Worcester, Hereford, Lichfield and Coventry, Lincoln, and Norwich.

The dioceses of the two English archbishops, or the districts in which they have ordinary episcopal functions to perform, were remodelled by 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 77. The diocese of Canterbury comprises the greater part of the county of Kent, except the city and deanery of Rochester and some parishes transferred by the above act, a number of parishes distinct from each other, and called Peculiars, in the county of Sussex, with small districts in other dioceses, particularly London, which, belonging in some form to the archbishop, acknowledge no inferior episcopal authority. The diocese of the archbishop of York consists of the county of York, except that portion of it included in the new diocese of Ripon, the whole county of Nottingham, with some detached districts. Exact knowledge of the diocesan division of the country is of general importance as a guide to the depositaries of wills of parties deceased. But all wills which dispose of property in the public funds must be proved in the Prerogative Court of the archbishop of Canterbury; and in cases of intestacy, letters of administration must be obtained in the same court; for the Bank of England acknowledges no other probates or letters of administration.

Lives of all the archbishops and bishops of England and Wales are to be found in an old book entitled De Præsulibus Angliæ Commentarius. It is a work of great research and distinguished merit. The author was Francis Godwin, or Goodwin, bishop of Llandaff, and it was first published in 1616. A new edition of it, or rather the matter of which it consists, trauslated and recast, with a continuation to the present time, would form a useful addition to our literature. There is also an octavo volume, published in 1720, by John le Neve, containing live of all the Protestant archbishops, but written in a dry and uninteresting manner. Of particular lives there are many, by Strype and others; many of the persons who have held this high dignity having been distinguished by eminent personal qualities, as well as by the exalted station they have occupied.

St. Andrew's is to Scotland what Canterbury is to England; and while the episcopal form and order of the church existed in that country, it was the seat of the archbishop, though till 1470, when the pope granted him the title of archbishop, he was known only as the Episcopus Maximus Scotia. In 1491 the bishop of Glasgow obtained the title of archbishop, and had three bishops placed as suffragans under him. Until about 1466 the archbishop of York claimed metropolitan jurisdiction over the bishops in Scotland.

In Ireland there are two archbishoprics, Armagh and Dublin. The archbishoprics of Tuam and Cashel were reduced to bishoprics by the act 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 37. Catalogues of the archbishops of Ireland and Scotland may be found in that useful book for ready reference the Political Register, by Robert Beatson, Esq., of which there are two editions.

To enumerate all the prelates throughout Christendom to whom the rank and office of archbishop belong would extend this article to an unreasonable length. The principle exists in all Catholic countries, that there shall be certain bishops who have a superiority over the rest, forming the persons next in dignity to the great pastor pastorum of the church, the pope. The extent of the provinces belonging to each varies, for these ecclesiastical distributions of kingdoms were not made with foresight, and on a regular plan, but followed the accidents which attended the early fortunes of the Christian doctrine. In Germany, some of the archbishops attained no small portion of political independence and power. Three of them, viz. those of Treves, Cologne, and Mainz, were electors of the empire. In France, under the old regime, there were eighteen archbishoprics, all of which, except Cambray, are said to have been founded in the second, third, and fourth centuries; the foundation of the archbishopric of Cambray was referred to the sixth century. The number of bishops in France was one hundred and four. The French have a very large and splendid work, entitled Gallia Christiana, containing an ample history of each province, and of the several subordinate sees comprehended in it, and also of the

and the law" (Acts vi. 13); and he was punished by stoning, the peculiar mode of putting to death prescribed, as we have seen, by the Jewish law for blasphemy. Our Lord himself was put to death as one convicted of this crime: "Again the high-priest asked and said unto him, Art thou the Christ, the son of the blessed? And Jesus said, I am; and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven. Then the high-priest rent his clothes and said, What need we any further witnesses? Ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of death" (Mark xiv. 61-64). It was manifest that there was here nothing of violence or passion, nothing of any evil intention essential to constitute such a crime, nothing, indeed, but the declaration of that divine mission on which he had come into the world, and of which his miracles were intended to be the proof.

There are some instances of the use of the term in the New Testament, in which it is not easy to say whether the word is used in its ordinary sense of hurtful, injurious, and insulting speech, or in the restricted, and what may be called the forensic sense. Thus when it is said of Christ or his apostles that they were blasphemed, it is doubtful whether the writers intended to speak of the act as one of more than ordinary reviling, or to charge the parties with being guilty of the offence of speaking insultingly and reproachfully to persons invested with a character of more than ordinary sacredness: and even in the passage about the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, it appears most probable from the context that blasphemy is there used in the sense of ordinary reviling, though the object against which it was directed gave to such reviling the character of unusual atrocity.

Among the canonists, the definition of blasphemy is made to include the denying of God, or the asserting of anything to be God which is not God,-anything, indeed, in the words of the Summa Angelica," voce "Blasfemia," which implies "quandam derogationem excellentis bonitatis alicujus et præcipue divinæ;" and this extended application of the term has

been received in most Christian countries, and punishments have been affixed to the offence.

In our own country, by the common law, open blasphemy was punishable by fine and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment. The kind of blasphemy which was thus cognizable is described by Blackstone to be "denying the being or providence of God, contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ, profane scoffing at the Holy Scripture, or exposing it to contempt and ridicule" (Commentaries, b. iv. c. iv.). All these heads, except the first, seem to spring immediately from the original sense of the word blasphemy, as they are that hurtful and insulting speech which the word denotes. And we suspect that whenever the common law was called into operation to punish persons guilty of the first of these forms of blasphemy, it was only when the denial was accompanied with opprobrious words or gestures, which seem to be essential to complete the true crime of blasphemy. Errors in opinion, even on points which are of the very essence of religion, were referred in England in early times to the ecclesiastics, as falling under the denomination of heretical opinions, to be dealt with by them as other heresies were. There is nothing in the statute-book under the word blasphemy till we come to the reign of King William III. In that reign an act was passed, the title of which is "An Act for the more effectual suppressing of blasphemy and profaneness." "We believe that the statute-book of no other nation can show such an extension and comprehension as is given in this statute to the word blasphemy, unless, indeed, a statute of the Scottish parliament, which was passed not long before, viz. the Act of 1695, c. 11. The only other Scottish act is of Charles the Second's reign. The primitive and real meaning of blasphemy, and we may add of profaneness also, was entirely lost sight of, and the act was directed to the restraint of all free investigation of positions respecting things esteemed sacred. The more proper title would have been, "An Act to prevent the investigation of the grounds of belief in Divine revelation, and the nature of the

taings revealed;" for that such is its object is apparent throughout the whole of it: "Whereas many persons have of late years openly avowed and published many blasphemous and infamous opinions contrary to the doctrines and principles of the Christian religion, greatly tending to the dishonour of Almighty God, and may prove destructive to the peace and welfare of this kingdom; wherefore for the more effectual suppressing of the said detestable crimes, be it enacted, that if any person or persons having been educated in, or at any time having made profession of, the Christian religion within this realm, shall, by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, deny any one of the persons of the Holy Trinity to be God, or shall assert or maintain that there are more gods than one, or shall deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of divine authority," &c. These are the whole of the offences comprised in this act. The penalties are severe : disqualifications; incapacity to act as executor or guardian, or to receive legacies; three years' imprisonment. (Stat. 9 Will. III. c. 35.) If, however, within four months after the first conviction, the offender will renounce his error in open court, he is for that time discharged from all disabilities. The writings alluded to in the preamble were not, in any proper sense of the term, blasphemous. They were, for the most part, we believe universally, the work of sober-minded and well-disposed men, who, however mistaken they might be, were yet in the pursuit of truth, and seeking it in a direction in which it is especially of importance to mankind to find it. To prevent such inquiries by laws such as these is most unwise. There can be no solid conviction where there can be no inquiry. In a state where laws like this are acted on (happily, in this country, it is become a dead letter), Christianity can never have the seat she ought to have, not only in the affections, but in the rational and sober convictions of mankind. What we mean however at present to urge is, that the title of blasphemy in this statute is a palpable misnomer. The delivery either from the pulpit or the press of the results of reflection and inquiry applied

to the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, or of any particular book included within that term, to the claim of Christianity to be a divine institution, or to the claim of the doctrine of the Trinity to be received as part of Christianity, can never be regarded as blasphemy or profaneness, however in particular instances it may sometimes be accompanied by expressions which may bring the individual using them within the scope of a charge of blasphemy. Blackstone, in his chapter on offences against God and religion, does not treat of this statute in the section headed Blasphemy, but under Apostasy. Indeed, blasphemy, as Blackstone defines it, and profaneness, are still offences at common law, and may be prosecuted as such; for the statute of William is merely cumulative, as it is termed, and the common law offence, the prosecution and the punishment, remain as they were before the statute. (R. v. Carlile, 3 B and A. 161.)

We are surprised that such a statute could have been passed so near our own time; still more that such a title should have been prefixed to it. As to its main provision it remains in force. But in 1813, the number of persons who openly avowed that they did not consider the doctrine of the Trinity as possessed of sufficient support from the words of Scripture, when truly interpreted, to deserve assent, having greatly increased, and large congregations of them being found in most of the principal towns, several clergymen also of undoubted respectability, learning, and piety having seceded from the church on the ground that this doctrine as professed in the church was without sufficient authority, a bill was introduced into parliament to relieve such persons from the operation of this statute, and it passed without opposition. This act, which is commonly called Mr. Smith's Act, after the name of the late Mr. William Smith, then member for the city of Norwich, by whom it was introduced, is stat. 53 George III. c. 160.

The legal crime of blasphemy and profaneness is made by this statute of King William something entirely different from the crime when considered with reference to religion or morals. Few persons will

charge any guilt upon a man who, in the course of philosophic investigation, is brought at last to doubt respecting any of the great points of religious belief, after an investigation pursued with diligence, and under a sense of the high importance of the subject. Such a charge would be the result of bigotry alone, and would have no corresponding conviction in the heart of the person thus accused. Yet such a person may be morally guilty of blasphemy. He is morally guilty, if he suffer himself to be led to the use of gross and opprobrious expressions, such as are shocking to the common sense and common feelings of mankind, and abhorrent to the minds of all philosophic inquirers, and all persons who, in the spirit of seriousness, are seeking to know the truth in respect of things which are of the last importance to them. Whoever acknowledges the existence of God and his providence, and yet speaks of him, or still more to him, or of and concerning them, in the language of affront, or otherwise, indeed, than with a feeling of reverence correspondent to the dignity and awfulness of the subject, cannot be held morally guiltless: and when there is no such admission, there is at least a decency to be observed in treating or speaking of them which will be observed by all who have any spirit of seriousness, or any just regard for the peace and welfare of society.

At the same time it must also be admitted that a certain freedom must be allowed in respect of the manner in which questions referring to sacred subjects are treated. All things are not really sacred which many agree to call so.

The term

sacred may be made to cover any opinion however absurd, as witchcraft and the popular superstitions have sometimes taken shelter under it. It will scarcely be denied that it is morally right to attack opinions of this class, even though the mind of a nation is not sufficiently enlightened to discern the absurdity of them, with any weapons, even those of insult and ridicule; and that though the cry of blasphemy may be raised, yet that at the bar of sound reason such a person, so far from being justly chargeable with so odious a crime, may be rendering to the

world the most essential service, by setting the absurdity of the opinion in that clear light in which it admits of being placed, and thus attracting to it the eyes of all observers. But opinions which have better pretension to be called sacred may not improperly be treated with a certain freedom that to those holding them shall be offensive. Very strong things in this way have been said against the doctrine of transubstantiation by Protestant writers, who have not been regarded by their fellow-Protestants as doing more than setting an erroneous doctrine in its true light, though the Roman Catholic will have a different opinion on the matter. So the Almighty Father, as he appears in the system of Christian faith which is called Calvinism, has by some been represented in characters which, to the sincere believer in that system, cannot but have been accounted blasphemous; while by those who hold the system to rest on a mistaken interpretation of Scripture it has been held to be no more than the real character in which that system invests him. There is in fact, when the subject is regarded as one of morals rather than of law, a relative and a positive blasphemy. That is blasphemy to one which is not so to another. And this should teach all persons a forbearance in the application of so odious a term. Strong and forcible expressions have had their use. Satire and ridicule may reach where plain argument will not go but it behoves every man who ventures on the use of these weapons to consider the intention by which he is influenced, to look upon himself as one who is a debtor in an especial manner to the truth, and who has to satisfy himself that he aims at nothing but the increase of the knowledge and the virtue and happiness of society.

BLOCKADE, LAW OF.

Whenever

a war takes place, it affects in various ways all states which have any connexion with the belligerent powers. A principal part accordingly of the science of international law is that which respects the rights of such neutral states. For obvious reasons this is also the most intricate part of the subject. There is here a general

rule, namely, that the neutral ought not to be at all interfered with, conflicting with a great variety of exceptions, derived from what is conceived to be the right of each of the belligerents to prosecute the object of annoying its enemy, even though (within certain limits) it inflicts injury upon a third party. In the first place there is to be settled the question of what these limits are. It evidently would not do to say that the belligerent shall not be justified in doing anything which may in any way inconvenience a neutral power; for such a principle would go nigh to tie up the hands of the belligerent altogether, inasmuch as almost any hostile act whatever might in this way be construed into an injury by neutral states. They might complain, for instance, that they suffered an inconvenience, when a belligerent power seized upon the ships of its enemy that were on their way to supply other countries with the ordinary articles of commerce. On the other hand, there is a manifest expediency in restricting the exercise of the rights of war, for the sake of the protection of neutrals, to as great an extent as is compatible with the effectual pursuit of the end for which war is waged. Accordingly it has been commonly laid down, that belligerents are not to do anything which shall have a greater tendency to incommode neutrals than to benefit themselves. It is evident however that this is a very vague rule, the application of which must give rise to many questions.

It is by this rule that publicists have endeavoured to determine the extent to which the right of blockade may properly be carried, and the manner in which it ought to be exercised. We can only notice the principal conclusions to which they have come, which indeed, so far as they are generally admitted, are nothing more than a set of rules fashioned on positive international morality (that is, so much of positive morality as states in general agree in recognising) by judicial decision. Accordingly perhaps the most complete exposition of the modern doctrine of blockade may be collected from the admirable judgments delivered during the course of the last war by the late Lord Stowell (Sir William Scott), while

presiding over the High Court of Admiralty, which have been ably reported by Dr. Edwards and Sir Charles Robinson. A very convenient compendium of the law, principally derived from this source, has been given by Mr. Joseph Chitty in his work entitled 'A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nations,' 8vo. Lond. 1812. The various pamphlets and published speeches of Lord Erskine, Mr. Stephen, Mr. Brougham, Lord Ashburton (Mr. Alexander Baring), Lord Sheffield, and others, which appeared in the course of the controversy respecting the Orders in Council, may also be consulted with advantage. To these may be added various articles in volumes xi. xii. xiv. and xix. of the Edinburgh Review,' particularly one in volume xix. pp. 290-317, headed "Disputes with America," written immediately before the breaking out of the last war with that country.

The first and the essential circumstance necessary to make a good blockade is, that there be actually stationed at the place a sufficient force to prevent the entry or exit of vessels. Sir William Scott has said (case of the Vrow Judith, Jan. 17, 1799), “A blockade is a sort of circumvallation round a place, by which all foreign connexion and correspondence is, as far as human power can effect it, to be entirely cut off." Such a check as this, it is evident, is absolutely necessary to prevent the greatest abuse of the right of blockade. The benefit accruing to a belligerent from blockading its enemy's ports, by which it claims the privilege of seizing any vessel that attempts to touch or has actually touched at such ports, and the inconvenience thereby inflicted upon neutrals, would both, without such a provision, be absolutely unlimited. In point of fact, belligerents have frequently affected, in their declarations of blockade, to overstep the boundaries thus set to the exercise of the right. France, as Mr. Brougham showed in his speech delivered before the House of Commons, 1st April, 1808, in support of the petitions of London, Liverpool, and other towns, against the orders in council, had repeatedly done so both since and previous to the Revolution. She did so in 1739 and in 1756, and also in 1796, in 1797, and in 1800.