those battles of its earlier years, in which victory was hardly wrenched by Napoleon's novel tactics and military genius, and by the warlike enthusiasm of his soldiers, to whom triumph had become habitual, from the stubborn hosts of Muscovy, we find, in the single battle of the Borodino, a sufficient proof of what Russian troops can do. Since the fall of Napoleon, they have had little opportunity of signalising themselves. Their victories in 1828-9 were neither easily won, nor, as we shall presently show, unattended by very severe loss, although Turks were their only antagonists, and treachery more than once came to their aid. And in Circassia they have almost invariably had the worst of it, a circumstance supporting the belief sometimes expressed, and which has been confirmed to us by persons who have had opportunity of observation, that the Russian army, as at present composed, and with the exception of the imperial guard, and of certain select regiments, is by no means, either as regards the spirit or the physical powers of the soldier, in a condition to bear comparison with those of Germany, France, and England. In estimating the probabilities of any war, it is indispensable to take into account the temper of the soldier, the degree of enthusiasm, or of martial ardour excited in him by the nature of the contest. In 1812 the struggle was on Russian ground, with an invader against whom hatred had long accumulated, and in defence of all that men hold dearest. No stimulus was wanting-but neither was any spared to raise the patriotic and military spirit to the very highest pitch. The case is now very different, and we are justified in doubting the willingness, or at least the zeal, with which the Russian advances to the encounter of the Turk. A few months ago the Czar's appeal to the religious feelings of the nation excited a momentary enthusiasm. This, however, seems to have been of brief duration. It is some time since any signs of it have been shown or reported. Instead of it we hear of the ravages made by fever in the ill-fed and badly-quartered army of Prince Gortschakoff. Owing, probably, to habitually poor and insufficient nourishment, the Russian soldier is remarkably unenduring of fatigue, and subject to sickness. In the field, at his superior's command, he will stand immovable to be mowed down by grape-shot, but he quickly yields to the assaults of disease. It is well known that in the campaign of 1812 the sufferings of the Russians were by no means less than those of the French, although they had rations and resources at command, whilst the broken host they drove before them had neither hospitals nor commissariat, nor an instant's repose. In all their attacks upon Turkey, the Russian loss has been almost as great from sickness as from the sword. In 1806 the typhus fever they imported into Wallachia spread amongst the inhabitants, committing terrible ravages; and before the outbreak of the present hostilities, after less than four months, occupation, the most trustworthy accounts rated the diminution in the effective strength of the Russian troops in the Provinces, by deaths and men in hospital, at nearly one-fifth of the whole force that had entered. With reference to the present temper of the Russian army, it is interesting here to extract a paragraph from a striking article, entitled L'Occupation Russi dans les Principautés du Danube, which appeared a month ago in the leading French Review, La Revue des Deux Mondes. The article, although signed by one of the editors of the Revue, is stated, at its commencement, to be compiled from copious notes taken upon the spot by a traveller of distinction. The following passage is curious, and in accordance, in most of its particulars, with strict probability, and with the information received upon the subject from other quarters : "No very eminent qualities are to be attributed to the Russian generals now commanding in the Danubian provinces ; and it is the general opinion that when the war shall assume a serious character, military men of greater capacity will be sent to direct the operations. Neither must one expect to find, in the generals by patriotic and religious enthusiasm, as of the army of occupation, men inspired a Suwarrow would assuredly have been in a war undertaken upon the pretext now put forward by the Russian cabinet. Mysticism of that kind is not at all in Prince Gortschakoff's way, and it is not Russia and Turkey. from him that the example could come. then impassioned him have already grown old. He at first had persuaded himself that he was marching to the rescue of the holy shrines, sold to the Jews by the Turks. By keeping him for four months peaceably encamped in the principalities, they have allowed him to discover that the peril is, at any rate, not pressing. He doubted not, when advancing by forced marches upon Bucharest, that the town was in the power of the Turks, and already given up to fire and sword. His own eyes assured him how different was the true state of things. To-day it is of the massacre of the Christians in Bulgaria that he must be told, in order to revive his zeal. As to his superiors, who cannot delude themselves as to the true motives of the war, it is a question whether the feeling of nationality suffices to make them forget that the right is not on their side. Some of them certainly seem to contemplate the future with the satisfac tion of brave officers, well pleased to fight, and careless of the motive others with perfect scepticism-others again, it is said, with unconcealed grief, because they do not feel themselves sustained by the greatness and equity of their cause, and by that natural ardour inspired, in a generous enterprise, by the encouragement of public opinion. These last cannot restrain their complaints and the expression of their gloomy presentiments; and it has been related to us by persons worthy of belief, that one of them had gone so far as publicly to shed tears in a drawing-room at Bucharest. The expression of similar sentiments was witnessed on the eve of the unfortunate expedition made, during the Hungarian insurrection, by a corps of the army of occupation, against the troops of Bem, concentrated in Southern Transylvania." The picture here painted, from sketches taken from life, and of the accuracy of whose details, proceeding, as it does, from a highly intelligent and respectable source, we have no right to doubt until counter-evidence be brought forward, amply suffices to explain any defeats, however signal, the Czar's armies may meet with. Dispirited by sickness, bad quarters, and a worse cause, it will not be wonderful if they are vanquished by troops in good working condition, led by officers whom there is no reason to believe less efficient than those op 775 posed to them, and fired by religious fanaticism. It has been somewhat vertible fact that there is not the stuff too readily accepted as an incontroIt is hard to say why that should be. of a good soldier in a modern Turk. In thews and sinews he is not deficient. Turkish porters carry loads that would in character he is submissive and break the back of most Europeans; amenable to discipline; if his ordinary nature be indolent, he displays fierce energy when once roused, and his fatalism makes him fearless of death. In martial prowess and skill with arms he was once unsurpassed, and the decline of his military reputation is quite recent. It may probably changes by which other races have be traced to his slowness in adopting of the middle ages were quite the been prompt to profit. The Turks equals of the most warlike of Chrisganisation were the same, and their tian nations. Their tactics and orpersonal valour has always been conspicuous. But when Europe adopted the system of standing armies, and At tegy, the Mahometan warrior was laid the foundations of modern strathrown into the shade, and soon had he had previously given them. to seek lessons from those to whom the beginning of the present century, and under the auspices of France, Sultan Selim attempted a reform in the Turkish army. He decreed the creation of bodies of infantry and manner, and in less than three years cavalry organised in the European twelve regiments were formed, to each of artillery. The turbulent and terone of which was attached a company rible janissaries beheld this nucleus or model of a regular army with no in the revolution that raised Mahmoud favourable eye. It was swept away to the throne, reformed by him, and again broken up by an insurrection that nearly cost him his life. The formation of a regular Turkish army after the massacre of the janissaries was definitively adjourned until 1826, and the abolition of their corps. Then it was that Russia, taking advantage Sultan's military power found itself, of the state of transition in which the with its old army broken up and its new one not yet disciplined, declared war against Turkey. The date is suf ficiently recent for many to remember the events of the contest that ensued. Under most unfavourable circumstances, the Ottomans showed themselves by no means unworthy of their ancient military reputation. The Russians met an amount of resistance they by no means expected. Eighteen months took them to Adrianople, but not until they had lost, by disease or in action, 150,000 men (some accounts estimate their loss yet higher) and 50,000 horses. Then, as now, fever and dysentery played havoc in their ranks. The system introduced by Mahmoud was carried out by his successor, the present Sultan, who limited the period of military service, which previously had been for life. By a decree published in 1843, the whole military system of Turkey was definitively regulated; the conscription was established, and European organisation introduced in all branches of the service. The infantry, cavalry, and engineers were organised upon the French model, the artillery upon that of Prussia, to which nation its officers belonged. The main division of the army was into the nizam or standing army, and the redif or reserve. This latter has frequently, during recent discussions of Turkish affairs, been loosely spoken of as consisting of raw levies, or at best a sort of militia, whereas in reality it consists entirely of men who have served their time. This is no unimportant error to rectify before estimating the chances of the war, of whose progress every post for the last fortnight has brought us accounts more and more exciting. Every ordou or army corps -the Turkish standing army has six of these—has its redif, whose commanding officer is stationed, in time of peace, at the headquarters of the ordou. The non-commissioned officers, who receive regular pay, are bound to reside in the towns and villages of their sub-divisions, and to exercise their men every week. For one month of every year, the soldiers of the reserve muster at the headquarters of their respective ordous, to be exercised in manoeuvres on a large scale, and are duly paid and rationed from the time they leave their homes until they return to them. At other times their arms are preserved in depots, distributed through the various cantonments, and can be drawn out of store at any moment for immediate service. Far from being raw or irregular troops, the redifs are in fact all old soldiers, although still young men, and there is no reason for their proving, when called out, in the least less efficient than their comrades of the line, to which they themselves have, without exception, already belonged. The system is almost identical with that of the Prussian landwehr. As regards the numbers Turkey can bring into the field, the brief statistics on this head we gave in our last article have been confirmed and shown to be within the mark by several writers, who have since busied themselves with the subject. Estimating the nizam and redif at 300,000 men, these writers make the troops furnished by tributary provinces, and the irregulars of all kinds, the gendarmes, volunteers, Tartars, &c., amount to upwards of 250,000 more, without reckoning the Bachi-Bezouks, nearly 200,000 strong. These BachiBozouks are soldiers of the old Turkish army, and their name, which signifies spoiled heads, is given to them because they are allowed to retain the ancient head-dress. From the same authorities, amongst which a prominent place is to be given to Ubicini's recently published Lettres sur la Turquie-a work in which the military resources of the country receive particular consideration-we learn that the total number of regular troops the tributary provinces are bound to furnish is 40,000, and of irregulars nearly thrice as many. Syria is set down as able easily to send 50,000 horsemen to the assistance of the Porte, if that government has the means to support them. Admitting that there be, as is very likely, exaggeration in some of these estimates, making a large allowance for sick, ineffective, absent without leave, and other contingencies, we still get a very high figure for the total of the Turkish army. Of course, with the exception of some foreign officers, it is supposed to consist entirely of Mussulmans, although Omer Pasha, in his campaign in Bosnia, had 12,000 Christian Bosniaks under his orders, and at the present time we are informed that 2000 Catholic Albanians are on the Danube. Finally, and to close this branch of the subject to which the present state of war gives especial interest, whilst at the same time it may impair its correctness from one week to the nextthose estimates most favourable to Turkey make the number of men she now has under arms amount to 330,000, with a power of raising half a million more if necessary. The total amount very nearly agrees with a statement quoted, in our last article, from the Journal de Constantinople. The 330,000 men consist of garrisons, of Omer Pasha's army, of the army of reserve or of the Balkan, whose headquarters are at Adrianople, of Selim Pasha's corps in Anatolia, and of that of Abdi Pasha in Armenia. The most cautious statements, and the least favourable to Turkey, admit that there were, more than a month ago, at least 200,000 men in arms for the Sultan, a force daily increasing, and in whose movements and preparations extraordinary activity was being displayed. However superior the resources and military efficiency of Turkey may prove to the estimate made of them before they were put to the test, her most sanguine partisans can hardly anticipate that in the long-run they would enable her to cope with the power of Russia. On the first intelligence of Omer Pasha's having crossed the Danube, a step which few anticipated his taking in the teeth of a Russian army, and on the news of his first suc 777 cesses, which, up to the time we write, and as far as our information goes, some, who before had proclaimed have been unchequered by a reverse, Turkey utterly effete and incapable of defence, passed to the opposite extreme, and began calculating the consequences of her being found more than a match for her antagonist. This is indeed foolish precipitation. Turkey may give Russia much more We are quite prepared to believe that trouble than was generally anticipated; and we found this belief less upon the yet have but imperfect accounts, than result of the actions of which we as upon positive evidence and inferences drawn from the past, which we have adduced in this and in another article. think Turkey able to hold her own We should be only too satisfied to against a sovereign by whom men's lives, in a contest of this kind, would be regarded as mere materiel of war, armies, would raise twice as many to and who, if he lost half-a-dozen replace them. Gladly indeed should we see Turkey maintaining her frontier and baffling her foe without foreign aid. But this is too good a only too probable that England and result to hope for, and it is, we fear, France will be forced to take part in the fight. If they be compelled reluchoped they will not sheath it until tantly to draw the sword, it is to be they have obtained solid guarantees that Europe shall not again have her tranquillity disturbed on flimsy pretexts and for the gratification of a despot's ambition. INDEX TO VOL. LXXIV. Acropolis, the, at Athens, 572. Africa, use of Hemp as a narcotic in, 618. Alaric, respect paid to Athens by, 570. Alençon, the Protestants of, 4. Allan, Madame, 79. All's Well that Ends Well, new readings Almanza, incident of the battle of, 18. Alpine region of Switzerland, birds, &c. ALPINE REGIONs, Brute Life iN THE, 539. Antony and Cleopatra, new readings in, Apacheta, the, in the mountains of Peru, Areca, narcotic use of, 680. Ardoch, the Roman camp at, 565. As you Like it, new readings in, 197. Assembly of Divines, anecdote of the, 25. Atolls of the Pacific, the, 363. Ball, sketch of a, in Bolivia, 144. Barcelona and Mataro railway, the, 480. Baths, Roman, remains of, in Scotland, 563. Bautzen, Napoleon at, 163. BEAUTY, REAL and Ideal, 726. Beer, employment of the hop in, 137. Berlin, the French Protestant colony in, 11. Bernadotte, the conduct of, during the Besika, the movement of the combined Betel-nut, narcotic use of the, 680- Bijou perdu, opera of the, 675. Bolivian Indians, eating of clay by the, 691. Bolivian kitchen, picture of a, 144. Borneo, employment of opium in, 606. Boyne, the French refugees at the, 16. Bressant the actor, 79. Brewing, employment of the hop in, 137. British school of art, characteristics of Brohan the actress, 79. Brouage, the Protestants of, 4. BRUTE LIFE IN THE ALPINE REGIONS, 539. Burke, unpopularity of, during his life, BURTON'S HISTORY OF SCOTLAND FROM |