The powers of the President are carefully defined. He is the commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces, has power to grant reprieves and pardons (except in cases. of impeachment), and has power with the advice and consent. of the Senate to make treaties and appoint the judges, naval and military, and certain other public officers. He is further empowered to convene and, in certain cases, adjourn Congress, and generally see that the laws are faithfully maintained and executed.

The President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the State ministers, who are the heads of the seven State Departments created by Act of Congress, and are known as the Cabinet. He is empowered to require their opinion in writing on matters relating to their various departments, but no responsibility to Congress attaches to the ministers themselves; they are solely responsible to the President, who has the power of dismissal, and who alone is responsible to Congress for their Acts.

These points may be noted with regard to the American Constitution :

(1) The fundamental characteristic aimed at by the
framers of the Constitution was the separation
of the legislative, executive, and judicial depart-
ments. (1) But whilst this is true of the
judicature, it is only partially true of the
executive and the legislative. It was hoped that
the President would be outside of and above the
sphere of party politics, but he is in fact the creature
of the dominant party, and must necessarily be
willing to carry out their policy. America has, in
fact, in the words of Mr. Bryce, "reproduced the
English system of executive government by a party
majority, reproduced it in a more extreme form,
because in England the titular head of the State,
in whose name administrative acts are done, stands
in isolated dignity outside party politics." (m)
(2) Objection has been taken to the method of electing
the President. Since the electors chosen by any

(1) See Bryce, American Commonwealth, i. 257.
(m) Bryce, i. 257.

state are all pledged to vote for the same candidate, the election is practically one of states. It is therefore possible for a President to be elected who might not command a majority in a popular vote over the whole Union. A further objection is the turmoil into which the country is thrown by a Presidential election every four years.

(3) Through the multitude of appointments which are in the hands of the President, he has little time to attend to other matters, and tends to become a wire-puller engaged in questions of patronage rather than a great executive officer. (n)

The Swiss Confederation.

The Constitution of Switzerland is somewhat similar to that of the United States. Side by side with a federal government, whose legislative powers are strictly defined, there exist the local legislatures of the various cantons with undefined legislative powers.

The Federal Government consists of (1) a Federal Executive Council composed of seven members, elected by both Houses of the Federal Legislative Assembly sitting together in congress, for three years; (2) a Federal Legislative Assembly, consisting of two Houses, viz. the Council of States, composed of two members from each of the twenty-two cantons chosen by the people for varying terms (except in six cantons where they are chosen by the legislature of the canton), and the National Council, composed of members elected for three years by the people in each canton in proportion to their populations, viz. one representative for each 20,000 inhabitants.

The members of the Federal Executive Council must not be members of either House of the Federal Legislative Assembly; and though they may speak or introduce measures in either House, they may not vote. The President and Vice-President are nominated annually by the two Houses of the Federal Assembly, the President always retaining the control of foreign affairs, the other executive offices being distributed

(n) See Bryce, i. 83.

annually amongst the members of the Federal Council. The Federal Council has, in addition to its executive duties, certain judicial functions in deciding questions of administrative and constitutional law. Though elected by the Federal Assembly, the members of the Federal Council are not dismissible by that body. In effect, the position of the Federal Council may be compared to that of a board of directors in a joint-stock company, which, though nominally under the control of the shareholders, in practice is never interfered with, except in cases of gross mismanagement. The federal legislative power is vested in the two Houses of the Federal Assembly, of which the National Council is the predominant member, though nominally both Houses are on an equal footing as to originating legislative measures. An appeal on certain questions of administrative law lies from the Federal Council to the Assembly.

The legislative power of the Federal Assembly is limited to certain defined subjects, and under these powers codes of civil and criminal law have been made. The federal judiciary is composed of nineteen members chosen by the two Houses of the Federal Assembly for six years, and is empowered to determine the validity of laws made by the various cantons, but not by the federal legislature itself. It has no power to try cases of administrative law, for these are reserved for the Federal Council with an ultimate appeal to the Federal Assembly. No alteration of the Constitution can be effected without resorting to the referendum; that is to say, the vote of the citizens as a whole must be taken, and the measure cannot be passed unless both a majority of the citizens and a majority of the cantons are in its favour. Any law passed by the federal legislature may also be submitted to the test of the referendum, and a certain number of citizens may initiate a law, though opposed by the legislature, and submit it to the popular vote.

Differences between the American and Swiss Constitutions. It will be seen that the main points of difference between the American and Swiss Constitutions are:

(1) The executive is vested in a President in the United States and a Federal Council in Switzerland.

(2) In the United States the President is chosen by the Electoral College, composed of elected representatives from each state, whilst in Switzerland the members of the Federal Council are elected by the Federal Assembly.

(3) The Upper House or Council of State in Switzerland has not the same weight in the Constitution as the Senate in the United States, since the consent of the latter is necessary before the President can make treaties or appoint public officers.

(4) Party government, and consequent wire pulling, exists in an exaggerated form in the United States, whilst in Switzerland it is almost entirely absent. This result, it would seem, follows from the manner in which the executives are appointed in the two countries, as well as from the fact that in the one case the executive is vested in a President, who appoints the various public officers, and in the other case in a council.

Imperial Federation.

Requirements for Successful Federation. The topic of imperial federation occupies so prominent a place in English politics of the present day, that a short consideration of the various schemes which have been proposed to bring about a closer union of the colonies with the mother country may not be out of place in the present volume.

In approaching such a topic it is necessary in the first place to consider the requirements necessary to bring about a successful union of the kind in contemplation. The first requisite is obviously that stated by Mr. Dicey, viz. a group of states ready and desirous of forming a union; and this desire and readiness on the part of the various states can only be based upon the recognition of mutual advantage, and the firm conviction that a union is desirable and advantageous for all parties concerned, not necessarily for all purposes and under all circumstances, but, at all events, for a certain class of purposes, however narrow the limits of that class.

The English Standpoint.-In contemplating the idea of at closer union between England and her colonies it is necessary, then, first to discover to what class of subjects it is that the combined control and management implied in any scheme of federation may be applied for the mutual benefit of the whole Empire and of each separate state.

On the part of England, the reason for seeking federation is not far to discover. A country limited in area, and in the extent of its natural resources, must necessarily, at some period of its history, arrive at a stage of development when the limit of expansion and progress within must appear to be within measurable distance of being reached. It may even be that such a country feels the strain of holding her relative position with other countries whom she has hitherto outstripped in power and wealth through more rapid development and keener enterprise, but who are now drawing level with her, and may eventually surpass her, not through any special merit, but through the more tardy but none the less inevitable development of natural resources greater in extent than her own.

To some minds England may seem to be in such a position to-day. With a population far in excess of that which can be supported by her native natural resources, and dependent in great measure upon the successful sale in foreign markets of commodities manufactured from the raw products imported from abroad, she finds herself hedged round with hostile tariffs and possibly losing her ground in the great markets of the world, whilst the growing power and wealth of other nations threaten to overshadow her position in the foremost rank. The need for the encouragement of mutual commerce with the colonies, and for combination in fighting the hostile tariffs of other countries, is one of the objects which draws England towards federation, whilst equally important and equally necessary at the present conjuncture is the need for combination for purposes of mutual defence and protection, to enable the Empire to maintain its position in foreign politics.

The Colonial Standpoint.-With the colonies, on the other hand, the need for closer union has possibly not presented itself as yet in any very forcible colours, owing to the fact that their natural resources have not been fully exploited,