which your peculiar apprehension and experience of such mat ters will apply as far as possible. In the voluminous papers in which the evidence is contained, there is a large mass, upon which I am unwilling to observe,-I mean the conversations that are represented to have taken place after this accident had happened. You are aware, gentlemen, that ship testimony of this sort is usually of a very contradictory nature; and therefore it will be much safer for you to determine this case upon the real facts brought before you, instead of deciding it on the faith of these uncertain colloquies. I shall be very glad to hear that you have found quite enough in these facts to enable you to do so; but if not, it will be my duty to point out a few of the facts, that may be most material for your notice. At present I shall state only these:-Here is a large ship, possessed of all the advantages of wind, tide, and weather. She runs down a light vessel, by a violent blow upon her side, as she is proceeding against wind and tide, with all imaginable caution and regard for her own safety. It is for you, gentlemen, to instruct me, whether the ship has cleared herself of the imputation of misconduct, attaching, as it does, to a misfortune that certainly ought not to have taken place under such a state of circumstances. You will judge whether, from the papers before the Court, it appears that due caution has been exercised on the other side. You will judge whether a proper look-out was kept, such as ought to have been kept: you will also judge whether, on the near approach of the danger,

the Dundee took those proper measures of precaution and safety that it then became indispensably necessary to adopt? On the other hand, gentlemen, you will consider, whether the suffering ship, which is clearly shown to have observed all reasonable caution, is incontrovertibly proved to have adopted a measure of an extremely disadvantageous kind, and such as has exposed her to the unfortunate destruction of her hull, rigging, and cargo. I shall not enter into a minute examination of this evidence. You must be infinitely better judges of them than myself, and must bring to their consideration infinitely more experience and information than any which I can pretend to help you to. It is, indeed, the greatest satisfaction to me to know, that you have given the evidence the most meritorious consideration,—that you have devoted to it the most anxious consideration, and have listened attentively to the able arguments which have been constructed upon it. Your judgment on the circumstances of this case, therefore, is much more proper to direct me, than mine is to direct you; and to that I must refer them.

The Senior Trinity Master, (Mr. Isaac Robinson) lamented, that in all these cases of collision it almost invariably happened that there were similar variations and discrepancies in the evidence to those which had occurred in the present instance. But this was easily accounted for, and particularly in this case, when the situation of the vessels was considered. Taking it that the Dundee was proceeding at about five knots an hour, allowing for

the running of the tide one and a quarter, and for the slack three quarters per hour, these vessels were approaching each other at the rate of sixteen feet in a second. He mentioned these circumstances, merely for the sake of showing that, in such a state of things, and such a rate of sailing, it was almost impossible that men should be able to give any accurate account of the transaction. It appeared to the master and his brother, that it would be hard to judge of the veracity of men engaged in such a scene, by any accidental discrepancies of evidence. It was a scene of confusion, terror, and alarm; the horrors of which nobody knew, but he who had been present in it. In the case of a house on fire, however alarming might be the progress of the flames, it might be said that a man had time to collect himself, and to meet with fortitude so trying a situation; but in the case of two ships nearing each other with this velocity, the time was so momentary, and the peril so inevitable, that the mind had no opportunity of rallying, and the senses of a man were too much engrossed with the present danger to allow of his observing passing circumstances with any minuteness. In the evidence very few circumstances were detailed, but those which arose between the period at which the alarm was first excited, and that at which the accident took place. Himself and his brother conceived that the blame of that event must rest upon the party which first caused that species of alarm, which first produced in the other party an incapability of managing their own vessel. It was important, therefore, to as

certain who did excite it, at a time when both parties were pursuing their course in the full possession of all their faculties. There was one rule which was well known to all seamen, and it was this-the ship which had the wind, which was going largely, and which had the command of her helm, was to take care of those ships that were sailing by the wind. Now, one of these vessels was sailing 11 points from it. As to the Dundee, he (himself) and his brother, found no fault with the sails she had up, though the other vessel was stem. ming the tide. But the Dundee was aware that the Princess Charlotte being in the wind, it was of importance to her, so stemming the tide, to go on steadily in her course. Now, they did think, that the Princess Charlotte was, at the time, going on in that course under a full understanding that the Dundee would "take care of her."

It did appear,

that only a few minutes before, the Adventure had cleared the Princess Charlotte. It was perhaps important to consider the time at which the Adventure came in a line with the smack and the Dundee. The evidence varied from 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, to 45 minutes; and in the time of five minutes it was impossible to suppose, that the Dundee had not kept a good look-out: if it was a longer time, then a question arose, how far the Dundee was acting with prudence in sailing in the very eddy of the brig's wake; for if the evidence of her own crew was to be believed, she was certainly not more than forty feet astern of the Adventure, which would bring her within the effect of that eddy.

She must have known, that, by the circumstance of her being headed by the Adventure, rigged as that brig was, there was one arc of the horizon kept from her view, and the danger she was incurring was evident. Had she reflected, that, every moment she remained

[On the petition of the proctor for the owners of the Dundee, it was ordered to be referred to the registrar and merchants, to ascertain the amount of said damages.]

go on board a ship, or any other obstruction which the Adventure might have run aboard of, she would hardly have persisted in following so close. As to the Adventure, it was quite clear that she had not kept a good look-out. It was proved that the master of the Adventure, when they told him that the smack was coming down upon her, ran forward and cried out "Helm hard to starboard!"-a cry that, in a seaman's ear, sounded very much like alarm and fear indeed. The masters could discover, on the other hand, no impropriety in the working of the Princess Charlotte; and if there was, the terror and apprehension of her crew might very well excuse it.

The other Trinity Master expressed his conviction, that if the helm of the Dundee had been put hard to starboard at the same time that the brig's helm was so put, she could not have struck the smack; and this, he thought, was evident from their respective

courses.

Lord Stowell said, these opinions certainly decided his own judgment, which indeed had all along travelled to the same conclusion. He must, in this case, consider that the Dundee was the wrong-doer; and he therefore pronounced her liable for the damages incurred accord ingly.

JAN. 19.

James Mudie v. Edward Thomason and Charles Jones.-Mr. Hart, on the part of the plaintiff, moved for an injunction to restrain the defendants from exhibiting, or selling, or offering for sale, certain medals. The facts of the case were these;-Some time previously to the year 1816, the plaintiff determined to execute dies for a series of medals, which were intended to commemorate the principal events of the late war. The dies for the first part of the series were, with considerable labour and expense, completed in 1819, and the defendants, who resided at Birmingham, were applied to for the purpose of striking the medals. During this negotiation, the defendants assured the plaintiff that he should be honourably dealt with. The terms of payment having been agreed upon, the dies were given to the defendants; but before this was done, the plaintiff received an assurance, that all possible care should be taken of the dies. It was also stipulated, that the dies should be kept locked up in a box, except when wanted for use; that no medals should be struck, except with the consent and for the use of the plaintiff; that all the medals which might be struck should be sent to London; and that none should be disposed of

by the defendants, at Birmingham. The defendants had, how ever, lately caused a large shield, emblazoned with the most remarkable events of the Duke of Wellington's campaigns, to be manufactured at their establishment in Birmingham, and had also caused to be struck 25 reverses of the medals belonging to the plaintiff, which they had placed as ornaments round the shield. This shield the defendants had brought to London, had advertised for exhibition, and had also offered for sale. In addition to this, the plaintiff had cause to believe, that the defendants had lately struck off a large quantity of medals from his dies, and that they had disposed of some for money, and that they had then in their possession others not ordered to be struck by the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the application for the injunction was made.

Mr. Hart, in the course of his statement, said, the expense incurred by Mr. Mudie in manufacturing the medals amounted to nearly 10,000%.

The Lord Chancellor observed, that the terms of the agreement rendered it unnecessary to refer to any statute, and he, therefore, granted the injunction.

MARCH 27. Queen's College, Cambridge. The question at issue related to the Mastership of Queen's college, Cambridge. The college was founded by Elizabeth, the wife of Edward IV., and from her the college received a book of statutes, by which it was provided, that the fellows should proceed to elect a new master within

eight days after the office should become vacant: and if they omitted to do so, that the right of appointment should devolve to the Crown. It was also required by the statutes, that the senior fellow should admit the person elected to the office of master, under pain of expulsion from the college. The subject came before the Court upon two petitions. One petition was from Mr. King, a fellow of the college, who prayed that the Court, as visiter, would inquire, whether the office of master of Queen's college was vacant; and if it should be found to be so, whether the fellows ought to proceed to a new election, or whether the right of appointment had devolved to the Crown. The grounds on which this application rested were, that on the 12th day after the death of the late master, Dr. Milner, the fellows, in compliance with the statutes, proceeded to elect a new master, when Mr. Godfrey was chosen by a majority of votes. Immediately after the election, Mr.Godfrey required the senior fellow to admit him to his office, when he was informed, that it was first necessary for him to sign the declaration of faith required by the act of Uniformity. Mr. Godfrey, however, disregarded this intimation, and, as Mr. King contended, went through the usual form of admission, by receiving the keys and a copy of the statutes. The other petition was from Mr. Mandell, who was the opposing candidate to Mr. Godfrey at the time of the election. Mr. Mandell stated, that Mr. Godfrey obtained a majority of votes by voting for himself as fellow for Middlesex, although there was at that time another fellow for that county, and it was

provided by the statutes that there should never be more than one fellow for Middlesex at the college at one and the same time. Upon this ground, therefore, Mr. Mandell claimed to be the master of the college.

The question for the Court to decide was, whether, "by the act of Uniformity, passed under Charles II., Mr. Godfrey had not forfeited his office. By that act it is declared, that if any master or head of a college shall omit to sign the declaration of faith therein contained, before or at the time of his admission to office, such office shall, ipso facto, be considered void, as if its possessor were naturally dead. The Court was also to decide, whether, supposing Mr. Godfrey to have forfeited his office, the fellows ought not to have proceeded to a new election within twelve days, and whether, as they had not done so, the right of appointment to the office of master had not devolved to the Crown. Mr. Godfrey, in answer to the affidavits filed against him, contended, that the form of admission was not completed by the delivery of the keys, &c., until some subsequent ceremony was performed in the chapel of the college. This ceremony he had gone through several days after he had signed the declaration of faith before the vice-chancellor of the college. He therefore maintained, that he had not violated the provisions of the act of Uniformity. With respect to the allegation that he was not entitled to vote as fellow for Middlesex, Mr. Godfrey asserted, that it had been the immemorial usage of the college to maintain two fellows for that county.

The Lord Chancellor, after detailing the facts of the case, and declaring that Mr. Godfrey ought to be considered, at the time of the election, as de jure fellow for Middlesex, decided, that according to the intention of the statutes, and the constant usage of the college, the admission of the master was not completed by the delivery of the keys, &c. In this view of the case, it was evident, that Mr. Godfrey had signed the declaration of faith, required by the act of Uniformity previously to his admission. His lordship stated, that he would hear any observations from counsel on the question of what ought to constitute admission. If no application were made to him on this point before Saturday, it must be understood that Mr. Godfrey was duly elected master.

KING'S BENCH, WESTMINSTER.

The King v. Clement.-This was a proceeding upon a rule obtained by Mr. Denman, for cause to be shown why the proceedings in the Court below should not be removed by certiorari into this Court. The matter in question was, the fine of 500!. imposed by the judges in April, last year, at the Old Bailey, for a contempt of Court, in publishing a full account of the proceedings on the trials of Thistlewood and Ings, contrary to the express orders of the Court, forbidding the publication of any of the proceedings against those two prisoners, until the trials of six others, included with them in the same indictment, for the same crime, should be terminated.

The Attorney-General showed