freeman shall be exiled, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."

There are, however, instances in our history of an irregular exercise of the power of banishing an obnoxious subject by the mere authority of the crown; and in the case of parliamentary impeachment for a misdemeanor, perpetual exile has been made part of the sentence of the House of Lords, with the assent of the king. (Sir Giles Mompesson's case, in the reign of James I., reported by Rushworth and Selden, and cited in Comyns, Digest, tit. "Parliament," 1. 44.) Aliens and Jews (formerly regarded as aliens) have, in many instances, been banished by royal proclamation.

Banishment is said to have been first introduced as a punishment in the ordinary courts by a statute in the thirtyninth year of the reign of Elizabeth, by which it was enacted that "such rogues as were dangerous to the inferior people should be banished the realm;" but an instance occurs in an early statute of uncertain date (usually printed immediately after one of the eighteenth year of Edward II.), by which butchers who sell unsound meat are compelled to abjure the village or town in which the offence was committed. At a much later period the punishment now called transportation was sanctioned by the legislature, and has in other cases been made the condition on which the crown has consented to pardon a capital offence.

Some towns of England used to inflict the punishment of banishment from the territory within their jurisdiction, for life and for definite periods. The extracts from the Annals of Sandwich, one of the Cinque Ports, which are printed in Boys' History of Sandwich,' contain many instances of this punishment in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Banishment in some form has been prevalent in the criminal law of most nations, ancient as well as modern. Among the Greeks two kinds were in use:-1. Perpetual exile (puyń), attended with confiscation of property, but this banishinent was probably never inflicted by a judicial sentence; at least among the later Athenians a sentence of perpetual

banishment appears only to have been pronounced when a criminal, who was accused of wilful murder, for instance, withdrew from the country before sentence was passed against him for the crime with which he was charged. The term phuge (puyń) was peculiarly applied to the case of a man who fled his country on a charge of wilful murder, and the property of such a person was made public. Those who had committed involuntary homicide were also obliged to leave the territory of Attica, but the name phuge was not given to this withdrawal, and the property of the exile was not confiscated. Such a person might return to Attica when he had obtained the permission of some near kinsman of the deceased. (Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates, cc. 9, 16.) 2. Ostracism, as it was called at Athens, and in some other democratical states of Greece, or Petalism, the term in use at Syracuse, was a temporary expulsion, unaccompanied by loss of property, and inflicted upon persons whose influence, arising either from great wealth or eminent merit, made them the objects of popular suspicion or jealousy. Aristides was ostracized from Athens for ten years, not because he had done any illegal act, but because people were jealous of his influence and good fame.

The general name for Banishment among the Romans in the Imperial period was Exsilium; and it was a penalty inflicted under the Empire on conviction in a Judicium Publicum, if it was also a Judicium Capitale. A Judicium Publicum was a trial in which the accused came within the penalties of certain laws (leges), and it was Capitale when the penalties were either death or exsilium. This Exsilium was defined by the Jurists under the Empire to be " aqua et ignis interdictio," a sentence which deprived a man of two of the chief necessaries of life. (Paulus, Dig. 48, tit. 1. s. 2.) The sentence was called Capital because it affected the Caput or Status of the condemned, and he lost all civic rights. There was also Exsilium which was not accompanied by civil disabilities, and accordingly was not Capitalis: this was called Relegatio. The person who was relegated was either

ordered to reside in some particular spot, or he was excluded from residing in particular places; the period of relegation might be definite or indefinite. If the relegatio was perpetual, the sentence might include the loss of part of his property; but the person who was relegated retained all the privileges of a Roman citizen. The poet Ovid was relegated to Tomi on the Danube: he was not exsul. Deportation, Deportatio in insulam, was a sentence by which a criminal was carried into some small island, sometimes in chains, and always for an indefinite period. A person who was relegated went to his place of exile. The person who was deported lost his citizenship and his property, but he continued to be a free man. It was a consequence of the loss of citizenship that the relation of the patria potestas was thereby dissolved, and accordingly a father who lost his citizenship by Deportation lost his power over his children; and the effect was the same if a son was under the penalty, for the son ceased to be a Roman citizen, and consequently ceased to be in his father's power. But marriage was not dissolved either by the Interdictio or Deportatio. (Cod. 5, tit. 16, s. 24; tit. 17, s. 1.) Interdictio and Deportatio are mentioned as two separate things in the Constitutions just referred to; but in the Institutes (i. tit. 12) Deportatio only is mentioned, and it corresponds to Interdictio in the passage in Gaius. (i. 128). Some further remarks will presently be made on this part of the subject.

Under the early Republic Exsilium was not a punishment: it was, as the name imports, merely a change of soil. A Roman citizen could go to another state, and the citizen of such state could remove to Rome, by virtue of isopolitical rights existing between the two states. This right was called Jus Exsulandi, the Right of Exsilium as applied to the party who availed himself of it, and the Law of Exsilium when it is considered a part of the political system. The condition of the exsul in the state to which he had removed might be various; but it seems probable that he would acquire citizenship in his new state, though he might not enjoy it in all its fulness (optimo jure). By the act of removing to another state

as an exsul, he divested himself of his original citizenship. A man who was awaiting his trial might withdraw before trial to another state into Exsilium-a practice which probably grew out of the Jus Exsulandi. Thus Exsilium, though a voluntary act, came to be considered as a punishment, for it was a mode of avoiding punishment; but still Banishment, as such, was not a part of the old Roman law. A practice was established under the later republic of effecting a sentence of banishment indirectly by means of the "interdictio aquæ et ignis," or with the addition of the word "tecti." (Cicero, Pro Domo, c. 30.) This sentence was either pronounced in a trial, or it was inflicted by a special lex. In the lex by which this penalty was inflicted on Cicero there was a clause which applied to any person who should give him shelter. This putting of a man under a ban, by excluding him from the main necessaries of life, had for its object to make him go beyond the limits within which he was subjected to the penalty; for the interdictio was limited to a certain distance from Rome. In Cicero's case the interdictio applied to all places within four hundred miles of Rome (Ad Attic. iii. 4). The interdictio did not prevent him from staying at Rome, but it was assumed that no man would stay in a place where he was excluded from the first necessaries of life. It has been a matter of dispute what was the legal effect of the Interdictio in the time of Cicero in the period of the Antonines, as appears from Gaius, the sentence of Interdictio when pronounced for any crime, pursuant to a penal law (ob aliquid maleficium ex lege pœnali) was followed by loss of citizenship. The penal laws were various, such as the Julia Majestatis, Julia de Adulteriis, and others. In the Oration Pro Domo, the writer labours to prove that Cicero had not lost the civitas by the Interdictio, but the tenor of the argument rather implies that the loss of civitas was a legal effect of the interdictio, and that there were particular reasons why it was not so in the case of Cicero. The whole subject however is handled in such a one-sided manner that no safe conclusion can be derived from this oration. It appears from Cicero's own

:

letters that he considered it necessary for his safety to withdraw from Rome before the bill (rogatio) was passed by which he was put under the Interdict. He was restored by a lex passed at the Comitia Centuriata. (Ad Attic. iv. 1.) It appears from another letter (Ad Attic. iii. 23), that he had lost his civitas by the lex which inflicted the penalty of the Interdictio, but the loss of civitas may have been effected by a special clause in the Lex.

The rules as to Exile under the legislation of Justinian are contained in the Digest, 48, tit. 22. The use of the word Deporto as applied to criminals who suffered the punishment of Deportatio, occurs in Tacitus (Annal. iv. 13; xiv. 45). It may be inferred however, from an expression in Terence (Phormio, v. 8, 85), that the punishment of Deportatio existed under the Republic. When Ulpian observes (Dig. 48, tit. 13, s. 3) that "the penalty of Peculation (peculatus) comprised the Interdictio, in place of which Deportatio has now succeeded," he probably means not that the Deportatio was exactly equivalent to the Interdictio, and that the name merely was changed, but that the Interdictio was disused in the case of Peculatus and a somewhat severer punishment took its place. Under the earlier Emperors, the punishment of Deportatio and Interdictio both subsisted, as we see by the instances already referred to, and in the case of C. Silanus, Proconsul of Asia, who was convicted of Repetundæ and relegated to Cythera. (Tacitus, Annal. iii. 68, &c.) Some of the later Jurists seem in fact to use Exsilium as a general term for banishment, of which the two species are Relegatio and Deportatio. Relegatio again is divided into two species, the Relegatio to a particular island, and the Relegatio which excluded a person from places which were specially named, but assigned no particular island as the abode of the Relegatus. The term Interdictio went out of use as the name of a special punishment, and Deportatio took its place, perhaps with some of the additional penalties attached to the notion of Deporto. In fact the verb Interdicc is used by the later jurists to express th the forms of

Relegatio, that under which a man was excluded from particular places (omnium locorum interdictio), and that by which he was excluded from all places except one (omnium locorum præter certum locum), which was in effect to confine him to the place that was named. (Marcianus, Dig. 48, tit. 22, s. 5, as corrected by Noodt, Opera Omnia, i. 58.) Sometimes the word Exsilium is used in the Digest (48, tit. 19, s. 38) to express the severer punishment of banishment, as opposed to the lighter punishment Relegatio. Practically then there were two kinds of banishment under the later empire, expressed by the names Relegatio and Deportatio, each of which had a distinct meaning, while the term Exsilium was used rather loosely.

The condemnation of criminals to work in the mines was a punishment in the nature of banishment, but still more severe. Thus, if a man seduced a maid who was of years too tender for cohabitation, he was sent to the mines, if he was a man of low condition; but only relegated, if he was of better condition. The same difference in punishment between people of low condition (humiliores) and those of better condition (honestiores) was observed in other cases; and it may be remarked that the like distinction in inflicting punishments is not unknown in this country in summary convictions.

Deportation is the third of the six "peines afflictives et infamantes" of the French Code Pénal. The punishment of deportation consists in the offender being transported out of the continental territory of France, there to remain for life; and if he returns, hard labour for life is added to his sentence. The sentence of deportation carries with it loss of all civil rights; though the government is empowered to mitigate this part of the penalty either wholly or in part. (Law of September, 1835, § 18, Code Pénal.) Banishment (bannissement) is classed as one of the two "peines infamantes," the other being civil degradation. The offender is transported by order of the government out of the territory of the kingdom for at least five and not more than ten years.

BANK, in barbarous Latin bancus,

literally signifies a bench or high seat; | but as a legal term it denotes a seat of judgment, or tribunal for the administration of justice. In a rude state of society, justice is usually administered in the open air, and the judges are placed in an elevated situation both for convenience and dignity. Thus it appears that the ancient Britons were accustomed to construct mounds or benches of turf for the accommodation of their superior judges. (Spelman, ad verbum.) It is clear, however, that in very early times in this country there was a distinction between those superior judicial officers who, for the sake of eminence, sat upon a bench or tribunal, and the judges of inferior courts, such as hundred courts and courts baron, the latter being analogous to the judices pedanei of the Roman law-a kind of inferior judges, whose duties are not very clearly defined, but who are supposed to have derived their denomination a pedibus, because they decided on inferior matters, on the level ground, and not on a raised seat.

In consequence of this distinction, the king's judges, or those who were immediately appointed by the crown to administer justice in the superior courts of common law, were in process of time called justices of the bench, or, as they are always styled in records, justiciarii de banco. This term, in former times, denoted the judges of a peculiar court held at Westminster, which is mentioned in records of the reign of Richard I., and must therefore have made its appearance, under the name of bancus or bench, not long after the Conquest. This court no doubt derived its name from its stationary character, being permanently held at Westminster, whereas the curia or aula regis followed the person of the king. (Maddox, History of the Exchequer, p. 539.) This institution was the origin of the modern Court of Common Pleas, and the judges of that court retain the technical title of "Justices of the Bench at Westminster" to the present day; whereas the formal title of the King's Bench judges is "the justices assigned to hold pleas in the court of the king before the king himself." For many centuries, however, the latter court has been popularly

called the Court of King's Bench, and the judges of both these courts have been described in acts of parliament and records in general terms as "the judges of either bench" (judices utriusque banci); but the barons of the Court of Exchequer have never been denominated judges of the bench, though, in popular language, a new baron, on his creation, is, like the other judges, said to be raised to the bench.

The phrase of sitting in banco, or in bank, merely denotes the sessions during the law terms, when the judges of each court sit together upon their several benches. In this sense it is used by Glanville, who wrote in the reign of Henry II., and who enumerates certain acts to be done by justices in banco sedentibus. Days in bank are days particularly appointed by the courts, or imposed upon them by various statutes, when process must be returned, or when parties served with writs are to make their appearance in full court. The day in bank is so called in opposition to the day at Nisi Prius, when a trial by a jury takes place according to the provisions of the statute of Nisi Prius. [ASSIZE.]

BANK-BANKER-BANKING. By the term "bank" is understood the establishment for carrying on the business to be described; the "banker" is the person by whom the business is conducted; and the expression "banking" is commonly used to denote the system upon which that business is managed, and the principles upon which it should be governed or regulated.

We propose to consider the subject of banks and banking under the following heads:

I. A brief historical sketch of the origin and progress of banking. II. An explanation of the objects and general principles of banking, including a description of the various kinds of banks. III. The history and constitution of the Bank of England.

IV. The art of banking as carried on by private establishments and joint stock associations in London and other parts of England, and in Ireland.