have before convinced of absurdities. But I need not insist any longer upon this, for if God hath a body, he must needs. have parts, both because his body cannot but have parts, extension being of the very essence of a body, and also because his body, not being the whole Deity itself, can be but part of it; so that his essence and his body must make up one God, as our soul and body makes one man" and therefore every argument, that proves God to have no parts, will as invincibly prove he hath no body. Leaving this, therefore, let us set our reason on work to determine the second thing, whether God hath parts, and be compounded or no. : And truly, at the first sight, reason can by no means grant that God hath any parts; for in reason we cannot but look upon God as a being in and of himself, most absolutely perfect, yea, as perfection and essence itself; incapable of receiving perfection from any thing, himself being the fountain, yea, perfection of all perfections; and therefore in Hebrew he hath called himself Shaddai, Gen. xvii. 1; that is, one of himself absolutely perfect and all-sufficient: whereas if he hath any parts, it is from these parts, not from himself, he receives perfection; whatsoever is compounded, receiving its perfection from the parts it is compounded of, some perfection from one part, some from another, and all from all; and therefore wheresoever any part is lacking, the whole cannot be perfect: so that to say, God hath parts, is as much as to say, he is not of himself perfect, and so not God. Again, reason cannot but look upon God as the first cause; so that whatsoever it is that is the first cause, that we are to call God, and therefore to call it God because it is the first cause: whereas if God be compounded of any thing, the parts he is compounded of being necessarily before himself that is compounded of these parts, he is not the first of beings, much less the first of causes. The parts are always in nature at least before the whole, yea, and the cause of it too: and so if God had parts of which he is compounded, in respect of those parts m Ανθρωποι μὲν γὰς ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενοι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενόμενοι συγκείμενον ἔχουσι, καὶ διαλυόμενον τὴν ἑαυτῶν λόγον· ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὢν ἐστι καὶ οὐ σύνθετος.-Athan. Oratio contra Gent. p. 40. B. edit. Ben. Par. 1698. he is compounded of, he would be an effect, and not the first cause, and so not God. Again, if he hath parts, they are either finite or infinite; infinite they cannot all be, it being impossible there should be more than one infinite: if they be finite, himself, who is compounded of them, cannot be infinite. It is impossible many finites should make one infinite being, or that any parts should make the whole of an higher nature than themselves are, or howsoever, so much higher as infinite is above finite, and therefore any being that hath parts is not infinite, and so not God. Thus we see it clear, that God, if he be God, must be without body, and without parts. Then, thirdly, that he is without passions is as manifest as the other: for passion, in its proper notion and notation, denotes suffering, which it is impossible for God, being a pure act, to do. Again, in every passion, there is a motion and change in the subject, where it is, and therefore also it is called a passion, because the subject suffers some change by it, sometimes loving, then hating, grieving, rejoicing, or the like, which all imply some change in the subject from what it was before: but now it is impossible there should be any motion or mutation in God; for inconstancy and mutability are imperfections, and therefore not to be admitted into the notion of a Deity. Again, if God should be moved or changed, he must be changed either from better to worse, from worse to better, or from equal to equal. From better to worse he cannot, for then he would be corrupted, and want some perfection after his change, which he had before, and so cease to be the chiefest good, and by consequence God, which I have showed before he cannot, being in and of himself eternal. From worse to better if he should change, before this change he was not God, because he wanted some good, or degree of goodness, which he hath after after this change he would not be God, because he had a beginning, and so not eternal. From equal to equal also he cannot change, for then too he would not be God absolutely perfect, wanting some perfection before his change, which he hath after, and some perfection after his change, which he had before. Lastly, if God should be moved or changed, or consequently be in passion any way, it must be either from something without him, or from something within him from any thing without him, it cannot be; for he is the first cause, and so the first mover, by whom all other things are moved, and therefore who cannot be moved by any thing. From within he cannot be moved, for he hath not any parts, (as I have showed) whereof one can be the thing moving, the other the thing moved, being in, of, by, and from himself, a most simple and pure act. And therefore we cannot but conclude, that as there is but one living and true God everlasting, so this one God is without body, parts, or passions.' 3. And this was also the doctrine of the ancient FATHERS: (1.) As first, that he is without body and parts. Tertullian elegantly expresseth it": Neither doth God stand in need of members, or of the offices of several parts, whose very tacit (or secret) will hath all things present and subservient to it. For why should he desire eyes, who is light itself? or why should he require feet, who is every where? or why should he go in any where, seeing there is no where that he can go out of himself? or why should he desire hands, whose very silent will effecteth all things? Neither can he want ears, who knoweth the very secret and silent motions of the heart.' And so Origen: For that (divine) substance is simple, or unmixed, neither compounded of any members, nor joints or affections: but whatsoever is performed by divine power, that men might understand it, is either expressed by the names of human members, or else is declared by common and known affections: and after n Neque sunt ei aut membra, aut membrorum officia necessaria, ad cujus solum etiam tacitum arbitrium et serviunt et adsunt omnia. Cur enim requirat oculos, qui lux est? aut cur quærat pedes, qui ubique est ? aut cur ingredi velit, cùm non sit quo extra se progredi possit? aut cur manus expetat, cujus ad omnia instituenda artifex est et silens voluntas? Nec auribus eget, qui etiam tacitas novit voluntates.-Tertul. [al. Novatian.] de Trinitat. cap. 6. p. 497. A. Paris. 1580. Simplex namque est illa substantia, et neque membris ullis, neque compaginibus, affectibusque composita: sed quicquid divinis virtutibus geritur, hoc, ut homines possent intelligere, aut humanorum membrorum appellatione profertur, aut communibus et notis annunciatur affectibus. Et hoc modo vel irasci, vel audire, vel loqui dicitur Deus, Orig. in Gen. Hom. 3. p. 9. B. Par. 1619. this manner is God said to be angry, to hear, or speak.' And Athanasius P: God is one whole being, not any part, or made up of several parts, but himself is the maker of the composition of all things. Behold how impiously they speak of God, whilst they utter such things: for if he be compounded of parts, he will appear altogether unlike unto himself, and would have his perfection from things unlike to one another.' And Augustine saith, There are some who presume to say, that God himself is a body; thinking, that whatsoever is not a body, cannot be a substance: such, I judge, ought utterly to be abhorred.' And elsewhere'; ' If our soul be not a body, how can God the Creator of our soul be a body?' (2.) And as the ancient fathers apprehended God without body and parts, so without passions too. As Hilary": But before we show what that word of anger and perturbation of wrath is, it behoves me to admonish my readers and hearers, that they do not believe that any changes and passions, and motion of affections can happen to God. For there is no new thing that can come into that eternal and perfect nature; neither can he (who is so, that as he is now, he is always, lest sometime he should not be the same,) be made to be any thing else than what he always is.' And Ρ Ο γὰρ Θεὸς ὅλον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ μέρη, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ διαφόρων συνήστηκεν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τὴς πάντων συστάσεως ἔστι ποιητής. Θέα γὰρ ὅσην ασέβειαν κατα τοῦ θείου ταῦτα λέγοντες ἐξηχοῦνται. Εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μερῶν συνέστηκε πάντως αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἀνόμοιος φανήσεται, καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἔχων τὴν συμπλήρωσιν. ·Athanas. Orat. con. Gent. tom. i. p. 27. C. Ed. Ben. Par. 1698. Sunt enim quidam, qui Deum ipsum omnino corpus esse præsumunt, putantes quicquid corpus non est, nullam prorsus esse substantiam: istos omni modo aversandos censeo.-Aug. Epist. 147. ad Paulinam, cap. 21. p. 493. Ed. Ben. Par. 1688. r Porrò si noster animus corpus non est, quomodo Deus Creator animi corpus est ?—Aug. de Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. 5. p. 195. D. Ed. Ben. Par. 1685. * Ac priusquam quis iste iræ sermo, et quæ hæc indignationis perturbatio sit, ostendamus, admoneri legentes atque audientes oportet, ne aliquas demutationes passionum perturbationesque motuum cadere in Deum credant. Nihil enim in æternam illam et perfectam naturam novum incidit, neque qui ita est, ut qualis est, talis et semper sit, ne aliquando non idem sit, potest effici aliquid aliud esse, quàm semper est,-Hil. in Ps. 2. Enar. p. 639. A. Paris. 1605. Augustine: That we so may understand God, if we can, as much as we can, good without quality, great without quantity, the Creator without indigence, present without site, containing all things without habit (or compass), wholly every where without place, eternal without time, making changeable things without any change of himself, and suffering nothing at all.' And so Athanasius in his dispute with Arius, concerning God's begetting of his Son: Arius tells him, he believed God was not mutable, nor subject to passions, and therefore how could he beget a Son? To whom Athanasius replies"; Neither do we believe, that the divine nature is subject to passions, but faithfully confess, that the Father, who is without passions, did, without passion of himself, that is of God, beget the Son, that is God.' And Athenagoras showing that the idols of the heathens were not gods, saith, But if they should say, Ut sic intelligamus Deum, si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia Creatorem, sine situ præsentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem.-Aug. de Trinit. lib. v. cap. 1. p. 833. B. Ed. Ben. Par. 1694. "Sed neque nos passionum conditionibus divinam credimus subjacere naturam, sed impassibilem Patrem impassibiliter ex seipso, id est, Deo, Deum, quod ipse est, Filium generâsse fideliter confitemur.- Athanas. Disp. contra Arium Laodic. hab. tom. ii. p. 611. A. Par. 1627. * Καὶ τοι εἰ σαρκοειδεῖς μόνον ἔλεγον αὐτοὺς καὶ αἷμα ἔχειν καὶ σπέρμα, καὶ πάθη ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· καὶ τότε ἔδει λῆρον, καὶ γέλωτος λόγους τούτους νομίζειν ουτε γὰς ὀργὴ, οὔτ ̓ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὄρεξις, ουδε παιδοποιὸν σπέρμα ἐν τῷ Θεῷ.- Athenag. Leg. pro Christianis, p. 82. Ed. Oxon. 1682. Where he also brings out of their own authors several expressions of the passions of those idol gods: as where Jupiter is brought in bewailing his son, Αἱ αἱ (λέγων) ὅτι μοι Σαρπήδονα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν And another, in the flames of lust, crying out, And then adds, Οὐ γὰρ πώποτέ μ ̓ ὧδε θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικὸς Γενητός ἐστι, φθαρτος ἐστι, οὐδὲν ἔχων θεοῦ. Ibid. And after all having shown that those gods the heathens worshipped, were subject to passions, he cries out, Πῶς ἂν οὖν εἴποι τὶς ταῦτα εἶναι Θεοῦς. Ibid. P. 92. As if he should have said, God is without passions, which they, being subject to, can by no means be esteemed as Gods. |