had been prevented by a pardon. It was in the power of the appellant alone to relinquish the prosecution, either by releasing his right of appeal or by accepting a compromise. Another remarkable feature of appeal was the mode of trial, which in cases of treason or capital felony was either by jury or by battle, at the election of the defendant. Where the latter form of trial was adopted, the following was the order of proceeding :-The appellant formally charged the appellee with the offence: the latter denied his guilt, threw down his glove, and declared himself ready to prove his innocence by a personal combat. The challenge was accepted by the appellant, unless he had some matter to allege, in what was termed a counterplea, showing that the defendant was not entitled to the privilege of battle, and both parties were then put to their oaths, in which the guilt of he accused was solemnly asserted on one side and denied on the other. A day was then appointed by the court for the combat, the defendant was taken into custody, and the accuser was required to give security to appear at the time and place prefixed. On the day of battle, the parties met in the presence of the judges, armed with certain prescribed weapons, and each took a preliminary oath to the effect that he had resorted to no unfair means for securing the assistance of the devil in the approaching contest. If the defendant was vanquished, sentence was passed upon him, and he was forthwith hanged. But if he was victorious, or was able to persist in the combat till starlight, or if the appellant voluntarily yielded, and cried craven, then the defendant was acquitted of the charge, and the appellant was not only compelled to pay damages to the accused, but was further subjected to heavy civil penalties and disabilities. Some of the details of this singular mode of trial, as reported by contemporary writers, are sufficiently ludicrous. Thus we are told that the combatants were allowed to be attended within the lists by counsel, and a surgeon with his ointments. In the reign of Charles I., Lord Rea, on a similar occasion, was in dulged with a seat and wine for refreshment, and was further permitted to avail himself of such valuable auxiliaries as nails, hammers, files, scissors, bodkin, needle and thread. (Rushworth's Collections, cited in Barrington's Observations, p. 328.) We also learn from the Close Rolls recently published, that parties under confinement preparatory to the trial were allowed to go out of custody for the purpose of practising or taking lessons in fencing. (Mr. Hardy's Introduction, p. 185.) The whimsical combat between Horner and Peter, in the second part of Henry VI., has made the proceedings on an appeal familiar to the readers of Shakspere; and the scene of a judicial duel upon a criminal accusation has been still more recently presented to us in the beautiful fictions of Sir Walter Scott. It appears probable that the trial by battle was introduced into England from Normandy. The Grand Coustumier of that country, and the Assizes of Jerusalem, furnish evidence of its early existence. The courts in which it was admitted were the King's Bench, the Court of Chivalry, and (in the earlier periods of our history) the High Court of Parliament. In some cases the appellant was able to deprive the accused of his choice of trial, and to submit the inquiry to a jury. Thus, if the appellant was a female; or under age; or above the age of sixty; or in holy orders; or was a peer of the realm; or was expressly privileged from the trial by battle by some charter of the king; or laboured under some material personal defect, as loss of sight or limb; in all such cases he or she was allowed to state in a counterplea the ground of exemption, and to refer the charge to the ordinary tribunal. The party accused was also disqualified from insisting on his wager of battle, where he had been detected in the very act of committing the offence, or under circumstances which precluded all question of his guilt. Indeed (if early authorities are to be trusted) it is far from clear that a criminal, apprehended in flagranti delicto, did not undergo the penalties of the law forthwith, without the formality of any Besides the appeal by innocent or injured parties, a similar proceeding was in certain cases instituted at the suit of an accomplice. The circumstances under which this might be done are mentioned under the article APPROVER. trial. (Palgrave's English Commonwealth, | Law, book ii. chaps. 23 and 45; Ashford vol. i. p. 210.) The law on this latter v. Thornton, Barnwall and Alderson's point formed the subject of discussion in Reports, vol. i.; Kendal's Argument for the Court of King's Bench in the year Construing largely, &c.; Bigby v. Ken1818, in the cast of Ashford v. Thornton. nedy, Sir William Blackstone's Reports, Upon that occasion the defendant had vol. ii. p. 714; and the ingenious specubeen acquitted upon a prior indictment lations and remarks of Sir F. Palgrave for the murder of a female, whom he was on the origin of trial by battle, in his supposed to have previously violated. work on the Commonwealth of England.) The acquittal of the accused upon evidence which to many appeared sufficient to establish his guilt occasioned great dissatisfaction, and the brother and next heir of the deceased was accordingly advised to bring the matter again under the consideration of a jury by the disused process of an appeal. The defendant waged his battle in the manner above described, and the appellant replied circumstances of such strong and pregnant suspicion as (it was contended) precluded the defendant from asserting his innocence by battle. It was, however, decided by the court that an appeal, being in its origin and nature a hostile challenge, gave to the appellee a right to insist upon fighting, and that the appellant could not deprive him of that right by a mere allegation of suspicious circumstances. The case was settled by the voluntary abandonment of the prosecution. In the following year an act (59 Geo. III. c. 46) was passed to abolish all criminal appeals and trial by battle in all cases, both civil and criminal. The cases in which, by the ancient law, appeals were permitted, were treason, capital felony, mayhem, and larceny. Indeed, the earliest records of our law contain proofs that appeals were a common mode of proceeding in many ordinary breaches of the peace, which at this day are the subject of an action of trespass. The wife could prosecute an appeal for the murder of her husband; the heir male general for the murder of his ancestor; and in any case the prosecutor might lawfully compromise the suit by accepting a pecuniary satisfaction from the accused. Hence it was that the proceeding was in fact frequently resorted to for the purpose of obtaining such compensation rather than for the ostensible object of ensuring the execution of justice on the offender. (Hawkins's Crown APPEAL. The removal of a Civil cause from an inferior court or judge to a superior one, for the purpose of examining the validity of the judgment given by such inferior court or judge, is called an Appeal. An appeal from the decision of a court of common law is usually prosecuted by suing out a writ of error, by means of which the judgment of the court below undergoes discussion, and is either affirmed or reversed in the court of error. The term appeal, used in the above sense, is by the law of England applied in strictness chiefly to certain proceedings in Parliament, in the Privy Council and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in the Courts of Equity, in the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical courts, and in the Court of Quarter Sessions. Thus an appeal lies to the House of Lords from the decrees or orders of the Court of Chancery in this country and in Ireland, and from the decisions of the supreme civil courts in Scotland. An appeal lies to the king in council from the decrees and decisions of the colonial courts, and indeed from all judicatures within the dominions of the crown, except Great Britain and Ireland. To the same jurisdiction are referred (in the last resort) all ecclesiastical and admiralty causes, and all matters of lunacy and idiotcy. In 1844 an act was passed correcting an anomaly in the former state of the law under which appeals could not be brought before the Privy Council for the reversal, &c. of judgments, of any courts in certain colonies, save only of the | Courts of Error or Courts of Appeal within the same. The act provides for the admission of appeals from other courts of justice within such colonies. A decree or order of the Master of the Rolls or the Vice-Chancellors may be revised by the Lord Chancellor upon a petition of appeal. The number of causes or petitions heard on appeal before the Lord Chancellor from Trinity Term, 1842, to Hilary Term, 1844, both inclusive, was 133, in all of which, with the exception of 15, judgment had been given at the end of Hilary Term, 1844. An appeal lies directly from the ViceAdmiralty courts of the colonies, and from other inferior admiralty courts, as well as from the High Court of Admiralty, to the king in council. This latter appellate jurisdiction was regulated by statutes 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 92, and 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 41, by which the Court of Delegates, Commission of Review, and Commission of Appeal in Prize Causes, have been abolished. To the judicial committee of Privy Council (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 41) are referred all appeals from the courts of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, the Colonial and Indian courts, all appeals to the Queen in Council, matters relating to the rights of patentees, &c., &c. [PRIVY COUNCIL.] The number of causes or petitions heard on appeal before her Majesty's Privy Council, from January 1, 1842, to February 20, 1844, was 92, and judgment had been delivered in all exsept three. In the ecclesiastical courts, a series of appeals is provided from the Archdeacon's Court to that of the bishop, and from the bishop to the archbishop. From the archbishop the appeal of right lay to the king in council before the Reformation; yet appeals to the Pope, or appeals to Rome, as they were called, were in fact of common occurrence until the reign of Henry VIII., by whom an appeal was directed to be made to certain delegates named by himself, and appeals to Rome were abolished (24 Hen. VIII. c. 12). After that period a Court of Delegates, appointed for each cause, was the ordinary appellate tribunal, until the abolition of their jurisdiction by the act alluded to above, by which it is further provided that no Commission of Review shall hereafter issue, but that the decision of the king in council shall be final and conclusive. Such are the principal heads of appeal, to which we may add the appellate jurisdiction of the justices of the peace assembled at the Quarter Sessions, to whom various statutes have given authority to hear upon appeal the complaints of persons alleging themselves to be aggrieved by the orders or acts of individual magistrates. Under recent acts of parliament the right of appeal is given in a number of cases relating to ecclesiastical discipline. There is an appeal given to the clergy from the bishop to the archbishop in certain cases, which must be presented in one month after the bishop's decision. (1 & 2 Vict. c. 106.) By § 83 of the same act, it is provided that in case of difference between an incumbent and curate as to stipend, the case may be brought before the bishop and summarily determined, and the incumbent's living may be sequestered if he refuses payment according to the bishop's decision. § 111 points out the mode of making appeals under this act. Appeals on matters of ecclesiastical discipline are still further provided for by §§ 13, 15, and 16 of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86. In the session of 1844 (May 30) a bill was brought into the House of Commons by Mr. Kelly, to provide an Appeal in Criminal cases, and thus to give the same privileges which property enjoys, but which are denied in matters affecting life and liberty. At present, in criminal cases, the judge may, if he think proper, reserve a point for consideration. If the case be considered by the judges, the reasons for affirming the sentence, or for recommending a pardon, are not publicly delivered. In every criminal case recourse may at present be had to the Secretary of State; but as a matter of course he would refer to the judge, and unless the judge is favourable, there is very little chance that the Secretary of State would M grant relief. In the bill brought in by | 55 Geo. III c. 104, is 10s. The number Mr. Kelly it is intended to assimilate of licensed appraisers in London is about criminal as much as possible to civil pro- nine hundred, and in other parts of Engcedure as to appeal. It is left open to land and Wales there are about seventeen the party convicted to move in any of the hundred. superior courts for a rule to show cause why there should not be a new trial; upon which motion the court is to be at liberty to deal with the matter as in a civil case, and, on good cause shown, a new trial will take place. Application may be made by a convicted party upon points of law in arrest of judgment. The bill also allows a bill of exceptions, and an ultimate appeal to the House of Lords. To prevent the abuse of the privilege, it is proposed to invest the judge with a discretionary power, either to pass and execute the sentence, or to postpone the passing and execution of it. The measure was opposed by the government, and since the above was written it has been withdrawn. APPRAISEMENT (from the French aprécier, appriser, or appraiser, and remotely from the Latin pretium, to set a price upon an article). When goods have been taken under a distress for rent, it is necessary, in order to enable the landlord to sell them according to the provisions of the statute 2 William and Mary, sess. i. c. 5, that they should be previously appraised or valued by two appraisers. These appraisers are sworn by the sheriff, under-sheriff, or constable, to appraise the goods truly according to the best of their understanding. After such an appraisement has been made, the landlord may proceed to sell the goods for the best price that can be procured. By the statute 48 Geo. III. c. 140, an ad valorem stamp duty was imposed upon appraisements. APPRAISERS (French, apréciateurs) are persons employed to value property. By the statute 46 Geo. III. c. 43, it was first required that any person exercising the calling of an appraiser should annually take out a licence to act as such, stating his name and place of abode, and signed by two commissioners of stamps. By the same statute a stamp duty of 6s. was imposed upon such licences; and unlicensed persons were forbidden to act as appraisers under a penalty of 50l. The duty imposed by the General Stamp Act, APPRENTICE (from the French apprenti, which is from the verb apprendre, to learn) signifies a person who is bound by indenture to serve a master for a certain term, and receives, in return for his services, instruction in his master's profession, art, or occupation. In addition to this, the master is often bound to provide food and clothing for the apprentice, and sometimes to pay him small wages, but the master often receives a premium. In England the word was once used to denote those students of the common law in the societies of the inns of court who -not having completed their professional education by ten years' study in those societies, at which time they were qualified to leave their inns and to execute the full office of an advocate, upon being called by writ to take upon them the degree of serjeant-at-law-were yet of sufficient standing to be allowed to practise in all courts of law except the court of Common Pleas. This denomination of apprentice (in law Latin apprenticii ad legem nobiliores, apprenticii ad barras, or simply apprenticii ad legem) appears to have continued until the close of the sixteenth century, after which this term fell into disuse, and we find the same class of advocates designated, from their pleading without the bar, as outer barristers, now shortened into the well-known term barristers. (Spelman, Gloss. ad verbum ; Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. i. 23; vol. iii. 27.) The system of apprenticeship in modern Europe is said to have grown up in conjunction with the system of associating and incorporating handicraft trades in the twelfth century. The corporations, it is said, were formed for the purpose of resisting the oppression of the feudal lords, and it is obvious that the union of artisans in various bodies must have enabled them to act with more power and effect. The restraint of free competition, the maintenance of peculiar privileges, and the limitation of the numbers of such as should participate in them, were the main results to which these institutions tended; and for these purposes a more effective instrument than apprenticeship could hardly be found. To exercise a trade, it was necessary to be free of the company or fraternity of that trade; and as the principal if not the only mode of acquiring this freedom in early times was by serving an apprenticeship to a member of the body, it became easy to limit the numbers admitted to this privilege, either indirectly by the length of apprenticeship required, or more immediately by limiting the number of apprentices to be taken by each master. So strict in some instances were these regulations, that no master was allowed to take as an apprentice any but his own son. In agriculture, apprenticeship, though in some comparatively later instances encouraged by positive laws, has never prevailed to any great extent. The tendency to association indeed is not strong among the agricultural population, combination being, to the scattered inhabitants of the country, inconvenient and often impracticable; whereas the inhabitants of towns are by their very position invited to it. Subsequently to the twelfth century, apprenticeship has prevailed in almost every part of Europe-in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and probably in other countries. It is asserted by Adam Smith, that seven years seem once to have been all over Europe the usual term established for the duration of apprenticeships in most trades. There seems, however, to have been no settled rule on this subject, for there is abundant evidence to show that the custom in this respect varied not only in different countries, but in different incorporated trades in the same town. In Italy, the Latin term for the contract of apprenticeship was acconventatio. | From an old form of an Italian instrument, given by Beier in his learned work De Collegiis Opificum, it appears that the contract, which in most respects closely resembled English indentures of apprenticeship, was signed by the father or other friend of the boy who was to be bound, and not by the boy himself, who testified his consent to the agreement merely by being present. In France, the trading associations prevailed to a great extent under the names of "Corps de Marchands" and "Communautés." Many of them had been established by the crown solely for the purpose of raising revenue by the grant of exclusive privileges and monopolies. At the latter end of the seventeenth century there were in Paris six “Corps de Marchands," and one hundred and twenty-nine Communautés," or companies of tradesmen, each fraternity having its own rules and laws. Among these bodies the duration of apprenticeship varied from three to eight or ten years. It was an invariable rule in the "Corps de Marchands," which was generally followed in the "Communautés," that no master should have more than one apprentice at a time. There was also a regulation that no one should exercise his trade as a master until, in addition to his apprenticeship, he had served a certain number of years as a journeyman. During the latter term he was called the "compagnon" of his master, and the term itself was called his "compagnonage." He had also, before being admitted to practise his trade as master, to deliver to the "jurande," or wardens of the company, a specimen of his proficiency in his art, called his "chef d'œuvre." He was then said "aspirer à la maîtrise." The sons of merchants living in their father's house till seventeen years of age, and following his trade, were reputed to have served their apprenticeship, and became entitled to the privileges incidental to it without being actually bound. These companies or associations were abolished at the Revolution, when a perfect freedom of industry was recognised by law, and this, with a few exceptions, has continued to the present day. But though the contract of apprenticeship, so far as a fixed period goes, has ceased in France to be imperative upon the artisan, it has not fallen into disuse; a law of 22 Germinal, An XI. (12th April, 1803), prescribes the rights and duties both of master and apprentice. It does not, however, lay down any particular form, and leaves the time and other conditions of the contract to be determined by the parties. In Germany, though we find the same |