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Notices of New Books.

tricts, having been recently set out by a commission with reference to the distribution of the population, the situation of towns, roads, railways, and other considerations of public convenience, it appears reasonable to adopt them in further localising the administration of any branch of the law; nor is it probable that the public would endure another set of local courts, with different and extremely inconvenient districts.

“Another paragraph in Sir Fitzroy Kelly's letter calls for notice from me:

"At length he (Sir Richard Bethell) and I met, and by an amalgamation of his measure and mine we framed and agreed upon a bill which (except upon a single point, on which I doubt not that, if his overwhelming occupations would have allowed him to give me one hour before the night when the bill was to have gone into committee, we should have been perfectly reconciled) would have been accepted almost unanimously by both Houses of Parliament, and would have entirely satisfied the country.'

"The amended bill was not altogether an amalgamation of the bills of Sir Richard Bethell and Sir Fitzroy Kelly; but on the very important question of the county courts jurisdiction (to which Sir Fitzroy Kelly makes no allusion in his letter), Sir Richard Bethell adopted substantially the provisions of my bill, as appears by the 106th and following sections and the schedule of his amended bill.

"Sir Richard Bethell, Sir Fitzroy Kelly, and myself, met and discussed the three bills. The result of the discussion was, that Sir Richard Bethell expressed his concurrence in the view entertained by both Sir Fitzroy Kelly and myself, that the procedure should be as far as possible that of common law. As to the mode of providing for the local jurisdiction, however, he inclined to my view, and afterwards adopted it. In his speech on the subject (June 26, 1856), as reported in 'Hansard,' he thus expresses himself: He proposed to introduce a provision for the purpose not only of giving county courts authority to entertain contentious suits, where the property did not exceed £300, but also to entertain suits for the administration of estates which did not exceed a similar amount. He was indebted for this suggestion to his honourable and learned friend (Mr. Collier); and the house would agree with him that this would be an improvement in the law with regard to the proof of wills; and that the great considerations of convenience, accessibility, and cheapness would be very much promoted by having a tribunal in which small estates not exceeding £300 might be readily administered and divided among the parties entitled, whether as creditors or legatees.'

"I have dwelt upon this subject because I consider the county courts jurisdiction one of the most important elements of this question. Although I am opposed to extending the jurisdiction of those courts to matters of great importance or amount, I would give them jurisdiction as far as possible over all disputes of whatever description where the amount in dispute is small.

"I may notice one other provision in which Sir Fitzroy Kelly's bill differed both from that of Sir Richard Bethell and mine: the former proposed to retain the monopoly of the proctors in the common form business (changing their name to attorneys'); the two latter to abolish it.

"Sir Fitzroy Kelly, agreeing as he does with me that the proposition to transfer the jurisdiction to common law is good in principle,' I think somewhat

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over estimates the force of the impediment which he believes to be opposed to this good principle by the reluctance of the judges to entertain the jurisdiction.

The number of disputed testameutary causes tried annually in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury is, I believe, little more than forty-probably as many may be tried in the other ecclesiastical courts throughout the kingdom; if these, however, were transferred to common law they would not be necessarily additional causes, for while a judge and jury are trying the competency of a testator to dispose of his realty, the ecclesiastical courts are often trying the same question as to his personalty. In such cases, to transfer the jurisdiction from Doctors'commons to Westminster-hall would be merely to unite two parts of a cause which never ought to have been separated,

"I have great difficulty in believing that while a commission is inquiring into the expediency of reducing the number of the common law judges, on the alleged ground that they have not sufficient employment for their time, they should object to entertain this jurisdiction. Indeed, the question is not whether their jurisdiction should be extended or left as it is, but whether that which they now possess to try the validity of wills disposing of realty by ejectment or otherwise should be taken from them and transferred to a new court.

"It seems to me a question well deserving of the consideration of the society, whether, if jurisdiction over small properties of deceased persons were conferred upon the county court judges, aided by registrars, the higher class of testamentary business might not be transacted by the common law judges, assisted by a metropolitan registrar with a competent staff. Whether the jurisdiction should be given to all the courts or to one of them, say the Common Pleas, or to a certain number of the judges sitting as a separate court, are questions comparatively of detail, which I will not now discuss."

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Practice of Courts of Justice in England and the United States. BY CONWAY ROBINSON. Volume I. As to the Place and Time of a Transaction or Proceeding, treating chiefly of the Conflict of Laws and the Statute of Limitations. Richmond, Virginia, 1854. A. Morris. pp. 677.

search and although the author, an American, Tis is a work of great learning and retreats mainly of the law and practice of America, the volume is well entitled to a place in the law libraries of this country.

It is described in the title-page as "The Practice of Courts of Justice;" but it treats of the law as administered in those courts; and the following general subjects comprehended in the volume will shew the extensive nature of its contents:

1. Of Fugitives from Justice, and Slaves going to a State where Slavery is not allowed.

2. Non-resident Guardian, Committee or Trustee, and Bail.

3. Private Wrongs.

4. Contracts.

5. Marriage and Divorce.

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10. War and Aliens.

11. Suits of Foreign Sovereigns and Corporations. 12. Parties; Assignees, Administrators, and Heirs. 13. When and how Suit may be brought; and how defended.

14. Proceedings to operate beyond the State. 15. In what County or Corporation and in what Tribunal to sue.

16. Contracts and Proceedings on Sunday. 17. Computation of Time.

18. Relation of Client and Attorney.

19. Time for bringing Personal Actions generally. Mr. Conway Robinson, in his preface, thus explains the object and design of his learned labours, which we trust he will be able at an early period to complete.

"I have been preparing the present work upon a plan to make it useful elsewhere as well as in Virginia-considering that what is the basis of the practice in the English courts of justice is the basis of the practice in nearly all the states of North America, quite as much, or almost as much, as in Virginia. Here the common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principles of the bill of rights and constitution of the state, continues in full force and is the rule of decision, except in those respects wherein it is altered by the general assembly. Here, also, the right and benefit of all writs, remedial and judicial, given by any statute or act of Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the 4th year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, not local to England, are still saved so far as the same may consist with the bill of rights and constitution of this state and the acts of assembly.

"In many matters of great and general interest, there is a like practice in the courts of justice in England and in most of the states of this Union. This work, in treating of that practice, will shew how far it is founded on the common law or affected by statute. It will also set forth whatever there may be peculiar to the practice in Virginia; preserving of the former work all that is of value, and presenting in all matters of practice a view of the Virginia statutes and decisions to the period of this publication.

"The investigation required for such a work is, in a measure, limited by my library. This, however, enables me to examine quite a regular series of the reported decisions of the English courts, of the supreme and circuit courts of the United States, and the state courts of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana, and some of Texas, Mississippi, and other states.

"When I think of the time and labour expended on the present volume, and consider that this is but the beginning of the work, I am at times discouraged by the magnitude of the undertaking. It must treat of the causes for which personal actions may be maintained, the parties, pleadings and evidence, as well as the proceedings generally therein from the commencing to the final process; the proceedings in suits for land, in other civil cases at law, in cases before courts of probate and other cases of a miscellaneous nature; the cases for equitable jurisdiction,

the rules for the limitation thereof, the parties pleadings, and proceedings therein; and the proceedings in criminal causes."

From the contents of this first volume we select the following disquisition on the relation of client, counsel, and attorney-topics which are at all times interesting to the profession, and peculiarly so at the present time.

"1. Rule in England as to an attorney.

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"It has been said that an attorney cannot sue for his bill till the business which he has been retained in, is terminated (1 Sid. 31). In the report in Siderfin no facts are stated to explain the decision of the court. It may be that the attorney on the very day of the assizes deserted the conduct of the cause, giving his client neither time nor opportunity to obtain other professional assistance; if so, the decision was proper (9 Bingh. 402). The next case is Mordecai v. Solomon (Sayer 172). There, the court observes, that where an attorney had commenced a suit upon the credit of a client he ought to proceed in it, although the client did not bring him money every time he applied for it; for aught tha appears the conduct of the attorney might have bee, such as it is supposed to have been in the precedin case in Siderfin (9 Bingh. 402). It is, however mentioned by Lord Eldon that the Court of Common Pleas, when he was there, held that an attorney having quitted his client before trial could not bring an action for his bill (14 Ves. 273). Tindal, C. J., infers that the attorney must have deserted his client suddenly, and have left him unprepared to act for himself (9 Bingh. 402). Then there is the case of Rownson v. Earle, (4 C. and P. 45; 19 Eng. Com. Law. Rep. 266); in which Lord Tenterden held that an attorney who had given notice that he would not go on with a cause in the Court of Chancery without being supplied with money, had a right to desist from it, and might recover for the work done up to that time (9 Bingh. 402). In a case in which all the business charged for ended in April, and the client had from June been repeatedly applied to and apprised of the attorney's resolution, the Court of Common Pleas sustained an action commenced in October: being unwilling to say that he was not justified in refusing to proceed further (Vansandau, fc., v. Browne, 9 Bingh. 402; 23 Eng. Com. Law. Rep. 315).

"My notion of the rule,' says Bayley, B., 'is that an attorney has a right to call upon the client from time to time, on reasonable notice, to make advances, and for the purpose of taking the cause to trial, to supply him with adequate funds, not to pay his costs, but the expenses out of pocket.' He is not entitled arbitrarily to abandon a cause at any stage of it he may think fit, and insist on payment of his bill up to that time; but if he has good ground he may do so and may recover the amount of his bill (Wadsworth v. Marshall, &c., 2 Cr. and Jer. 665). When, however, he desires to quit his client, he must give him reasonable notice. Although an attorney who undertakes a cause is not bound, at all events, to proceed with it if he is not supplied with funds, yet an attorney who has undertaken a defence with a view to trial, cannot abandon it on the eve of the assizes without giving his client a reasonable opportunity of resorting to other assistance (Hoby v. Burit, 3 Barn. and Ald. 350; 23 Eng. Com. Law. Rep. 91). "I am not aware,' says Alderson, B., 'that there is any case in which it has been held that an attorney

Notices of New Books-Law of Costs.

without reasonable notice, can sustain an action for part of his bill (Harris, &c., v. Osborne, 2 C. M. and R. 638). When an attorney is retained to prosecute or defend a cause, I consider, says Lord Lyndhurst, that he enters into a special contract to carry it on to its termination. I do not mean to say that under no circumstances can he put an end to this contract; but it cannot be put an end to without notice' (ld. 632.) The cases,' Baron Parke observes, ' may be explained either upon the supposition that this is to be treated as a general contract, or upon the supposition that it is a special contract to carry on the suit to its termination, subject to be put an end to on reasonable notice. In ancient times it was considered as an entire contract of which the attorney could not divest himself by any means; but in consequence of the increased expenses of suits in modern times the rule has been varied, and the attorney is at liberty to determine the contract on reasonable notice. The contract of the client is to pay at the completion of the suit; and unless the contract be defeated by reasonable notice, the attorney has no cause of action' (ld. 632, 3). Where the cause in which the attorney was retained was discontinued by him without previous notice to his client, and without his shewing why he had not proceeded in it, the attorney's action for work and labour in the cause resulted in a verdict for the defendant (Nicholls v. Wilson, 11 M. and W. 106).

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"2. Rule in England as to counsel.

"A bill of a counsellor-at-law against a solicitor for fees was (on demurrer) dismissed in the fifth year of Charles the First (Moor v. Row, 1 Ch. Rep. 38). Can it be thought,' said Lord Hardwicke, that this court will suffer a gentleman of the bar to maintain an action for fees?' (2 Atk. 332.) The Roman orators practised gratis, for honour merely, or at most for the sake of gaining influence; and so likewise,' observes Sir William Blackstone, it is established with us that a counsel can maintain no action for his fees; which are given not as locatio vel conductio, but as quiddam honorarium; not as a salary or hire, but as a mere gratuity which a counsellor cannot demand without doing wrong to his reputation' (3 Bl. Com. 28).

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are seldom heard at the bar. They practise strictly as attorneys, and to apply the rule of the Roman law to them would be a perversion of it. Yet Mooney v. Lloyd would have done it; and the decision in Gray v. Breckenridge, by which it was overruled, seems to be as deeply seated in justice as it is in legal analogy' (Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts, 338).

"In Pennsylvania an attorney is not at liberty to vex his client with an action for each item of service the instant it is rendered; his right to sue is not necessarily postponed till judgment is had; nor does it then necessarily arise, especially where money is to be collected or the judgment is to be enforced by further proceedings. It may,' adds Gibson, C. J., 'be his duty to expedite an execution and attend to the thousand and one matters usually connected with it' (Id. 339).

"4. Rule in New York.

"An interesting opinion upon the relation between the client and his advocate, as it was under the institutions of Rome, and as it is England, Scotland, and France, has been delivered in New York by Chancellor Walworth (26 Wend. 452). In that state the notion that fees of counsel are merely honorary, like those of a barrister or serjeant in England, is not recognised (Stevens, &c., v. Adams, 23 Wend. 57). 'Where,' says Chancellor Walworth, a party employs counsel and agrees to give him a specific allowance for his services, or to pay him what those services shall be reasonably worth,' if compensation be not made according to the agreement, the counsel has a legal right to sue and recover such compensstion (Adams v. Stephens, &c., 26 Wend. 457. "5. Statutes of Virginia.

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"Formerly the lawyers of this state were prohibited from taking, before the suits they were employed in were finally determined, any greater fees for their services than were expressed in the act of assembly (1 R. C. 1819, p. 270, ch. 76, § 14)a This act subjected to a penalty a lawyer taking greater fee or reward before he had performed the service or finished the suit (Id.). And it further provided that no lawyer, in a suit to be brought for his fees or services, should recover more than those fees, notwithstanding any agreement, contract, or

"3. In Pennsylvania distinction between attorney and obligation made or entered into by the party against

counsel, as to claim for fees, abolished. "Considering that the law as laid down in this passage of Blackstone was brought by our ancestors with them when they emigrated from England, and had not since been altered, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at one time held that an action could not be supported by a gentleman of the bar against his client, for advice and services in the trial of a cause, over and above the attorney's fees allowed by act of assembly (Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. and R. 412). This case has been since overruled (Gray v. Breckenridge, &c., 2 Penrose and Watts, 75).

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It is,' says Gibson, C. J., hard to imagine a principle of policy that would forbid compensation for services in a profession which is now as purely a calling as any mechanical art.' It is known to every member of the bar how narrow is the compass of his duties as an advocate. His most constant and effective efforts are made in the preparatory stages; and his agency in directing the process of execution is an invaluable one. In fact, a substantial if not a preponderating portion of professional business never finds its way to the ear of the judges at all; and there are many gentlemen in honourable and lucrative practice who

whom such suit shall be brought, if such agreement, contract, or obligation shall have been entered into before the suits in which such fees shall have accrued, or services been rendered, were finally determined (Id. § 15). This was altered by the act of 1839, 40, p. 44, ch. 50, § 2; in accordance with which the Code provides as follows:

"An attorney shall be entitled as a fee to the amount which the clerk is authorised to tax in the bill of costs, in any suit, or for any service as such attorney. But any contract made with an attorney for other or higher fees shall be valid and may be enforced, in like manner with any other contract. Code, p. 636, ch. 164, § 11."

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Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association.

appoint, in case they could not agree-the costs of the cause to abide the event of, the action, and the costs of the reference and award to abide the event of the award. The arbitrators found all the issues joined in the action for the plaintiff, and that he was entitled to recover in such action the sum of £80 14s. 11d., and as to the matters in difference between the said parties other than those in the said action they found that there was due from the plaintiff to the defendant the sum of £6, and they directed that the defendant should pay the plaintiff the balance within ten days from the date of the award.

Upon a rule to review the master's decision disallowing the plaintiff's costs of the reference and award, Cresswell, J., said "The arbitrator has pronounced two distinct decisions-in favour of the plaintiff so far as the action is concerned,-in favour of the defendant as to the matters in difference. Neither party is entitled to the costs of the reference." -Gribble v. Buchanan, 18 Com. B. 691.

METROPOLITAN AND PROVINCIAL LAW ASSOCIATION.

ON THE LAW REFORMS OF LAST SESSION.

IT has been our business and duty from week to week during every session of Parliament to notice the alterations in the law, either proposed or carried, and at the close of each session to sum up the results. As different counsel take various views of the same case, and as the profession cannot be too well informed of the nature and effect of recent enactments, it may not be inappropriate to notice the summary of the labours of Parliament in the last session, as recorded by the managing committee of the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association in their 9th circular just issued. We propose, therefore, to make some extracts relating to the most prominent statutes that received the Royal Assent.

The committee observe that :

"The acts which were passed affecting the practice of the law are not mauy in number, nor, with some exceptions, very important in their character.

"Among the more important Government measures which have ripened into law, may be mentioned the acts relating to Joint Stock Companies, Mercantile Law Amendment, County Courts Amendment, Leases and Sales of Settled Estates, and the General Police.

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By the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, seven or more persons, associated for any lawful purpose, except banking or insurance, may form themselves into an incorporated company, with, or without, limited liability; and if any number of persons exceeding twenty carry on business without being registered as a company under this act (unless they are authorised by private act, charter, or letters patent), each of them is separately liable for the whole debts of the partnership.

"The effect of registration confers on the company all the advantages of a body corporate.

"If companies of less than seven shareholders (either originally or by reduction), carry on business, for a period of six months, every shareholder becomes separately liable for the whole of the debts contracted, during the time business is so conducted.

"The business relating to winding up is divided between the Courts of Chancery and Bankruptcy, and the act contains a number of provisions on this point. Limited companies registered in England (except those within the jurisdiction of the Stannaries Court), are to be wound up in the Court of Bankruptcy, subject to such rules as the commissioners may make.

"Other companies are to be wound up in the Court of Chancery, under a new procedure to be formed by the Lord Chancellor. And a company may he wound up by the court, when a resolution for that object has been passed at a general meeting; when a company does not commence business within a year from its incorporation, or suspends its business for the same period; when the shareholders are reduced below seven; when the company cannot pay its debts (and a company is to be deemed unable to pay when a creditor for £50 or upwards has given a notice requiring payment, and the company has neglected for three weeks to pay, or to secure, the debt); when a judgment, decree, or order, is returned unsatisfied; or when three-fourths of the capital of the company have been lost, or become unavailable (sects. 67, 68). There are circumstances, however, under which a company may be wound up voluntarily. These are, when

the period fixed for the duration of the company has expired; or when any event happens, upon the occurrence of which it is provided by the constitution of the company that it is to be dissolved; or when a general meeting of the company has passed a resolution requiring a voluntary winding up (sec. 102).

"When a company is to be wound up, "official liquidators," payable by a per centage, are to be appointed by the court; their principal duties are to assist the court, and to take possession of all property, effects, and choses in action of the company, and to perform any other duties imposed by the court. They are empowered to bring or defend actions and suits; to carry on the business of the company; to sell real and personal property, moveable effects, and choses in action; to execute all deeds; to draw bills; and, generally, to do all things necessary for winding up the company, and distributing its assets. They are, also, authorised, in the performance of their duties, to engage the assistance of a solicitor who is to be paid such fees as the court may direct (secs. 88 to 91 inclusive).

"All commissioners in bankruptcy, and all county court judges (except the London commissioners, and the metropolitan county court judges), are to be commissioners for receiving evidence under the act; and every such commissioner is to have the same powers of summoning and examining witnesses, and requiring production and delivery of documents, and punishing defaults, and allowing costs, as the court which made the order for winding up possesses (sec. 101).

"On one portion of the act it is difficult to put a construction, namely, the provisions as to insurance companies.

"Section 2 enacts, 'That this act shall not apply to persons associated together for the purpose of banking or insurance.'

"Section 107 repeals the former joint stock acts of the 8 Vic. c. 110; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 78, and the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133 (Limited Liability Act, 1855), but provides that 'such repeal shall not take effect with respect to any company completely registered under the said act of the eighth year of her present

Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association.

Majesty, until such company has obtained registration under this act, as hereinafter-mentioned.'

"Section 110 enacts, that every company completely registered under the said act of the eighth year of the reign of her present Majesty, c. 110, shall on or before the third day of November, 1856, and any other company duly constituted by law previously to the passing of this act, and consisting of seven or more shareholders, may, at any time hereafter, register itself as a company under this act, with or without limited liability, subject to this proviso, that no company shall be registered under this act as a limited company, unless either a certificate of complete registration with limited liability, under the " Limited Liability Act, 1855," has been obtained by it, or an assent to its being so registered has been given by three-fourths in number and value of such of its shareholders as may have been present, personally or by proxy, in cases where proxies are allowed by the regulations of the company, at some general meeting summoned for that purpose.'

"Now it will be seen that the new act deprives new insurance companies of the benefit of the Joint Stock Companies Act (8 Vic. c. 110), for it repeals that act except as to companies completely registered under that act; and it provides no substitute, for it is expressly declared that the new act shall not apply to insurance companies. There is, therefore, no legal authority under which new companies for the purpose of insurance can now be formed, so as to have the legal incidents of a corporation, except by letters patent under the 1st Vic. c. 73, or by the troublesome and expensive process of obtaining a private act, or a charter from the Crown.

"A deed of arrangement may, indeed, be resorted to, but this would subject the members of the company to the liability of a private commercial speculation, every partner being severally responsible for the acts of his co-partners.

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"And with respect to insurance companies already completely registered, there is a difference of opinion on the construction of the act. It is contended by some that every company' registered under the 8 Vict. c. 110, including insurance associations, must be registered in November next under the new act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 47); whilst others maintain that inasmuch as it is expressly declared that the act shall not apply to insurance companies, and because companies intended to be registered under it may be registered with or without limited liability,' and insurance companies must remain unlimited in liability, they cannot be registered under it. also maintained that as it is declared, It is that the repeal of the former acts shall not take effect with respect to any company completely registered under the said act of the 8th of her present Majesty until such company has obtained registration under this act,' insurance companies completely registered will continue effectually registered under the former act. The doubt, however, cannot be set at rest until the meeting of Parliament, or until the courts express an opinion on the subject.

"In June, 1853, a commission was appointed to inquire and ascertain how far the mercantile laws of the different parts of the United Kingdom might be advantageously assimilated. In 1855, the commissioners made a report, in which it is mentioned that the commissioners, in order to obtain information on the subject, had prepared a statement showing a considerable number of the differences between the

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mercantile laws prevailing in different parts of the United Kingdom, and caused such statement to be printed and circulated amongst legal and mercantile men, requesting them to point out any other differences which might occur to them, and any practical inconvenience which they had known to arise from existing differences. The papers so circulated, and the answers received, are printed in an appendix to the report; and in order to present a connected view of the more important of those differences, a statement of them is also printed in another appendix to the report.

"The information collected under this commission has produced the act to amend the laws of England and Ireland, affecting trade and commerce, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97. Its object is to do away with the inconvenience felt by persons engaged in trade, from the laws of England and Ireland differing from the laws of Scotland.

"It provides that, for the future, no judgment or execution against the goods of a debtor shall prejudice the title of a bona fide purchaser of such goods before their attachment, if the person had not notice that a writ had been delivered and remained unexecuted in the hands of the under-sheriff (sec. 1).

delivery of goods sold, the jury, if they find for the "In actions for breach of contract for the specific goods to which he is entitled, and what damages he plaintiff, shall declare specifically what are the has sustained; and power is given to the court to option of retaining the goods upon paying their order the delivery, without giving the defendant the value and the extra damages recovered (sec. 2).

"After the passing of the act, no special promise in writing, to be security for another party, shall be invalid from the fact that the consideration for such promise does not appear on the instrument or in writing; and no guarantee given to, or for, a firm, is to be binding after a change has taken place in one or more of the persons constituting the firm, unless an intention that such promise shall continue to be binding, shall appear (sec. 4).

"A surety who discharges a debt or liability, is to be entitled to the benefit of all securities which shall be held by the creditor in respect of such debt; and may call for assignment thereof (sec. 5).

"No acceptance of any bill of exchange, either inland or foreign, made after December, 1856, shall be binding on any person, unless the acceptance be in writing on such bill, or if there be more than one part of such bill, on one of the said parts, and signed by the acceptor or his agent (sec. 6).

"With reference to claims for repairs done, or supplies furnished, to ships, every port in the United Kingdom, the islands of Guernsey, Man, Jersey, Alderney, and Sark, shall be deemed a home port (sec. 8).

"All actions on merchants' accounts shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action has arisen (sec. 9).

"No person is to be entitled to any additional time within which to sue, on account of his absence in foreign parts, or of imprisonment (sec. 10).

"This act does not, however, embrace all the alterations recommended by the commissioners, and Mr. Anderson, Q. C., one of the commissioners, alludes, in an appendix to the report, to many points in which our mercantile law might be simplified and improved.

"The next act to be noticed is that for amending

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