ment gave an arena for the accomplished vigour of the Irish intellectual athlete-it gave an object for the aspiring vigour of the rising generation -it gave an impulse to all. On the closing of those gates the spirit of Ireland passed away, and its recollection only revives the feeling of its loss, and the hopelessness of its restoration. The scene of its noblest triumphs is now an intellectual cemetery, and every inscription on its walls is a rebuke of the national ruin, and a remonstrance against that system of weak concession and frantic confidence, which abandoned the faith and the freedom of the country to the public enemy of the empire!

Among the aspersions flung at random on the Irish administration of Lord Castlereagh was cruelty; he was said to have used gratuitous severity in putting down the rebellion. We think that his conduct was impeachable on only one ground-his lenity. He suffered all the early instigators, and some of the later actors in the rebellion, to be pardoned, on the simple condition of quitting the country. And what was the result? They spread themselves through America, and envenomed the whole populace of the United States against England. They harangued, they wrote, they travelled, simply to proclaim the downfall of England. When their manners disgusted the better orders, or their swindling the middle ranks, they opened a market for the passions of the populace, and stocked it with falsehood, libel, and hostility to England. We have had two American wars since: Can we doubt that the popular clamour for those wars was fed by the falsehoods of those pardoned traitors? The most essential maxim of public justice is, that the rebel must die." We hang the highwayman, who may be driven to the road by hunger; we hang the murderer, who may be maddened by the bitterest provocation of the passions. Common sense feels the necessity of removing from earth beings thus dangerous to society. But their crimes are brief and single, and their object individual. But the rebel is a comprehensive murderer; his act may involve thousands in ruin; his violence may leave its proof in the ravage

VOL. LXXIV.-NO. CCCCLIII.

of kingdoms; his venom may even be epidemic, may poison the political atmosphere, and lay in the tomb multitudes of whom he knows nothing, and who knew nothing of him except by the sword and the scaffold. The rebellion of 1798, hatched by a few unemployed barristers, sitting in the back-room of a linendraper's warehouse, is said to have cost the lives of 70,000 men in the field. Not one of those conspirators ever attempted that small redemption of the ruffian's guilt

the hazard of his person; not one of those firebands of the popular fury ever fell in the field. We have seen for these fifty years the result of that lenity-which means cruelty to the innocent, and protection to the guiltyin the perpetual agitation of Ireland; an agitation proclaiming inveterate hostility to England, sounding in the peasant's ear the watchword of trea

son

"Hereditary bondsmen, know ye not, Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow;"

and producing two rebellions, which, though of minor import, from the poltroonery of their leaders, have, by the help of "lenity," propagated a race of missionaries of revolt through every dependency of Britain.

The charge of corrupting the Irish Parliament to sell its independence, was alleged against Lord Castlereagh. We are not his lordship's advocates. But history will turn with contempt from a charge which divides the criminality between the accusers and the accused. The culprit cannot plead his own temptation. It was said that the purchase of the Parliament cost half a million.

But the greater part of that sum was openly paid for boroughs, which, by length of time and notorious custom, had become the property of individuals. We do not disguise the abuse, but it was an abuse of a hundred and fifty years standing; and, like the English nomination-boroughs, it had been the avenue through which entered the Grattans, Burkes, Plunkets, and nearly all the other "celebrities" of the Irish legislature.

But it was equally acknowledged, that the chief bribe offered by the Government was not pecuniary, nor Pro

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testant, nor Parliamentary. It was a promise of concessions to Popery, at which the Papists grasped, and for which they agreed to be deaf and dumb, while the country was ringing with voices of despair.

On the cessation of the general tumult, Lord Castlereagh gave up the Secretaryship, and came to England. His intelligence and intrepidity were now so fully felt that Pitt marked him for an English minister. On Pitt's retirement in 1802, he was appointed to the head of the Board of Control. He retained his position on Pitt's resumption of office until 1805, when he received the still higher appointment of Secretary for War and Colonies. This office he of course resigned on the formation of the Fox cabinet, which followed the lamented death of Pitt; and again, on the dissolution of the Whig Cabinet, he was appointed to the Secretaryship, under the Perceval Ministry. His next change was the result of the dispute with Canning, a transaction originating in mistake, carried on in misapprehension, and finished by a duel that remnant of the Gothic code of arms which, though reprobated by our laws and denounced by our religion, remains a custom of the world of fashion, to the scandal of our age. The duel was fortunately unattended with fatal consequences, but it might have deprived the country of two men distinguished by their talents and services. Both the antagonists resigned their offices; but, on the death of Perceval-who was cruelly murdered by an assassin-Lord Castlereagh was nominated Foreign Secretary-an office which he held until his death.

It was at this period that the public first comprehended his qualities for administration. The war had lingered for years. England was straining her finances for the most costly hostilities which the world had ever seen, but which seemed interminable. She had to maintain a struggle, without the animation of conflict; to exhaust herself by the perpetual preparation for battle, without the hope of victory. While war was raging through Europe, England lay, like a patient in the hospital while the storm of the ramparts was going on. It was a time of which

history had given no example, and which more resembled the grandeur and mystery of prophecy than the ordinary vicissitudes of nations. Every throne of Europe was eclipsed, as the shadow of the great conquering empire passed over it. In the language of the Apocalypse, the "sun was darkened, and the moon was red as blood, and the stars fell from heaven;" the whole firmament of earthly sovereignty seemed to be dismantled. Slavery, or Anarchy, were the alternatives; European supremacy was on the verge of overthrow.

If this language may appear strange to our quieter time, it is not exaggerated, and will even appear tame to the survivors of that most astonishing, memorable, and magnificent time. England was firm; but, looking round the world, she saw nothing but weakness. Relying upon her native courage, and upon higher impulses than her courage, she stood, like the Spartan, with no rampart but her own bold breast and sinewy arm. Wherever she looked she saw nothing but submission. To the statesmen and soldiers of the Continent the question was at an end; the one accepted the chain as a work of destiny, the other abandoned the sword as a necessity of nature. The Congress of Erfurth was a Convention of crowned heads, summoned to lay their diadems at the feet of the Uni

versal Master. "Come to Erfurth," was the letter of Napoleon to Talma, the tragedian, "and you shall play before a pitful of kings;” a sentiment which, though striking the deepest chord of arrogance, was simply true, and inimitably characteristic of the man, the crisis, and the age.

Lord Castlereagh, as Foreign Secretary, had scarcely assumed the seals of office, when he fixed the eyes of Europe on himself. The office is peculiar, and bears but slight analogy to the general administration of the country. Its ministry extends to all Europe. It has, of course, to guide, protect, and reconcile interests the most complicated, helpless, and contradictory; for the influence of England virtually places her in a position of universal supremacy. Nothing in the whole circle of European interests can be done without her, or against her. Her national love of peace, her

acknowledged love of justice, the publicity of her opinions, and the absence of all desire on her part for Continental territory, make her the natural refuge of all the aggrieved interests of Europe; while her extraordinary power, and the extraordinary rapidity with which that power may be applied, render her arbitration irresistible. Her fleet could close up every port of Europe, before a single brigade could cross the frontier of any of its kingdoms.

To this high position Lord Castlereagh brought every essential quality -clearness of view, decision of temper, and lofty integrity. We have now his whole correspondence before us, and not a syllable of artifice, disingenuousness, or disguise, can be detected in it from the commencement to the close. He also possessed the minor, yet not slight advantages (when we regard the formalities of foreigners), of noble birth, finished manners, gentle temperament, and an exterior of remarkable distinction, a stately person, and a handsome countenance.

This manliness of character was instantly brought into demand.

The Spanish insurrection of the 2d of May 1808 was a thunder-clap. It showed that there was an angry fire in those clouds which had already covered the political horizon; but it was impossible for human sagacity to foretell whether it might not pass away like so many of the peasant convulsions of the North of Europe. Spain was languid with the indolence of four centuries; she was drugged with superstition; and, above all, she was accustomed to French dependency: her chains had become a part of her nature. But the native spirit of England, like the Trojan hero, drew the augury from its own bosom, and, in spite of all adverse omens and sinister predictions, pronounced that the "surest of all omens was the cause of the country." This was the turning-point of the fortunes of Europe; and on the services of the Foreign Secretary at this momentous period, we have the testimony of a statesman and soldier, published some years ago, which, though the testimony of a brother, has never been impeached, and which, from the pub

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licity of the narrative, must now be beyond all question. "To his counsels,' is the language of his noble biographer, "I boldly assert, it was chiefly owing that the British Cabinet decided to afford hearty and effective assistance in that arduous struggle; in spite of the violent outcries of the Parliamentary opposition against our interference, and their prophetic denunciations that this interference would only involve the country in disasters and disgrace." But England owed to him another, and scarcely less opposed, but most essential service- the appointment of Arthur, Duke of Wellington, to the command of the British troops in Spain. letter from George III. gives a curious insight into the intricate motives which sometimes decide great events, and also the difficulties of public counsel which public men sometimes have to overcome. This document, after assuring Lord Castlereagh of the royal confidence in his conduct, thus proceeds:-" His Majesty must ever approve of the principle which shall secure the support and protection of Government to men exposing their reputation as well as their lives in his service, when their character and conduct were attacked and aspersed on loose and insufficient grounds, without adverting to embarrassments and local difficulties, of which those on the spot can alone form an adequate judgment." (This was so far in reference to the dispute between Lord Castlereagh and Canning.)

The next paragraph expresses the royal reluctance to hazarding the British force in the Portuguese campaign. "Lord Castlereagh must remember that the King was not disposed to question the correctness of the representations made by the late Sir John Moore, which subsequent experience has so fully confirmed. And, although he was induced to yield to the advice of his confidential servants, he never could look with satisfaction to the prospect of another British army being committed in Spain, under the possible recurrence of the same difficulties."

The most singular portion of the royal letter is the reason assigned for putting "Lord Wellington" in command. "It was this impression which

prompted the King to acquiesce in the appointment of so young a Lieutenantgeneral as Lord Wellington, to the command of the troops in Portugal; as he hoped that this consideration would operate with others against any considerable augmentation of that army; though that augmentation has been gradually produced by events not then foreseen." This letter shows the obstacles which were to be encountered, in even the highest quarters, against the appointment of the man, who had no sooner arrived on the field than he began a career of conquest which finished only with the liberation of Europe. But the statesman had fixed on the soldier, not simply as his countryman, but from observation of his talents in early life; from the intellectual vigour which he displayed in Parliament, almost in his boyhood; from his intrepidity in his Indian wars; and, perhaps, still more from that instinctive sense of genius, which characterises, to the eye of ability, the man made to mould the fortunes of empire.

From this period the WAR was a succession of newly-waked efforts to throw off the slavery of the Continent: the struggle of Austria in 1809; the Russian campaign of 1812; the invasion of France in 1813; the liberation of Holland in 1813; the capitulation of Paris in 1814; and the settlement of Europe by the battle of Waterloo in 1815;-events of the greatest magnitude, and all under the impulse of Lord Castlereagh.

We now advert to the correspondence in the present series. The volume begins with the year 1813. Napoleon had re-entered Germany with an enormous army, and kept the Allies at bay. After some delay, from the necessity of disciplining his conscripts, he had rushed on the allied army and forced it back into Silesia. But his prestige was failing: his battles were no longer triumphs -they were desperate struggles; and even when successful, they were bought with a ruinous loss. The campaign of Moscow had taught the Russians their strength, and reformed the tactics of the Germans; when beaten in one field, they retired to another, at a few leagues' distance, and fought again. They were now

approaching, in their retreat, a region of mountains, and if Napoleon followed, his army must be either slaughtered or starved. The throne of France was beginning to shake, and the Corsican had recourse to negotiation. Austria had an immense army ready to move on his flank, and she carried ruin or restoration in her hand. But the army, composed of Swedes, with Prussian and Russian brigades, under the command of Bernadotte, then prince-royal of Sweden, was scarcely less an object of anxiety in the camp of the Allies. Though actually pledged to them, his movements were tardy, his principles doubtful, and his demands imperious. To bring him fairly into line with the Allies was the immediate object of their councils; and the correspondence is full of their fears, their hopes, their threats, and their recriminations.

Sir Charles Stewart (the present Marquis of Londonderry), who was accredited to the sovereigns as a kind of military ambassador, thus writes from headquarters, in June: "The accounts from Hamburg and Stralsund are bad. I fear the Swedes will go, and Bonaparte gets 20,000 Danes in the north. However, we shall trim him yet, if we can confine him to fair fighting.

"The Prince-Royal has not been managed as he should have been; and if the Emperor does not lower his tone, Bernadotte will yet seize Finland. The disorder in the Russian army is great-Prussians are infinitely better.

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rides the bear over them; but they are obedient and patient, and I will pledge my faith for them. Though the Germans will not burn their Moscow, and lay waste their country, still they will be true, and Prussia will not be the first power that will withdraw from English alliance.

"I trust Parliament will be up before the bright hopes of England will be overclouded. At all events, Wellington must send you a victory to bruit forth with the armistice."

The campaign of 1813, in Germany, had abated the hopes excited by the Moscow retreat, and the advance of the army under Bernadotte was urgently pressed by the diplomatists. But he had at first grown tardy, then

self-willed, and then irritable; the general opinion being, that he had some views on the throne of France, if chance, or the popular fickleness, should remove Napoleon. It was

known that he at once feared and hated the French Emperor; but he had an evident reluctance to be in front on the march to Paris. French popularity was still supposed to be his idol. Thornton, our ambassador at Stockholm, an acute John Bull, who seems to have had no peculiar deference for the lucky Frenchman, often addressed him in a tone altogether different from diplomatic reserve, and was met with all the fiery temper of Gascony. A considerable battle had taken place at Juterboch, in the north, between the Prussians and the French under Ney. The conflict continued for some hours with doubtful success, when, at last, the Swedish battalions were marched into the field, and the French retreated with great loss. The slowness of the Prince-Royal's movements on this occasion produced great murmurs even among the Swedes, but the diplomatists were all indignation.

Thornton writes: "On my arriving here (Juterboch) this morning, the first person I spoke with was General Pozzo di Borgo, who desired to talk to me alone; and who gave me to understand, that in the operations of the day before yesterday (the day of the battle), he thought that he had discovered an extreme repugnance in the Prince to give a decided character to the events of the day, and, in fact, to terminate the campaign on this side, by the total defeat and destruction of the hostile army, which he (the General) declared to have been completely in the power of the Prince. From what I see of the ardour of the Swedish officers and soldiers, he will gain as little with them by this repugnance, as he would with the Allies by a similar forbearance towards the French. The former are extremely mortified at having no share in the military events of those days."

Lord Castlereagh's answer to Thornton is a striking instance of the calm sagacity and sound judgment of the Minister. "You acted very properly in not withholding from me a

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knowledge of this circumstance. shall not, however, till I hear further, impart the communication, except to Lord Liverpool. The charge

of any supposed tenderness to the enemy implies so much, that it cannot be hazarded while he is to be supported. I deemed it advisable to-day, in congratulating Mr Rehausen (the Swedish envoy) on the victory, to express my regret that the Swedes should not have been more prominent, and I took the liberty, as feeling deeply interested in the personal glory and character of the Prince, to mention to him, that the Prussians having happened more than once to have the whole thrown upon them, even in the presence of the Swedish troops, I felt it my duty to intimate to him that this had occasioned comments. His hostility to Bonaparte cannot be doubted on any ordinary rule of conduct. His weak side, I should fear, is a desire to make a party in France and in the French army. If an explosion can be avoided, it is of the utmost importance that it should not be hazarded at such a moment."

But the details of the "haute diplomatie" are always curious. We must give another scene--an interview between Bernadotte and Thornton-in a letter from the latter to the Foreign Secretary. "My Lord,-In the discussion which I had with the PrinceRoyal yesterday on the subject of money, and which was carried on with a sort of bitterness which I had not seen in him, at least towards me, he adverted suddenly, and par parenthèse, to the letter which had been written to him from Halle, and which I had signed, with the other gentlemen. 'Et vous,' said he, vous qui n'êtes pas militaire, vous me donnez des conseils militaires.'

"I answered, that I never pretended to give him military counsels. Then I appealed to Baron de Wetterstedt (then present) whether I had not informed him that I myself prepared the letter. Vous aviez bien tort,' interrupted he, and said that if he had not been actuated by 'égards' for the sovereigns whom they represented, he should have sent back the letter unopened. observed to his Royal Highness that

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