and therefore the need for seeking fresh grounds for expansion and the consequent necessity of taking a part in foreign politics has not been felt to any appreciable extent. At the some time the colonies have felt, and will increasingly feel, the harmful results of hostile tariffs upon the prices realized for their raw produce, which at present constitutes the main bulk of their export trade. Further, with the increase of wealth and prosperity, and the rapid progress of internal development, the colonies are, no doubt, beginning to feel the necessity of taking their place in foreign politics, and to realize the importance in that connection of taking their share in maintaining adequate naval and military forces for defensive purposes. Here, then, are two subjects upon which the interests of the colonies and the mother country would obviously be furthered by working in union; for it is manifest that much saving and economy both to England and the colonies must result from the joint maintenance and control of one imperial military and naval force for the whole Empire, whilst the actual and moral weight of the whole Empire working in unison in the sphere of foreign politics, and incidentally in combating the hostile tariffs of foreign nations, must, of course, vastly exceed that of any individual state, and therefore in the long run effect more for each individual state than such state could effect for itself by relying on its own resources. Topics for Federation. There seems to be some consensus of opinion as to the class of subjects which could properly be entrusted to the joint control of some federal form of government. A list of such subjects would include the following: (1) Foreign affairs. (2) Naval and military forces and defence. (3) Intercolonial, home, and foreign trade and commerce. (4) Imperial finance. (5) Postal and telegraph services. (6) Immigration and emigration. (7) Aliens and naturalization. (8) Census. (9) Currency, coinage, and weights and measures. (10) Merchant shipping and navigation. (13) Marriage and divorce. (14) Patents and copyrights. (15) Extradition. (16) Courts of Appeal. Proposed Federal Constitutions.-It being conceded that subjects of such a nature are suitable to be entrusted to the control and regulation of some federal form of government, it remains to consider shortly the various forms of federal constitution which have been proposed at various times. (0) The first and most obvious method is the creation of an Imperial Parliament and an Imperial Executive composed of representatives of all the various colonies in proportion to their populations and of the mother country. Such a federal or imperial Government would be analogous to the dominion Government in Canada, or the federal Government of the United States. It would be superior to the Parliament at Westminster, which would take the position of a state legislature, administrative and legislative functions with regard to some or all of the subjects in the above list being assigned to the Imperial Parliament to the exclusion of the colonial and home legislatures, whilst on other subjects it might have a concurrent right of legislation or administration with the home and colonial government. In any case, laws made by the federal Parliament would be superior to and override laws. made by any single colony or by the home legislature. A discussion of the arguments for and against such a scheme will not be attempted here, but the general consensus of opinion would seem to be that the time is not yet ripe for any such sweeping alteration of the Constitution, and that federation, if it is to come at all, must proceed by gradual (0) The various forms of federal constitution will be found well treated of in a series of five essays written for the prize competition held under the auspices of the London Chamber of Commerce in 1887 ("England and her Colonies." Swan, Sonnenschein, Lowrey & Co.). stages of development, without any such sudden and drastic changes as the creation of a federal Parliament would entail at the present moment. An alternative scheme for the creation of a federal Parliament is the inclusion of colonial representatives in both Houses of the present Imperial Parliament at Westminster, that body at the same time being relieved of its duties with regard to matters of purely local interest, such as licensing, education, private bill legislation and the like, which are to be handed over to local bodies or a new home Government. Such a scheme would appear less feasible than the former ; for if a federal Parliament is to be created at all, it would obviously be better to create a new body with new and certain functions than to attempt to sa wich new representatives and new functions in with the old body and the old functions. Such a scheme, in whatever light it be viewed, must appear of a patch-work nature, and bound to result in a medley of conflicting powers, interests, and duties. Another scheme is that a colonial council of advice should be formed to assist the English Cabinet with regard to matters in which the colonies are interested. Such a council might be formed as a committee of the present Privy Council, colonials of distinction being made members of that body. The weak points of such a scheme would appear to be that a council having no legislative or executive functions would possess little real weight or authority, whilst it would be almost impossible for the colonial representatives to truly gauge the precise shade of opinion prevailing in their own colonies at any particular moment, so that their advice would necessarily be wanting in weight and authority. Other schemes have been proposed, such as the creation of a single federal chamber possessing both legislative and executive powers, or executive but no legislative powers; but all such schemes would seem to be open to the objection that they go beyond the degree of federation which the present state of public opinion both at home and in the colonies would be prepared to admit. General Conclusions as to Federation. The conclusions, then, which may be drawn with regard to federation of the Empire at the present day with any degree of certainty would seem to be as follows : (1) Federation to be successful must be built upon a solid recognition by all parties of the mutual advantages to be gained by closer union for certain definite purposes. (2) No drastic changes in the Constitution such as would be necessitated by the creation of a Federal Parliament would at present be admitted by the state of public feeling at home and in the colonies. (3) It is becoming recognized that in return for a voice in the foreign policy of the Empire the colonies should contribute to the cost of Imperial defence. (4) It is becoming recognized that combination and union. in matters of trade, commerce, and tariffs will materially advance the commercial prosperity of the whole Empire collectively and individually, and assist in combating the hostile tariffs of foreign countries. (5) A voice in foreign politics for the colonies, contribution by the colonies to Imperial defence, and possibly mutual understandings and concessions with regard to trade, commerce, and tariffs, must form the basis of any present scheme of federation. (6) That a succession of conferences between high political representatives of the colonies and of England is the best means of inaugurating federation at the present time. (7) That the germ of federation is to be found at the present day in the recent conferences with colonial premiers, the recently reconstituted Imperial defence committee of the Cabinet, and the agents-general for the colonies. (8) That it might be possible for the colonies to appoint accredited agents, similar to the present agentsgeneral, to act as their representatives in matters of foreign policy, Imperial defence, and trade. (9) That it is contrary to the principles of English liberty that there should be any taxation of the colonies for Imperial or other purposes without adequate representation on the part of the colonies. CHAPTER III. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (continued). (2) The Right to Personal Freedom. THE right to personal freedom means that no man may be punished, imprisoned, or coerced, except for a breach of the law proved in a legal manner before an ordinary tribunal, and this right flows directly from the provisions of Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights. (a) The latter enactment, by declaring the Court of High Commission, which James II. had endeavoured to re-establish under the name of the Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, to be illegal, put an end for ever to the attempts of the Crown to set up courts where men might be tried in an uncertain and arbitrary manner, and which had proved such a fertile source of tyranny in the case of the Star Chamber. It is true that at the present day a soldier may be tried and punished by court martial for certain offences, but the jurisdiction of the military courts is strictly limited by statute, and is controlled by the civil courts by means of the writs of prohibition and certiorari. Moreover, the officers who sit upon a court martial, if they exceed their jurisdiction, are liable to indictment at the suit of the party injured for assault, false imprisonment, manslaughter, or murder, and may be sued civilly for damages. (b) Safeguards for Personal Freedom.-The chief safeguard, however, for the liberty of the subject lies in the legal remedies which have been provided in case of its infringement. Of these the remedies by criminal information, indictment, or (a) See ante, p. 6. (b) A discussion as to how far martial law is admitted by the law of England will be found post, p. 29. |