puts the duties of obedience to them upon free will and moral duty. After dissenting from Mr. Locke as to the origin of governments in compact, he says, "Wherefore rejecting the intervention of a compact as unfounded in its principle, and dangerous in the application, we assign for the only ground of the subject's obligation, the will of God, as collected from expediency.

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"The steps by which the argument proceeds arefew and direct. It is the will of God that the happiness of human life be promoted: "this is the first step and the foundation, not only of this, but of every moral conclusion. Civil society conduces to that end: this is the second proposition. Civil socie. ties cannot be upheld, unless in each the interest of the whole society be binding upon every part and member of it: this is the third step and conducts us to the conclusion, namely, That so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without publick inconveniency, it is the will of God (which will universally determines our duty) that the established government be obeyed, and no longer.

"But who shall judge of this? We answer every man for himself. In contentions between the sovereign and the subject, the parties acknowledge no common arbitrator; and it would be absurd to commit the decision to those whose conduct has provoked the question, and whose own interest, authority, and fate, are immediately concerned in it. The danger of errour and abuse is no objection to the rule of expediency, because every other rule is liable to the same or greater; and every rule that can be propounded upon the subject, like all rules which appeal to, or bind the conscience, must in the application, depend upon private judgment. It may be observed, however, that it ought equally to be accounted the exercise of a man's private judgment, whether he determines by reasonings and conclusions of his own, or submits to be directed by the advice of others, provided he be free to choose his guide."

He then proceeds in a manner rather inconsistent with the principles entertained by my learned friend in his opening to you.

"No usage, law, or authority whatever, is so binding, that it need or ought to be continued when it may be changed with advantage to the community. The family of the prince, the order of succession, the prerogative of the crown, the form and parts of the legislature, together with the respective powers, offices, duration, and mutual dependency of the several parts, are all only so many laws, mutable, like other laws, whenever expediency requires, either by the ordinary act of the legislature, or, if the occasion de serve it; by the interposition of the people."

No man can say that Mr. Paley intended to diffusé discontent by this declaration. He must therefore be taken to think with me, that freedom and affection, and the sense of advantages, are the best and the only supports of government. On the same principle, he then goes on to say," These points are wont to be approached with a kind of awe; they are represented to the mind as principles of the constitution, settled by our ancestors, and being settled, to be no more committed to innovation or debate; as foundations never to be stirred; as the terms and conditions of the social compact, to which every Citizen of the state has engaged his fidelity, by virtue of a promise which he canhot now recall. Such reasons have no place in our system."

Such are the sentiments of this excellent author, and there is no part of Mr. Paine's work, from the one end of it to the other, that advances any other proposition.

But the attorney general will say, these are the grave speculative opinions of a friend to the English government, whereas Mr. Paine is its professed enemy. What then? The principle is that every man, while he obeys the laws, is to think for himself, and to conduct himself as he thinks. The very ends of society exact this license, and the policy of the law in its provisions for its security, has tacitly sanctioned it.

The real fact is, that writings against a free and welf proportioned government, need not be guarded against by laws. They cannot often exist, and never with effect. The just and awful principles of society, are rarely brought forward, but when they are insulted and denied, or abused in practice. Mr. Locke's essay on government, we owe to sir Robert Filmer, as we owe Mr Paine's to Mr. Burke; and indeed, between the arguments of Filmer and Burke, I see no essential difference; since it is not worth disputing, whether a king exists by divine right or indissoluble human compact. If he exists whether we will or no; if his existence be without our consent, and continue without our benefit, it matters not a farthing whether his title be from God or man.

That his title is from man, and from every generation of man, without regard to the determination of former ones, hear from Mr. Locke. "All men" say they, (i. e. Filmer and his adherents) " are born under government and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is plain, mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other, that tied them without their own consent, to a subjection to them and to their heirs."

"It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else."

So much for Mr. Locke's opinion of the rights of mankind. Let us now examine his ideas of the supposed danger of trusting mankind with their rights.

"Perhaps it will be said, that the people being igno. rant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and fickle humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin: and no government will be able long to subsist if the people may set up a new legislature, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this, I answer, quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to; and if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption, it is not an easy thing to be changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions, has in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king, lords, and commons; and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line."

Gentlemen, I wish I had strength to go on with all that is material, but I have read enough, not only to maintain the true principles of government, but to put to shame the narrow system of distrusting the people.

It may be said, that Mr. Locke went great lengths in his positions, to beat down the contrary doctrine of divine right, which was then endangering the new establishment. But that cannot be objected to Mr. Hume, who maintains the same doctrine. Speaking of the Magna Charta in his history vol. 2d page 88, he says,

" It must be confessed, that the former articles of the great charter, contain such mitigations and explanations of the feodal law, as are reasonable and equitable; and that the latter involve all the chief outlines of a legal government, and provide for the equal distribution of justice and free enjoyment of property; the great object for which political society was founded by men, which the people have a perpetual and unalienable right to recall; and which no time nor precedent, nor statute, nor positive institution, ought to deter them from keeping ever uppermost in their thoughts and attention."

These authorities are sufficient to rest on, yet I cannot omit Mr. Burke himself, who is, if possible, still more distinct on the subject. Speaking, not of the ancient people of England, but of colonies planted almost within our memories, he says, " If there be one fact in the world perfectly clear, it is this; that the disposition of the people of America is wholly averse to any other than a free government, and this is indication enough to any honest statesman, how he ought to adapt whatever power he finds in his hands to their case. If any ask me what a free government is, I answer, that it is what the people think so; and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter. If they practically allow me a greater degree of authority over them than is consistent with any correct ideas of perfect freedom, I ought to thank them for so great a trust, and not to endeavour to prove from thence, that they have reasoned amiss, and that having gone so far, by analogy, they must hereafter have no enjoyment but by my pleasure.

Gentlemen, I am sorry to feel my time considerably consumed before I am arrived at what I conceive to be the material subject of your consideration. For all that I have been stating now, is only to show, that there is not that novelty in the opinions of the defendant, that should lead you to think that he does not bona fide entertain them, much less when connected with the history of his life, which, I therefore brought into view before you. But still the great question remains unargued. Had he a right to promulgate these opinions? Gentlemen, if he entertained them, I shall argue that he had. And although my arguments upon the liberty of the press, may not to day be honoured with your, or the court's approbation, I shall retire not at all disheartened, consoling myself with the reflection, that a season may arrive for their reception. The most essential freedoms of