constitutional doctrine enunciated above was clearly expressed by Lord Granville in Parliament in 1864 with reference to the attendance of the Queen at a committee of the Privy Council. (r)

The prime minister thus presides in place of the sovereign at meetings of the Cabinet, and his opinion is of paramount weight and importance; and though members meet nominally on an equal footing, the vote of the majority in ordinary cases deciding the question (s), he has the power in the last resort of requiring the resignation of a minister, or, by himself resigning, of bringing about the dissolution of the Ministry as a whole. Individual ministers have, however, it appears, the right of access to the sovereign on matters concerning their own departments, though out of courtesy and loyalty to their chief, any such communications should be made known to the premier immediately beforehand or afterwards. (t)

Though the sovereign is thus debarred from taking any part in the formal deliberations of his ministers, he is constitutionally entitled to criticise the conduct of the executive, and for this purpose the resolutions of the Cabinet ought, it seems, to be communicated to him, together with the fullest information on all important matters, in time to enable him to come to a proper decision. Measures sanctioned by the sovereign should not, it appears, afterwards be arbitrarily altered or modified without reference to him. (u)

Since the Ministry is collectively responsible to Parliament for the advice given to the Crown, so that advice ought to be unanimous; and, as a necessary corollary, it is not, in general, constitutional for the sovereign to inquire into the lines of division in the Cabinet. This doctrine is to be found enunciated in the House of Commons by Lord North in the reign of George III. (v)

If the Crown refuses to accept the advice of his ministers the usual and recognized course is for the latter either to modify their decision in accordance with the wishes of the sovereign

(r) See Parl. Debates, 3rd Series, clxxv. 251.

(8) See Report of the Admiralty Committee, 1861, p. 168. (t) See Todd, Parl. Govt. ii. 208.

(u) See the Memorandum addressed to the Foreign Secretary (Lord Palmerston) by Queen Victoria through the Prime Minister (Lord John Russell) in 1851 (Parl. Debates, 3rd Series, cxix. 90; see also Ib. clxxxviii. p. 1113. Report on Official Salaries, 1850, Evidence No. 326. (v) See Parl. Hist. xxiii. 678; xxiv. 291.

or resign. (w) But except possibly in cases of grave importance, where it is necessary for the sovereign to hear the views of all parties, or where the sovereign differs from his ministers and wishes to find others who would accept responsibility for his action by taking office in case of resignation of the existing Ministry, it is clearly recognized as unconstitutional for the Crown to take advice from persons other than his ministers. An illustration of the recognition of this principle is to be found in the frequent denunciations in Parliament of the "influence behind the throne" during the reign of George III. due to the party known as "King's men," or the "King's Friends," which that sovereign attempted to form on the advice principally of Lord Bute. (x)

The expression of the sovereign's political views to persons other than his ministers is also regarded as unconstitutional ; though, it is said, he may listen to the views of others, or act as a mediator in the case of political quarrels. (y) It is also regarded as unconstitutional for the sovereign to take any independent action either in foreign politics or by influencing ministers or executive officers (2) without reference to his responsible adviser; (a) and that a minister who acts without consulting his colleagues cannot escape responsibility on the ground that he acted in compliance with the sovereign's wishes, is instanced by the case of Lord Somers in 1701, who was impeached for causing the Great Seal to be affixed to the Partition Treaties concluded by William III. without authority and without communicating with his colleagues. (b) Even visits of state to the crowned heads of foreign countries are somewhat jealously regarded by Parliament, and on such occasions it is said that the political wishes or intentions of the sovereign should be fully disclosed to his ministers. (c)

(w) See Parl. Debates, ix. 239. See also p. 187, post.

(x) See Parl. Debates, xvi. 9; May, Const. Hist., I. 11, 12, 84.

(y) See Todd, Parl. Govt., ii. 202, 203, 205; May, Parl. Pract., Ed. 1863, 314.

(z) See the references in notes (a), (b), (c), post.

(a) See the instance as to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy by the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland in the reign of George ÏV., cited by Anson, 3rd Ed., ii. 44.

(b) Somers' (Lord) case (1701), 14 St. Tri. 250. On two occasions Lord Hardwicke refused to affix the Great Seal to treaties at the instance of George II. (see Harris, Life of Hardwicke, ii. 59, 369).

(c) See the discussions in Parliament as to the visit of King Edward VII.

It also appears to be proper (and was usual with Queen Victoria) to disclose to the prime minister the private correspondence of the sovereign with crowned heads or foreign ministers when it touches upon political matters. (d) As, with a view to preserving the independence of ministers in forming their decisions, the sovereign is no longer present at their deliberations, so his ministers are constitutionally entitled at all times to tender him free and unfettered advice ; any attempt on the part of the sovereign to limit the nature of that advice, or to exact pledges, either as the condition of summons to office, or by threat of dismissal, is clearly recognized as unconstitutional. This principle became fully recognized in 1807, when George III. endeavoured to exact a pledge from the Grenville Ministry not to make further proposals in favour of Catholics, and actually dismissed the Ministry for recording in the council minutes their right at any time to submit their views upon the Catholic question. Though no direct vote was taken, the principle being clearly admitted, resolutions were formulated in both Houses to the effect that it is contrary to the first duties of the confidential servants of the Crown to restrain themselves, by any pledge express or implied, from offering to the King any advice which circumstances may render necessary for the welfare of the kingdom. (e)

Ministerial Responsibility. The ministers of the Crown may be made responsible for the conduct of the executive, or for administrative or legislative acts in three ways: (1) Firstly, they are individually and personally liable for tortious or criminal acts, and in such cases are in general amenable to the ordinary legal processes in the manner and subject to the exceptions previously mentioned. (ƒ)

(2) Secondly, they are immediately responsible to Parliament, and ultimately to the electorate, for the general conduct

to the Tsar of Russia, Parl. Debates, 4th Series, ccxxxix. 963–966, 1119, 1262, 1290, 1570, 1571. On such occasions the King is not necessarily accompanied by the Foreign Secretary or any member of the Cabinet (Ibid.).

(d) See Anson, 3rd Ed. ii. 43.

(e) Parl. Debates, ix. 285, 328-9, 335, 362, 380; May, Const. Hist., i. 96, 97.

(f) See p. 38, ante.

of the executive and the advice given to the Crown, as also for the policy of the legislative measures initiated under Government auspices, and this responsibility may be enforced in the case of Parliament, either by impeachment, or by direct vote of censure, or want of confidence, or defeat of a Government measure in the House of Commons, either of which latter are generally understood to necessarily entail the resignation of the Ministry and consequent loss of office, (g) unless on an appeal to the electorate at a general election consequent upon a dissolution, they are again returned to power with a majority sufficient to enable them to carry the measure in question. It is in this sense that they are said to be ultimately responsible to the electorate.

Of these methods of enforcing Parliamentary responsibility that by impeachment, being in its essence more in the nature of a criminal prosecution than a remedy in case of mistaken or distasteful policy, (h) has tended to become obsolete at the present day, loss of office consequent upon defeat of a Government measure, or vote of want of confidence, or of censure, being the usual mode of enforcing obedience to the wishes of the House of Commons. (i)

(3) Thirdly, though the responsibility of ministers has in the main shifted from the Crown to Parliament since the Reform Act of 1832, the Ministry still is in theory constitutionally responsible to the Crown for the conduct of the Government, and in exceptional or grave cases this responsibility might, it is apprehended, be enforced by the exercise of the prerogatives of veto, dissolution, or dismissal. (k)

Though in the earlier periods of cabinet history ministers did not necessarily retire from office together, and instances have occurred where ministers have remained in office through successive administrations, () it is now generally recognized that upon vital questions the Ministry are collectively responsible to Parliament, the Crown, and the electorate, this

(g) As to resignation generally, see p. 187, post.
(h) See the Laws of England, vii. p. 47, note (a).
(i) See as to resignation, post, p. 187.

(k) As to veto, see p. 56, ante; as to dissolution, p. 87, ante; as to dismissal, p. 191, post. And generally as to the exercise of these prerogatives, p. 189, post.

(1) E.g. Lord Thurlow, L.C.; Lord Palmerston, 1809-1828, 1830-1834.

implying as a necessary corollary that on such questions their advice must be, or appear to be, unanimous, and that they must stand or fall together. (m) Cases, however, not of vital importance may quite conceivably arise where the Ministry might not hold themselves, or be held responsible for the Act of an individual minister. (n)

It is now a generally recognized constitutional doctrine that there is no executive or legislative act of the Crown for which some minister or the Ministry as a whole is not immediately responsible, or for which some person or group of persons not at the time in office may be held constructively responsible, the latter part of the proposition meaning to imply that in the event of the sovereign's acting in opposition to the advice of his ministers on some vital question (such as the exercise of the prerogatives of veto or dissolution) which would entail the resignation or dismissal of the existing Ministry, there must be some group of persons who would be willing to endorse the sovereign's action by accepting office, at least until the sense of the electorate could be taken upon a dissolution. (o) The evolution of this doctrine to its present comprehensive form has been gradual, and is to be discerned in the Grand Remonstrance of 1641. After the revolution of 1688 it is to be found frequently asserted in Parliament, (p) but whilst the Crown continued to take an active and independent part in politics, as in the case of William III. and the Partition Treaties in 1698 and 1699, or in the case of the attempts made by George III. to revive the Royal influence, which led to the lament by Fox in 1778 that the king was 'his own unadvised minister," (q) and to the forced retirement of Pitt in 1761,

(m) See Parl. Debates, 3rd Series, cxxvi. 883.

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(n) See the instance as to the Solicitor-General for Ireland (Todd, Parl. Govt., ii. 332).

(0) The doctrine of the responsibility of the incoming Ministry for the events which led to the resignation or dismissal of their predecessors was clearly recognized in the debates in Parliament in 1807 on the occasion of the dismissal of the Grenville Ministry by George III., for refusing to pledge themselves upon the Roman Catholic relief question (see Parl. Debates, ix. 335, 381). It was also freely admitted by Sir Robert Peel in 1834 (see Parl. Debates, 3rd Series, xxvi. 216, 223).

(p) E.g. in 1711 (see Parl. Hist., vi. 972; 1083); 1739, by the Duke of Argyle (Parl. Hist., x. 1138); 1741, by Sir John Barnard (Parl. Hist., xi. 1268); 1807, by Lord Selkirk (Parl. Debates, ix. 335, 381).

(7) See Todd, Parl. Govt., i. 175.