cent persons should be justified, it is an impeachment of that resplendent attribute of Deity, to say that he foreordained their condemnation while in a state of perfect innocence. And in regard to their sin, agreeably to your doctrine, they acted perfectly according to the divine mind, unless you suppose his decrees were contrary to his will; and if so, they could not have done otherwise, unless you suppose they could have resisted the irresistable decress of God, which is a contradiction.

See that stern judge upon the bench, and that trembling criminal at the bar-The witnessess are pointed in their testimony against him-murder, wilful murder is proved-His counsel, or rather a professed advocate for the judge, proceeds to develope the circumstances of the case- "The criminal says he, is guilty of wilful murder, and therefore the sentence of condemnation must be pronounced against him. True, he is dependent on the honourable court for his present existence; for such unlimited authority hath his honour over the lives of men, especially such as are devoted to such flagrant acts of wickedness, that he may take them away at pleasure-But be it known to you, gentlemen of the jury, that this same honourable judge contrived 'a plan' by which this wicked murderer should be excited to sin as he has; and lest his plan or scheme' should not take effect he secretly provoked him to anger against his brother, and even guided his hand when the fatal blow was given." But pray Mr. counsel, says the foreman of the jury, do you mean

to impeach the character of our honourable judge? I have always thought differently of him-I took him for an upright man-" and so indeed he is," rejoins the wise counsel-" Permit me to explain the reasons of his conduct. You must know then, that there are some men "ministers of satan," who pretend to plead the cause of righteousness, who are continually harping upon the evil of sin, its unhappy influence upon society; and they also insinuate, that my manner of vindicating the judge has a tendency to asperse his character, especially his goodness and justice-I hope you have not heard their harangues-But as I was about to say, our honourable judge is of a quite different opinion respecting sin-He thinks the rest of our honest neighbours could not be happy were there not some murderers and thieves, &c. that he might have an opportunity of displaying his sovereignty in punishing them.To convince you and all other good people that he is right, he contrived, as I said before, that this man, who stands trembling before you, should commit this sin, that he might make a public example of him before you all. Some, indeed, have intimated that he is not just in punishing men for doing what he designed they should; but this only proceeds from ignorance; and he wishes to let them know how mistaken they are. It is true "his holy nature abhors" murder, although he has determined many shall commit it, even against his commandsFor you must also know that he has expressly forbidden it but his determination, which must stand,

because perfectly according to his good pleasure, is secretly opposed to his commands, and it must and shall be accomplished. Therefore, gentlemen, please to pronounce sentence, that our judge may have an opportunity of convincing you of the justice and impartiality of his determinations."

Do you think, sir, the judge would approbate such a speech? and yet in such a point of light you represent the Judge of all the earth, for you expressly assert that all things, and consequently wickedness of every kind, is brought about by the agency of God, and that they are according to the counsel of his will, and yet that he will adjudge to everlasting torments those who thus fulfil his will. If such sentiments do not cast an impenetrable mist around the glory of God's justice, I know not what

can.

2. But this doctrine not only eclipses the glory of God's justice in the condemnation of the wicked, it also militates, in the second place, against the wisdom of God. For according to the representation you have given of his character, he is so deficient in wisdom that he cannot govern the world without a previous plan. Here you reduce the infinitely wise God to the level of an ignorant mechanic, who cannot see the end from the beginning without a prescribed plan. I conclude his own infinite mind is sufficient to guide him in all his multifarious works and ways, without any previously devised "plan or scheme." The goodness, wisdom, and immutability of his counsel, as well as his infinite

foresight of all possible causes and events, preclude the necessity of any other limits to regulate his adorable conduct.

Your doctrine also militates against the wisdom of God by making the decrees, and commands clash-you very justly conclude that the harmony of God's works are marks or evidences of his wisdom. But in p. 7. you insinuate that his decrees and commands are in opposition to each other. He decreed that man should murder, and that the children of Israel should make their children pass through the fire to Moloch, which thing he commanded them not. Here then are two works of the Almighty, his decrees and commands directly opposed to each other. Is this harmony? Such conduct is so far from being a mark of wisdom, that it is indicative of the most consummate duplicity and folly. It is an evidence of duplicity, because it supposes him to command mankind to do that, which he never designed they should-and it is an indication of folly to publish laws, which were superceded by a prior act of the Almighty, called a decree. As God is infinitely sincere, and wise, he cannot be the author of that doctrine which necessarily imputes insincerity and folly to him; and as the jarring sentiments which you advocate fix these reproachful blots on his character, they must, on that very account, if no other reasons could be assigned, be erroneous.

Another reason why your inconsistent doctrine sullies the glory of infinite wisdom is, that it supposes it impossible for God to foresee what will be,

unless he predetermine it shall be. The doctrine espoused by us, acknowledges, not only that his infinite prescience seeth what will be, but also all that may, and might have been. And this prescience does not depend upon a predetermination of the Almighty for its existence, nor upon the transpiring events brought about by the voluntary conduct of free agents, but is an essential perfection of his nature. To say that his prescience depends upon his predetermination, is to suppose a time when the Almighty did not possess infinite knowledge. In this way you make knowledge, or wisdom respecting future events, an adventitious property of the divine mind, and therefore not essential and if not essential he may exist without it-It is easy to perceive, therefore, that your doctrine in this way also, eclipses the glory of infinite wisdom. It were easy, without any such perfection as infinite knowledge, to predict future events, if these events depended solely on a predetermination in the Almighty to bring them to pass: but God possesses this perfection in the most pre-eminent degree; for known unto him are all his works from the foundation of the world: and inasmuch as your doctrine of foreordination annihilates his prescience, it must be unscriptural and irrational.

Once more-the doctrine of immutable decrees respecting every event sullies the glory of God's wisdom, by supposing him incapable of governing mankind as free agents. If all our actions are the result of a predetermining cause in God, as you as