TENANT AT WILL."Tenant at will is, where lands or tenements are let by one man to another, to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, by force of which lease the lessee is in possession" (Litt. s. 68; Vth. Co. Litt. 55 a).

TENANT FOR LIFE.-A Tenant for Life is, as the phrase implies, one who is entitled to the benefit of property for the term of his life.

The large powers now given to the Tenant for Life of settled lands, render the definition of this phrase in connection with such lands a matter of great importance. For the purposes of the Settled Land Act, 1882, a Tenant for Life is, "The person who is for the time being, under a Settlement, beneficially entitled to possession of settled land, for his life” (s. 2, subs. 5: V. also s. 58, for an enumeration of other limited owners who have the same powers as Tenants for Life). Speaking broadly, the result of these sections is that the person intended to have the income of the land is the Tenant for Life for the time being (Re Jones, 53 L. J. Ch. 807; 26 Ch. D. 736).

As to those who are, or have the powers of, a Tenant for Life under the Settled Land Act; V. Re Jones, sup.: Re Buccleuch, 54 L. J. Ch. 401; 55 Ib. 107; 31 Ch. D. 135; 53 L. T. 733; 34 W. R. 169.

On the contrary; V. Re Hazle, 53 L. J. Ch. 574; 54 Ib. 628; 29 Ch. D. 78; 52 L. T. 947 ; 33 W. R. 759: Re Alkinson, 31 Ch. D. 577; 54 L. T. 403; 34 W. R. 445: Re Strangways, 34 Ch. D. 423; 56 L. J. Ch. 195 ; 55 L. T. 714; 35 W. R. 83: Re Horne, 39 Ch. D. 84; 57 L. J. Ch. 211; 58 L. T. 103; 36 W. R. 348. Re Hazle was on the phrase "Tenant for years determinable on Life."

As to the phrase "Tenant for life in possession; " V. Re Wright to Marshall, 54 L. J. Ch. 60; 28 Ch. D. 93; 51 L. T. 781; 33 W. R. 304.

TENANT IN COMMON. "Tenants in common are they, which have lands or tenements in fee simple, fee tail, or for term of life, &c., and they have such lands or tenements by several titles, and not by a joint title, and none of them know of this his several, but they ought by the law to occupy these lands or tenements in common, and pro indiviso to take the profits in common. And because they come to such lands or tenements by several titles, and not by one joint title, and their occupation and possession shall be by law between them in common, they are called Tenants in Common" (Litt. s. 292).

V. TENANCY IN COMMON.

TENANT-RIGHT.-Away-going future crops fall strictly within the meaning of the words "Tenant-Right yet to come," as contained in a Bill of Sale (Petch v. Tutin, 15 L. J. Ex. 280).

TENANTABLE REPAIR.-Under an obligation to keep premises in "Tenantable Repair," decorative repair is not included; papering, always,

and painting, unless needed for the protection of the property, are decorative repairs: nor does the obligation extend to repairing, or restoring, what is worn out by age (Crawford v. Newton, 36 W. R. 54: Proudfoot v. Hart, 59 L. J. Q. B. 129): but Waste, whether voluntary or permissive, is a breach of the obligation (Ib.). For an article discussing the cases on this phrase V. 32 S. J. 55.

TENDER. "To tender (de tender),' or tendre, is a word common both to the English and French, in Latine offerre; and in that sense, and with that Latine word it is alwaies used in the common law" (Co. Litt. 211 a).

As to requisites of a Tender V. Co. Litt. 207 a, 213 b; Rosc. N. P. 632-634.

All the precision of a strict legal Tender is not required in "tendering " Rates to Overseers under s. 30, Reform Act, 1832 (per Maule, J.); but merely saying "I am prepared to pay them " is not sufficient (Bishop v. Smedley, 15 L. J. C. P. 73; 2 C. B. 90).

"Making or tendering satisfaction; " V. SATISFACTION.

TENEMENT.-"The most comprehensive words of description applicable to Real Estate, are 'Tenements and Hereditaments,' as they include every species of realty, as well corporeal as incorporeal" (1 Jarm. 777 : Vf. Co. Litt. 6 a, 19 b, 20 a). And it is said that "by the grant of all Tenements, will pass as much as by the grant of all Hereditaments " (Touch. 91); but hereon Preston, in his Ed. of the Touchstone, says "this proposition is too general," and Ld. Coke says that "Tenement" is a large word to grant realty, but "Hereditament" is the largest (1 Inst. 6).

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'Tenement,' though in its vulgar acceptation it is only applied to houses and other buildings, yet in its original proper and legal term signifies everything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature; whether it be of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstantial ideal kind" (2 Bla. Com. 16; Va. Touch. 91). Thus this word will include an Advowson (Westfaling v. Westfaling, 3 Atk. 460 : Gully v. Bishop of Exeter, 4 Bing. 290: Sv. Kensey v. Langham, Ca. t. Talb. 145 n. e); and may include Tithes (Powell v. Bull, 1 Comyn, 265: R. v. Skingle, 1 Stra. 100: R. v. Barker, 6 A. & E. 388: Sv. R. v. Nevill, 8 Q. B. 452; 15 L. J. M. C. 33). So "a Dignity, whether it be granted of a place or not, is a "Tenement' within the Statute De Donis, and consequently not forfeited on an attainder for felony" (per Chitty, J., in Re Rivett-Carnac's Will, 54 L. J. Ch. 1076; 30 Ch. D. 136, citing R. v. Knollys, 2 Salk. 509; 1 Ld. Raym. 10 Ferrer's Case, 2 Eden, 373).

A Freehold Rent-Charge, is within the words "Freehold Lands or Tenements" in s. 18, Reform Act, 1832 (Druitt v. Christchurch, Colt. Reg. Ca. 328).

"An Annuity in fee, not being a rent-charge, is an Hereditament, but not

a Tenement; neither is a Condition a Tenement, but it is an Hereditament, 3 Rep. 2; 2 Bla. Com. 17; Salk. 239." Tenement" doth not comprehend a personal Annuity in fee; and an Annuity for life is neither a Tenement or Hereditament; and an office for life is a Tenement, and not an Hereditament" (Preston's Addns. to Touch. 91).

On the other hand "Tenement" sometimes receives its popular meaning of "House" (Yorkshire Insrce. v. Clayton, 51 L. J. Q. B. 82; 8 Q. B. D. 421). "The common people still use the word, as in the days of Blackstone, to mean a House" (per Cotton, L. J., Dashwood v. Ayles, 55 L. J. Q. B. 10); or it may, even now, sometimes be the equivalent of "Dwellinghouse" (Minifie v. Banger, 55 L. J. Q. B. 10; W. N. (85) 189).

"With respect to the word 'tenements' or tenementa, in Co. Litt. 20 a, it is stated-This is the only word which the Stat. of Westm. 2, that created estates taile, useth; and it includeth not only all corporate inheritances which are or may be holden, but also all inheritances issuing out of any of those inheritances, or concerning or annexed to or exerciseable within the same, though they lie not in tenure, therefore all these without question may be entailed.' That is a proper legal definition of Tenement.' I think Tenement' when used at all in connection with a house or room, must mean something of the same kind, or of the same character, and a thing absolutely immovable from the land" (per Martin, B., Fredericks v. Howie, 31 L. J. M. C. 249; 1 H. & C. 381; 6 L. T. 544 : Vƒ. R. v. Manchester Water Works Co., 1 B. & C. 630 : R. v. East London Water Works Co., 21 L. J. M. C. 49; 17 Q. B. 512: Colebrooke v. Tickell, 4 A. & E. 916; 5 L. J. K. B. 180: Sv. R. v. Shrewsbury Gas Co., 1 L. J. M. C. 18; 3 B. & Ad. 216). In Fredericks v. Howie, it was held that a portable booth used by strolling players is not a "Tenement," within s. 46, Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 V. c. 47), which prohibits keeping, &c. "any House or other Tenement as an unlicensed theatre. V. PLACE.

So "Tenement" in s. 167, Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, 10 & 11 V. c. 34, means property capable of visible and physical occupation, and does not include a Several Fishery (Redington v. Millar, 24 L. R. Ir. 65).

For a collection of the cases on the word "Tenement as used in the 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12 (which regulated Pauper Settlements); V. 3 Chitty's Stat. 3 Ed. 1034.

As to the meaning of "Tenement " in s. 3, Lands C. C. Act, 1845, and as to its being there affected by its context "of any tenure; V. G. W. Ry. v. Swindon Ry., 52 L. J. Ch. 306; 53 Ib. 1075; 22 Ch. D. 677 ; 9 App. Ca. 787.

V. HEREDITAMENT.

TENOR. The law attaches a technical meaning to the word "Tenor," as signifying either an exact copy, or a statement of the Libel verbatim. "Tenor" has so strict and technical a meaning as to make it necessary to

recite verbatim; but the expression "Manner and Form" means nothing more than a substantial recital (Wright v. Clements, 3 B. & Ald. 503).

TENURE. "The word "Tenure' signifies the relation of Tenant to Lord" (per Selborne, L. C., A.-G. of Ontario v. Mercer, 52 L. J. P. C. 85 ; 8 App. Ca. 767).

Vh. Co. Litt. 1 a, b.

TERM. "It is said by my Lord Coke, that the word 'Term,' though it is more properly applied to a Term for years, yet may mean an Estate for Life, and it is plainly in this deed used in that sense the trustees are to permit Robert Dormer to receive the profits during the term of his life; and the estate to the children is not to commence till the end, or other sooner determination of the said term, which by referring the relative to the last antecedent, must mean the term of his life as to the words "Sooner Determination,' inserted after the estate for life, these are insensible and may be rejected; they were probably thrown in, currente calamo, or by following a Precedent, and if the Precedent was before the Reformation, when there was a civil death (as well as a natural) by entering into religion, it might then have a meaning " (per Hardwicke, L. C., Smith v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 137). Va. Wrotesley v. Adams, 1 Plowd. 198.

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"The word "Term,' in a covenant in a lease, may signify either the time or the estate granted" (Woodf. 144, and authorities there cited).

Where a "Term" of periods of time is spoken of, successive periods are implied. Therefore residence for "a term of 3 years," to give a Settlement under s. 34, 39 & 40 V. c. 61, must be for three whole consecutive years,— without receiving relief (Dorchester v. Weymouth, 55 L. J. M. C. 44; 16 Q. B. D. 31; 54 L. T. 52; 50 J. P. 310).

TERM CERTAIN.-"Term or number of years certain," 1 G. 4, c. 87, s. 1 ;—a tenancy for 99 years determinable on lives is not within this phrase (Doe d. Pemberton v. Roe, 7 B. & C. 2; 5 L. J. O. S. K. B. 289), nor is a tenancy from quarter to quarter determinable by a 3 months' notice, or on the tenant losing his beer license (Doe d. Carter v. Roe, 12 L. J. Ex. 27; 10 M. & W. 670).

TERMINATION.-V. DETERMINATION.

TERMS." Contract which, according to the Terms thereof, ought to be performed within the jurisdiction," Ord. 11, R. 1 (e), R. S. C., does not mean that the place of performance is to be stated in terms; it suffices if such place appears from the contract and its circumstances (Reynolds v. Coleman, 56 L. J. Ch. 903; 36 Ch. D. 453; 57 L. T. 588; 35 W. R. 813). Vf. WITHIN THE JURISDICTION.

TESTAMENT.-" A Testament is the true declaration of our last

Will, of that wee would to be done after our death" (Termes de la Ley, Testament).

"Testament" includes a Will, Codicils, &c.; "Instrument" signifies the Will alone (Fuller v. Hooper, 2 Ves. sen. 242). V. INSTRUMENT.

TESTAMENTARY ESTATE. This phrase in a gift of "personal and testamentary estate" carries the realty; as otherwise it would be inoperative (Smith v. Coffin, 2 H. Bl. 445: Roe d. Penwarden v. Gilbert, 3 Brod. & B. 85: Doe d. Evans v. Walker, 19 L. J. Q. B. 293; 15 Q. B. 28: cited 1 Jarm. 725). In the last of those cases (Evans v. Walker), Campbell, C. J., said, "I think the words 'my Testamentary Estate' mean to include all that I can dispose of. They are prima facie sufficiently large to carry both the realty and personalty."

TESTAMENTARY

EXPENSES.-"Testamentary Expenses,"

are those which are incident to the proper performance of the duty of an executor (Sharp v. Lush, 48 L. J. Ch. 231; 10 Ch. D. 468: Vh. Brougham v. Poulett, 19 Bea. 134: Re Young, 44 L. T. 499).

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The costs of all proper parties to proceedings for determining the scope of a devise, are "Testamentary Expenses" (Morrell v. Fisher, 4 D. G. & S. 422); so are the costs of an administration suit (Miles v. Harrison, 43 L. J. Ch. 585; 9 Ch. 316: Harloe v. Harloe, 44 L. J. Ch. 512; L. R. 20 Eq. 471 in which latter case Hall, V.-C. refused to follow Gilbertson v. Gilbertson, 34 Bea. 354, and Stringer v. Harper, 26 Ib. 585; 28 L. J. Ch. 643: Miles v. Harrison, and Harloe v. Harloe, were followed in Sharp v. Lush, sup. and in Penny v. Penny, 48 L. J. Ch. 691; 11 Ch. D. 440: Vh. Lewin, 644: Browne v. Groombridge, 4 Mad. 495); and so are the costs. of an unsuccessful opposition to a Will the proof of which has been established under a compromise, one of the terms of which was that such costs should be paid out of the estate (Brown v. Burdett, 53 L. J. Ch. 56).

By s. 125 (7), Bankry. Act, 1883, "Testamentary Expenses incurred in and about the debtor's estate" by the legal personal representative of a deceased insolvent debtor, are a preferential debt upon the estate: held by Judge Holl, at Newcastle-upon-Tyne County Court, that these words include not merely the cost of obtaining probate, but also the reasonable expenses of investigating the position of the debtor's affairs, and generally of administering his estate prior to the bankruptcy administration Order (Re Turnbull, 29 S. J. 557). The phrase also includes costs properly incurred in an Administration Action (Re York, 36 Ch. D. 233; 56 L. J. Ch. 552; 56 L. T. 704; 35 W. R. 609).

Funeral expenses, the ascertaining testator's debts and their amounts (including rent current at the decease), and the cost of warehousing specific legacies, are "Testamentary Expenses" (Sharp v. Lush, sup.).

V. EXECUTORSHIP EXPENSES.