to be "no Greek or Latin word which expresses the idea we now annex to the word apprentice, a servant bound to work at a particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term of years, upon condition that the master shall teach him that trade." It has been observed on this, that such a word could not have been required, when nearly all who worked for a master were slaves. But if many or most of the workmen were slaves, the masters were not, and the members of the companies could not be slaves. Adam Smith asserts that long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary; and he affirms that "the arts which are much superior to common trades, such as those of making clocks and watches, contain no such mystery as to require a long course of instruction." But in this and other passages, he rather underrates the time that is necessary for attaining sufficient expertness in many arts, though he truly observes that agriculture, in which our law never required apprenticeship, and in which apprenticeship is little in use, and "many inferior branches of country labour, requires much more skill and experience than the greater part of mechanic trades." Wherever the law allows the contract of apprenticeship to be unrestrained, its terms will be regulated by custom, which though it may be sometimes unreasonable or absurd, must finally adapt itself to true principles in a country where industry is free and wealth is consequently accumulating. Those who have an art, mystery, craft, or trade to teach, and can teach it well, and give a youth every opportunity of learning it sufficiently, will always be sought after by parents and guardians of children in preference to other masters, and the terms of the contract will be less favourable in a pecuniary point of view to the parent or guardian than in cases where the master cannot offer those advantages. The good master may require a sum of money with the apprentice, and may require his services for a longer period than is necessary for him to master the mystery, craft, or trade. In other cases a master may often be glad to get an apprentice, that is, in other words, a servant, for as long a time as he can, and without requiring any money with him. The contract of ap | prenticeship in various trades will, as already observed, be regulated by custom, but it cannot remain unaffected by the general principles of the demand and supply of labour. In most professions of the more liberal kind there is in England no contract of apprenticeship; the pupil or learner pays a fee, and has the opportunity of learning his teacher's art or profession if he pleases. Thus a man who intends to be called to the bar pays a fee to a special pleader, a conveyancer, or an equity draftsman, and has the liberty of attending at the chambers of his teacher and learning what he can by seeing the routine of business and assisting in it. But he may neglect his studies, if he pleases, and this will neither concern his master, who can very well dispense with the assistance of an ignorant pupil, and gets the money without giving anything for it, nor the public. For though the barrister is admitted by the inns of court without any examination, and may be utterly ignorant of his profession, no mischief ensues to the public, because the rules of the profession do not permit him to undertake business without the intervention of an attorney or solicitor, and no one would employ him without such intervention. But the attorney or solicitor is required by act of parliament to serve a five years' appren ticeship, the reasons for which are much diminished since the institution of an examination by the Incorporated Law Society in Chancery Lane, London, before he can be admitted to practise. Indeed a part of the time which is now spent in an attorney's office would be much better spent at a good school, and would perhaps cost the parent or guardian as little. There is frequently a fee paid with an apprentice to an attorney or solicitor, and there is a stamp duty of 120l. on his indentures; so that it is probable that the raising of revenue was one object in legislating on this matter. Persons who practise as physicians serve no apprenticeship, but they are subjected to examinations; all persons who practise as apothecaries must serve a five years' apprenticeship. The reasons for this apprenticeship also are much diminished by the institution of examinations, at which persons are rejected master will be content with such a period; he may require either more money with the apprentice and less of his service, or less of his money and more of his service. This is a matter that no legislator can usefully interfere with. But when boys leave home at an early age, and are sent to learn an art, it is necessary that they should be subjected to control, and for a considerable period. They must learn to be attentive to their business, methodical, a well-behaved; and if their master sets them a good example, the moral discipline of a boy's apprenticeship is useful. If the master does not set a good example, the effect will be that he will not be so likely to have apprentices; for an apprenticeship partakes of the nature of a school education, an education in an art or mystery, and a preparation for the world; and a master who can best prepare youths in this threefold way is most likely to have the offer of apprentices. who have not the necessary knowledge, | tract is left free by the law, it will depend though they have served the regular on many circumstances, whether the period of apprenticeship. If the examination of the attorney and apothecary is sufficiently strict, that is a better guarantee for their professional competence than the mere fact of having served an apprenticeship. Yet the apprenticeship is some guarantee for the character of the apothecary and solicitor, which the examination alone cannot be, for a youth who has much misconducted himself during his apprenticeship cannot receive the testimonial of his master for good conduct, and he is liable to have his indentures cancelled. The attorney and apothecary belong to two classes whose services are constantly required by the public, who have little or no means of judging of their professional ability. A man can tell if his shoemaker or tailor uses him well, but his health may be ruined by his apothecary, or his affairs damaged by his attorney, without his knowing where the fault lies. There is no objection, therefore, to requiring apprenticeship or any other condition from an attorney or apothecary which shall be a guarantee for his professional competence, but nothing more should be required than is necessary, and it is generally agreed that an apprenticeship of five years is not necessary. If, however, the law were altered in this respect, it is very possible that the practice of five years' apprenticeship might still continue; and there would be no good reason for the law interfering if the parties were willing to make such a contract. In all those arts, crafts, trades, and mysteries which a boy is sent to learn at an early age, a relation analogous to that of master and servant, and parent and child, is necessary both for the security of the master and the benefit of the boy. Adam Smith speaks of apprenticeship as if the only question was the length of time necessary to learn the art or mystery in. If parents can keep their children at home or at school till they approach man's estate, the control created by the contract of apprenticeship is less necessary, and the term for serving a master need not be longer than is requisite for the learning of the art. Still, if the con APPRISING. [ADJUDICATION.] APPROPRIATION. [ADVOWSON.] APPROVER. By the old English law, when a person who had been arrested, imprisoned, and indicted for treason or felony, confessed the crime charged in the indictment, and was admitted by the court to reveal on oath the accomplices of his guilt, he was called an approver. The judge or court might in their discretion give judgment and award execution upon the party confessing, or admit him to be an approver. In the latter case a coroner was directed to receive and record the particulars of the approver's disclosure, which was called as appeal, and process was thereupon issued to apprehend and try the appellees, that is, the persons whom the approver had named as the partners of his crime. As the approver, in revealing his accomplices, rendered himself liable to the punishment due to the crime which he had confessed, and was only respited at the discretion of the court, it was considered that an accusation, made under such circumstances, was entitled to pecu liar credit, and the accomplices were therefore put upon their trial without the intervention of a grand jury. Here, however, as in other appeals [APPEAL], the parties accused by the approver were allowed to choose the mode of trial, and the approver might be compelled to fight each of his accomplices in succession. But, unlike an appeal by an innocent person, the prosecution at the suit of an approver might be defeated and discharged by a pardon granted by the king either to the approver or to the appellee. If the approver failed to make good his appeal, judgment of death was given against him. If he succeeded in convicting the appellee, he was entitled to a small daily allowance from the time of being admitted approver, and to a pardon from the king. The appeal by approvers had become obsolete before the abolition of it by parliament; and the present practice is to prefer a bill of indictment against all parties implicated in the charge, except the approver, and to permit the criminal who confesses his guilt to give evidence against his companions before the grand jury. If upon the trial the demeanour and testimony of the accomplice are satisfactory to the court, he is recommended to the mercy of the crown. (See 2 Hawk., Crown Law, ch. 24.) ARBITRATION is the adjudication upon a matter in controversy between private individuals appointed by the parties. This mode of settling differences is very frequently resorted to as a means of avoiding the delay and expense of an action at law or a suit in equity. It has the advantage of providing an efficient tribunal for the decision of many causes -such, for instance, as involve the examination of long and complicated accounts,-which the ordinary courts are, from their mode of proceeding and the want of proper machinery, incompetent to investigate. The person appointed to adjudicate is called an arbitrator, or referee. The matter on which he is appointed to adjudicate is said to be referred or submitted to arbitration. His judgment or decision is called an arbitrament, or, more usually, an award Most matters actually in controversy between private persons may be referred to arbitration; but an agreement to refer any differences which may hereafter arise is not binding, for the parties cannot be compelled to name an arbitrator. But an agreement may be made to refer any dispute that may arise to arbitration, with a condition of certain penalties, to be paid by the party who shall refuse to agree in the appointment of an arbitrator. No injury can be the subject of an arbitration, unless it is such as may be a matter of civil controversy between the parties: a felony, for instance, which is a wrong, not to the party injured merely, but to society in general, cannot be referred. There are no particular qualifications required for an arbitrator. În matters of complicated accounts, mercantile men are usually preferred. In other cases, it is usual to appoint barristers, who, being accustomed to judicial investigations, are able to estimate the evidence properly, to confine the examination strictly to the points in question, and, in making the award, to avoid those informalities for which it might afterwards be set aside. Both time and expense are thus saved by fixing on a professional arbitrator. Any number of persons may be named as arbitrators: if the number is even, it is usually provided that, if they are divided in opinion, a third person shall be appointed, called an umpire, to whose sole decision the matter is then referred. A dispute may be referred to arbitration, either-1. When there is an action or suit already pending between the parties relating thereto, or-2. When there is no such action or suit. 1. In the former case, the parties to the action or suit, if sui juris, are in general competent to submit to arbitration. The reference may be made at any stage of the proceedings: if before trial, it is effected by a rule of the court of law or an order of the court of equity in which the action or suit is brought; if at the trial, by an order of the judge or an order of Nisi Prius, either of which may afterwards be made a rule of court. The usual mode of proceeding in a case referred to arbitration where an action is pending, is for the parties to consent that a verdict shall be given for the plaintiff for the damages laid in the declaration, subject to the award of the arbitrator. The person named as arbitrator is not bound to accept the office, nor, having accepted, can he be compelled to proceed with it. In either case, if the arbitrator refuses or ceases to act, the reference is at an end, unless the contingency has been provided for in the submission, or unless both parties consent to appoint some other person as arbitrator in his stead. The order of reference usually provides that the award shall be made within a certain period; and if the arbitrator lets the day slip without making his award, his authority ceases, but a clause has usually been inserted to enable the arbitrator to enlarge the time; and now, independently of any such clause, the court, or any judge thereof, is, by the late statute for the amendment of the law (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42), empowered to do so. The authority of an arbitrator ceases as soon as he has made or declared his award. After this (even though it be before the expiration of the time appointed) he has no longer the power even of correcting a mistake. When the arbitrator has accepted his office, he fixes the times and place for the parties to appear before him. Each of them furnishes him with a statement of his case, which is usually done by giving him a copy of the briefs on each side; and on the day appointed he proceeds to hear them (either in person, or by their counsel or attorneys), and to receive the evidence on each side, nearly in the same manner as a judge at an ordinary trial: but he is frequently invested by the order of reference, with a power of examining the parties themselves. No means existed of compelling the attendance of witnesses, or the production of documents, before an arbitrator, until the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, authorized the court or a judge to make an order to that effect; disobedience to which order, if served with proper notice of the time and place of attendance, becomes a contempt of court. The witnesses, thus compelled to attend, are entitled to their expenses in the same manner as at a trial. And where the order requires the witnesses to be examined upon oath, the arbitrator is by the same statute authorized to administer an oath or affirmation, as the case may require; and any person who gives false evidence may be indicted for perjury. The extent of an arbitrator's authority depends on the terms of the reference : it may either be confined to the action pending between the parties, or it may include any other specified grounds of dispute, or all disputes and controversies whatever existing between them at the time of the reference. Where the matters referred to him are specified, it is his duty to decide upon them all; where they are not specified, it is his duty to decide upon as many as are laid before him. In no case is an arbitrator authorized to adjudicate upon anything not comprehended in the reference; such, for instance, as any claims or disputes which may have arisen after the reference was made, or, where the reference is specific, anything not expressly included in it. An arbitrator being a judge appointed by the parties themselves for the settlement of their differences, his decision on the merits of the case submitted to him is conclusive. But if his award be partially or illegally made, the superior courts have the power of setting it aside, upon application being made within reasonable time. This happens either, 1. where the award is not co-extensive with the arbitrator's authority; or, 2. where it appears on the face of it to proceed on mistaken views of law, or to fail in some of the qualities required for its validity; or, 3. where any misconduct has been committed. This may happen in two cases: 1st, where the arbitrators have been guilty of corruption or other misbehaviour, as, if they have proceeded to arbitrate without giving notice of the meeting, have improperly refused to receive evidence, or committed any other gross irregularity in practice: 2ndly, where it is proved that the arbitrator has been misled by fraud used by either of the parties. Where an award is absolutely void. as where it is made after the authority of the arbitrator has ceased, it is not in general necessary to set it aside, for it is incapable of being enforced. When the award has been made and delivered, if one of the parties refuses to comply with it, the other may bring_an action against him on the award. But the most prompt and efficient remedy is to apply to the court for an attachment, grounded on the contempt of court which he has been guilty of by disobeying the order of reference. In opposing this application, the other party may insist on any objection apparent on the award itself; but if there were any other objections affecting its validity, and he has neglected to apply to the court to set it aside within the time fixed by them for that purpose, it is too late for him to avail himself of them. When, in the original action, a verdict has been given for the plaintiff subject to a reference, if the defendant does not abide by and perform the award, the plaintiff may, by leave of the court, enter a judgment and sue out execution for the whole damages mentioned in the verdict. 2. Where no action has been commenced, the parties may refer their differences to arbitration by mutual agreement. Every person capable of making a disposition of his property may be party to such an agreement: no peculiar form is necessary for its validity. Whether the submission be verbal or in writing, it is in the power of either of the parties to revoke it, and thus put an end to the authority of the arbitrator at any time before the award is made. In order to prevent this, it is usual for the parties to make it a part of their agreement, that they will abide by and perform the award; and if after this either of them should, without sufficient reason, revoke his submission, or otherwise prevent the arbitrator from proceeding with the arbitration, he will be liable to an action for the breach of his agreement. The time for making the award may be enlarged, if there be a clause to that effect in the agreement of submission, or if all the parties consent to it, but not otherwise. There are no means of compelling the attendance of witnesses, nor has the arbitrator the power of adminis | tering an oath; but the witnesses and -if they have agreed to be examinedthe parties are sworn either before a judge, or, in the country, before a commissioner. They may, however, be examined without having being sworn, if no objection is made to it at the time. The courts cannot enforce performance of the award by attachment; the only remedy is an action on the award itself, or rather, on the agreement of submission. The defendant may insist on any objection apparent on the award itself, but where there is any other ground for setting it aside, his only remedy is by a bill in equity. Thus where the reference is by agreement, many inconveniences occur, particularly from the deficiency of the remedies: but the statute 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 15, enables parties to put such references on the same footing as those which are made where a cause is depending. The statute enacts that all merchants and others, who desire to end any controversy, suit, or quarrel (for which there is no other remedy but by personal action or suit in equity), may agree that their submission of the suit to arbitration or umpirage shall be made a rule of any of the king's courts of record, and may insert such agreement in their submission, or promise, or condition of the arbitration bond; which agreement being proved on oath by one of the witnesses thereto, the court shall make a rule that such submission and award shall be conclusive; and after such rule made, the parties disobeying the award shall be liable to be punished as for a contempt of the court; unless such award shall be set aside for corruption or other misbehaviour in the arbitrators or umpire, proved on oath to the court, within one term after the award is made. The provisions of the new statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, apply as well to arbitrations made in pursuance of such agreements of submission, as to those made by order of court; and the law is the same in both cases, except in some few points of practice. Previously to the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, the authority of the arbitrator was revocable by either party at any time before the award was made; but by that |