 L. J. Q. B. 232; 11 A. & E. 826; 3 P. & D. 511), or where the fi. fa. was, after seizure but before sale, set aside for irregularity (Miles v. Harris, 31 L. J. C. P. 361; 6 L. T. 649), there was no "Levy;" secus, where the writ was set aside after sale (Bullen v. Ansley, 6 Esp. 111), or where a sale was prevented by a compromise between the parties (Alchin v. Wells, 5 T. R. 470).

But Alchin v. Wells only related to civil proceedings; and under s. 3, 3 G. 1, c. 15, the amount "levied or collected" for the Crown, on which poundage was chargeable was the amount actually obtained, although such amount was the result of a compromise (R. v. Robinson, 4 L. J. Ex. 319; 2 Cr. M. & R. 334); but on the other hand, the poundage under this latter statute was payable on the amount "levied or collected," and therefore, semble, if the amount was paid before seizure, the poundage was payable (R. v. Jetherell, Parker, 177: Vth. per Denman, C. J., Coles v. Coates, sup.).

"Levied," in a Declaration for a False Return of nulla bona, imported not only a seizure and a sale under the plaintiff's fi. fa., but also that the sheriff had in his hands the proceeds (Drewe v. Lainson, 9 L. J. Q. B. 69; 11 A. & E. 529; 3 P. & D. 245).

V. EXECUTED.

S.J.D.

F F

LEVY WAR.-" Every one commits High Treason who levies war against the Queen in any of her dominions. The expression to levy war' means—(a) Attacking in the manner usual in war the Queen herself or her military forces, acting as such by her orders, in the execution of their duty; (b) Attempting by an insurrection of whatever nature by force or constraint to compel the Queen to change her measures or counsels, or to intimidate or overawe both Houses or either House of Parliament; (c) Attempting by an insurrection of whatever kind to effect any general public object.

"But the expression 'to levy war against the Queen,' does not include any insurrection against any private person for the purpose of inflicting upon him any private wrong, even if such insurrection is conducted in a warlike manner" (Steph. Cr. 41).

Vf. Arch. Cr. 834-839.

LIABILITY.-V. CHARGE OR LIABILITY; DEBTS.

"Liability," for purpose of Proof in Bankruptcy; V. s. 37 (8) Bankry. Act, 1883. Vh. Hardy v. Fothergill, 56 L. J. Q. B. 363; 58 Ib. 44; 13 App. Ca. 351; nom. Morgan v. Hardy, 18 Q. B. D. 646. V. FAIRLY ESTIMATED.

"Do not admit liability;" V. G. W. Ry. v. McCarthy, 56 L. J. P. C. 33; 12 App. Ca. 218; 56 L. T. 582; 35 W. R. 429; 51 J. P. 532.

"Liabilities," in a Building Society's Rules, include sums payable to Investing Members (Re West Riding Bg. Socy., 59 L. J. Ch. 197; 6 Times Rep. 160).

LIABILITY TO CEASE. In a Charter-Party, the cases shew "that the plain meaning of the words 'liability to cease' is not that the liability should cease to accrue, but that the liability should cease to be enforced" (per Cleasby, B., Francesco v. Massey, L. R. 8 Ex. 104; 42 L. J. Ex. 76, 77: Vf. Kish v. Cory, L. R. 10 Q. B. 561; 44 L. J. Q. B. 205).

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LIABLE. For an instance as to the practical value of this word; V. James v. Young, 53 L. J. Ch. 796; 27 Ch. D. 652.

"Liable to pay a Solicitor's Bill and so entitled to tax it, s. 38, 6 & 7 V. c. 73; V. Re Barber, 15 L. J. Ex. 9; 14 M. & W. 720.

An Owner is " liable" to pay rates within s. 19, Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act, 1869, 32 & 33 V. c. 41, whether he is so by agreement with the overseers under s. 3, or by vestry order under s. 4, or by agreement with the occupier (Barton v. Birmingham, 48 L. J. C. P. 87).

"Liable, by reason of any contract or promise, to a demand in the nature of damages," s. 153, Bankry. Act, 1861; V. Johnson v. Skafte, L. R. 4 Q. B. 700; 38 L. J. Q. B. 318.

"Liable to contribute in whole or in part to the County Rate," s. 117, 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76; V. R. v. Monck, 2 Q. B. D. 544; 46 L. J. M. C. 251. V. LIABILITY: NOT LIABLE.