a blind to the enemy, he called the army of referve, though it was deftined to be the most active, at Dijon. From this central point he menaced at once Germany, Swit, zerland, and Italy; but thofe countries the most where his attack was not intended. The war in Germany he confided to the-ftrong army under Moreau, while he, with the army under his command, fhould go to reconquer Italy, the theatre of his moft fplendid victories. But the first object, in his present career, was to arrive in time to fave Genoa, and the unfortunate army of Maffena, which defended that place; the most important in all Italy, to be preserved or to be conquered.

The principal object and aim of the Auftrians, who, in the courfe of the laft campaign, had recovered

all that they had loft in Italy, was to keep the French armies, in Switzerland and on the Rhine, in play, while they fhould puth with all poffible vigour the fiege of Genoa : the poffeffion of which was alone wanting to render them complete mafters of all Italy. This object, which they confidered as now within their grafp, and foon to be accomplished, would have enabled them to bear with their whole united force on Switzerland, by the poffeffion of which, it would be in their power to force the French to keep on the defenfive, on the fide of the fouth as well as of the eaft. Such then, being the oppofite views of the two contending armies, it will be proper to begin our narrative of the campaign with the memorable fiege of Genoa.

CHAP.

AFTER FTER the brilliant campaign of Maffena, in Switzerland, he was judged by the firft conful to be the fittest man for taking the command of the difcomfited army of Championet. From Switzer land he came ftraight to Paris, to receive inftructions refpecting the difficult and painful tafk he had undertaken. He then proceeded through Lyons to Toulon and Marfeilles, in order to take measures for revictualling the army, and the city of Genoa. At Lyons, and in the fouth of France, he found the cavalry, with the heavy artillery, which had been fent back about the beginning of autumn, both becaufe forage was fearce, and as being of no great utility in the defence of a place environed by moun tains. He was not a little furprized at the wretched condition of thofe remains of the campaign of 1799, and ftill more when he came acquainted, at Toulon, with the negligence, and the roguery of the army contractors. There he made

fuch regulations as might remedy part of the evil. He made purchafes of grain and of fhoes, which he fent off, by fea, to his army. But when he was informed that general Champoniet had died, at Antibes, of the fame epidemic diftemper that raged in the army, he went immediately to Genoa, where he arrived on the ninth of February, and where he illued proclamations for, re-eftablishing confidence among the troops and the inhabitants of the city and territory of Genoa, all in a state of infurrection. He made fome examples of military juftice among the former, and fet himfelf to calm the latter, firft by modes of conciliation, but finaly by force, which he was obliged to employ against the revolted Ligu rian peafants. The army, which had been stated by the French minifter at fixty thousand men, was reduced to twenty-five thoufand, according to the account given of it by Maffena; and of thefe, according to the report of one of the [N2]

generals

generals who served under him, not above a half was fit for active duty. The horror, excited by the hospitals, was fuch, that not a few of the fick foldiers remained at their own quarters, and chofe rather to die there, then fuffer themselves to be carried into fuch a doleful and dreadful mansion. There were others who, no longer able to fupport themselves under multiplied and long continued privations,. threw themselves into the ftreets from their windows. The loffes were not lefs that arofe from defertion. Numbers of officers were to be feen, in fmall bodies, remain ing at their pofts alone, and abandoned by their men. Whole bodies of the foldiery went off without their commanders, and without orders; and there were general officers too who left the army, without taking leave or obtaining permillion. And thus, on the whole, according to the account of the general officer we have alluded to, and whole evidence is worthy of all report, the French army of Italy in the intermediate winter, between the campaigns of 1799 and 1800, loft, by fickness and desertion, near thirty thousand men.

In this fituation of affairs Maffena perceived the neceffity of new modelling his army. He fent back to France fome officers, and among thefe even fome general officers, on the pretext of recruiting. While he was under the neceffity of getting rid of fome of his generals, he called to Genoa others in their room, from the army of Italy, in whom he could confide, in which number was generals Soult, Audinot, Gazau, Thureau, and others.In the midft of that want and inanition in which the people and the

army vegetated in Liguria, what gave general Maffena particular pain, was his inability to throw provifions either into Gavi or Savona. But fome fhips laden with grain being arrived at Genoa, in the courfe of trade, on the twentyfirft of March, he loft no time to take advantage of this circumstance. He revictualled Gavi for three months, and repaired the works.

He next turned his attention to the state of the marine. He armed and fitted out fome privateers, for efcorting the convoys of provisions that were coming along the coast, and for bringing grain from Corfica. He alfo made feveral changes in the civil adminiftration of the Ligurian republic.

In the midft of general Maffena's efforts to palliate fo many irreparable evils, all of a fudden, and at once, the English fleet, under lord Keith, appeared, on the fifth of April, in the gulf, off Geroa, for the blockade of which it was drawn up in all the regular forms; while on the other hand the army of general Melas, approached close to the city by land, and extended its front along the whole line of the French army. The French generals themselves admit that the opening of the campaign, by general Melas, was entitled to the highest praife, on account of the address with which he concealed the immenfe force which he had in Italy. Being well acquainted with the weak ftate of the republican army, he contented himself, during the winter, with watching its movements, by means of a fimple and flight cordon; while he difpofed his own throughout Piedmont, Lombardy, the Venetian state, the Bolognese, the march of Ancona and Tulcany.

Thus

Thus divided, the Auftrian army had the appearance of weakness; but it poffeffed all the means of being easily recruited, and provided with all things neceffary for action. The reinforcements which it received, from time to time, during its long repofe, were in like manner dispersed over an immenfe extent of country, and were fcarcely to be perceived. On the whole, the French were perfuaded that it would be late in the feafon before the Auftrians could take the field. They even flattered themselves that they fhould be beforehand with the enemy, at the very time when the different corps, that were to compofe the Auftrian armies, were on their march to the general rendezvous. Cities, towns, and villages, all at once, as by a spontaneous movement, fent forth companies, regiments, and battalions, for the formation of an active army. In a few days, general Melas was enabled to affemble ten thousand men before Bobbio, ten thoufand in front of Tortona, thirty thoufand at Acqui and Alexandria, to advance with this great force against Maffena, and, at the fame time, to leave behind him, in the plains of Piedmont, the whole of his cavalry, a fine park of artillery, and twenty thoufand infantry. The aftonifhment, excited by all these circumstances, was great and univerfal. Maffena adopted the only measure that was prudent and practicable in his fituation. He contracted his lines; he formed masses, which, though altogether difproportioned to the numerous bodies to which they were oppofed, might yet make an impreffion, and divide the enemy, by darting upon them at points favourable to an attack, and obtaining different advantages,

according to local circumftances, and the genius and combinations of the chief commander. But the divifions of his army being extended on a line of fixty miles, to draw them clofe together was a very difficult matter.

The bufinefs of covering the city of Genoa was undertaken by Maffena himfelf, at the head of one of his divifions; but the right wing of general Melas's army, which bore principally on Vado and Savona, took Vado on the second day of the fiege, and, by this movement, ifolated the right wing of the army under the orders of Maffena.

It will here be proper, before entering more particularly into the fiege of Genoa, to give fome account of the manner in which the army of Genoa, being the right wing of the French army of Italy, was compofed, and alfo of the dif ferent points or pofts in which the different divifions were ftationed.— The commander-in-chief of this army was Maffena. His head-quar ters were at Genoa. The officers of his ftaff were as follows: Audinot, general of divifion, was the firft general of the staff; major-general Ardneux, adjutant-general.

Thiebault, Reille, Gautier, and Campana, adjutants-general, employed by the commander-in-chief. Degiovani, Ottovi, and Neroo, adjutants-general, employed by the

staff.