(1.) First; That he is a God of infinite power is certain, for he is God Almighty, Gen. xxxv. 11: "He is wise in heart and mighty in strength: who hath hardened himself against him and hath prospered?” Job, ix. 4. "Canst thou

by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" xi. 7. As if he should say, Canst thou find out the bounds and limits of his power and greatness? Canst thou tell where it will end and be perfected? Is not he infinite? Yes, he can " do every thing," Job, xlii. 2. Yea," he hath done whatsoever he pleased," Psalm cxv. 3. And the reason is, because "with God nothing shall be impossible," Luke, i. 37. "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible," Matt. xix. 26.

(2.) Secondly; That he is of infinite wisdom, is as frequently inculcated in Scripture, as that he is of infinite power; for he is "the only wise God," 1 Tim. i. 17. Rom. xvi. 27. Jude, 25. He knoweth all things," 1 John, iii. 20. John, xxi. 17. "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him, with whom we have to do," Heb. iv. 13. "For there is not a word in my tongue, but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. Whither, therefore, shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there," &c. Psalm cxxxix. 4, 7 — 12. and why so, but because he is of infinite wisdom, or, as himself saith, "his understanding is infinite," Psalm cxlvii. 5.

(3.) Thirdly; he is of infinite goodness, as well as infinite wisdom and power; for his goodness is great goodness, Psalm cxlv. 7. He is "good to all, and his mercies are over all his works," v. 9. Yea, "there is none good but God," Mark, x. 18. Luke, xviii. 19. None essentially, originally, or infinitely good but God. Therefore doth David cry, "Whom have I in heaven but thee? Neither is there any upon earth that I desire besides thee," Psalm 1xxiii. 25. And he, being thus the centre of all our desires, must needs be the perfection of all goodness, or, as it is here expressed, "of infinite goodness."

2. Confirmation from REASON.-And Scripture being

so plentiful, I need not be prolix in producing reasons to back this truth; especially itself being so clear, that none that hath the right understanding of it can deny subscription to it. For if I do but say, God is God, it will necessarily follow that he is of infinite power, wisdom, aud goodness: for all these are perfections which it is impossible for us to abstract from the notion of a deity; and not only the things themselves, but the infinitude of them, is a perfection also, without which God would be imperfect, and so not God. Again; wisdom, power, and goodness being perfections, are necessary properties in God; yea, they are the very essence of God: it being impossible for God to be God, and yet to have any thing in him which is not himself; and, therefore, his essence being infinite (as it must be if it be the essence of God), these, his properties, cannot but be infinite too. And these reasons serve to prove, that all these perfections of power, wisdom, and goodness, are in God; and if we should further consider them distinctly, we might easily find every one by itself to be infinite, as it is in God.

(1.) As for his power, reason cannot but grant him to be the cause of causes, or the first cause, and, therefore, must needs acknowledge him to have all power in his hand; so that nothing can be possible which he cannot do, and, therefore, he must needs be able to do all things that are possible. We cannot so properly say, God can do any thing because it is possible, as, therefore is any thing possible because God can do it; for the possibility of any thing's being done, is grounded merely upon God's power and ability to do it; so that the possibility of any thing's being done, as well as the thing itself that is thus possible to be done, must depend upon God, as the first cause; otherwise, there would be something in the world which he would not be the cause of, and so not the first cause, or cause of all things. And if to this we consider, what God hath or can do, we shall easily grant him to be of infinite power; for God can make any thing of nothing, as when he made this glorious fabric of the world, and all things contained in it, of nothing, or no pre-existing matter; he can make nothing of any thing, there being no more power requisite to make any thing nothing, than to make

nothing any thing. Yea, and he can make any thing of any thing too: of stones he can raise up children to Abraham; he can make a saint of a sinner; and all this he can do with means, or without means, or with contrary means, howsoever, whensoever, wheresoever himself pleaseth; so that one thing is not easier or harder to him than another; a whole army is no more able to resist him than a silly fly; he can as easily make ten thousand worlds as one; and any thing as easily as we can think a thought, yea, as easily as himself can understand himself. For he doth but will any thing to be done, and in himself say "fiat," and imme diately whatsoever his will is should be done, gathers up itself out of nothing, or out of pre-existing matter, as himself pleaseth, and becomes just what himself willed it should be. And what is, if this be not to be of infinite power?

(2.) Neither can reason discover less of the infinitude of his wisdom than of his power. For, he being the first cause, his wisdom must needs be answerable to his power; for, otherwise, let his power he never so great, yet of himself he could not do any thing: for if he be not as wise as powerful, what he doeth must either be done by chance, cr by the direction of another: if by chance, he is not the first cause, for that is always a necessary, never an accidental cause; if by the direction of another, wanting wisdom in himself, then he would not be the first cause neither, but rather an instrument in the other's hand to do what he pleaseth: so that to be the first cause, infinite wisdom is required, as well as infinite power: and not only to be the first cause, but to be of infinite power, it is likewise requisite he should be of infinite wisdom; it being impossible for him to do more than he knows: and, therefore, if his wisdom and knowledge be not, his might and power cannot be infinite; especially seeing that impo

Sed omnipotens manus tua, cui omnia pari modo sunt possibilia. Nec enim possibilius est ei creare vermiculum, quàm angelum; nec impossibilius extendere cœlum quàm folium; nec levius formare capillum, quàm corpus; nec difficilius fundare terram super aquas, quàm aquas fundare super terram: sed omnia quæcunque voluit fecit, in cœlo et in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis, et ne inter omnia sicut voluit, potuit et scivit. Aug. Soliloq. Anima ad Deum, in Appendice ad tom. vi. cap. 9. p. 89. D. Ed. Ben. Par. 1685.

tence in knowing all things, is itself a contradiction to omnipotence in doing all things; this being one thing, that omnipotence must be able to do, or not be omnipotence, even to know all things.

(3.) Lastly; reason is also as confident in attributing goodness as wisdom and power to the Deity; nay, therefore, because it ascribes infinite wisdom and power, it cannot but also attribute infinite goodness unto God: for he that is infinitely wise and powerful in himself, cannot but be infinitely good; wisdom and power being two perfections much to be desired, and, therefore, such things as we cannot but term good; the very nature of goodness consisting in desirableness. Again, he that is the chiefest good, must needs be of infinite goodness; for if he be not of infinite goodness, other things may be as good as he, and then he would not be the chiefest good. Now, that God is the chiefest good is certain; for otherwise, he would have some other above him: if he be not in every thing, and so in goodness too, supreme, he would have a superior, or, howsoever, an equal, and, by consequence, himself would not be the first and prime cause, and so not God. But I need not expatiate upon these things, for he that is infinite in one perfection, cannot but be so in all: and, therefore, goodness being a perfection, yea, perfection itself (for goodness and perfection are convertible terms), he cannot but be of infinite goodness, as well as of infinite power and wisdom. 3. This infinitude of perfections in God, and particularly power, wisdom, and goodness, is frequently inculcated by the FATHERS: as, first, for his infinite power; Justind excellently: God hath not a measured power; therefore, to him there is nothing but what is fit to produce whatsoever he pleaseth; neither doth the cutting in pieces, nor burning of bodies, hinder him that he cannot raise them up again. For God doth not work by the law and measure ́of nature, but by the power of his own will, which wanteth

of

« Ο δὲ Θεὸς οὐκ ἔμμετρον τὴν δύναμιν· δια τοῦτο οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν, ἀ επιτήδειον πρὸς ποίησιν πάντων ὧν βούλεται, οὐδὲ κωλύεται ὑπὸ τῆς τομῆς καὶ καύσεως τῶν σωμάτων του ποιήσασθαι αυτῶν τὴν ἀνάστασιν. οὐ γὰρ νόμῳ καὶ μέτρῳ φύσεως ἐργάζεται ὁ Θεὸς, ἀλλ ̓ αὐθεντίᾳ βουλῆς τῆς ἐν μηδενὶ ἀπορουμένης πρός ποίησιν ὧν βούλεται ποιεῖν. ·Justin. Paris. 1636. Respons. Quæst. III. ad Orthodox.

p. 465. D.

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nothing to produce what he pleaseth.' And Tertullian : They do not know God aright, who do not think he can do what they do not think."' And again, There is nothing difficult to God; who is ignorant of this? And who knows not that the things that are impossible with men are possible with God? And "God chose the foolish things of the world that he might confound the wise:" all this we have read.' And presently after: Truly there is nothing difficult to God; but if we use this assertion so abruptly in our presumptions, we might feign any thing of God, as if he hath done it, because he can do it. But because he can do all things, we are not therefore to believe he did that also which he never did: but we must inquire whether he did it or no.' And by this means something will be difficult even unto God, to wit, that which he never did, not because he cannot, but because he will not do it. For God's willing a thing, is his ability of doing it; and his nilling it, is his inability to do it; but what he will, he both can, and manifesteth it too? And so Origeni too: According to us, God can do all things, the doing of which is not inconsistent with his being God, and good, and wise.' And Damascenk, reckoning up the

e Malè Deum nôrunt, qui non putant illum posse quod non putant.Tertull. de Resur. Carnis, cap. 38. p. 407. B. Par. 1634.

' Nihil Deo difficile. Quis hoc nesciat? Et impossibilia apud sæculum, possibilia apud Deum quis ignoret? Et stulta mundi elegit Deus, ut confundat sapientiam.' Legimus omnia. — Idem. adv, Praxeam, cap. 10. p. 641. B.

• Planè nihil Deo difficile. Sed si tamn abruptè in præsumptionibus nostris hâc sententiâ utamur, quidvis de Deo confingere poterimus, quasi fecerit, quia facere potuerit. Non autem quia omnia potest facere, ideò utique credendum est illum fecisse, etiam quod non fecerit. Sed an fecerit, requirendum. - Idem. ibid.

Hâc ratione erit aliquid et difficile Deo; id scilicet quodcunque non fecerit non quia non potuerit, sed quia noluerit. Dei enim posse, velle est; et non posse, nolle; quod autem voluit, et potuit et ostendit. -Idem. ibid. C.

1 Δύναται καθ' ἡμᾶς πάντα ὁ Θεὸς, ἅπερ δυνάμενος, τοῦ Θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθός sīvai, xal copòs sīvai, oùn ižíorarai. — Orig. contra Cels. lib. iii. p. 154. Cantab.

1658.

* Δύναμιν οὐδενὶ μέτρῳ γνωριζομένην, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ οἰκείῳ βουλήματι μετρουμένην. πάντα γὰρ όσα θέλει δύναται. Damasc. Orthod. Fid. lib. i. cap. 8. p. 25.

Basil. 1548.