were overthrown with the arms of the loyalifts.

When the unfortunate and fugitive prince of that family, his royal highness the count d'Artois, or Monfeur, as the poor royalists, after the ideal acceffion of Lewis XVIII. affected to call him, was made acquainted with the death of M. de Frotté, he immediately paid a vifit to the unhappy father of that young hero in London, and mingled his tears of condolence with those of the old count, with the most affecting fenfibility. It was younger brother of general de Frotté, that aided the escape of fir Sidney Smith from the tower of the Temple, and afterwards ferved un

a

'HE determination of the Britifh miniftry, on the fubject of peace or war with France, we have already feen in the courfe of the debates in parliament. They had no objection to treat with any form of government in France, that should appear, from experience or the evidence of facts, to be able and will ing to negociate, on the principles eftablished among European nations, and to preferve and fupport the ufual relations of peace and amity; but a peace, concluded with an unftable government, muft itfelf be unftable. The peace, that did not promile to be permanent, was good for nothing. It was, farther, pregnant with disadvantage and danger. But no fecure and lafting peace could co-exift, with a fyftem of aggrelfion, aggrandizement, and univerfal deftruction: a fyftem that had been adopted and purfued in France from the commencement of the revolution; and from which it did not by any means appear, that the new chief, the first conful, Buonaparte, had at all departed. In

fuch circumftances, the only means of obtaining an honourable, fecure, and lafting peace, was, to profecute the war with vigour.-Such alfo were the fentiments of the great ally of Britain, the emperor of Germany.

Of the political fituation of Auftria, and the Germanic empire, in relation to France, we may form a tolerably juft idea from the circular letter of the archduke Charles, dated at Donaueschingen, the fourth of December, 1799, to the anterior circles of the empire, of which a tranflation here follows: It is from the impulfe of the most invincible neceffity, that I am induced to fpeak to you of an object, and of difpofitions, from whence there may arife the greatest detriments to the common caufe of Germany. I perceive, with regret, that the late events in France, through which the fupreme power has paffed into new hands, have revived the hope, already fo often deceived, of an approaching pacification; and that, on the firength of this premature fuppofition, an idea prevails that it

is not, for the prefent, neceffary to call on the princes and ftates of the empire for their contingents, and the discharge of the other duties they owe to the conftitution. A true German and patriotic heart, and an understanding enlightened by fo much fad experience, can never be led into fo great an error: an error, which would deprive us of the only means of concluding a fpeedy peace, on fair and proper terms, and fuch as might be folid and lafting. It would be wrong, for a moment, to lofe fight of the maxim, that the moft vigorous preparation for war is the fureft way to obtain peace. This we fhall acquire both the fooner, and on the better terms, if the enemy fhall fee that we are in a state for continuing the war, in case of his perfifting in an imperious tone, and pretending yet once more to prescribe a peace, accompanied with difgrace and flavery, or that fhould put it into his power to involve us in difgrace and flavery hereafter. We have been too often deceived by a precipitate hope of peace, on the part of France, to be lulled, by the late events, into a fleep of fallacious fecurity. It has been invariably found, that every new faction in France has talked a great deal about peace. The word peace has been always in their mouths, never in their hearts. By the plaufible af furances of peace they only aimed at drawing over public opinion to their fide, and acquiring popularity. They have uniformly commenced new wars. They have never fhewn a difpofition to make peace on equal terms. By peace, they mean nothing more than the extermination of their enemies.

The revolution of the ninth of

November, when closely contemplated, cannot, all at once, infpire full concedence in the new government. A part of the persons, into whofe hands the fupreme power has fallen, are the members of former councils, who, both by their profeffed principles, and the whole of their public conduct, have fworn eternal enmity and mortal hatred to all ftates not conftituted like their

own; feveral of which they have overthrown, and others of which, in the midft of perfect peace, they have perfidiously brought under their fubjection. Nor is the fpirit that reigns in the publications of France of the moft pacific nature. In thefe, it is often faid, that the late revolution has no other end in view, than to raife the republic to the rank which the ought to hold in the fcale of European nations. The old directory, in thofe writings, is cenfured, not for having made war on their neighbours, but for having made war unfuccefsfully; for not having made new conquefts, and for having loft provinces that had been before conquered. The French proclamations fet out always with a difcourfe about victory, and fpeak of peace only in the laft place; which fhews that they do not yet confider circumftances as fufficiently favourable for pacification; and that they have a mind, before the conclufion of peace, to try the chances of war. The minifter of war announces openly, that he is bufily employed in recruiting the army, and providing all things neceflary for its equipment and fupport. He adds, that he will join it himself, and fhare its dangers, as foon as the feafon will admit the opening of the campaign; and that he is preparing new [pretended] triumphs.

"In the warlike preparations of France, there has been no remiffion, that can induce the Germans to admit of any relaxation in theirs; on the contrary, a new military corps is to be formed in the four departments not united to the republic. But, even on the fuppoition, that there is no reafon for miftrufting the views and the projects of the new rulers of France, the late revolution is not yet fufficiently confirmed and confolidated to afford any reafonable affurance that it will not be overthrown as the others have been. On the whole, the prefent queftion is not concerning fuch a peace, as a convention for a fhort time, or an armiftice. The point in hand is, conditions of perfect fecurity; conditions demanded by honour, dignity, liberty, the integrity of the German empire, and the inviolability of the moft facred treaties.

The

object contended for, is a fit, juft, and permanent peace, according to the fenfe of the decifions of the diet; fuch as fhall fecure religion, property, civil order, and the conftitution of the German empire."

"I invite you to take all these objections into your moft ferious confideration, according to the fentiments of patriotifm with which you are infpired; and, having done fo, you will undoubtedly agree with me, that prudence imperiously demands that you do not fuffer your felves to be thrown into a state of inaction, by rumours of approaching peace, and more moderate principles; but to keep your arms in your hands, and to preferve a military attitude until peace be actually figned. You will perceive, as I do, how fatally imprudent it would be to let any languor creep into

measures of defence, and how ne ceffary it is to redouble our efforts for a due augmentation of the troops, and to accomplish, with the greatest activity, and, in the moft ferious manner, the renewed decifion of the diet, and the refolutions it entered into and confirmed, for the common defence: in order that we may have it in our power to oppose an energetic mals of efforts, to the views of the enemy, whatever they may be. It is only by an impofing military force that it is poffible to hinder the enemy from new attacks and devaftations; to fhorten or to terminate the evils of war; to improve the terms of pacification; and, in a word, to accelerate a peace worthy of the name, and to compenfate the multiplied facrifices by which, for fo long a time, we have endeavoured to procure it."

The court of Vienna fortified, as we have feen, by pecuniary fupplies from England, and the acceffion of Bavarians, Wirtemburgers, and other German troops in British pay, and mindful of both the paft and recent glory and conquefts of the Auftrian arms, was not to be fhaken or diverted from its refolution of perfevering in war, by the offer of a negociation for peace, by Buonaparte, on the general ground of the treaty of Campo Formio. The imperial minifters replied to the overtures of the firft conful, that the emperor would not negociate for peace, but in conjunction with his ally the king of Great Britain. Though the circles of the empire were not to be roused from that lethargic indifference to the common profperity and safety, into which, from the prevailing luxury and felfishnefs of the age, and the hope of fecurity and advan

tages

*

tages of fecret understandings with France and with Pruffia, they had fallen; the Auftrians, feconded by the English, prepared for military operations with great alacrity and vigour: notwithstanding the defection of the Ruffians, under marshal prince Suwarrow, and the oppofition of a powerful party at court in favour of peace on any tolerable terms; in which number was the archduke Charles, though he knew, as he declared, that it was only by prefenting an impofing military force, ready for action, that any tolerable terms of peace were to be expected. Nor were the military preparations of the French flackened, as is truly ftated in the archduke's letter, but more and more quickened, during the fhort period of the attempt at a negociation for peace with the Auftrians and English. The infurrections in the western departments, while they juftified military confcriptions and movements, to the greateft lovers of peace, were only a kind of a great military review and rendezvous for affembling and exercifing a vaft body of troops to be employed, as occafion might require, in any direction.

After the inftallation of the confuls, a ceremony which was performed with vaft pomp, at the Thuilleries, on the nineteenth of February, and the final reduction of the rebellion in the weft, announced to the French nation at the fame period, the first conful gave official notice of the rejection of of thofe overtures for peace, which he had tendered to different powers,

and particularly of their rejection by England. He addressed a proclamation, complaining of the obftinate determination of the English to continue the war, and inviting the French to furnish the fubfidies and men, that were neceffary for acquiring peace by force of arms, if it could not be regained by conciliatory meafures, of which, however, he faid, that he was not yet without fome hopes. It was also, at the fame time, decreed by the confuls, that an army of referve fhould be raifed, to confift of fixty thoufand men, compofed of confcripts, and to be affembled at Dijon, where the first conful himself was to take the command of it in perfon. The proclamation and decree of the firit conful were approved of by the legislative body and tribunate. A part of the new confular guard, amounting to thirtyfix thousand men, of the finest youth of France, received orders to hold themfelves in readinefs to march, on the twenty-fifth of March, to Dijon, to join the army of relerve, where different bodies of troops had already affembled. Bertier, minilter-at-war, was to accompany the general-in-chief, and the ex-director, Carnot, was to take charge of his department in his abfence. Bernadotte was allo appointed to be one of his lieutenant-generals.

While the French army of referve is drawing from different parts of France to Dijon, the great centre of military defign and operation, on the part of France, it will be proper to look back to the fitua