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ful, though the prefent government might remain? He did not mean to enter into any difcuffion of the character of this extraordinary, perfon; but he would afk, whether the hiftory of the world, much lefs the prefent ftate of France, moral or civil, furnished a reasonable expectalion, that either accidents or new convulfions would raise up to power fome character, whofe moderation and juftice might be more fafely repofed in?

As to the restoration of the houfe of Bourbon, he would not enter into what good could be expected for England from fuch an event. He would, in the teeth of all hiftory and experience, fuppofe it to he aufpicious, and confine himself to its practicability. He might áffume the utter impoffibility of fuch a change, except by the fuccefs of the confederacy. The whole property of France, real or perfonal, in the hands of its prefent poffeffors, depended on the exiftence of the prefent, or fome fimilar government. It was impoffible to restore the princes of the houfe. of Bourbon, without reftitution to thofe who had been exiled in its defence, which, in effect, raifed up the whole property in the nation to fupport the republic, whatever they might feel concerning its effects. In every view, he difapproved the anfwer that had been fent by minifters to Buonaparte. It appeared to him to be pregnant with danger, and to entail an awful refponibility on thote who advised it, and thofe who fupported it.

Mr. Pitt, the chancellor of the exchequer and prime minifter, confidered the French revolution as the levereft trial which the vifitation VOL. XLII.

of Providence had ever yet inflicted

But

on the nations of the earth. he could not help reflecting with fatisfaction, that this country, even under fuch a trial, had not only been exempted from thofe calamities which had covered almost every other part of Europe, but appeared to have been referved as a refuge and afylum to thofe who fled from its perfecution, as a barrier to oppofe its progrefs, and, perhaps, ultimately as an inftru`ment to deliver the world from the crimes and miferies which had attended it. This outline, Mr. Pitt filled up in a fpeech of great length. Before any man could concur in opinion with the learned gentleman who had spoken last, Mr. Pitt contended, that he muft come within one of the three following defcriptions: he muft either believe that the French revolution neither does now exhibit, nor has at any time exhibited, fuch circumftances of danger, arifing out of the very nature of the fyftem, and the internal state of France, as to leave to foreign powers no adequate ground of fecurity in negociation; or, fecondly, he must be of opinion, that the change, which had recently taken place, had given that fecurity; which, in the former ftages of the revolution, was wanting; or, thirdly, he muft be one who, believing that the danger existed, neverthelefs thought, from view of the prefent preffure on the country; from his view of its fituation and profpects, compared with thefe of the enemy, that we were, with our eyes open, bound to accept inadequate fecurity for every thing that is valuable and facred, rather than endure the pressure, or [H]

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incur the risk which would refult from a farther prolongation of the conteft. Having defcribed the excelles and outrage with the principle from which they flowed, in the different ftages of the French revolution, and endeavoured to eftablifh the propofition, that the French revolution had been fuch as to afford to foreign powers no adequate ground for fecurity in negociation, he came next to fhew that that fe'curity had not yet been afforded by the change which had lately taken place: that we could not derive any confidence either from the frame of the government, or the past character and conduct of the perfon who was now the abfolute ruler of France. The name of Buonaparte would be recorded with the horrors committed in Italy, in the memorable campaign of 1796 and 1797, in the Milanefe, in Genoa, in Tufcany, in Modena, in Rome, and in Venice.

Mr. Pitt having confidered, laftly, whether there was any thing in the circumftances of the prefent moment that could juftify the acceptation of a fecurity confeffedly inadequate, againft fo great a danger as was threatened by France, concluded, not that we were entitled to confider ourselves certain of ultimate fuccefs in the war; but that, confidering the value of the object for which we were contending, the means for fupporting the conteft, and the probable courfe of human we fhould be inexcufable if, at this moment, we were to relinquish the ftruggle on any grounds fhort of complete fecu

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the following peroration:" Sir, I think you ought to have given a civil, clear, and explicit answer to the overture which was fairly and handfomely made to you. If you were defirous that the negociation fhould have included all your allies, as the means of bringing about a general peace, you fhould have told Buonaparte fo. but I believe you were afraid of his agreeing to the propofal: you took that method before. Aye, but you fay, the people were anxious for peace in 1797. I fay, they are friends to peace, and I am confident you will one day own it. Believe me, they are friends to peace; although, by the laws you have made, reftraining the expreflion of the fenfe of the people, public opinion cannot now be heard, as loudly and unequivocally as heretofore. But I will not go into the internal state of the country. It is too afflicting to the heart to fee the ftrides which have been made, by means of, and under the miferable pretext of this, against liberty of every kind; both of power of fpeech and of writing: and to obferve, in another kingdom, the rapid approaches to that military defpotifm which we affect to make an argument against peace. I know, fir, that public opinion, if it could be collected, would be as much for peace now, as in 1797: and I know that it is only by pub lic opinion, not by a fenfe of duty, not by the inclination of their minds, that minifters will be brought, if ever, to give us peace. I afk for no gentleman's vote who would have reprobated the compliance of minifters with the propofition of the French government; I ask for no gentleman's fupport, to night,

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who would have voted against minifters, if they had come down and propofed to enter into a negociation with the French: but I have a right to ask I know that in honour, in confiftency, in conscience, I have a right to expect the vote of every honourable gentleman who would have voted with minifters in an addrefs to his majefty diane

trically oppofite to the motion of this night.'

On a divifion of the house, the addrefs was carried by 260 against 64.

An address, approving and affenting to his majefty's meffage, refpecting the Ruffian troops was alfo voted.

University of MICHIGAN

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CHAP.

CHA P. VII.

Meffage from his Majesty, respecting the Employment of German Troops infead of Ruffians.-Debates thereon in both Houses.-Motions for an Inquiry into the Failure of the Dutch Expedition, in both Houses.-Debates thereon. -Supplies required.-Ways and Means for raising them.

Meffage was brought down

vigour, would readily concur in the

A from his majefty to the house wishes of his majefty, and give their

of peers, on the thirteenth of February, ftating, that his majefty was, at prefent, employed in concerting fuch engagements with the emperor of Germany, the elector of Bavaria, and other powers of the empire, as might ftrengthen the efforts of his imperial majefty, and materially conduce to the advantage of the common cause, in the courfe of the enfuing campaign. His majefty promised to give directions that these engagements, as foon as they fhould have been completed and ratified, fhould be laid before the houfe. But, in order to infure the benefit of this co-operation at an early period, his majefty was defirous of authorizing his minister to make provifionally fuch advances as might be neceffary, in the first inftance, for that purpofe; and he recommended it to the houfe to make fuch provifion accordingly.-A fimilar meffage was delivered to the houfe of commons.-The fecretary of state for foreign affairs, lord Grenville, in the house of peers, moved an addrefs to his majefty, thanking his majefty for his gracicus communication, and affuring him that the house, confcious of the neceffity of profecuting the war with

fupport to fuch measures as fhould be deemed moft likely to make good his engagements with his allies.

Lord Holland faid, that, if the purport of the prefent measure were merely to exchange Ruffian for German mercenaries, to that he not only fhould have no objection, but even fhould think we had gained by the exchange. We should, have the fatisfaction of knowing that those we employed, rendered the horrors of war lefs heart-breaking, lefs difgufting, than thofe we expected to employ. We fhould alfo gain in point of foldiers; for he was happy to find that the troops of the more enlightened and civilized nations of Auftria, Pruffia, France, and England, were greatly fuperior to the Ruffians in difcipline, in courage, in military fkill, and all the qualifications neceffary to form a powerful army. It was a matter of fincere fatisfaction to find, that skill and civilization had fo decided a fuperiority over ignorance and barbarity; that the enlightened nations of the South had not fo much to fear, as had often been thought, from the inroads of thofe favage and ignorant barbarians of the North. But it was not a mere exchange of

troops

troops. We were indeed to fubfidize and employ German troops inftead of Ruffians; but were German troops ready to contend for the fame objects? Did the cabinet of Vienna cordially approve of all the principles laid down by the noble fecretary of state in his anfwers to Buonaparte? Did the emperor of Germany really think, and, if he did fo, where had he declared it, that the fpeedieft and fureft means of reftoring peace would be the reftoration of the Bourbons? Lord Holland did not know but that monarch might rather imagine that the facrifice of the territories of his fellowhireling, the elector of Bavaria, to his ambitious projects, would be the speedieft and fureft means of reftoring tranquillity. His lordship proceeded to fpeak at great length of the different views entertained, or that might be entertained in the progrefs of events, by Auftria and England, the power and the advantages enjoyed by the French government, among which he enumerated the haughty and irritating anfwer of lord Grenville to Buona parte, the improbability of fuccefs on the part of the allies, and the improbability alfo, that even victory and fuccefs in arms would lead to peace. In a word, he expatiated over all the wide and beaten field of the policy or impolicy of the war, and of our mode of treating, and treating with the French. He alfo reverted to the debate on the anfwers that had been given to the French overtures, and to certain maxims and confiderations which he had endeavoured to imprefs on their lordships minds, and he had reafon to think, he faid, not without fuccefs. He conjured the houfe, fince they had that night

learnt, that one of their chief hopes was to be a reliance on the cabinet of Vienna, to reflect again, and not to engage in an undertaking fo delperate in its appearance, in which fuccefs itself feemed only to lead to new wars, new expenfes, and new embarraffments, and in which failure, (which feemed but too probable,) was difgrace and ruin.

The duke of Montrofe faid, that it was not his intention to go through the variety of topics touched on by the noble lord who had fpoken laft," but to advert merely to the fingle question, which appeared to him to arife out of the proper confiderationof his majefty's message and the address now moved; namely, whether, during a war with France, under fingular and unprecedented circumftances, it was wife in this country to fubfidize the princes of the continent, and purchase the aid of auxiliary troops, in order to harass the enemy near their native country; or let them have an opportunity, for want of a politic diverfion, to bring the war into the British channel, and on the coafts of this kingdom? The Hiftory of England proved, by a variety of precedents, that it had always been the policy. of Great Britain, when engaged in a foreign war, to avail itfelf of the affiftance of auxiliary troops.-On a divifion of the houfe, the addrefs was carried by 28 against 3.-The order of the day, for taking his majefty's meffage into confideration, being, at the fame time, read, in the houfe of commons,

Mr. Pitt rofe, and faid, that he had ftated yesterday the general ground on which he flattered himfelf that this meffage was likely to be received without oppofition. The ground was this, that the ob[H 3]

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