the claim which the Goorkhas had set up; but when their commissioner was requested to give the necessary directions for, delivering up the disputed lands, it appeared that he had no powers to do so and to the representations made to his government no regard whatever was paid; on the contrary, Major Bradshaw received a peremptory order to quit the Nepaul frontiers. Under these circumstances a detachment of our troops was ordered up; and upon their advance the Goorkhas retired from the disputed ground, which was peaceably occupied by us, and the Company's authority reestablished; and it seemed as if, without making a formal renunciation of their pretended rights, the Goorkhas had tacitly acquiesced in our resumption of the territory. Shortly afterwards, the rainy season making it necessary to withdraw the troops in consequence of the fevers, which at that period of the year prevail in the neighbourhood of the hills, the charge of the recovered lands was intrusted to the Company's civil officers at the several Tannahs or police establishments along the frontier; but no sooner was our military force removed than the Goorkhas advanced a body of their troops, attacked our Tannahs, killed several of our people, and murdered in cold blood with circumstances of peculiar atrocity the Company's principal Tannahdar, (police officer,) who was put to death in presence of the commander of the Goorkha troops, after the post to which he belonged had been surrendered! By this means they succeeded in re-occupying the disputed lands. It was now evident that from negociation no satisfactory consequences could be expected, but that it was the purpose of the Goorkhas to retain by force, what they had acquired by injustice. In this posture of affairs the Governor-general the Earl of Moira, now Marquis of Hastings, actuated by a laudable anxiety to avoid war as long as there appeared any probability that our provinces could be secured by an amicable adjustment of differences, transmitted a strong and indignant remonstrance to the Goorkha government, calling upon it for a disavowal of the acts of violence and atrocity committed by its officer, and demanding his immediate punishment, together with the restoration of the lands Asiatic Journ.-No. 31. It that had been seized. With this atonement it was stated that the Company's government would be satisfied; but if not instantly made, the Governor-general would have recourse to arms, nor lay them down until a severe chastisement had been inflicted, and an effectual security obtained against any future molestation. To this expostulation no proper answer being returned, war was formally declared, and the troops received orders to march. The contest in which we were thus involved was one of considerable difficulty and importance; a signal insult had been offered us, and a most wanton outrage committed upon our territory, for which apology and reparation were refused. The foundation of our empire in India rests upon the opinion entertained of our power; to have failed or to have only partially succeeded in punishing the insolence of this people, would have been attended with effects the most injurious to our influence in other parts of Hindustan. became necessary therefore, in embarking in the war, to contemplate, as its only adequate end, the complete submission of the Goorkha government, and the conclusion of such a peace as would effectually secure us against any future danger from that quarter. But the difficulties to be surmounted in the attainment of these objects were of the most formidable description, for it was not a contest likely to be terminated by one or two battles fought in the plains, where the discipline and valour of our troops would have had to encounter the superior numbers and irregular courage of an Indian army, and where, from past experience, the result might be confidently predicted; but we were to engage with a new enemy in a mountainous country, where nature opposed every obstacle to the prosecution of war, and where the advantages of discipline were in some measure lost by the impossibility of acting in large and united bodies. Amidst the multifarious transactions of war, there is perhaps no kind of enterprise more arduous and more doubtful, which has oftener baffled the skill of the ablest generals and chilled the courage of the bravest troops, than the endeavour to subdue a mountain country defended by a hardy, warlike, and resolute people. It is by this standard VOL. VI. E which were over that the difficulties come, and the ability displayed in the conduct of the Nepaul war, must be estimated. To bring such a war to a speedy and decisive issue was the task imposed upon Lord Hastings, and the plan of the campaign laid down by him was admirably calculated to accomplish this purpose. His first object was to penetrate into the mountains; and with this view, he divided his army into four columns that to the eastward, consisting of the troops from Dinapore, under Major-general Marley, was destined to enter the hills opposite Catmandoo, and march upon that capital. At some distance to the westward, the Benares division under Major-general Sullivan Wood was instructed to occupy Bootwal, and to co-operate from that side with Majorgeneral Marley. Upon the banks of the Suttledge, the western extremity of our line of operations, the division under Major-general Ochterlony was opposed to the Goorkha army under Amer Sing, their principal general. Major-general Gillespie was ordered to enter the Doon', and to possess himself of Kalonga; to secure the passes of the rivers in that district, and prevent the retreat of Amer Sing when pressed by Major-general Ochterlony. The effect of this extensive plan of operations was to weaken the enemy's line in every part by compelling him to occupy a most extensive front, and to render him uncertain of the precise point where the passes of the mountains would be forced; while the success of any one of our columns in penetrating into the mountains, by turning the enemy's defences, would insure the issue of the whole campaign. Had Lord Hastings formed his army into one or two columns, the enemy would have concentrated his whole force opposite to the menaced point, and have rendered the chances of success in forcing our way into the hills very doubtful; and if we had prevailed in this preliminary operation, the embarrassment and difficulty movements within the hills, through narrow defiles and pathways where scarcely two men could march abreast, would have been precisely in pro portion to the magnitude of our corps, and have added to the enemy's means of prolonging the contest. of our The plan therefore adopted by Lord Hastings was well contrived to bring the war to a prompt decision; but its commencement was not signalized by that immediate success which his Lordship appears to have had reason to expect. The columns under Generals Marley and Wood, which were destined to act against Catmandoo, experienced some difficulties in their march under the hills, which delayed their operations; and they do not seem to have made many attempts to enter the mountains in pursuance of the original instructions. Nevertheless an important advantage, which it was the merit of the plan to secure, was derived from them, as by drawing large bodies of the enemy to that quarter, they weakened the defences in other parts. The division under Majorgen. Gillespie entered the hills as had been designed, and attacked the fortress of Kalonga, which he attempted to storm; but the determined resistance of the enemy, and it is supposed some misconception of orders, baffled the efforts of our troops, and after an obstinate conflict they were repulsed with considerable loss. The Major-gen. in a renewed effort to carry the place, headed himself the storming party, and while cheering on his men to the attack, fell at the foot of the breach, covered with wounds, and lamented by the whole army, of which his chivalrous character and ardent courage, displayed on so many occasions, had rendered him one of the brightest ornaments. The assault failed in consequence, and the troops were withdrawn. But here, as in the case of Generals Wood and Marley, although the operations were not successful, yet by the diversion which they caused, they essentially contributed to the result which was preparing in the west. In that quarter Major-gen. Ochterlony was advancing with that perseverance, judgment, and ability for which his military conduct is remarkable. To aid his exertions more effectually, Lord Hastings, who was himself at this time in the northen parts of Hindustan, directed another column, to be formed, of which he gave the command to Colonel Nicholls, an officer of his own staff, with orders to enter the province of Kemaon, one of the western districts of the Goorkhas, which his Lordship conceived might be occupied while the attention of the enemy was engaged in opposing the other divisions. Colonel Nicholls was instructed to possess himself of Almora, the principal fortress of Kemaon, to secure the passes of the rivers from the westward, and thus cut off the retreat of Amer Sing, and operate in his rear. Colonel Nicholls executed this movement with the greatest promptitude and success. He passed through the mountains without loss, engaged the Goorkha army under Husti Dhal, one of the Rajah's uncles, and completely defeated it; Husti Dhal himself was killed in the action. The Colonel next attacked the advanced positions of the Goorkhas before Almora, and carried them by assault. He then opened his batteries upon the fort of Almora, which capitulated; and in about ten days of most laborious exertions and hard fighting, the province of Kemaon was completely reduced, and occupied by our troops. This operation was decisive of the campaign; for Amer Sing, commanding the principal corps of the enemy on the Suttledge, being repulsed in some attempts which he made upon Major-gen. Ochterlony, and severely pressed by the judicious movements of that excellent officer, found his retreat intercepted by Col. Nicholls' occupation of Kemaon, and in consequence proposed the surrender of his army to Major-Gen. Ochterlony, upon terms, which were acceded to. Thus the whole of the Goorkha country, from the banks of the Suttledge to the Gogra, was occupied by the British army; and the positions from which we were now enabled to prosecute the war rendered the conquest of the remaining part of the country certain. Under these circumstances the Rajah of Nepaul sent deputies to our camp to offer his submission, and to solicit peace on any terms we might think proper to grant. A treaty was accordingly framed, the terms of which, while they left the Rajah an independent sovereign, effectually secured us against any future danger from that quarter. By these terms the whole of the Terraya, which had been the source of so much dispute and the immediate cause of the war, was to be ceded to the British government, with the exception of the district of Morung, which was humanely left to the Goorkhas, on account of the urgent want of some lowland pasture for their cattle. The province of Kemaon was to be given up and united in perpetuity to the Company's dominions, and the country upon the Jumna, to the west of Kemaon, to be restored to the several chiefs from whom it had been conquered by the Goorkhas. The fortress of Nagri, and a certain extent of territory to the eastward, were to be assigned to the Rajah of Sikhim, the chief of a nation partly Hindus and partly Tartars, with whom recent events had brought us into connection, and who had aided us in the war. This treaty was signed by the Rajah's deputies, and the ratifications were to be exchanged within a certain period; but the Rajah, with the ordinary policy of Indian courts, iuterposed delays, and finally refused to sign the ratification, in the hope that the approach of the rains would oblige us to desist from our operations. This foolish act of perfidy, which could be attended with no other advantage to him than the procrastination of a few months, whilst it exposed him to more rigorous treatment at the end of that period, rendered however another campaign necessary. Accordingly, during the interval of the rains, preparations were made for the conquest of the country; and as we had retained military possession of Kemaon and all the western provinces, as far as to the Sutledge, the scale of operations was now reduced within narrow limits, and the success certain. The chief command of the army in this second campaign was given to Sir David Ochterlony, who was to advance. by Muckwanpore to the capital, Catman doo. As soon as the season admitted, Sir David commenced his operations, and encountered the enemy at Muckwanpore: at this place they made a vigorous staud, and fought with great courage, advancing close up to the bayonets of our men, and pouring in their fire; but after a sharp contest they were completely defeated with considerable loss, and our march to the capital was secured. Deputies now arrived for the second time in our camp from the Rajab, supplicating from our generosity any terms of peace that would but leave him a sovereign. It was in the power of the British to have acquired the ratified. At the commencement of the war the state of India in other parts was by no means satisfactory, and it was only by an extensive scheme of military movements, and a vigorous and decisive line of policy, that Lord Hastings was enabled to keep the Mahrattas in awe, and to prevent any interruptions on their part to the operations against Nepaul. There is the strongest evidence that, previously to the breaking out of the war, the Goorkha government was in correspondence with Sindiah and other Mahratta chiefs, and that a reliance on their co-operation was entertained; but the promptitude of Lord Hastings' determination, when he found that no settlement of the points in dispute could be expected from negociation, entirely disconcerted this plan. He had for some time, indeed, foreseen the issue that the discussions would probably take, and had made all his preparations with great secrecy; so that at the same instant the war was declared, and the troops were in march for the different points on which they were to act, before Sindiah or the other Mahrattas had any conception that the war-arrangements were began. country for themselves, or to have disposed by us in the last Mahratta war, and ought of it in any other way that they might to have been retained as forming a most have thought expedient. But the governor- useful barrier against any inroads from general was satisfied with the terms of the that side, but it had been most unacformer treaty, as fully answering all the countably restored to Sindiah during the objects for which we had gone to war, weak and spiritless system which imwhich the Rajah now gladly and speedily mediately succeeded the splendid and politic administration of Lord Wellesley; instead therefore of being a bulwark of security to us, as that noble lord had wisely designed, it was now become an object of jealousy and apprehension, on which our attention was necessarily fixed. Meer Khan, with an army of twenty-five thousand men, partly free-booters and partly Mahrattas, was also near at hand, and the Mahratta Rajah of Berar, or as he is sometimes called of Nagpore, from the name of his capital, was collecting a large army for the ostensible purpose of chastising the Rajah of Bhopal, a petty sovereign, whose territories lie between Berar and Sindiah's country, but in re ality with the view of uniting with Sindiah and Meer Khan in a joint invasion of our provinces. The means by which it was hoped our government would be deceived in this instance, were skilfully combined. The Rajah of Bhopal, with an affected dread of the preparations making by the Nagpore Rajah, applied to our government for assistance, and offered to subsidise a British force, and place himself under our protection. This proposal was readily accepted by Lord Hastings; but when the terms of the alliance were to be adjusted, the Rajah interposed all kinds of difficulties and delays, which with other circumstances that transpired, led to a clear discovery, that the application to the British government had been made in concert with the Nagpore Rajah, to further his deceitful purposes, and to conceal more effectually the real object of assembling his army. Lord Hastings, however, had not been deceived. He had discerned the meditated hostility of the Rajah in the collecting of his troops, and he had in consequence ordered the Madras army, together with the Hydrabad subsidiary force, to move forward. So that about the time when the Rajah's army was assembled, and ready to march, as he pretended, against Bhopaul, but actually to form a junction with Sindiah, Col. Doveton had reached Ellichpore upon his frontier at the head At this period the number of effective troops which Lord Hastings had at his disposal was inadequate to the prosecu-. tion of a war that required a considerable force to bring it to an easy decision, and to the security at the same time of our empire, from the danger to which it might be exposed in other quarters; but he immediately adopted the more active measures for raising men, and promptly collected an army in the northern parts of Hindustan, where he himself then was, sufficient to check the Mahrattas, should they have attempted any movement upon our provinces. There were several indications which made it necessary to watch their steps with particular vigilance. Sindiah was at the head of a considerable force at Gwalior, a fortress close upon our frontier, which had been conquered of thirty thousand men; and Lord Has- their territories, have effectually secured |