CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

It must be obvious that in spite of the new lease of life she obtained in 1896, and of the comparative quiet of the last few years, the position of Siam is a precarious one. Dangers threaten her from without and from within, but her worst enemy is really herself. There can be little doubt that if she put her government into an efficient condition, if she developed the resources of her rich territory, opening it up as the British have done in Burmah, or the Dutch in Java, to foreign trade and commerce, and if she inspired merchants with a sense of security, then, with Great Britain behind her, she would be, humanly speaking, free from all risk of foreign aggression. But can we hope that she will rise to the occasion? I have tried to show in an earlier chapter what slender grounds of confidence there are, judging à priori from the Siamese character, that she can ever attain thorough efficiency while at the same time preserving her complete independence. Her people are lazy and

frivolous, with the laziness and frivolity of many generations, nor are essential race characteristics changed in a day, even if they do not bear their stamp till the end of all time. No other tropical nation in the East has maintained its independence, and are the Siamese to prove an exception to the rule? When, too, we look at the actual condition of affairs, the grounds for confidence are not greatly increased. On the surface many improvements have been effected in the last few years, but the present régime is far from satisfactory, and not likely to lead to any substantial changes for the better in the future. The Siamese employ a large number of Europeans in different Government departments, but they are clever enough to keep the real power in their own hands. Some reforms which do not interfere with vested interests are allowed to go through, others are passed with a flourish of trumpets for the express purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of Europe. Those reforms, however, which in any way touch the interests, or offend the prejudices of the powerful, are obstructed or mangled till at last they are quietly put on the shelf; while not a few which do not apparently contain any seeming ground of offence are never proceeded with, simply on account of the vis inertia with which the Siamese character is weighted to the earth.

In reality there is no effective European control. Not only are the different administrative posts

parcelled out among different nationalities who have about as much idea of combination as the European Concert, but in each separate department it is the Siamese who retain the executive power. The European adviser is literally the adviser and very little else. He is no doubt able to carry certain minor reforms, but in the long run the power is not with him. That pleasing fiction which prevails in so many lands we know, and which veils absolute ultimate authority under the specious guise of "advice," is too transparent for the not unsophisticated Siamese. They are determined to be their own masters, and the king in particular is quick enough to let any European who talks big know his proper place. I should be only too glad to think that I was thoroughly mistaken, and that the Siamese might, though slowly, develop for themselves an efficient government in which, as is the acknowledged ideal of most of them, they could ultimately dispense with all outside assistance. This would be the happiest solution for Our own country of a very difficult problem, not to mention that it would cause much greater reason for confidence in the latent possibilities of Oriental nations generally. But though this solution is still not altogether beyond the bounds of hope, there are few, if any, who have a firsthand acquaintance with Siam that really believe in it. It is quite clear from the present state of affairs that not only can the Siamese not afford

to dispense with European assistance, but that

this assistance should be made much more effective. What Lord Milner has said of Egypt applies with equal force to Siam: "It is not enough to have well-qualified Europeans in the Egyptian service in order to keep things straight. It is necessary that there should be some power behind them to give effectiveness to their advice," and, “European skill is useless without European authority." The present régime has now lasted some time, and before many more years elapse the day of reckoning must come. Siam if still found wanting, will have to choose between voluntarily abdicating a portion at least of her authority and being forcibly deprived of the whole of it. Inefficiency may be condoned for a certain time, especially if there is some outward appearance of reforms being introduced, but in the last resort it must be wiped out. In these days when the pressure of population is rapidly increasing, when soon every available inch of the world's surface will be required for man's use, misgovernment in one of the most fertile tracts of the globe will not be long tolerated. Siam then will have to arrange her affairs while there is yet time.

What at present is the outlook? She has nothing to hope from France. On her other side is Great Britain, who has no wish for her territory, and would gladly help her to retain as large a Lord Milner's "England in Egypt."

measure of independence as possible, but who at the same time cannot save her in spite of herself. The only course open, it seems to me, premising always that she does not ultimately prove capable of self-government, is for her to give British officers a real control in the conduct of her affairs, and in return to ask for British protection against outside aggression. Whether Great Britain, would, or would not, accept such a rôle is another matter. She could only do so at the risk of giving offence to France, though nobody could maintain that her acceptance was an infringement of the treaty of 1896. It would hardly be possible for Great Britain on the other hand, either on political or purely commercial grounds, to allow France to annex the country. If she shrank from imposing on herself the burden of a protectorate, the only alternative would seem to be to allow a less powerful people, as for example the Dutch, who perhaps know how to manage Orientals in some respects better than anybody else, to take over the country subject to certain conditions and restrictions. British commerce, which would be practically destroyed in the case of French annexation, might thus be safeguarded, and it would not be necessary to protect the Burmese frontier against a great military Power. The question may seem an academic one, and certainly may not arise for solution for years; on the other hand, some unexpected turn of events may cause it to become